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The Persistence of Segregation: Links Between Residential Segregation and School Segregation

Nancy A. Denton*

Parents, researchers, courts, and others interested in school desegregation for the last four decades have noted almost unanimously that school segregation and residential segregation are inextricably entwined. This connection is grounded in the preeminence of the concept of “neighborhood schools” in the United States. As Reynolds Farley said twenty years ago, “If parents desire that their children attend neighborhood schools and if the nation’s Constitution requires racially integrated schools, then neighborhoods must be integrated.” The violent reaction in many urban areas to busing further demonstrates the important relationship between neighborhood segregation and school segregation.2

It is appropriate, then, to examine the status of residential segregation as a prelude to a discussion of school segregation. As long as the traditional, geographic idea of neighborhood schools continues to hold sway, neighborhood segregation will naturally determine school segregation. Trends in residential segregation during the past four decades are very clear. To put it bluntly, neighborhood segregation, particularly that of African-Americans from non-Hispanic whites, has been high, continues

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2. See Susan Olzak et al., School Desegregation, Interracial Exposure, and Antibus ing Activity in Contemporary Urban America, 100 AM. J. SOC. 196, 217 (1994) (describing antibusing protests including meetings, rallies, picketing, boycotts, and riots). See generally JENNIFER HOCHSCHILD, THE NEW AMERICAN DILEMMA: LIBERAL DEMOCRACY AND SCHOOL DESEGREGATION (1984) (examining how incrementalism and popular control work to desegregate schools); D. GARTH TAYLOR, PUBLIC OPINION AND COLLECTIVE ACTION: THE BOSTON SCHOOL DESEGREGATION CONFLICT (1986) (showing that although a great majority of white Bostonians are not racist on most questions, most of the non-racist majority is against busing in Boston).
to be high, and can be expected to remain high in the foreseeable future.\textsuperscript{3} This is particularly true in large cities of the Northeast and Midwest with large African-American populations, where, not coincidentally, school segregation also remains very high.\textsuperscript{4} While there is evidence of a decline in residential segregation in many places, the magnitude of these declines is small.\textsuperscript{5}

One need not delve exhaustively into the research on school desegregation to find acknowledgment of the important effect of residential segregation on school segregation. Yet researchers studying residential segregation have not tended to give school segregation as important a role. No doubt some of this asymmetry comes from the lack of data on schools in the population and housing census, the data source that researchers use most often in studying residential segregation. But if we acknowledge that progress in reducing segregation in both neighborhoods and schools has stalled or slowed,\textsuperscript{6} then considering the two issues jointly may shed light on both.

In this Essay, I document in Part I the current status of research into the levels and trends of residential segregation in the urban areas of the United States. To the extent that neighborhood schools remain important to U.S. citizens, discussions of policy to desegregate schools must be rooted in up-to-date information about residential segregation. I then review various explanations for the levels and trends in residential segregation. In Part II, I argue that many people frequently explain residential segregation with intuitively appealing but erroneous rationales that I call "myths," and that these myths about residential segregation in turn distort discussions of school desegregation. In Part III, I describe some commonalities


\textsuperscript{6} Massey & Denton, supra note 3, at 223; Rivkin, supra note 4, at 291.
between school and residential segregation. At the neighborhood level, I discuss refinements in the study of neighborhood change needed to account for the importance of school segregation as a factor in neighborhood racial change. At the metropolitan level, I explore how metropolitan boundary fragmentation affects efforts to desegregate both schools and neighborhoods. I conclude the Essay in Part IV with a discussion of my own research on multiethnic neighborhoods. I suggest that such neighborhoods should become a centerpiece of policy initiatives for citizens and communities concerned about the issues of school and housing segregation in the mid-1990s.

