Publication
Review of Law and Economics
Volume
6
Page
219
Year
2010
Abstract
Comparative causation is the only tort regime that allows parties to share an accident loss in equilibrium. The sharing of an accident loss between a nonnegligent injurer and his nonnegligent victim spreads activity level and R&D incentives between prospective tortfeasors and their victims. This is an effect that is never observed under the other negligence and strict liability based regimes. In spite of these interesting attributes, the existing literature left open the question as to whether loss sharing was able to maintain optimal care incentives for both parties. In this paper, we address this unresolved issue in the literature, considering the effciency of loss-sharing under comparative causation.
Recommended Citation
Francesco Parisi and Ram Singh, The Efficiency of Comparative Causation, 6 219 (2010), available at https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/faculty_articles/709.
