Two Dimensions of Regulatory Competition
Publication Title
International Review of Law and Economics
Volume
26
Page
56
Year
2006
Abstract
This paper recasts current theories of regulatory or legislative competition. Building on the recent contribution of Buchanan and Yoon (2000) [Buchanan, J., & Yoon, R. Symmetric tragedies: Commons and anticommons. The Journal of Law and Economics, 43(1), 1–14], we consider alternative ways in which decision-making competence can be allocated among multiple legislative or administrative bodies. The general model is used to consider the equilibria obtained under different allocations of competence and to formulate some policy considerations.
Recommended Citation
Francesco Parisi, Norbert Schulz, and Jonathan Klick, Two Dimensions of Regulatory Competition, 26 Int'l Rev. L. & Econ. 56 (2006), available at https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/faculty_articles/776.
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