I. PERSISTING RESIDENTIAL SEGREGATION

Research over the last four decades unequivocally shows that in the large urban areas of the United States, African-Americans are highly residentially segregated from non-Hispanic whites.7 In 1990, more than seventy-five percent of African-Americans in northern metropolitan areas and more than sixty-five percent of those in southern metropolitan areas would have had to move to different neighborhoods if they were to be distributed evenly across the neighborhoods as compared to non-Hispanic whites.8 While levels of segregation have declined overall, this decline has not been uniform; the greatest declines have been in the South and West, in newer metropolitan areas, and in areas with smaller absolute or proportionate African-American populations.9 At the rates of change seen between 1980 and 1990, it would take another seventy-seven years for segregation in northern metropolitan areas to reach moderate levels, and about half that time for areas in the South.10 All of

8. MASSEY & DENTON, supra note 3, at 222.
10. MASSEY & DENTON, supra note 3, at 221, 222. Researchers generally measure levels of segregation on a 100 point scale, with a score around 60
this is not to deny progress but to emphasize the *high level* and *slow change* of African-American residential segregation.

In 1980, the pattern of residential segregation for African-Americans in some metropolitan areas was so extreme that Douglas Massey and I coined the term "hypersegregation."\(^{11}\) By hypersegregation we mean that no matter how one conceptualizes segregation, African-Americans score very high: they are *unevenly distributed* across neighborhoods; they are *highly isolated* within very racially homogenous neighborhoods; their neighborhoods are *clustered* to form contiguous ghettos, *centralized* near central business districts and away from suburban schools and jobs, and *concentrated* in terms of population density and spatial area compared to white neighborhoods. Together, these five concepts (evenness, isolation, clustering, centralization, and concentration) comprise five distinct dimensions of segregation. In 1980, African-Americans in Baltimore, Chicago, Cleveland, Detroit, Milwaukee, and Philadelphia were highly segregated on all five of these dimensions; blacks in Gary, Indiana, Los Angeles, Newark, and St. Louis were highly segregated on four of the five dimensions. This means that we classified a total of ten metropolitan areas as "hypersegregated."\(^{12}\) By 1990, hypersegregation had not greatly decreased. Only two cities had dropped from our list and generally considered "moderate." A score of 60, for example, indicates that 60% of a particular group in the area studied would have to move in order to reach the number expected if racial/ethnic groups were evenly distributed.


\(^{12}\) *Id.* at 381-82. We later added Buffalo, Indianapolis, Kansas City, New York, Atlanta, and Dallas to our list of hypersegregated cities, for a total of 16. We measure hypersegregation using indices of segregation, all of which range from 0 to 1.0. The average segregation scores for each dimension for sixteen metropolitan areas in 1990 were 0.78 for evenness, 0.72 for isolation, 0.59 for clustering, 0.84 for concentration, and 0.86 for centralization. All of these are still well above our cutoff score of 0.6 with the exception of clustering, which falls just below it because of the inclusion of Atlanta and Dallas, cities that we no longer classified as hypersegregated in 1990. Nancy A. Denton, *Are African-Americans Still Hypersegregated?*, in *Residential Apartheid: The American Legacy* 49, 57 (Robert D. Bullard et al. eds., 1994).

Since we defined hypersegregation as four or five segregation indices greater than 0.6, actual changes of the values of the indices must be examined to insure that having the same cutoff point in both years does not mask considerable improvement. This would be the case, for example, if the values were all close to 1.0 in 1980 but close to 0.6 in 1990. Massey & Denton, *supra* note 3, at 76.
African-Americans remain hypersegregated in the remaining metropolitan areas.\textsuperscript{13}

Between 1980 and 1990, the absolute magnitude of change for the five dimensions of hypersegregation was very small. Over those ten years, the average changes never even reached 0.05 (or five points on a 0 to 100 scale). Indeed, the average isolation, clustering, and concentration indices actually increased between 1980 and 1990. If we separate the average changes into those that are positive and those that are negative, the average increase is larger than the average decrease for all the dimensions except evenness.\textsuperscript{14} Thus the kindest interpretation one can put on this analysis of residential segregation in these sixteen hypersegregated metropolitan areas is one of stability; certainly there is little to indicate any significant improvement in the residential segregation of African-Americans in these large metropolitan areas of the Northeast and Midwest.

