The Economics of Tort Law
Publication Title
The Elgar Companion to Law and Economics
Year
2005
Abstract
Economic analysis has long been employed for the study of tort liability. This paper revisits the main contributions to the subject emphasizing the inherent impossibility for tort liability to set perfectly efficient first-best incentives to take precaution for all parties to an accident and the need to choose among second best outcomes. The paper provides a pathfinder through the literature in various areas of tort law and economics.
Recommended Citation
Giuseppe Dari-Mattiacci & Francesco Parisi, The Economics of Tort Law, in The Elgar Companion to Law and Economics 87-102 (Jurgen Backhaus, ed., Edward Elgar, 2d ed., 2005)
Archival Statement
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