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Eva Stensvad
Ralph F. Hall

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Left to Their Own Devices: IOM's Medical Device Committee's Failure to Comply

Eva Stensvad* & Ralph F. Hall**

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* Eva Stensvad received her J.D. in 2011 from the University of Minnesota Law School. She received an M.D. in 2007 from Northwestern University Feinberg School of Medicine and a B.A. in 2003 from Northwestern University.

** Ralph F. Hall, J.D., serves as Distinguished Professor and Practitioner at the University of Minnesota Law School where he concentrates on FDA and compliance subjects. He is also Counsel to Faegre Baker Daniels and serves as CEO of MR3 Medical, LLC.
I. INTRODUCTION

The U.S. medical device market is the largest in the world.1 It has been estimated at $105.8 billion in 2011, and seven of the world’s ten largest device manufacturers are U.S. companies.2 However, the industry is in the midst of major change. In 2009, the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) launched a comprehensive review of one of its major pathways for devices to enter the market—the 510(k) clearance process.3 As part of this review, the FDA assembled a number of internal working groups, held public meetings, and commissioned the Institute of Medicine (IOM) to assemble a committee to conduct its own independent evaluation of the 510(k) system.4 In early 2011, the FDA released its recommendations for approximately twenty-five changes it plans to implement.5 There were seven additional issues, however, that the FDA recognized as being especially problematic.6 The FDA deferred taking actions on these particular issues, instead referring them to the IOM committee for evaluation.7

The IOM is the “health arm of the National Academy of Sciences,” which together with the National Academy of Engineering and National Research Council form the National

2. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id. at 3; U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., PLAN OF ACTION FOR IMPLEMENTATION OF 510(K) AND SCIENCE RECOMMENDATIONS 1 (2011) [hereinafter FDA, PLAN OF ACTION], available at http://www.fda.gov/downloads/AboutFDA/CentersOffices/CDRH/CDRReports/UCM239450.pdf.
6. FDA, 510(K) AND SCIENCE REPORT RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 3, at 2.
7. Id.
Academies. Its mission is to serve as an advisor to the federal government. As such, it is heavily involved in policy analysis and recommendations. In fact, most of its work comes from Congress or federal agencies. The IOM’s reputation for distinguished experts, robust analyses, and fair processes lead to its recommendations being heavily relied upon by government officials and other stakeholders. Thus, the IOM is highly influential in shaping public policy.

The IOM’s powerful status creates a responsibility to ensure that its processes are fair, objective, and inclusive. Unlike traditional federal advisory committees, IOM committees that advise federal agencies are subject to few legal requirements. For example, they do not have to publish notice of meetings in the Federal Register, may deliberate in private, do not require monitoring by federal officials, and do not need to release for public comment their recommendations before issuing them in final form. Additionally, the IOM alone determines who is appointed to each committee. However, like advisory committees, IOM committees are required to be “fairly balanced . . . for the functions to be performed.” A committee that is not fairly balanced lacks the essential expertise and perspectives to adequately fulfill its functions. Such a committee’s recommendations may thus be incomplete or ill-informed. Additionally, the committee risks actual or perceived bias, threatening stakeholder acceptance of its recommendations. To avoid relying on

9. See COMM. ON THE PUB. HEALTH EFFECTIVENESS OF THE FDA 510(K) CLEARANCE PROCESS, PUBLIC HEALTH EFFECTIVENESS OF THE FDA 510(K) CLEARANCE PROCESS iv (Theresa Wizemann ed. 2010) [hereinafter PUBLIC HEALTH EFFECTIVENESS OF THE FDA 510(K) CLEARANCE PROCESS], available at http://books.nap.edu/openbook.php?record_id=12960&page=R1 (“The Institute acts under the responsibility given to the National Academy of Sciences by its congressional charter to be an adviser to the federal government . . . .”).
10. See About the IOM, supra note 8.
11. Cf. id. (discussing the IOM’s stellar reputation and work with Congress and federal agencies).
14. Id. § 15(b)(1).
15. Id.
such an unbalanced committee, federal law prohibits the FDA from using any report issued by a committee that lacks fair balance.  

This Article contends that, while the IOM is generally an invaluable policy resource, its Committee on the Public Health Effectiveness of the FDA 510(k) Clearance Process (510(k) Committee) is not fairly balanced. The committee’s primary function is to evaluate the 510(k) system’s effect on patient safety and innovation, but the committee lacks patients, patient advocates, inventors and innovators who are familiar with the 510(k) system, product developers, entrepreneurs, financiers, manufacturers, and medical device industry professionals. These critical omissions in 510(k) Committee membership render the committee unbalanced and thus unable to fairly and accurately perform its duties. Additionally, the committee does not contain a balance of perspectives, subjecting it to possible bias, or at least the appearance of bias. For these reasons, the FDA is legally prohibited from using “any advice or recommendation provided by” the 510(k) Committee. Furthermore, by releasing its report before these issues could be resolved, IOM has risked damaging its well-deserved reputation for quality and objectivity.

This Article proceeds in five parts. Part I introduces the FDA’s 510(k) clearance process and discusses some of the controversy regarding the adequacy of that process. Part II reviews the federal law that applies to advisory committees generally as well as the specific provisions that pertain to IOM committees. This Part also discusses the requirement that IOM committees be “fairly balanced” and suggests how courts might interpret that requirement. Part III presents the National Academies’ policies regarding committee member selection and committee operation. It focuses on the Academies’ policies re-

16. Id. § 15(a).  
17. This Article is an expansion of an earlier piece on this subject by the authors. See Ralph F. Hall & Eva Stensvad, Recent Development, A Failure to Comply: An Initial Assessment of Gaps in IOM’s Medical Device Study Committee, 12 MINN. J. SCI. & TECH. 731 (2011).  
19. Id.  
garding balance, bias, and conflicts of interest. Part IV closely examines the 510(k) Committee’s purpose and composition, concluding that the committee lacks the balance of expertise and perspectives necessary to fulfill its function. Finally, Part V addresses other policy considerations that dictate a balanced committee. The Article concludes that given the 510(k) Committee’s composition, the FDA is statutorily barred from using its report before these serious issues could be resolved.

The issue presented by this Article is a matter of fair process—the final report’s recommendations and the authors’ opinions regarding those recommendations are irrelevant.21 If federal agencies intend to rely on IOM committees when making major policy and regulatory decisions, those IOM committees must follow good processes and contain fair balance. At the very least, they must comply with the few statutory requirements that apply to them.

II. FDA’S 510(K) CLEARANCE PROCESS FOR MEDICAL DEVICES

The FDA is an agency within the Department of Health and Human Services.22 It has two primary functions with respect to medical devices. First, it is “responsible for protecting the public health by assuring the safety, efficacy, and security of . . . medical devices.”23 Second, it is “responsible for advancing the public health by helping to speed innovations.”24 Given the inherent tension between thoroughly ensuring that devices are safe and effective and optimally promoting innovation, the FDA attempts to balance these goals through its device approval and clearance mechanisms. In particular, the 510(k)
process aims to make safe and effective devices available to consumers more quickly and less expensively, thus promoting innovation in the device industry.

Before a manufacturer can market a medical device in the United States, the medical device is first classified into "one of three regulatory classes based on the level of [regulatory] control necessary to assure the safety and effectiveness of the device." Device classification is essentially risk-based, with Class I devices being the lowest risk and Class III being the highest. For non-exempt devices, manufacturers must obtain FDA approval or clearance through one of two main pathways. The first pathway, for higher-risk or Class III devices,
is Premarket Approval (PMA).\textsuperscript{32} This is the most stringent type of device application process required by the FDA, requiring extensive scientific and regulatory review to ensure the device’s safety and effectiveness prior to marketing.\textsuperscript{33} Although FDA regulations provide 180 days to review the PMA and make a determination, actual review usually takes a lot longer.\textsuperscript{34} Approval is based on the strength of the scientific and clinical data as well as inspections of the manufacturing facility, processes, and regulatory compliance.\textsuperscript{35}

The second pathway to market is the 510(k) clearance process, or premarket notification, pursuant to section 510(k) of the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act.\textsuperscript{36} This process can be used for moderate-risk devices (generally Class II devices) that do not require a PMA and for which a “predicate” device exists.\textsuperscript{37} It can also be used when a manufacturer seeks a new indication or “intended use” for an already-marketed device or when the manufacturer has changed the design or characteristics of a device such that it might affect its performance, safety, or effectiveness.\textsuperscript{38} The manufacturer must submit a 510(k), which is a premarket submission made to the FDA, to demonstrate that

\textsuperscript{33} FDA, Premarket Approval (PMA), supra note 31.
\textsuperscript{34} Id.
\textsuperscript{37} FDA, Overview of Medical Devices, supra note 30. Examples of Class II devices include infusion pumps, blood pressure cuffs, ventilators, x-ray systems, and various surgical materials. See id. Where a predicate device does not exist, applicants may use the “de novo” process to seek reclassification based upon a risk assessment of the product, possibly enabling them to utilize the 510(k) system rather than the default PMA pathway. See 21 U.S.C. § 360c(f)(2) (2006); see also Special Considerations, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., http://www.fda.gov/MedicalDevices/DeviceRegulationandGuidance/HowtoMarketYourDevice/PremarketSubmissions/PremarketNotification510k/ucm134578.htm (last updated Sept. 3, 2010).
\textsuperscript{38} Premarket Notification (510k), U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., http://www.fda.gov/MedicalDevices/DeviceRegulationandGuidance/HowtoMarketYourDevice/PremarketSubmissions/PremarketNotification510k/default.htm (last updated Sept. 3, 2010) [hereinafter FDA, Premarket Notification (510k)].
the device to be marketed is at least as safe and effective as (i.e., substantially equivalent to) a legally marketed device, or “predicate” device.39 A predicate device is one “that was legally marketed prior to May 28, 1976” for which a PMA is not required, “a device which has been reclassified from [C]lass III to [C]lass II or I . . . , or a device which has been found to be substantially equivalent through the 510(k) premarket notification process.”40 Once the manufacturer makes its 510(k) submission, the Center for Devices and Radiological Health (CDRH) within the FDA has ninety days to determine whether the device is, in fact, substantially equivalent.41 Once the FDA declares a device substantially equivalent, the manufacturer may immediately market the device.42

Compared to the PMA process, the 510(k) process is different in three key ways. First, it is generally less stringent—PMAs require scientific and clinical studies and a more thorough FDA review including inspection of manufacturing facilities, whereas substantial equivalence for 510(k)s is usually based on device descriptions and technical data.43 Second, it is usually much faster—the FDA generally makes 510(k) decisions more quickly than it does PMA decisions.44 Third, 510(k)s are significantly less expensive than PMAs.45 For example, in fiscal year 2012, the standard fee for a PMA was $220,050.46 In contrast, the standard 510(k) fee was only $4049.47 For these