When we move beyond these large northeastern and midwestern metropolitan areas, the situation in 1990 showed a continuation of the trends observed from 1970 to 1980. Analyzing data from 1980 to 1990 for African-Americans, Farley and Frey found "a pervasive pattern of modest declines—the average index of dissimilarity fell from 69 in 1980 to 65 in 1990."\textsuperscript{15} The number of moderately segregated metropolitan areas more than doubled (from 29 in 1980 to 68 in 1990) indicating declines in segregation in many areas that were formerly severely segregated. The average score for the fifteen least segregated places in 1990 was only 42, less than half the degree of segregation in the fifteen most segregated places in that year.\textsuperscript{16} As was the case in 1980, the large majority of metropolitan areas with comparatively low black-white segregation scores were in the South and West.

The historical impetus for school desegregation was clearly linked to improvement of educational opportunities for African-

\textsuperscript{13} The cities dropped from the list of hypersegregated metropolitan areas—Atlanta and Dallas—are both southern cities. Denton, \textit{supra} note 12, at 57.

\textsuperscript{14} \textit{Id.} at 60.

\textsuperscript{15} Farley & Frey, \textit{supra} note 5, at 30. The "index of dissimilarity" ranges from 0 to 100. It is generally interpreted as the percent of \textit{either} group (African-Americans and whites in this case) that would have to move in order for the two groups being compared to be distributed evenly across the neighborhoods in the city.

\textsuperscript{16} \textit{Id.} at 33.
Americans, and both school and residential segregation studies share a focus on comparisons between blacks and whites. However, U.S. urban areas are clearly populated by more than these two groups. Fortunately, the nation's other two large minority groups, Hispanics and Asians, have not experienced the same pattern of extreme residential segregation as have African-Americans. Furthermore, while the continued immigration of new members of these groups might have been expected to increase their segregation, trends between 1980 and 1990 showed mainly stability or only modest increases. In Farley and Frey's research, the average segregation score for Hispanics and Asians was twenty points lower than the average for blacks, and clearly in the moderate range as segregation scores are normally interpreted. Furthermore, there is some tendency for black-white segregation to decline more in metropolitan areas that are more multiethnic.

Looking at the residential patterns of these broadly defined groups, however, fails to account for real intragroup variation. Research suggests the presence of a "color line" within these groups as well. Among Hispanics, those who identify racially as black or as "Spanish race" are more segregated than those who identify as white. Cities with a Hispanic population that is largely or historically Puerto Rican have higher Hispanic versus non-Hispanic white segregation scores than those dominated by Mexicans or Cubans. Similarly, darker skinned Asians from the Indian subcontinent are more residentially

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17. See Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 483 (1954) (stating that the question presented in the case is whether "segregation of children in public schools . . . deprive[s] the children of the minority group of equal educational opportunities").

18. Farley & Frey, supra note 5, at 32; Harrison & Bennett, supra note 5, at 162.

19. Farley & Frey, supra note 5, at 32.

20. That is, around 60 on a 100 point scale.

21. Farley & Frey, supra note 5, at 38.

22. My research on the individual Hispanic and Asian groups that make up these umbrella categories is planned but has not yet been completed for 1990.


larger and more diverse society we need to watch for an expanding color line. While there is little evidence that the residential situation of Hispanics and Asians will ever be as segregated as that of African-Americans, it is important to follow the residential and school patterns of all groups.

Thus, the current levels and trends of residential segregation in American cities do not bode well for school integration, particularly for African-Americans in the large northern metropolitan areas. These trends are remarkably consistent over the last few decades and the results are consistent across researchers. Unevenness, isolation, clustering, concentration, and centralization cumulate in their effects on neighborhoods. While it may be possible to combat one or two factors, their additive effects exacerbate the difficulty of changing neighborhood patterns by attracting whites back to the cities and areas of cities they have left. Thus, while it is intuitively true that school integration should follow neighborhood integration, the persistence of severe residential segregation, particularly in the large northern metropolitan areas, does not bode well for school desegregation. We must now ask what causes and maintains these patterns of severe residential separation.

II. "MYTHS" AND OTHER EXPLANATIONS FOR RESIDENTIAL SEGREGATION

A. Three Myths

Research on the residential segregation of African-Americans


26. Indeed, Gary Orfield has pointed out recently that Hispanic students rapidly are becoming segregated in terms of the average number of non-Hispanic whites in their classrooms. Orfield, supra note 4, at 235.

