Abstract
In Trump v. Anderson, 144 S. Ct. 662 (2024), the Supreme Court of the United States held that the Colorado Supreme Court erred in excluding former President Donald J. Trump from the Republican Party’s primary ballot in the state. The Court reasoned that the Constitution makes Congress, not the states, solely responsible for enforcing Section 3 of the Fourteenth Amendment. Scholars of Section 3 have persuasively argued that Section 3 is self-executing, so the Court’s rationale lacks a sound basis in the original or contemporary meaning of the text of the Civil War Amendments, the original intent of their drafters, or the Court’s own precedent interpreting them. This Article nonetheless argues that the Court’s judgment is justifiable on structural grounds identified in the author’s recent book, The Collective-Action Constitution (2024). As envisioned in McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819), the Constitution’s federal structure bars states from enforcing Section 3 against candidates for President or Vice President, at least if they enjoy substantial support within their own political party. More than two centuries ago, McCulloch articulated a structural principle that disables states from causing multistate collective-action problems by interfering with a function of the national governing process. That structural, collective-action principle extends in parallel fashion to actions by states that interfere excessively with a function of the national political process. The Presidency, along with the Vice Presidency, is a uniquely national office because all states, and all voters in states, play a role in determining who will run for that office and ultimately occupy it. Just as “a part” may not tax “the whole” because the whole is not represented in the part, so a part may not make presidential eligibility decisions that significantly undermine the capacity of the whole to determine who will represent it in the White House. Legal scholars can justly criticize much of the Court’s reasoning in Trump v. Anderson, but not the result that it reached.
Volume
39
Issue
2
Page
219
Year
2024
Recommended Citation
Neil S. Siegel,
Narrow but Deep: The McCulloch Principle, Collective-Action Theory, and Section Three Enforcement,
39
Const. Comment.
219
(2024).
Available at:
https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/const-comment/vol39/iss2/3
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