39. Id. A finding of substantial equivalence does not mean that the devices are identical—it means that when looking at the intended use of the device and its technological characteristics, there are no new questions raised as to the device’s safety and effectiveness. Id.
41. FDA, Premarket Notification (510k), supra note 38. Alternatively, the FDA can “find the device not substantially equivalent (NSE) . . . , or request additional information” giving the manufacturer an additional thirty days. SCHOONMAKER, supra note 35, at 14.
42. FDA, Premarket Notification (510k), supra note 38.
44. Id. at 15.
45. Id.
47. Premarket Notification [510(k)] Review Fees, FOOD & DRUG ADMIN.,
reasons—and because most new medical devices are similar to products already on the market, do not present any new safety or technical questions, and do not represent a significant health risk\textsuperscript{48}—the 510(k) process is heavily utilized by the medical device industry. In 2009, the FDA received 3597 510(k)s, only 20 original PMAs, and 1394 PMA supplements.\textsuperscript{49} In 2010, 2766 medical devices were cleared through the 510(k) process.\textsuperscript{50} Between January and September 2011, 2281 devices had been cleared.\textsuperscript{51}

Despite the advantages of the 510(k) process, it has recently come under attack. Stakeholders on both sides have criticized the process as inadequately protecting public health—either by insufficiently ensuring patient safety or by unnecessarily hindering innovation.\textsuperscript{52} For example, Public Citizen, a national nonprofit organization, fervently argues that the 510(k) process clears devices too easily and “has failed to keep dangerous and ineffective medical devices from the market.”\textsuperscript{53} Supporting this assertion, a Government Accountability Office (GAO) study found that between 2003 and 2007, the FDA reviewed 13,199 510(k) submissions for Class I and II devices and cleared ninety percent for marketing.\textsuperscript{54} It also found that the


\textsuperscript{50.} See Devices Cleared in 2010, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., http://www.fda.gov/MedicalDevices/ProductsandMedicalProcedures/Device ApprovalsandClearances/510kClearances/ucm199998.htm (last updated Jan. 6, 2011) (totaling the number of 510(k) clearances for all of 2010).


\textsuperscript{52.} FDA 510(K) AND THE PUB. HEALTH, supra note 9, at 15–16; MEDICAL DEVICES AND THE PUBLIC’S HEALTH, supra note 21, at 4.


\textsuperscript{54.} U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 43, at 6. This study did not look at all 510(k) submissions—for specific study methodology, see id.
FDA reviewed 342 submissions for Class III devices and cleared sixty-seven percent for marketing. In 2010, seventy-three percent of 510(k) submissions resulted in a substantially equivalent determination, and in the first eight months of 2011, that number rose again to seventy-seven percent.

Conversely, other groups argue that the 510(k) process is so burdensome, unpredictable, and inconsistent that it actually inhibits innovation. A survey of over two hundred medical technology companies found that the inefficient, prolonged premarket regulatory process resulted in devices being available in the United States a full two years later than in other countries, having a significant effect on patient health in the United States. As a result of the perceived flaws of the regulatory system, “[f]ewer medical device start-ups are being launched in the U.S. . . . [a]nd innovators . . . are relocating to other countries.” In addition, although the FDA clears a significant percentage of devices, at least one analysis has shown that the vast majority of 510(k) clearances do not result in a Class I safety recall over a five-year period.

at 30.

55. Id. at 6.


57. See, e.g., JOSH MAKOWER ET AL., FDA IMPACT ON U.S. MEDICAL TECHNOLOGY INNOVATION 6–7 (2010) (surveying over two hundred medical technology companies and finding that most respondents found the regulatory process to be unpredictable, prolonged, inefficient, and expensive).

58. Id. at 7. “Under current FDA processes, millions of U.S. patients are being denied or delayed access to leading medical devices that are first (or exclusively) brought to market in other countries.” Id. at 8.

59. Id. at 8.

60. Class I recalls are the most serious recalls, in which “there is a reasonable probability that the use of . . . a violative product will cause serious adverse health consequences or death.” Background and Definitions, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., http://www.fda.gov/Safety/Recalls/ucm165546.htm (last updated June 24, 2009).

61. Ralph F. Hall, Univ. of Minn., Using Recall Data to Assess the 510(k) Process (July 28, 2010), available at http://www.iom.edu/~media/Files/PublicHealth/510kProcess/2010-JUL-28/06%20Hall.pdf. This study found that 99.55% of all devices cleared through the 510(k) process over a five-year period did not result in a Class I recall for any reason, and 99.78% the devices did not experience Class I safety recalls related to any premarket issue. Id. In sum, only 0.22% of cleared devices resulted in a recall related to premarket issues. Id.
Because of the widespread criticism of the premarket regulatory process, the FDA launched a review of the 510(k) system. In September 2009, the FDA established two staff committees—the 510(k) Working Group and the Task Force on the Utilization of Science in Regulatory Decision Making—to review and address concerns regarding the 510(k) program. In August 2010, the two internal working groups issued fifty-five recommendations, and after reviewing public comments, the FDA announced in January 2011 the twenty-five actions it plans to take to improve the 510(k) program.

In addition to its internal working groups, the FDA also commissioned the IOM to conduct a detailed external review of the system. This IOM committee was formed in early 2010 and held three public meetings in March, June, and July 2010. In the FDA’s January 2011 work plan, it specifically referred seven important questions to this IOM committee. However, the 510(k) Committee held no public meetings after the FDA referred these questions to it. The IOM committee completed its analysis and conducted a peer review process that did not include any public discussion of proposed recommendations. The committee then released its report on July 29, 2011.

64. See FDA 510(k) AND THE PUB. HEALTH, supra note 9, at 1.
66. FDA, 510(k) AND SCIENCE REPORT RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 3, at 2.
67. See MEDICAL DEVICES AND THE PUBLIC’S HEALTH, supra note 21, at 19 (indicating that the last public meeting was held in July 2010).
68. Drafts of IOM reports remain confidential until after the report is independently reviewed. See NAT’L ACADS., OUR STUDY PROCESS: ENSURING INDEPENDENT, OBJECTIVE ADVICE (n.d.) [hereinafter NAT’L ACADS., OUR STUDY PROCESS], available at http://www.nationalacademies.org/studycommitteeprocess.pdf. Only after all committee members and appropriate officials sign off on the final report is the report released to the public. Id.
69. Press Release, Nat’l Acads., FDA Should Invest in Developing a New Regulatory Framework to Replace Flawed 510(k) Medical Device Clearance
III. THE FEDERAL ADVISORY COMMITTEE ACT

IOM committees do not operate in a legal vacuum—they are governed by section 15 of the Federal Advisory Committee Act (FACA). This next section discusses FACA’s history and application to IOM committees. It then examines the requirements imposed by section 15 on IOM committees. Finally, it discusses whether judicial review of IOM committees is possible and, if so, what such review might entail.

A. FEDERAL ADVISORY COMMITTEE ACT AND AMENDMENTS

FACA was originally enacted in 1972 in order to address concerns that advisory committees were disorganized, duplicative, not properly overseen, and lacking in public involvement. The purpose of the Act is “to reduce wasteful expenditure on advisory committees and to make advisory committees established by the executive branch of government more accountable to the public” by “provid[ing] standards for the es-


71. Advisory committees are generally “entities created to provide the Government with expert advice and collective recommendations from the private sector.” Virginia A. McMurtry, Introduction and Legislative History of the Federal Advisory Committee Act (Public Law 92-463), in VIRGINIA A. MCMURTRY, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 95TH CONG., FEDERAL ADVISORY COMMITTEE ACT (PUBLIC LAW 92-463): SOURCE BOOK: LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, TEXTS, AND OTHER DOCUMENTS 3 (Comm. Print 1978). FACA defines “advisory committees” as

any committee, board, commission, council, conference, panel, task force, or other similar group . . . which is . . . (a) established by statute or reorganization plan, or (b) established or utilized by the President, or (c) established or utilized by one or more agencies, in the interest of obtaining advice or recommendations for the President or one or more agencies or officers of the Federal Government.

5 U.S.C. app. 2 § 3(2) (2006). The current definition specifically excludes any committee created by the National Academy of Sciences. Id.


tablishment, operation, termination, and control of advisory committees."\(^74\) It imposed a number of requirements on advisory committees including fair balance on committees, filing of committee charters, notice and publication of meetings in the Federal Register, public access to meetings and records, monitoring of meetings by federal officials, and limited committee duration.\(^75\) It also provided for Office of Management and Budget (OMB) oversight.\(^76\)

FACA applies to advisory committees that are “established” or “utilized” by federal agencies.\(^77\) As originally enacted, FACA was not intended to apply to committees formed by the National Academy of Sciences (NAS),\(^78\) of which the IOM is a part.\(^79\) NAS is a private, independent organization of scientists and academics, chartered by Congress in 1863 to “investigate, examine, experiment, and report upon any subject of science.”\(^80\) Its original purpose was to provide the government with independent advice on scientific matters.\(^81\) It “consists of members elected by peers in recognition of distinguished achievement in their respective fields.”\(^82\) NAS has about 2100 members, and the IOM has about 1600 members.\(^83\) While the NAS and IOM are technically independent and do not receive “direct appropriations from the federal government, . . . many of [their] activities are mandated and funded by Congress and federal

76. S. Rep. No. 92-1098. OMB’s oversight was later transferred to the General Services Administration. 5 U.S.C. app. 2 § 12.
77. 5 U.S.C. app. 2 § 3(2).
78. “The concept of extending FACA to privately managed and controlled organizations outside the Federal government such as the National Academy of Sciences was discussed and rejected when the FACA legislation was adopted by the House of Representatives.” 143 CONG. REC. 25,844 (1997) (citing 118 CONG. REC. 31,421 (1972)).
79. NAS established the IOM in 1970, History of the National Academies, NAT’L ACADS., http://www.nationalacademies.org/about/history.html (last visited Oct. 30, 2011). Over the years, NAS has evolved to incorporate not only IOM, but also the National Academy of Engineering and the National Research Council. NAT’L ACADS., GETTING TO KNOW THE COMMITTEE PROCESS 2 (2005), available at http://www.nationalacademies.org/nrc/CommitteeProcess.pdf. Together, these organizations are collectively known as the National Academies. Id.
81. Id.
82. History of the National Academies, supra note 79.
83. Id.
agencies." In fact, approximately ninety percent of NAS reports are requested by government agencies or legislative committees of Congress. The NAS and IOM are highly influential organizations due to the wealth of expertise among their membership, the high quality of their work, and their well-earned "solid reputation[s] as the nation's premier source of independent, expert advice on scientific, engineering, and medical issues."

For twenty-five years, FACA was not applied to NAS—it was only applied to committees "subject to actual management and control by a Federal agency." However, in 1997, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia in Animal Legal Defense Fund, Inc. v. Shalala held that FACA should apply to committees formed by NAS because NAS is a "quasi-public" organization that receives public funds, was formed by the government, and generally operates for the government's benefit. The court found the NAS committee was "utilized" by the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services and thus subject to FACA's many requirements.