27. In many cities, the school desegregation potential is severely limited by the few whites remaining in the school system. David R. James, City Limits on Racial Equality: The Effects of City-Suburb Boundaries on Public School Desegregation, 1968-1976, 54 Am. Soc. Rev. 963, 975 (1989); Rivkin, supra note 4, at 285; see also Farley, supra note 1, at 192 (concluding that residential segregation makes school integration more difficult to accomplish because, as the proportion of black students increases, it becomes necessary to bus more children longer distances to achieve integration of schools).
shows such a uniform pattern of high levels and slow change that a number of what I call "myths" have arisen to explain segregation. Because these myths superficially and intuitively seem to account for the reality that most people, regardless of race, see around them every day, they are quite easy to believe. These myths are most often used to explain the segregation of African-Americans, but occasionally are used for other groups as well. Like their more individual psychological counterpart, stereotypes, these myths contain small grains of truth that make them believable, yet wrong.

1. Myth One: Segregation Has Always Been with Us

Travel to city after city, talk to many different people and to older people, and it seems that blacks have always lived in separate neighborhoods. But historical research into neighborhood patterns reveals this common view to be false. Despite severe prejudice, discrimination, poverty, and the existence of separate and unequal schools, African-American residential patterns at the beginning of this century were nowhere near as segregated as those we see now.\(^{28}\) True, there were areas in cities that were known for their black residents, but those areas were not all black and not all blacks in the city lived in them.\(^{29}\) Homogeneously black neighborhoods containing nearly all of the black population in a city is a twentieth century development in the United States, and it is one that has never been experienced by any other group in this country.\(^{30}\) The danger of this myth


The structure of the commercial city kept black ghettoes from forming. The population had no choice but to mix. Lack of adequate transportation systems, mixed patterns of land use, and the ubiquity of cheap housing led to the dispersal of both the immigrant and black populations. Cincinnati's experience was not unique. Throughout the nineteenth century, in both the North and South, blacks lived in biracial residential areas; even in the most segregated locations blacks and whites lived adjacent to one another or shared the same dwellings. Id. at 159.

\(^{29}\) See generally THOMAS LEE PHILPOTT, THE SLUM AND THE GHETTO: IMMIGRANTS, BLACKS, AND REFORMERS IN CHICAGO, 1880-1930, at 131 (1978) ("An ethnic enclave was not a district in which all the inhabitants were of the same ethnic group and in which all of the people of that ethnic group lived.").

\(^{30}\) MASSEY & DENTON, supra note 3, at 57-59.
is that it is very difficult to see the possibility—or even the need—to change things that "have always been that way."

2. Myth Two: Residential Segregation in Cities Is "Natural"

Severe and persisting residential segregation is not a "normal" part of the development of cities. The intensification of segregation of African-Americans in the North occurred at the same time as a great period of growth in northern cities, but segregation was not a normal or natural part of this growth. A host of private, public, and governmental actors deliberately created residential segregation.  

The real estate industry, banks, appraisers, and insurance agents translated private prejudice into public action ultimately sanctioned by the federal government in Federal Housing Administration (FHA) loan policies and the federal highway program.  

As a result, the post-World War II suburban growth was for whites; blacks remained in the cities.  

The rise of the suburbs corresponded in time with black migration to the North, but the residential segregation of African-Americans went up faster than one would expect from

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31. See Massey & Denton, supra note 3, at 26-57, 83-114 (suggesting that the spatial isolation of black Americans was achieved by a conjunction of racist attitudes, private behaviors, and institutional practices that disenfranchised blacks from urban housing markets and led to the creation of the ghetto); see also Kenneth Jackson, Crabgrass Frontier: The Suburbanization of the United States 190-230 (1985) (stating that there are many ways in which government largesse can affect where people live, such as housing administration, loan subsidies, and the tax code); Gregory D. Squires, Capital and Communities in Black and White: The Intersections of Race, Class, and Uneven Development 48-56 (1994) (stating that uneven development, in terms of the industrial and spatial configuration of cities and the outcomes of this process as it affects class, race, and gender groups within cities, has been the predominant feature of the revolution of metropolitan areas in the United States in recent decades).

32. Kenneth Jackson writes:

In 1955 Columbia Professor Charles Abrams pointed a much stronger accusatory finger at FHA for discriminatory practices. Writing in 1955, the famed urban planner said: "A government offering such bounty to builders and lenders could have required compliance with a nondiscrimination policy. Or the agency could at least have pursued a course of evasion, or hidden behind the screen of local autonomy. Instead, FHA adopted a racial policy that could well have been culled from the Nuremberg laws. From its inception FHA set itself up as the protector of the all white neighborhood. It sent its agents into the field to keep Negroes and other minorities from buying homes in white neighborhoods."

Jackson, supra note 31, at 214.
their population growth alone. In reflecting on the links between school and residential segregation, I am often struck by the fact that just as we started to implement Brown v. Board of Education, we also started building the highways and suburban developments that would allow whites to escape the city into the suburbs.

3. Myth Three: Housing Discrimination Is Illegal, So It Must Not Be a Problem

It is an easy enough assumption that the 1968 Fair Housing Act, which outlawed discrimination in the sale and rental of housing, effectively ended discrimination in housing. At a more general level, this myth involves an appeal to law as a justification for shrugging off problems we see in society: "It is against the law to discriminate, so segregation must be the result of other factors." This is a myth because research confirms the persistence of widespread discrimination in the sale and rental of housing: relative to whites, blacks and Hispanics are likely to encounter unfavorable treatment roughly one-half of the time. This discrimination is sometimes subtle (what Gary Orfield has called "discrimination with a smile") but the actions and consequences are real: blacks and Hispanics see fewer units of housing, are quoted unfavorable terms and conditions, and generally must search harder to find housing that is comparable to whites of similar means.

It may seem unbelievable that discrimination remains this high given official public disapproval, but one must remember that there is a wide discrepancy between white attitudes on segregation in principle compared to in practice. White attitudes toward the idea that blacks should be able to purchase a house wherever they can afford have become increasingly

34. 47 U.S. 483 (1954).
36. Margery Austin Turner & Ron Wienk, The Persistence of Segregation in Urban Areas: Contributing Causes, in HOUSING MARKETS AND RESIDENTIAL MOBILITY, supra note 7, at 193, 199. For a more general discussion of all aspects of this research, see CLEAR AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE: MEASUREMENT OF DISCRIMINATION IN AMERICA (Michael Fix & Raymond Struyk eds., 1993).
37. Cf. Theodore M. Shaw, Equality and Educational Excellence: Legal Challenges in the 1990s, 80 MINN. L. REV. 901, 904 (1996) ("[T]his fight is not accepted with grace, nor is it welcomed by the majority in this country, not in practice, maybe in policy or in principle, but not in practice.").
favorable over the years, but nearly half of the white population would still vote against laws that would implement and enforce desegregation in housing.\textsuperscript{38} This led Doug Massey and me to conclude:

Ultimate responsibility for the persistence of racial segregation rests with white America. On issues of race and residence, white America continues to be fundamentally hypocritical and self-deceiving. Whites believe that people should be able to live wherever they want to regardless of skin color, but in practice they think that people—at least black people—should want to live with members of their own kind.\textsuperscript{39}

B. MORE SOPHISTICATED EXPLANATIONS FOR RESIDENTIAL SEGREGATION

As a result of the salience and seeming facial validity of these three myths to much of the American population, many, both white and black, see residential segregation as a natural or inevitable part of the social structure of United States society. To say that something is part of the social structure implies that it is beyond the control of the individuals affected. Paradoxically, however, people often refer to individuals' characteristics when attempting to explain away segregation. Nowhere is this clearer than in the less "mythical" explanations for patterns of residential segregation to which I now turn. Unlike the three myths discussed above, these explanations have some empirical validity. But to the extent that they are offered as sole causes of continuing segregation, ignoring discrimination, they can neither justify nor explain away continuing patterns of severe black-white residential segregation in contemporary cities.

Income differentials and voluntary segregation are the most frequent more sophisticated explanations for residential segregation.\textsuperscript{40} It is clear that African-Americans, and to an extent some Asians and Hispanics, are generally poorer than their non-Hispanic white counterparts.\textsuperscript{41} If income, however,

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38. See Howard Schuman et al., Racial Attitudes in America: Trends and Interpretations 97 (1988) (providing a table showing the attitudes of whites toward the principle of free residential choice and open housing laws).
40. A five article exchange between W.A.V. Clark and George Galster on whether contemporary discrimination needs to be included with income and personal preferences to understand contemporary residential segregation can be found in 5 POPULATION RES. & POL'Y REV. 95 (1986), 7 POPULATION RES. & POL'Y REV. 93 (1988), 7 POPULATION RES. & POL'Y REV. 113 (1988), 8 POPULATION RES. & POL'Y REV. 181 (1989), and 8 POPULATION RES. & POL'Y REV. 193 (1989).
41. Reynolds Farley, The Common Destiny of Blacks and Whites: Observations About the Social and Economic Status of the Races, in Race in America:
were the driving force behind residential segregation, we would expect residential segregation to decline as income, occupational status, or educational status improved. Research using 1980 data has shown precisely such a decline for Hispanics and Asians, but almost no decline for African-Americans. While comparable analyses using 1990 data have not yet been completed, the overall segregation trends, combined with documented income polarization, suggest that not much has changed. The segregation of African-Americans is not as responsive to income or other measures of human capital as is the segregation of other minority groups. Put another way, African-Americans are not as able to translate their social capital accumulations into spatial location as well as other groups. Estimates of the amount of segregation attributable to income vary and are the subject of scholarly dispute; however, the most common estimates suggest that income differentials account for no more than one-third of the residential segregation of African-Americans.

This leaves the argument that segregation is voluntary, a position increasingly adopted by both blacks and whites, though often for different reasons. For many whites, the belief that blacks prefer to live with blacks eliminates whites' responsibility

The Struggle for Equality 197, 206-07 (Herbert Hill & James E. Jones, Jr. eds., 1993); Harrison & Bennett, supra note 5, at 176; Frank Levy, Incomes and Income Inequality, in 1 STATE OF THE UNION: AMERICA IN THE 1990S, ECONOMIC TRENDS 1, 41-43 (Reynolds Farley ed., 1995).

42. Harrison & Bennett, supra note 5, at 162.


44. Levy, supra note 41, at 23-26. "Between 1979 and 1989, family income adjusted for family size grew by about 2 percent in the bottom quarter of the distribution and by 15-20 percent in the top quarter." Id. at 26.

45. "Since the mid-1970s, the race-class debate has gone on without definitive resolution with respect to a variety of socioeconomic outcomes: employment, wealth, family stability, education, crime. But when one considers residential segregation, the argument is easily and forcefully settled: race clearly predominates." MASSEY & DENTON, supra note 3, at 85. Indeed, race predominates to such an extent that speculation about what would have happened if black economic progress had continued becomes moot. Even if black income had continued to rise throughout the 1970s, segregation would not have declined: no matter how much blacks earned they remained spatially separated from whites. In 1980, as in the past, money did not buy entry into white neighborhoods of American cities. Id.; see also John E. Farley, Race Still Matters: The Minimal Role of Income and Housing Cost as Causes of Housing Segregation in St. Louis, 1990, 51 URB. AFF. REV. 244, 252 (1995) (asserting that as economic barriers to housing choices decrease, race has an even greater effect on differences in housing locations).
for the segregated neighborhoods around them. It also implies that blacks are responsible for their own segregation, and that whites are giving them what they want by allowing it. Nowhere is this belief more clear than in the often-made comparison between white ethnic groups and blacks, implying that if the former were able to work their way up, so should the latter. In reality, however, public opinion surveys reveal far more white reluctance to live with blacks than black reluctance to live with whites. For some blacks, however, voluntary segregation has become associated with black empowerment, the importance of black culture, black self-help goals, and the rhetorical point that if all-white neighborhoods are not bad, why should all-black ones be bad? Thus, voluntary segregation is the toughest “explanation” to discuss, for it strikes deeply at the political motivations of both groups. However, it is important that we at least try to understand how the current debate about separatism could be the result of generations of American apartheid rather than the cause.

To explore this point, let me begin by saying that I do not doubt that some number of blacks choose to live in all-black neighborhoods, a choice that deserves respect. The need for such a choice is well-documented. Middle class blacks experience a considerable number of overt racist incidents in addition to continued discrimination in real estate rental and sales and in employment. In this context, a segregated neighborhood can

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46. See LIEBERSON, supra note 33, at xi-xii (describing the common belief that if late immigrants from central, east, and south Europe were able to improve their social position, blacks should be able to do so as well).
47. Farley, supra note 7, at 168, 173.
49. Similarly, Dr. Kenneth Clark writes that the “rise of the black separatist movement in the 1960s manifested blacks’ identification with the reasoning of their oppressor. Black separatists internalized the reasoning of the proponents of racial separation.” Kenneth B. Clark, Beyond Brown v. Board of Education: Housing and Education in the Year 2000, 80 MINN. L. REV. 745, 747 (1996).
50. See JOE R. FEAGIN & MELVIN P. SIKES, LIVING WITH RACISM: THE BLACK MIDDLE CLASS EXPERIENCE 37-77 (1994); Joe R. Feagin, The Continuing Significance of Race: Antibleack Discrimination in Public Places, 56 AM. SOC. REV. 101, 104 (1991). In addition, both the popular media and activist groups such as the Southern Poverty Law Center and numerous Fair Housing agencies continue to document incidents of harassment, firebombing, ostracizing, and otherwise bad treatment of blacks. FEAGIN & SIKES, supra, at 249-67.
51. See generally CLEAR AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE, supra note 36.
be a retreat from the daily racism in the larger society.

However, one must question whether feeling the need for a "retreat," wanting to escape racist harassment and harm, constitutes truly "voluntary" action. "Voluntary" implies a free choice between at least two options, without compulsion or obligation; it connotes a positive choice. Thus, the issue is not whether some blacks prefer to live in all- or mainly-black neighborhoods, for as a group, African-Americans have varied opinions on this issue.\(^2\) Rather, the issue really is whether such a "choice" can be called voluntary if it results from a need to escape racism and racists. It is worth remembering that no other minority group in the United States has "preferred" to live such that between eighty and ninety percent of its members would have to move to be evenly distributed in major northern cities.

The argument for the self-segregation of African-Americans is also sometimes framed positively: such segregation improves the ability to share and pass on culture, as well as to develop institutions. While this idea has some appeal, it ignores the fundamental issue of power. In much of society (and especially in industries connected to the provision, development, marketing, and location of housing), whites continue to have much more power than do blacks.\(^3\) This power means that all-white neighborhoods do not generally suffer the decreases in services, property value, maintenance, school quality, and other amenities that all-black neighborhoods do. It is, of course, possible to defuse this point by arguing that the problem is not only a matter of neighborhood integration but of equity in resource allocation.\(^4\) This argument has facial validity, but sidesteps

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52. Farley, supra note 7, at 172; see also John Yinger, Closed Doors, Opportunities Lost: The Continuing Costs of Housing Discrimination 215 (1995) (stressing the need to provide opportunities for integration for minorities who choose to integrate and revitalize minority communities for those who do not).

53. Evidence of this phenomenon can be seen in the continuing racial disparities in incomes, occupational status, and control of management in many of these arenas.

the issue that not all resources are allocated through established systems of legal power. Private investment follows public investment: a well-maintained neighborhood with attentive public services, appreciating property values, and good schools attract industry and other amenities while discouraging crime and other dissemi nates.

Thus far, efforts by the government to ensure equitable treatment of black neighborhoods have been of limited or, at best, short-term success. While we certainly need to invest some money in housing in all-black areas (if only because these areas developed as a result of social policy) such reinvestment cannot be the main focus of housing policy. One needs only to remember that at one time all of our public housing was new and was viewed positively by many tenants: "When we moved in, it was nice. You didn't see all this graffiti, we had telephones in front, we had grass, we had fences." