Publication
Maryland Law Review
Volume
83
Page
653
Year
2024
Abstract
The United States has a mostly decentralized system for promoting new medicine development. By offering patents and regulatory exclusivities, the government incentivizes pharmaceutical companies to invent and bring to market new medicines. Although this development model offers benefits for promoting innovation, it comes at a cost: Market-based incentives lead companies to prioritize research and development (“R&D”) for medicines that offer a safe path to profitability, as opposed to those that offer the greatest social benefit. In particular, pharmaceutical companies are reluctant to invest in R&D for critically-needed antibiotics and infectious disease vaccines—both of which are difficult to develop and provide uncertain financial returns. This Article proposes that the government oversee the development of needed “infrastructure-adjacent medicines”— medicines that can help prevent future collapses of the public healthcare system and mitigate major economic harm. In addition to boosting internal R&D in such critical areas, the government could directly support innovation by exclusively licensing promising drug candidates from small- to mid-sized entities or by purchasing small biotechnology companies on the open market. When suitable private partners are not available, the government could oversee the final stages of development and retain control over the resulting intellectual property rights. This approach would allow private-sector pharmaceutical development to continue to flourish while filling a critical public health gap.
Recommended Citation
Sapna Kumar, Centralizing Pharmaceutical Innovation, 83 Maryland Law Review 653 (2024)
