Deterring Innovation: New York v. Actavis and the Duty to Subsidize Competitors' Market Theory

Joanna M. Shepherd, Emory University School of LawFollow

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Joanna M. Shepherd, Deterring Innovation: New York v. Actavis and the Duty to Subsidize Competitors' Market Theory, 17 Minn. J.L. Sci. & Tech. 663 (2016).
Available at: https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/mjlst/vol17/iss2/2

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Minnesota Journal of Law, Science & Technology

Deterring Innovation: New York v. Actavis and the Duty to Subsidize Competitors' Market Theory

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