Congress became concerned that the District Court's decision could "impose significant burdens on the Federal government" and interfere with the independence and quality of NAS studies. In response, Congress passed the Federal Adviso-

88. Who We Are, supra note 80.
88. 114 F.3d 1209 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
89. Id. at 1209–10; see also Animal Legal Def. Fund, Inc. v. Shalala, 104 F.3d 424, 428–29 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
90. 114 F.3d at 1209–10.
91. 143 CONG. REC. 25,844. It would have nearly “double[d] the number of discretionary committees subject to the FACA chartering requirements, almost double[d] the number of discretionary committees that must be monitored by Federal officials, and significantly increase[d] the administrative burdens on OMB and GSA in overseeing FACA committees.” Id.
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ry Committee Act Amendments of 1997, including the now-numbered section 15, in order to “clarify public disclosure requirements that are applicable to the National Academy of Sciences.” The purpose of the amendments was twofold. First, the amendments sought to make it clear that the “academy should not be subject to the full process of the Federal Advisory Committee Act.” Congress considered the Academies “valuable to America precisely because they are independent of agency influence” and because they include the “best professionals and experts” and “derive their recommendations from multiple perspectives.” FACA imposed rigorous procedural requirements which could potentially affect NAS’s independence. For those reasons, Congress wanted to ensure NAS’s independence from the government to “preserve their high quality, objective, independent studies.”

Second, the amendments “require[d] more openness when Federal agencies utilize the academies.” Congress recognized that NAS often provided the government with advice and needed to balance NAS’s “need for independence with the public’s right to know about the advisors and procedures used to produce technical or policy advice for the government.” These openness and accountability requirements included that NAS “[p]ost for public comment the names, biographies, and conflict of interest disclosures when committee members are nominated.” It also required open data-gathering meetings, posting for public comment the names of reviewers of draft committee reports, and making summaries available to the public of any closed committee meetings. Importantly, the amendments required that NAS committee membership be fairly balanced “for the functions to be performed.”

92. 111 Stat. 2689.
94. Id. at 25,843.
95. Id. at 25,845.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 25,843 (statement of Rep. Stephen Horn).
100. Id. (statement of Rep. Stephen Horn).
101. Id.
B. NAS “Fair Balance” Requirements Under FACA Section 15

Section 15 was intended to make NAS committees more open and accountable, without sacrificing their independence and objectivity. Among the other requirements previously discussed, section 15 provides that “[NAS] shall make its best efforts to ensure that . . . the committee membership is fairly balanced as determined by the Academy to be appropriate for the functions to be performed.” This “fair balance” requirement serves two important purposes. First, it ensures that the committees upon which federal agencies rely are objective and unbiased. Second, it guarantees that these committees include the variety of perspectives and expertise necessary to fulfill the committees’ functions. If a committee lacks balance, it may be inadequate to competently accomplish its task. Even if the range of expertise is adequate, the committee’s work and agency’s reliance on it may still be perceived as biased.

Additionally, individuals with conflicts of interest should not serve on the committee unless the conflict is “unavoidable” and “is promptly and publicly disclosed.” The statute itself does not define when a conflict of interest is “unavoidable,” and there is no useful discussion of this issue contained in the legislative history. A plain reading of the statute as well as the IOM’s practices in past committees indicate that this is not a statutory bar against including members with conflicts of interest, but merely discouragement of such practice unless the individuals are needed to provide a necessary perspective or area of expertise. The NAS and IOM have definitions and policies of their own regarding such conflicts, which will be discussed later in this Article.

Section 15 sets forth this “fair balance” requirement as a

103. Section 15 applies to “the National Academy of Sciences as a corporation, and therefore to the National Academies as a whole, including the National Academy of Engineering, the Institute of Medicine, and the National Research Council.” Nat’l Acads., Policy on Committee Composition and Balance and Conflicts of Interest for Committees Used in the Development of Reports 2 (2003) [hereinafter Nat’l Acads., Policy on Committee Composition], available at http://www.nationalacademies.org/cn/bi-coi_form-0.pdf.
104. 5 U.S.C. app. 2 § 15 (b)(1).
105. Id.
106. See infra notes 191–210 and accompanying text.
separate, additional requirement from public notice of meetings, open data-gathering meetings, public accessibility to materials, public availability of final reports, and public availability of reviewers’ names. Therefore, while public input and access to other parts of the committee’s work and data-gathering are valuable, these other mechanisms for public participation cannot compensate for a committee’s failure to meet the fair balance requirement. Importantly, the statute specifically requires fair balance among the committee membership, so fair balance during the peer review process alone also fails to satisfy FACA section 15. The NAS committee itself must have fair balance, regardless of how much public input and balance is present throughout the rest of the process.

Importantly, if a NAS committee fails to comply with the statute—for example, by not being fairly balanced—then “[a]n agency may not use any advice or recommendation” provided by that committee. Therefore, while NAS is free to include whomever it wants on its committees, if that committee composition does not comply with FACA requirements, then the FDA, a federal agency, is legally prohibited from using that committee’s work.

C. JUDICIAL REVIEW OF COMMITTEE BALANCE

FACA section 15 grants the IOM a great deal of discretion in committee membership—for example, the IOM has almost complete discretion as to which specific individuals it appoints to serve on its committees. Additionally, the IOM can determine when a conflict of interest is unavoidable. However, the IOM’s discretion is not absolute. The statute dictates the committee membership be fairly balanced for its given functions—

108. Id. § 15(b)(3).
109. Id. § 15(b)(3), (4).
110. Id. § 15(b)(5).
111. Id. § 15(b)(6).
112. Id. § 15(a).
113. There are a number of avenues through which committee composition may be reviewed and challenged, and judicial review is just one option. For example, any person can submit a Citizen Petition, requesting the FDA to refrain from taking any administrative action. See 21 C.F.R. § 10.30 (2010). The different mechanisms of challenging agency regulations are beyond the scope of this Article.
114. 5 U.S.C. app. 2 § 15(b)(1).
115. Id.
the IOM may only decide how to achieve this balance, not whether to achieve this balance. While balance need not be perfect, the IOM must make its “best efforts” to ensure that such balance on the committee is present. Thus, while the IOM has discretion as to how to achieve fair balance, an utter failure to comply, or even attempt to comply, with this statute could result in judicial review of the FDA’s use of an IOM committee’s advice.

There is currently no existing case law in which an IOM committee’s composition was challenged under FACA section 15. However, case law under section 5 of FACA may provide useful guidance as to when and how a court might evaluate such a challenge. Section 5 deals with official federal advisory committees (not IOM committees), but it contains similar language to section 15. Section 5 requires that “the membership of the advisory committee . . . be fairly balanced in terms of the . . . functions to be performed.” Courts examining section 5 have concluded that this “fairly balanced” requirement was designed to ensure that persons or groups directly affected by the work of a particular advisory committee would have some representation on the committee. Furthermore, “under FACA, 116. While the statute says that fair balance must be “determined by the Academy,” id., this phrase cannot be read so as to confer upon NAS unfettered discretion by removing a court’s authority to review statutory compliance. Otherwise, NAS could theoretically appoint anyone to a committee—for example, it could select a committee comprised entirely of industry representatives—and sprinkle the magic words “fairly balanced” over it. Without any possibility of reviewing NAS’s fair balance determination, there would be no means to challenge NAS or any federal agency using the NAS committee under this statute. Such a reading would render the entire statutory provision meaningless. It is well accepted that statutes should be read as to “give effect, if possible, to every clause and word . . . .” Montclair v. Ramsdell, 107 U.S. 147, 152 (1883). Furthermore, there is a “strong presumption that Congress intends judicial review of administrative action.” Bowen v. Mich. Acad. of Family Physicians, 476 U.S. 667, 670 (1986); see also McNary v. Haitian Refugee Ctr., 498 U.S. 479, 496 (1991) (“It is most unlikely that Congress intended to foreclose all forms of meaningful judicial review . . . .”). The Administrative Procedure Act, which governs the FDA, provides that “final agency action for which there is no other adequate remedy in a court [is] subject to judicial review.” 5 U.S.C. § 704 (2006). Therefore, there must be some form of meaningful judicial review of FDA’s compliance with this statute—which entails some evaluation of NAS’s determinations of fair balance. NAS’s discretion cannot be entirely beyond review.

agencies should not be permitted to assign advisory committees functions that the committee members do not have the expertise to perform.”

This section 5 language is strikingly similar to the fair balance requirement in section 15, and it may be fair to presume that Congress intended the same meaning and application of this phrase within the statute when it enacted section 15. Section 5 also requires fair balance with respect to points-of-view represented on the committee. While section 15 does not explicitly require point-of-view balance, such balance may nevertheless be necessary for an IOM committee to adequately fulfill its function—a biased IOM committee may be unable to competently address the issues with which it has been tasked. Therefore, committee members’ points-of-view must be considered when evaluating whether the committee is fairly balanced to perform its functions.

Courts reviewing committees’ compliance with section 5’s fair balance requirement are generally deferential to agencies’ determinations that a committee is fairly balanced to per-

S. REP. NO. 92-1098 (1972) and H.R. REP. NO. 92-1017 (1972)). The Senate Report states that section 5 “require[s] that membership of the advisory committee shall be representative of those who have a direct interest in the purpose of such committee.” S. REP. NO. 92-1098, at 9.


120. A well-established canon of statutory construction provides that “[a] term appearing in several places in a statutory text is generally read the same way each time it appears.” Ratzlaf v. United States, 510 U.S. 135, 143 (1994).

121. 5 U.S.C. app. 2 § 5(b)(2).

122. Indeed, Congress explicitly contemplated this balance of “multiple perspectives” when enacting the 1997 FACA amendments. See supra note 95 and accompanying text.

123. Some courts have found this to be a nonjusticiable, political question. See, e.g., Ctr. for Policy Analysis on Trade & Health (CPATH) v. Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, 540 F.3d 940, 945–47 (9th Cir. 2008); Sanchez v. Pena, 17 F. Supp. 2d 1235, 1238 (D.N.M. 1998). However, most courts have held it to be justiciable. See, e.g., Cargill, Inc. v. United States, 173 F.3d 323, 334–36 (5th Cir. 1999); Pub. Citizen v. Nat’l Advisory Comm. on Microbiological Criteria for Foods, 886 F.2d 419, 433 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (Edwards, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); Nw. Ecosystem Alliance v. Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, No. C99-1165R, 1999 WL 33526001, at *3–4 (W.D. Wash. Nov. 9, 1999). Additionally, litigants often encounter problems with fulfilling the standing requirements. See, e.g., Nat’l Anti-Hunger Coal., 711 F.2d at 1073–74 (stating that “[t]he standing question is a close one,” but ultimately agreeing that the litigants had standing); Metcalf v. Nat’l Petroleum Council, 553 F.2d 176 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (denying standing); Nw. Ecosystem Alliance, 1999 WL 33526001, at *2–3 (finding that litigants had standing).
form its functions. However, on occasion, courts have been willing to find that the committees are not fairly balanced and have enjoined the use of such committees. The examination has two prongs: First, what is the committee’s function? Second, is additional balance needed to fulfill those functions?

Where the functions to be performed are “narrow and explicit,” less representation on the committee may be required. For example, in Cargill, Inc. v. United States, the committee’s function was to peer-review a scientific study protocol for examining the health effects of diesel exhaust exposure on underground miners. Because the committee only needed “expertise in the scientific method” in order to fulfill its functions, it was sufficient that the committee contained only scientists and statisticians and not individuals with an “in-depth knowledge of diesel processes.” Furthermore, because the committee’s task of “providing scientific peer review” was “politically neutral and technocratic,” the court found that there was no need for mine managers to be represented on the committee. The committee was not called upon to make policy decisions or provide regulatory advice, so broader representation was unnecessary.

Similarly, in Public Citizen v. National Advisory Committee on Microbiological Criteria for Foods, the committee at issue was tasked with providing “advice and recommendations on the development of microbiological criteria for foods.” Public Citizen, moving for a preliminary injunction, argued that there was no fair balance because there were many food indus-

124. See, e.g., Cargill, 173 F.3d at 334 (explaining that the functional balance requirement is “subject to a deferential standard of review”).
125. See, e.g., Alabama-Tombigbee Rivers Coal. v. Dep’t of Interior, 26 F.3d 1103 (11th Cir. 1994) (upholding an injunction where a committee tasked with deciding whether to list a particular species of fish as endangered did not include any representatives who had an economic interest in that fish market).
126. Cargill, 173 F.3d at 336 (“In considering whether a committee is fairly balanced in terms of function, courts naturally have looked first at the functions to be performed.”).
127. Nat’l Anti-Hunger Coal., 711 F.2d at 1074.
128. Cargill, 173 F.3d at 323.
129. Id. at 336–37 (emphasis omitted).
130. Id. at 337.
131. Id.
133. Id. at 360.
try-related committee members but no consumer representatives or advocates on the committee.\textsuperscript{134} The court, however, found that because the committee was “charged with a highly technical mandate which requires extensive scientific background as well as expertise in processing and distribution practices,” no consumer advocates were necessary to provide fair balance for the committee’s particular function.\textsuperscript{135} Not “every interested party or group affected” is entitled to representation, only those required for the committee to fulfill its function.\textsuperscript{136} However, the court noted that had the committee’s purpose been “to study the effects of a particular type of regulation of microbiological criteria on the public, then the results might be different.”\textsuperscript{137}

When the committee is responsible for making broad substantive policy recommendations, however, much greater representation is required. For example, in \textit{National Anti-Hunger Coalition}, the committee at issue originally had the narrow function of “apply[ing] private sector expertise to attain cost-effective management in the federal government.”\textsuperscript{138} Even though the committee only included corporate executives and no public interest representatives, the court initially found that it was fairly balanced given its specific function of addressing “fiscal management of large private organizations.”\textsuperscript{139} However, later evidence revealed that the committee, in fact, made recommendations not concerning cost-control but instead concerning broad policy issues and possible repeal of existing legislation.\textsuperscript{140} Specifically, the court was concerned because the committee’s recommendations altered the established rights of those who might be affected, and those people were not represented on the committee.\textsuperscript{141} Because the committee addressed “areas of general national import,” the court found the committee unbalanced and illegal.\textsuperscript{142}

\textsuperscript{134} \textit{Id.} at 361–62.  
\textsuperscript{135} \textit{Id.} at 363.  
\textsuperscript{137} \textit{Id.} at 364.  
\textsuperscript{138} Nat’l Anti-Hunger Coal. v. Exec. Comm. of the President’s Private Sector Survey on Cost Control, 711 F.2d 1071, 1074 (D.C. Cir. 1983).  
\textsuperscript{139} \textit{Id.}  
\textsuperscript{141} \textit{Id.} at 1517.  
\textsuperscript{142} \textit{Id.}
In *Northwest Ecosystem Alliance v. Office of the U.S. Trade Representative*, the court in determining whether two committees were fairly balanced under FACA stated that “[t]he proper question, simply put, is whether the [committee]s perform functions that are so ‘narrow and explicit’ that fair balance among competing viewpoints is irrelevant.” The committees at issue provided trade and industrial recommendations regarding forest products. These committees’ advice “affect[ed] the environment nationally and internationally.” The plaintiffs, environmentalist organizations, sought representation on the committees because they had a “direct interest in the advice given by the [committees].” The court found that the committees’ functions could not “be characterized as ‘politically neutral and technocratic,’” but that the committees “offer[ed] advice on diverse and far-reaching issues that affect others.” Thus, broad representation was required on these committees, especially representation by environmentalists, whose interests were likely to be affected. The court found these committees to be unbalanced.

In conclusion, upon examining the case law under FACA section 5, a committee whose functions are narrow, scientific, or technical does not require as broad representation as a committee whose functions extend to broader policy matters. A committee tasked with addressing broad policy, regulatory, and legislative matters that affect others and are of “general national import” requires broad representation. Specifically, those key stakeholders most likely to be affected by the committee’s recommendations are entitled to representation on that committee.

144. Id. at *5.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Id. at *3.
148. Id. at *7.
149. Id.
150. Id.
IV. THE NATIONAL ACADEMIES’ SELECTION AND REQUIREMENTS FOR COMMITTEES

IOM committees are not only governed by statute—they are also governed by the National Academies’ own internal policies regarding member selection, balance, conflicts of interest, and bias.

A. SELECTION AND OPERATION OF COMMITTEES

National Academies’ staff initiates the search for committee candidates, permitting consultations and suggestions from outside groups and authorities.151 After review, the chair of the National Research Council, who also serves as the president of NAS, appoints members to the committee.152 Once appointed, members are required to “list all professional, consulting, and financial connections, as well as to describe pertinent intellectual positions and public statements.”153 However, most of this information remains confidential.154 Only members’ names, affiliations, and short biographies are posted online for public comment.155 During the first committee meeting, members discuss the confidential information in a closed session.156 At this meeting, changes to the committee’s composition are proposed and finalized.157 Final decision-making authority regarding committee balance and conflicts of interest rests with the chair of the National Research Council Executive Office and the General Counsel’s Office.158

Once committee membership is established, the committee

151. NAT'L ACADS., GETTING TO KNOW THE COMMITTEE PROCESS, supra note 79, at 6.
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. Id. This is a requirement under FACA, 5 U.S.C. app. 2 §15(b)(1) (2006). It is questionable whether these brief biographies really provide enough information upon which the public can meaningfully comment because they may omit information indicating possible conflicts of interest. It may be more appropriate, given the statute’s spirit of disclosure, to publicly provide committee members’ full curriculum vitae or other detailed background and personal information. This issue, however, is beyond the scope of this Article.
156. NAT'L ACADS., GETTING TO KNOW THE COMMITTEE PROCESS, supra note 79, at 7.
158. NAT'L ACADS., POLICY ON COMMITTEE COMPOSITION, supra note 103, at 8.
holds open data-gathering meetings, which the Academies defines as “any meeting of a committee at which anyone other than committee members or officials, agents, or employees of the institution is present.”159 Written materials provided by these outside individuals are made publicly accessible.160 Committees then deliberate in closed meetings when developing findings and drafting recommendations.161 The public is only provided with a brief summary of these meetings,162 and “[a]ll analyses and drafts of the report remain confidential.”163 The report itself remains confidential until it passes through independent review by other experts appointed by the National Academies.164 Once the review process is complete and appropriate Academies officials have signed off on the final report, only then is it released to the public.165 The public has no opportunity to suggest changes or address concerns—the report is final.166

159. Nat’l Acads., Getting to Know the Committee Process, supra note 79, at 12.

160. Nat’l Acads., Our Study Process, supra note 68. While NAS officially makes the data publicly accessible, the ease of this accessibility is debatable. In February 2011, both authors of this Article independently inquired about the material available from the IOM 510(k) Committee and have received no response or information as of the date of publication.

161. Id.; Nat’l Acads., Getting to Know the Committee Process, supra note 79, at 10.

162. Use of the word “brief” may be an understatement here. FACA section 15(b)(4) requires that “brief summary” of closed meetings be made publicly available. 5 U.S.C. app. 2 § 15(b)(4) (2006). The summary must “identify the committee members present, the topics discussed, materials made available to the committee, and other such matters that the Academy determines should be included.” Id. The IOM 510(k) committee has provided only this bare minimum information for each of its seven closed meetings, at no point including any “other such matters.” See Nat’l Acads., Project Information, CURRENT PROJECTS SYS., http://www8.nationalacademies.org/cp/projectview.aspx?key=IOM-BGH-10-05 (last visited Oct. 30, 2011) (listing each committee meeting and providing links to the summaries) (website since removed). This minimal provision of information is not unique to IOM’s 510(k) committee. See, e.g., Nat’l Acads., Meeting Information, CURRENT PROJECTS SYS., http://www8.nationalacademies.org/cp/meetingview.aspx?MeetingID=5391&MeeetingNo=3 (last visited Oct. 30, 2011) (providing a brief summary of a closed meeting of the IOM’s Strengthening Core Elements of Regulatory Systems in Developing Countries Committee including only the minimum required information) (website since removed).


164. Id.

165. Id.

166. Id.
B. COMMITTEE BALANCE, BIAS, AND CONFLICTS OF INTEREST

The National Academies recognizes the importance of achieving fair balance—not only balance in perspectives, but balance in knowledge and expertise. “[I]f a report is to be . . . effective . . . ,[it] must be, and must be perceived to be, not only highly competent but also the result of a process that is fairly balanced in terms of the knowledge, expertise, and perspectives utilized to produce it . . . .”167 Even fully competent committees may be ineffective if “undermined by allegations of conflict of interest or lack of balance and objectivity.”168 Furthermore, whether a committee is appropriately balanced depends heavily upon the specific tasks with which that committee is charged—“a committee that is well-balanced for one purpose may not be appropriately constructed for a modified task.”169 Therefore, the National Academies requires that its committees meet two criteria—they must contain an “appropriate range of expertise for the task” and must also contain a “balance of perspectives.”170 This echoes, albeit with more detail, the “fair balance” requirements of FACA.

First, the Academies requires that its committees “include experts with the specific expertise and experience needed to address the study’s statement of task.”171 It is not enough that committee members be highly qualified in terms of knowledge, training, and experience—“[i]t is also essential that the knowledge, experience, and perspectives of potential committee members be thoughtfully and carefully assessed and balanced in terms of the subtleties and complexities of the particular scientific, technical, and other issues to be addressed and the functions to be performed by the committee.”172 “[T]he significant omission of any required discipline from the committee might seriously compromise the quality of the committee’s analysis and judgments, even though it is clear to all that the committee is composed of highly qualified and distinguished

168. Id.
171. Id.
individuals."\textsuperscript{173}

Second, committees must have point-of-view balance, or a "balance of perspectives." Relevant points-of-view must be balanced "so that the committee can carry out its charge objectively and credibly."\textsuperscript{174} Without this balance, allegations of bias may undermine the committee’s work, regardless of its quality or competence.\textsuperscript{175} When a committee is otherwise composed of highly qualified experts, but is lacking balance, "the usual procedure is to add members to the committee to achieve the appropriate balance."\textsuperscript{176}

Importantly, committee members are permitted, even expected, to have a particular point-of-view on a relevant issue.\textsuperscript{177} These personal opinions, biases, or perspectives are not considered disqualifying conflicts of interest.\textsuperscript{178} Members may serve on the committee even though they are “committed to a fixed position on a particular issue” through public statements, publications, or by closely identifying or affiliating with particular interest groups.\textsuperscript{179} These biases, while not necessarily disqualifying, must be balanced.

In fact, the National Academies recognizes that sometimes member bias is actually necessary “to ensure that a committee is fully competent.”\textsuperscript{180} Some studies require particular perspectives despite potential bias or conflicts of interest. For example, the Academies’ official Policy on Committee Composition and Balance and Conflicts of Interest explains that “it may be important to have an ‘industrial’ perspective or an ‘environmental’ perspective” because “such individuals, through their particular knowledge and experience, are often vital to achieving an informed, comprehensive, and authoritative understanding and analysis of the specific problems and potential solutions to be

\textsuperscript{173} Id.
\textsuperscript{174} Committee Appointment Process, NAT’L ACADS., supra note 157.
\textsuperscript{175} NAT’L ACADS., GETTING TO KNOW THE COMMITTEE PROCESS, supra note 79, at 6 (“The credibility of a report can be called into question if the committee that produced it is perceived to be biased.”).
\textsuperscript{176} Id. at 7.
\textsuperscript{177} Committee Appointment Process, supra note 157 (“Committee members are expected to have points of view . . . .”).
\textsuperscript{178} See NAT’L ACADS., POLICY ON COMMITTEE COMPOSITION, supra note 103, at 5.
\textsuperscript{179} Id.
\textsuperscript{180} Id. at 3.
LEFT TO THEIR OWN DEVICES

considered by the committee.”

Conflicts of interest are different from points-of-view. The Academies defines a “conflict of interest” as “any financial or other interest which conflicts with the service of the individual because it (1) could significantly impair the individual’s objectivity or (2) could create an unfair competitive advantage for any person or organization.” Only current interests are considered conflicts, not past or possible future interests. Conflicts of interest are usually, but not always, financial. When individuals are appointed to a committee, they undergo a rigorous conflict of interest review. Generally, individuals with conflicts of interest may not serve on committees because it could cause others to “reasonably question, and perhaps discount or dismiss, the work of the committee.”

However, in some situations, the Academies may determine that a conflict of interest is unavoidable; in which case, it must promptly and publicly disclose the conflict. For example, the conflict may be unavoidable if “the individual’s qualifications, knowledge, and experience are particularly valuable to the work of the committee and if the institution is unable to identify another individual with comparable qualifications, knowledge, and experience who does not also have a conflict of interest.”

The National Academies states that unavoidable conflicts only arise in “rare situations” or “exceptional circumstances,” but a brief review of past IOM committees illustrates that this situation is not so “rare” or “exceptional.” A search on

181. Id.
182. Id. at 4.
183. Id.
184. Id.
186. NAT’L ACADS., POLICY ON COMMITTEE COMPOSITION, supra note 103, at 4.
187. This is required both by FACA and the National Academies’ own policies. See 5 U.S.C. app. 2 § 15(b)(1) (2006); Committee Appointment Process, supra note 157.
188. NAT’L ACADS., POLICY ON COMMITTEE COMPOSITION, supra note 103, at 8.
190. NAT’L ACADS., GETTING TO KNOW THE COMMITTEE PROCESS, supra note 79, at 7.
the IOM’s website for current or recent FDA-sponsored IOM committees revealed ten such committees, at least half of which contained members with industry background and at least three committees involved disclosed conflicts of interest. 191 For example, the IOM committee on Qualification of Biomarkers and Surrogate Endpoints in Chronic Disease includes a Vice President at Merck & Co. 192 The IOM concluded that this committee required “at least one person who has extensive current knowledge of the pharmaceutical industry’s involvement with efforts to define biomarker qualification strategies.” 193 Thus, despite this individual’s position at Merck, a large pharmaceutical company that engages in drug discovery and development, his membership was desirable because of his expertise and experience. 194 This committee also included another individual who had a conflict of interest because he “owns a consulting company through which he serves as a consultant to companies in the diagnostic, medical instruments and pharmaceutical industries.” 195 His membership was necessary because of his “expertise in clinical chemistry.” 196

The IOM committee on Accelerating Rare Diseases Research and Orphan Product Development was asked to evaluate strategies “to promote research discoveries and development of orphan products to improve the health of people with rare diseases.” 197 This committee evaluated public policies and legislative and regulatory initiatives relevant to product development for rare diseases. 198 This task is strikingly similar to the 510(k) Committee’s charge of evaluating innovation. Here,

191. See About Activities, INST. MED., http://www.iom.edu/Activities.aspx?search=%22food%20and%20drug%20administration%22 (last visited Oct. 30, 2011) (Disclosures of committee member conflicts of interest are only available for current projects, but not recently completed projects, so the total number of recent committees involving disclosed conflicts of interest may have in fact been greater than the three retrieved through this search.).
193. Id.
194. Id.
195. Id.
196. Id.
198. Id.
the IOM determined that the committee must include “someone with expertise and experience in the medical devices industry to help the committee examine factors affecting product development decisions by companies and assess options for accelerating research and development in the area of rare conditions.” Therefore, the IOM included on this committee a former Vice President of Medtronic, Inc., who also owned stock and was a consultant to Medtronic, despite his conflict of interest. His conflict of interest was thus “unavoidable” precisely because his “extensive experience and expertise in product research and development in the medical device industry” was considered necessary for the committee to accomplish its task. This same committee also included an individual who was a former Senior Vice President of Pfizer, Inc., owned stock and stock options in Pfizer, and who was also a “partner in a private equity firm focused on drug development programs.” This individual was required on the committee because of his “expert knowledge of drug discovery and development in the pharmaceutical industry.” Finally, this committee of fourteen people included a third member with a conflict of interest, an individual who consults with pharmaceutical, medical device, and biologics companies, because of her “direct experience with the administration of the FDA orphan product development program.”

The IOM committee on Review of the Food and Drug Administration’s Role in Ensuring Safe Food reviewed gaps in public health protection in the farm-to-table food safety system and made legislative, regulatory, and administrative recommendations. Two members of this committee had disclosed

200. Id. at 388. Medtronic manufactures medical devices, including devices used in treating certain rare conditions. Id. at 222.
201. Id. at 388.
202. Id.
203. Id.
204. Id.
205. Id.
conflicts of interest. First, the Senior Vice President and Chief Scientific and Regulatory Affairs Officer of the Grocery Manufacturers Association was permitted on the committee because of his “current knowledge of the regulatory and scientific activities and perspectives of the food industry.” He was appointed to this committee precisely because of his “current, in-depth knowledge of industry activities and perspectives.” The second member was an expert in the field of risk analysis and chemical risk assessment, who was appointed to the committee despite his role in a consulting firm that performs risk assessments for food industry clients and “whose financial interests could be affected by the outcome of the committee’s study.”

Clearly, individuals with conflicts of interest are frequently deemed valuable and necessary for IOM committees to fulfill their functions. In fact, it is often the source of these conflicts of interest—the individuals’ experience and connections with the industries involved—that makes their membership on the committee essential. Thus, these conflicts are considered “unavoidable.” At least three out of ten FDA-sponsored IOM committees contain members with such conflicts of interest. One can hardly view that as “exceptional” or “rare.”

V. IOM’S 510(K) COMMITTEE

The IOM’s 510(k) Committee must be fairly balanced in order to properly perform its functions. It must include all essential areas of expertise, balance the biases and perspectives of its members, and disclose any unavoidable conflicts of interest. A failure to achieve this balance violates both FACA section 15 as well as the National Academies’ own policies and requirements.

The 510(k) Committee was originally asked to assess two

208. Id. (emphasis added).
209. Id.
210. Id.
critical questions: 1) whether “the current 510(k) process optimally protects patients” and 2) whether it “promot[e]s innovation in support of public health.” If the committee found that the 510(k) system did not protect patients or promote innovation, it was asked to recommend any legislative, regulatory, or administrative changes that would be necessary to achieve these goals. In January 2011, the 510(k) Committee was also referred seven specific issues to consider. These issues covered a broad range of controversial issues, including the FDA’s authority to fully or partially rescind a 510(k) clearance, clarification as to when a device should no longer be available for use as a predicate, establishment of a new Class IIb device category, whether the FDA should consider off-label use when determining a device’s “intended use,” requiring each 510(k) submitter to keep at least one unit of the device under review available for the CDRH to access upon request, authorities and requirements for post-market surveillance studies, and clarification and consolidation of the terms “indication for use” and “intended use.” Therefore, the committee’s composition must be balanced not only for the initial broad system-wide and policy issues, but also for the additional specific issues it was later asked to address.

The 510(k) Committee has twelve members, consisting of five physicians, three lawyers, and a number of talented academics with a variety of technical backgrounds. Overall, the committee includes members with a wide range of educational and professional experiences. Each of the individuals on the committee is highly qualified and impressive, and this Article does not question their expertise or competence. However, there are some critical absences on this committee. Notably, the committee does not include:

213. Id.
214. FDA, PLAN OF ACTION, supra note 5, at 6; Press Release, FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., supra note 63.
215. See FDA, 510(K) AND SCIENCE REPORT RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 3, at 2, 11–13, 16–19; FDA, PLAN OF ACTION, supra note 5, at 6.
216. NAT'L ACADS., GETTING TO KNOW THE COMMITTEE PROCESS, supra note 79, at 5 (“[A] committee that is well-balanced for one purpose may not be appropriately constructed for a modified task.”).
217. MEDICAL DEVICES AND THE PUBLIC’S HEALTH, supra note 21, at 279–86.
Inventors and innovators who have created new device products under current FDA systems;\textsuperscript{218} product developers who have brought products from concept to market through the FDA approval processes; entrepreneurs; venture capitalists, investment bankers, or angel investors with experience financing new medical device innovation; individuals who routinely prepare 510(k) applications; management or other professionals from the medical device industry; or patients or patient advocates.

The FDA acknowledged some of these omissions in a recent hearing before Congress. Dr. Jeffrey Shuren, the Director of the FDA’s CDRH, admitted that the IOM committee does not include any innovators or inventors, entrepreneurs or investment and venture capital experts, or patients or patient group representatives.\textsuperscript{219} The FDA later amended these answers, identify-

\textsuperscript{218} One committee member, Dr. Lazar Greenfield, is credited with inventing the Greenfield vena cava filter. See id. at 280. However, this invention was introduced in 1973, before there was separate regulation of medical devices by the FDA. See Ken Garber, The Clot Stopper, \textit{22 INVENTION \\& TECH. MAG.}, Summer 2006, at 35, 36 (describing the invention of the Kimray-Greenfield filter in the early 1970s and stating that “at the time, the Food and Drug Administration did not have to approve medical devices”). The Medical Device Amendments creating the initial device regulatory system did not become law until 1976. Medical Device Amendments of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-295, 90 Stat. 539 (1976). The modern 510(k) system did not start to take shape until the Safe Medical Device Amendments of 1990, Safe Medical Devices Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-629, 104 Stat. 4511 (1990). There have been major subsequent changes to the statutory system for medical device regulation, most notably in 1997 and 2007. See Food and Drug Administration Amendments Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-85, 121 Stat. 823 (2007); Food and Drug Administration Modernization Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-115, 111 Stat. 2296 (1997). Of course, there has been a constant parade of new regulations, guidance documents, and policies in the last 20 years. See \textit{Overview of Device Regulation}, \textit{FOOD \\& DRUG ADMIN.}, \texttt{http://www.fda.gov/MedicalDevices/DeviceRegulationandGuidance/Overview/default.htm} (last updated Aug. 31, 2009) (providing information about many of the statutes, regulations and guidance concerning medical devices). The subsequent major changes to the Greenfield filter occurred after Boston Scientific acquired the device—and although Dr. Greenfield made suggestions to improve the filter’s design, it was Boston Scientific that navigated the FDA’s regulatory process. Cf. Ken Garber, \textit{supra} note 218, at 39 (describing the company’s subsequent changes to the filter).

\textsuperscript{219} \textit{Impact of Medical Device Regulation on Jobs and Patients: Hearing Before the H. Subcomm. on Health of the H. Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 112th Cong. 62 (2011)} (statement of Dr. Jeffrey Shuren, Director, Food \\& Drug Admin. Center for Devices and Radiological Health), \textit{available at}
ing two committee members as “inventors” or “innovators.” However, these individuals did not contribute to the creation of new devices under current FDA systems, so their contributions to this committee as “inventors” and “innovators” are severely limited and not particularly relevant. Without current and relevant experiences and perspectives on the committee, it is hardly “fairly balanced” to answer broad policy questions involving patient safety and innovation and is also not fairly balanced to adequately address the seven additional questions posed to it.

A. THE COMMITTEE LACKS BALANCE OF EXPERTISE TO ADDRESS SAFETY

The 510(k) Committee must include expertise to address both safety and innovation issues. Patient safety is undoubtedly a broad, public issue involving policy and regulatory recommendations and affecting the public at large. It is a complex, multi-factorial issue requiring consideration of not only manufacturing controls, device design, and other industry-related factors, but also patient access, autonomy, and acceptable risk. It is not a “narrow and explicit” function, nor is it “politically

http://democrats.energycommerce.house.gov/sites/default/files/image_uploads/Transcript_MedDevice.pdf. The FDA later justified these absences by saying that such individuals would have a conflict of interest and would thus be ineligible to serve on the committee; however, IOM’s past practices undermine this justification. See Letter from Jeanne Ireland, Assistant Comm’r for Legislation, Food & Drug Admin., to Hon. Joseph R. Pitts, Chairman, Subcomm. on Health, H. Comm. on Energy & Commerce (Apr. 12, 2011) (on file with author) [hereinafter Letter from Jeanne Ireland] (justifying the lack of these various individuals on the committee).

220. See Letter from Jeanne Ireland, supra note 219, at 15 (identifying Dr. Lazar Greenfield and Dr. Gary Dorfman as the committee’s only inventors and innovators).

221. As explained above, Dr. Greenfield’s experience as an inventor or innovator predates any current FDA regulatory schemes. See supra note 218. Dr. Dorfman, who “holds several patents related to medical devices,” may qualify as an “inventor”; however, his most recent patent was filed in 2002. Letter from Jeanne Ireland, supra note 219, at 15. See U.S. Patent No. 6,736,842 (filed July 24, 2002). He does not qualify as an “innovator” because innovation requires more than mere abstract conceptualization and patent-filing. See infra notes 231–236 and accompanying text (describing innovation as the transformation of an invention into a helpful commercial product).

222. This Article only argues that these individuals’ experience is insufficient to meet the specific requirements of this particular committee—it in no way intends to diminish their professional qualifications, knowledge, experience, and contributions.
neutral and technocratic.”

Rather, the safety of all patients in this country is an issue that most certainly affects “areas of general national import” and involves “diverse and far-reaching issues.” As previously discussed, where committees are called upon to make policy decisions or provide regulatory advice, broad representation is necessary. More diverse representation may also be necessary when the committee’s purpose is “to study the effects of a particular type of regulation . . . on the public.” Therefore, following the reasoning the courts have applied under FACA section 5, the 510(k) system’s protection of public safety is an issue requiring diverse committee representation.

Those who invent, design, develop, manufacture, finance, and test medical devices have much-needed expertise in how to ensure the safety of those devices. In fact, they are legally required to design, research, test, manufacture, and support the product in a safe manner. They offer valuable perspectives on the types of research systems, manufacturing controls, testing strategies, and design processes that are needed to enhance patient safety. Through their experience, they are familiar

227. Cf. Cargill, 173 F.3d at 337 (finding broad representation unnecessary because the committee was not called upon to make policy or regulatory decisions).
229. See, e.g., 21 U.S.C. § 360e(d) (2006) (conditioning premarket approval on a “showing of reasonable assurance” that the device is safe as well as an examination of the manufacturing, processing, packing, installation methods, facilities and controls, as well as device performance); id. § 351(a)–(d) (2006) (defining when a device is “adulterated” and making it illegal to ship such a device); 21 C.F.R. § 814.2 (2011) (requiring approved devices to be safe and effective); id. § 820.1 (establishing quality system regulations to ensure that finished devices are safe).
230. See Josh Makower, Consulting Associate Professor of Medicine, Stanford University, The Structure of the MedTech Innovation Ecosystem (June 14, 2010), in PUB. HEALTH EFFECTIVENESS OF THE FDA 510(K) CLEARANCE PROCESS: BALANCING PATIENT SAFETY AND INNOVATION—WORKSHOP REPORT, 18 (2010), available at http://www.iom.edu/~/media/Files/PublicHealth/510kProcess/2010-JUN-14/Presentations/14%20Mak
with how the FDA’s regulatory process affects these factors. These stakeholders are responsible for all new devices marketed in the United States, and it is their experience and work that greatly affects the safety of patients throughout the nation. Yet the committee lacks this expertise. Without at least some of these individuals on the committee, it cannot adequately evaluate the 510(k) system’s effect on patient safety and make practical, helpful recommendations as to how to improve it.

B. THE 510(K) COMMITTEE LACKS BALANCE OF EXPERTISE TO ADDRESS INNOVATION

Innovation is more than just invention. Invention is simply the embodiment of a new idea. It “generates new ideas, patents, prototypes, designs, breakthrough experiments, and working models.” Innovation, however, is the transformation of an idea or invention into a commercial product for the betterment of society. It is the identification of a need and the development of a service or product to meet that need. Innovation is responsible for an invention’s acceptance in society, as well as its profitability and value. Thus, innovation encompasses more than just invention—it includes the entire cycle, from invention, research and development, manufacturing, and marketing, to the ultimate value realization in society.

Invention

owner.pdf (explaining that good quality systems, beginning with design development and control, and continuing through manufacturing and post market surveillance, are primarily responsible for patient safety).


232. Id. (explaining that innovation “transforms these inventions into commercial products, services, and businesses”).

233. Id.

234. See id.

235. See Larry Dignan, The Difference Between Innovation and Invention, ZDNET (Mar. 7, 2007, 9:09 AM), http://www.zdnet.com/blog/btl/the-difference-between-innovation-and-invention/4610; see also William Buxton, Innovation vs. Invention, ROTMAN MAG., Fall 2005, at 52, 52 (“[I]nnovation is far more about prospecting, mining, refining and adding value . . . than it is about pure invention.”); Makower, supra note 230 (identifying the parts of the medical technology innovation system, including “fuelers” such as venture capitalists, investors, and public markets, “innovation catalysts” such as small start-ups, large companies, incubators, and other inventors and entrepreneurs, “consumers” such as patients, physicians, and hospitals, and “regulators” such as FDA, CMS, third party payers, and professional societies).
is possible without innovation, and innovation does not necessarily require invention.\(^{236}\)

To assess the 510(k) system’s promotion of innovation, the committee must include more than lawyers, doctors, and academics. It must include more than inventors or patent-holders. The IOM’s charge requires an appreciation of how regulation impacts the complex innovation ecosystem. It requires an understanding of innovation, finance, entrepreneurship, product development, manufacturing, and regulatory process. At least some 510(k) Committee members must have this knowledge. They must have experience in transforming inventions into commercial products and bringing value to society through these new products. Ideally, the Committee should include people who have worked within the current 510(k) framework when they have conceptualized devices, designed and developed those devices, obtained financing for new product lines, manufactured those devices, and successfully brought them to market. Essentially, the committee needs entrepreneurs and those who have recently been involved in the medical device industry for their experience and insights into the current 510(k) system’s effect on innovation. Unfortunately, the committee lacks this expertise.

The FDA has even acknowledged the crucial role industry plays in innovation. In a recent presentation made to the annual meeting of the Food and Drug Law Institute, the Director of CDRH stated: “U.S. medical device development is an ecosystem with shared responsibilities—to remain healthy it needs a strong device industry, a strong U.S. research system, and a strong FDA.”\(^{237}\) Thus, CDRH reconfirmed and explicitly recognized the vital role of industry in medical device innovation. This is precisely one of those situations in which it is crucial to have an “industrial” perspective to achieve an “informed, comprehensive, and authoritative understanding and analysis of the specific problems and potential solutions to be considered by the committee.”\(^{238}\) After all, it is industry that designs, tests,
develops, and makes the regulatory submissions for essentially all medical devices marketed in the United States.

While the current 510(k) Committee includes highly qualified, intelligent, and experienced members, individuals with the critical expertise in innovation, manufacturing, entrepreneurship, device development, financing, and marketing are conspicuously absent. Each current committee member is individually impressive and has expertise worthy of inclusion on the committee, but without this broader membership, the committee is inadequate to fulfill its mission. Thus, this committee is not fairly balanced to perform its functions and fails to satisfy FACA section 15 as well as the National Academies’ own policies on committee composition.

C. THE 510(k) COMMITTEE LACKS BALANCE TO ADDRESS ADDITIONAL QUESTIONS

In addition to the general issues of patient safety and innovation, the IOM 510(k) Committee was also asked to address seven specific issues, as explained above.239 Without an industry member on the committee, it is not fairly balanced to tackle these additional questions. For example, the committee was asked to “consider defining the scope and grounds for the exercise of the Center’s authority to fully or partially rescind a 510(k) clearance.”240 Recommendations as to rescinding 510(k) clearances may alter the established rights of those who might be affected241 (i.e. medical device companies who are currently marketing products cleared through the 510(k) process), and thus those interests must be represented on the committee.

As another example, the 510(k) Committee was also asked to “consider the possibility of requiring each 510(k) submitter to keep at least one unit of the device under review available for CDRH to access upon request.”242 This has enormous practical implications for medical device companies—storage and warehousing of functional devices such as large magnetic resonance

239. See FDA, 510(k) AND SCIENCE REPORT RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 3, at 2, 11–13, 16–19; FDA, PLAN OF ACTION, supra note 5, at 6.
240. FDA, PLAN OF ACTION, supra note 5, at 6.
242. FDA, PLAN OF ACTION, supra note 7, at 6.
imaging machines and other imaging devices, as well as complicated and sensitive electronics such as surgical robots, is not only expensive, but requires large amounts of real estate and the creation of specially-designed warehouses that can accommodate the specific weight, chemical, and temperature requirements of these devices.\textsuperscript{243} Device installation and calibration also presents significant burdens to industry.\textsuperscript{244} Medical device companies have essential insight as to the practicability, or even possibility, of this new requirement. They also offer valuable perspectives on the benefits (or lack thereof) that such a requirement may have in complaint investigation and corrective action for problematic devices.\textsuperscript{245} Theoretically it might be a great idea to keep one of each device ready for inspection at all times, but there are practical limitations that only those involved in the industry may be likely to consider.

Although this Article only discusses two of the seven additional issues, each of the seven questions posed to the 510(k) Committee could benefit from, or even requires, the perspective of an industry member on the committee. Therefore, even if the committee were fairly balanced for its original functions, it is not fairly balanced for these additional tasks.

D. THE COMMITTEE LACKS BALANCE OF PERSPECTIVES

IOM committees must also be balanced with respect to the perspectives and biases of the committee members. While not explicitly required by FACA,\textsuperscript{246} this is an explicit requirement according to the National Academies’ own policies.\textsuperscript{247} As previously noted, IOM committees can include individuals with preexisting biases, since most biases are not conflicts of interest, providing that there are countervailing viewpoints on the committee.\textsuperscript{248} Unfortunately, the 510(k) Committee does not include a balance of viewpoints.

For instance, one committee member spent almost twenty

\begin{footnotes}
\item[243] See id.
\item[244] See FDA, 510(k) AND SCIENCE REPORT RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 3, at 17.
\item[245] See 21 C.F.R. § 820.100 (2010) (discussing corrective and preventative action regarding medical devices).
\item[246] But as noted earlier, this is an implicit requirement when a lack of objectivity compromises the ability of the committee to fulfill its function.
\item[247] See supra notes 170, 174–176 and accompanying text.
\item[248] See supra notes 177–181 and accompanying text.
\end{footnotes}
years at the national public interest law firm Public Citizen Litigation Group, whose motto is “Defending democracy. Resisting corporate power.”

Public Citizen’s goal is to “defend democracy from corporate greed.” The organization is highly critical of the 510(k) process, asserting that medical devices are approved too quickly so that “dangerous or deadly devices enter the market.” In fact, the Director of Public Citizen’s Health Research Group criticized the FDA’s deferral to the IOM, stating that “the FDA is not being forceful enough about improving the safety and effectiveness of new devices” and is “yield[ing]” to innovation.

While this individual’s participation and viewpoint is certainly appropriate on the committee, there is no apparent counterweight—the committee actually requires an explicit pro-industry viewpoint to achieve balance.

Thus, the 510(k) Committee is unbalanced with respect to points-of-view as well as expertise. This imbalance in perspectives subjects the committee to the risk of actual bias, or at least the perception of bias, which may undermine the committee’s hard work, regardless of the accuracy of its final report.

E. THE COMMITTEE NEEDS PATIENTS OR PATIENT ADVOCATES

It is also critical that the patient—the ultimate stakeholder—is not represented on the committee. The charge to the committee requires balancing risk (i.e., the protection of patients) with innovation (i.e., getting patients faster and more economical access to innovative new products). This balancing process raises politically significant questions of patient auton-
omy, beneficence, and medical ethics. When should the patient have the right to some particular device despite known risks? Under what circumstances should the FDA intervene and make that decision for the patient by barring access to the device? The FDA charged the 510(k) Committee with determining the “optimal” balance between these factors.

Any adequate evaluation of patient safety requires a patient or patient advocate’s viewpoint and expertise. What constitutes an unacceptable risk or adequate safety is a value-driven determination, varying greatly with each individual and each disease. The stakeholder most affected by that balance and best positioned to opine upon it is the patient. In fact, the patient may be the only person even qualified to make this determination. Innovation concerns also require a patient’s perspective. The focus of device innovation is centered around and driven by patient needs. Devices are conceptualized only after identification of a particular patient need, and only devices that meet these needs can succeed in the market. Thus, the patient perspective is critical to a complete understanding of innovation.

But the 510(k) Committee includes no patients or patient advocates. It is hard to justify this omission—it is easy to find a patient representative without any financial conflict, and many other IOM committees have included such an individual.


255. See Makower, supra note 230, at 31 (explaining that the focus of MedTech innovation is “completely patient need driven, not technology driven”).

256. Id.

257. Many other IOM committees have included patient or consumer advocates. For example, the Committee on Comparative Effectiveness Research Prioritization included a woman from the National Breast Cancer Coalition, who herself had survived breast cancer and radiation-induced sarcoma. See Comm. on Comparative Effectiveness Research Prioritization & Board on Health Care Services, Inst. Med., Initial National Priorities for Comparative Effectiveness Research 218 (2009), available at http://www.nap.edu/catalog.php?record_id=12648. The Committee on Review of Omics-Based Tests for Predicting Patient Outcomes in Clinical Trials in-
While the committee does include a number of physicians, they cannot speak for the patient—the patient, not the doctor, is the ultimate decision-maker. The argument that the physician can make these decisions for the patient is long discredited.

For example, studies have shown that physicians make different decisions when they themselves are the patient—often recommending to their patients the treatment with the greatest chance of survival, while choosing for themselves the treatment with the lowest complication risk. Medical decision-making can be a function of who the patient is as much as what the patient has. Arguing that a patient representative is not capa-


See Amir Halevy, Medical Futility, Patient Autonomy, and Professional Integrity: Finding the Appropriate Balance, 18 HEALTH MATRIX 261, 266 (2008) (“In both medical ethics and health law, patient autonomy has replaced medical paternalism as the dominant decision-making model.”).

See also Holly Fernandez Lynch et al., Compliance with Advance Directives, 29 J. LEGAL MED. 133, 133 & n.2 (2008) (“[P]hysician paternalism has been widely rejected . . . .”); Rich, supra note 253, at 92 (explaining that “notions of beneficence and non-maleficence” are paternalistic and without justification).

See, e.g., Peter A. Ubel et al., Physicians Recommend Different Treatments for Patients than they Would Choose for Themselves, 171 ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED. 630 (2011).
ble of adding to the debate over this balance is simply paternalism run amok. The patient (or patient advocate) provides a critical area of expertise and an essential perspective needed to assess both questions of safety and innovation. Without such an individual, the committee is not fairly balanced for either function.

VI. THE FDA CANNOT LEGALLY USE THE IOM 510(K) COMMITTEE’S REPORT

As explained above, the IOM 510(k) Committee does not include any innovators, entrepreneurs, financiers, industry employees, patients, or patient advocates. These perspectives are critical for the committee to adequately evaluate the 510(k) system’s effect on patient safety and device innovation as well as to answer the seven additional issues it was asked to address. Without these perspectives, the committee is not “fairly balanced” with respect to either expertise or viewpoints and, therefore, is not in compliance with FACA. Since the 510(k) Committee fails to comply with this statutory requirement, the FDA “may not use any advice or recommendation” this committee provides.

These omissions in committee membership are surprising, given the IOM’s usual diligence in appointing members to committees to ensure the requisite expertise and achieve fair balance. The IOM could easily have avoided the gaps in expertise and lack of balance on this committee by including any one of a number of qualified individuals. In fact, many such individuals already belong to the NAS or IOM, or have at least served on other committees in the past. It simply defies credibility that the IOM would fail to include essential experts and viewpoints on this particular committee when it already has highly vetted, extremely qualified individuals among its mem-

and goals and thus is in the best position to make decisions regarding his life and health”.

263. Id. § 15(a).
264. See Our Study Process, INST. MED., http://www.iom.edu/About-IOM/Study-Process.aspx (last updated May 24, 2011) (“Our consensus studies are conducted by committees carefully composed to ensure the requisite expertise . . . ”).
265. See, e.g., supra note 200 and accompanying text (describing the inclusion of a Medtronic executive on an IOM committee).
bership. Alternatively, the IOM could have looked beyond its membership to any one of a number of distinguished experts and leaders in the medical device field to obtain the required committee membership, but it did not do so.

If the IOM was concerned about conflicts of interest, it could have simply disclosed these conflicts as it has done so many times before with other committees.\(^{266}\) When committees have evaluated drug innovation, pharmaceutical industry members were included on the committee.\(^{267}\) When committees have evaluated food safety, food industry members were on the committee.\(^{268}\) When committees assessed issues involving patient safety, patients or patient advocates were on the committee.\(^{269}\) In those cases, the individuals with conflicts of interest were deemed necessary to achieve balance and provide critical expertise, so the IOM classified those conflicts as “unavoidable.” Here, however, the IOM seemingly concluded that a committee evaluating medical devices did not require anyone involved in the device industry and that this committee evaluating patient safety did not require any patients or patient advocates. This inconsistency is both surprising and alarming, especially coming from an institution renowned for its thoroughness, objectivity, and balance.

Furthermore, for purposes of FACA’s fair balance requirement, it is irrelevant that the Committee solicits advice from industry, holds open data-gathering meetings, or even encourages open dialogue with outsiders who are not on the committee. It is also irrelevant that individuals with the expertise currently lacking from the committee may have been independent reviewers of the committee’s report before the report was issued. While this type of public input and fairness in the reviewing process is certainly desirable, and even legally required,\(^{270}\) it does not compensate for the committee’s failure to achieve fair balance on the committee itself. Section 15’s “fair balance” requirement is a specific requirement that the committee must meet.\(^{271}\) Therefore, while stakeholder participation through these other methods is necessary and valuable, it is not alone

\(^{266}\) See supra notes 191–210 and accompanying text.

\(^{267}\) See, e.g., supra notes 203–204 and accompanying text.

\(^{268}\) See, e.g., supra notes 207–209 and accompanying text.

\(^{269}\) See supra note 257 and accompanying text.


\(^{271}\) Compare id. § 15(b)(1), with supra notes 107–111 and accompanying text.
sufficient to satisfy FACA section 15.

As even the FDA has acknowledged, the IOM’s 510(k) Committee lacks sufficient expertise and fair balance to perform its functions of assessing patient safety and promoting innovation. As it has done many times before, IOM should have appointed qualified experts with these diverse backgrounds to provide critical expertise and balance. The IOM’s failure to do so has resulted in an incomplete and unbalanced committee, which threatens the integrity of the study and fails to comply with FACA’s requirements. The FDA is therefore statutorily forbidden from using any advice or reports this committee offers.

VII. POLICY CONSIDERATIONS DICTATE A BALANCED COMMITTEE

It is essential that the 510(k) Committee, as well as any other government-commissioned IOM committee, is balanced, includes all necessary expertise, and complies with FACA requirements. A failure to include appropriate membership on IOM committees has significant implications for the FDA, IOM, and the general public.

The FDA is responsible for regulating the production and marketing of all foods, drugs, medical devices, cosmetics, and many other health products in the United States.272 Its “regulations have considerable impact on the nation’s health, industries, and economy.”273 Government agencies, especially those that play as critical a role in society as does the FDA, are expected to utilize fair, accurate, and transparent processes when crafting rules and regulations. President Barack Obama reaffirmed this expectation through his “Open Government Initiative,”274 designed to “establish a system of transparency, public participation, and collaboration” in government.275 Part of this

272. The Importance of Public Comment to the FDA, FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., http://www.fda.gov/Drugs/ResourcesForYou/Consumers/ucm143569.htm (last updated May 1, 2009).
273. Id.
initiative was aimed at providing government decision-makers with a wider array of information through public input of ideas and expertise. In response, the FDA launched its own “Transparency Initiative” in June 2009. “Transparency in FDA's activities and decision-making allows the public to better understand the Agency's decisions, increasing credibility and promoting accountability.”

If the FDA begins to use or rely heavily on information provided by incomplete or unbalanced sources, especially when those sources purport to be fair and balanced, its ultimate decisions may be uninformed and have undesirable effects. Members of Congress have expressed this same concern. For instance, Senator John Kerry recently wrote to the FDA Commissioner, urging her “to establish a deliberative and transparent process for reviewing the IOM recommendations that ensures adequate opportunity to solicit substantive and meaningful input from all stakeholder groups before any recommendations are finalized.” He was concerned that the recommendations may be “disruptive to the medical device industry and could have a chilling effect on growth, jobs, and patient access to medical innovation.” A number of other members of Congress also wrote a letter to the IOM, expressing concern regarding the lack of expertise on the 510(k) Committee, and requesting opportunities for “substantive and meaningful participation by these stakeholders.”

Additionally, the public will also lose trust in the agency.

276. See Memorandum from Peter R. Orszag, Office of Mgmt. & Budget to the Heads of Exec. Dep’ts & Agencies (Dec. 8, 2009), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/assets/memoranda_2010/m10-06.pdf (“Participation allows members of the public to contribute ideas and expertise so that their government can make policies with the benefit of information that is widely dispersed in society.”).
280. Id.
An agency—such as the FDA, which has such a substantial impact on public health and on which the public heavily relies—must use committees that are fairly balanced in order to maintain its own credibility and authority. If the FDA intends to make major, controversial changes to the 510(k) clearance system and plans on using an IOM committee’s recommendations when making those changes, that committee must include all necessary expertise and foreclose any appearance of bias. Otherwise, it will be both irresponsible and illegal for the FDA to use the IOM report, and the FDA will lose the public’s faith.

Furthermore, if the FDA is permitted to defer issues to IOM committees that fail to comply with section 15’s requirements rather than use its own advisory committees, notice-and-comment rulemaking, or guidance development, the FDA will be able to completely circumvent FACA and other mechanisms for public involvement. FACA was designed to increase the public accountability of committees that advise federal agencies.282 “What we are dealing with . . . goes to the bedrock of Government decision making. Information is an important commodity in this capital.”283 Section 15 was added to impose some of these requirements, albeit a watered-down version, on NAS committees, like the 510(k) Committee.284 Since official advisory committees are subject to far more rigorous notification, access, monitoring, and other requirements than are IOM committees,285 it might be tempting for the FDA to simply use an IOM committee rather than an official federal advisory committee. If these IOM committees are not expected to comply with even the minimal section 15 requirements, then the FDA will be able to use IOM committees that remain unaccountable—unaccountable to the public, the government, and even its own institutional policies—in lieu of its own advisory committees. The result would be a governmental body receiving heavily relied-upon reports from committees that are unelected, incomplete, unanswerable to, and disconnected from the public.286 This is exactly what FACA was intended to prevent.

282. See supra notes 73–76 and accompanying text.
284. See supra notes 98–102 and accompanying text.
285. See supra notes 75–76 and accompanying text.
286. As a side note, it is also irresponsible for the federal government, through the FDA, to spend taxpayer dollars on an IOM committee that contravenes federal law and that the FDA is legally prohibited from using.
The IOM and the National Academies also have something to lose if this unbalanced committee proceeds. Although FACA only prohibits federal agency use of noncompliant NAS committees and does not prohibit NAS’s own formation or use of such committees, NAS’s reputation and work quality will deteriorate if it excludes necessary perspectives and fails to avoid actual or perceived bias. The National Academies produces 200–300 authoritative reports each year, many of which influence policy decisions. Its recommendations carry so much weight because of “[t]he reputation of the institution for objectivity, integrity, independence, and competence,” which it considers to be “one of its most valuable assets.” The institution is renowned for its thorough, robust, and objective research. Its members are some of the most respected and experienced professionals in their fields. But the value of the institution’s work will suffer if its committees are unbalanced or lack crucial expertise—it will no longer be regarded as objective, and possibly not even as competent.

Additionally, the IOM’s failure to comply with its own internal policies regarding conflicts of interest, balance, and bias will irreparably damage its reputation. The IOM depends on its policies and procedures to ensure quality, objectivity and independence. The public trusts that the IOM follows its own policies. This particular committee’s glaring failure to do so may cast a shadow over other IOM activities as well. There is little point in even having policies if the institution can selectively choose to follow them or not. By releasing this report, IOM has endangered its reputation for completeness, balance, and objectivity.

289. *See Our Reputation*, supra note 86 (“Over many decades, the [National Academies] have earned a solid reputation as the nation’s premier source of independent, expert advice on scientific, engineering, and medical issues.”); *Our Study Process*, supra note 264 (“The IOM applies the National Academies’ rigorous research process, aimed at providing objective and straightforward answers to difficult questions of national importance.”).
290. The National Academies boasts that more than three hundred of its members are Nobel laureates and are among the world’s most distinguished experts in their fields. *See Who We Are*, *Nat'L Acads.*, http://www.nationalacademies.org/about/whoweare.html (last visited Oct. 30, 2011).
Finally, much of what the 510(k) Committee does is secret already—it deliberates in closed meetings, does not disclose members’ curricula vitae or conflict-of-interest forms, and does not make its proposed recommendations available to the public for comment.291 “All analyses and drafts of the report remain confidential.”292 The committee only held three meetings that were open to the public.293 The “brief summaries” of the closed meetings provide little, if any, useful information.294 Even the material that is supposedly accessible to the public is not easy to obtain.295 Therefore, it is especially important for the IOM to comply with the few openness and balance requirements under section 15. It is not enough to allow stakeholder participation in other steps of the process, such as data-gathering. Nor is it sufficient to have individuals with the required, yet missing, expertise review the report after it is complete. The 510(k) Committee needed members on the inside who could provide much-needed perspectives and experience that were lacking—and this is exactly what FACA prescribes. FACA dictates that the committee itself includes a fair balance of expertise and perspectives.296 Otherwise, critical expertise and viewpoints cannot be considered in any meaningful way.

VIII. CONCLUSION

The IOM 510(k) Committee’s purpose is to assess how well the current 510(k) process advances medical device innovation while simultaneously assuring patient safety. Safety and innovation are unquestionably broad issues of national import, and the IOM’s recommendations will greatly affect the public health. Given the significance and breadth of this evaluation, the 510(k) Committee must contain broad membership including inventors/innovators, entrepreneurs, product developers,

291. See supra notes 151–166 and accompanying text; see also Federal Advisory Committee Act, INST. MED., http://www.iom.edu/About-IOM/Study-Process/FACA.aspx (last visited Oct. 30, 2011) (explaining when committee processes are open to the public and when they are not).
292. Federal Advisory Committee Act, supra note 291.
293. Medical Devices and the Public’s Health, supra note 21, at 19 (listing committee meetings).
294. See supra note 162 (describing the brief summaries).
295. See supra note 160 (explaining that both authors of this Article have inquired about available materials, receiving no response whatsoever).
financiers, industry professionals, and patients or patient advocates. These stakeholders can offer valuable, yet currently missing, insights into the current 510(k) system’s effect on safety and innovation. These are also the stakeholders that will be most greatly affected by the IOM’s recommendations and the FDA’s subsequent actions.

Unfortunately, the 510(k) Committee does not contain all of the required areas of expertise and perspectives, rendering it not “fairly balanced.” The IOM could have easily avoided these critical gaps in committee membership by appointing additional qualified experts and individuals in these areas, as it routinely has done for other committees—but it did not do so. The actual content of the IOM report is irrelevant if the process used to arrive at that report is flawed. Thus, the current committee fails to comply with federal law and also fails to comply with its own internal policies regarding committee composition.

As a result, the FDA is legally prohibited from using this IOM committee. However, we cannot unring a bell—now that this committee has issued its final report, it will be impossible to know whether the FDA saw it, read it, or used it. Any of the FDA’s subsequent actions may thereafter be legally challenged as a violation of FACA section 15. FDA may lose its credibility, and the IOM may have irreparably damaged its reputation for accuracy and objectivity. The IOM should have refrained from issuing a final report from this committee until this matter could be resolved.

The 510(k) system is responsible for clearing most of the life-saving medical devices currently on the market. When contemplating a major overhaul of a system as significant as the 510(k) system, with the public health and entire U.S. medical device market at stake, the FDA must rely on accurate, informed, and objective advice. It cannot be permitted to rely on an IOM committee that is unfairly balanced and in contravention of federal law and National Academies’ policies. These concerns are not limited to only this particular committee—expertise, fairness and balance are essential for all IOM committees that influence government decision-making. The IOM, and the government agencies that utilize the IOM, must be held accountable. The public deserves nothing less.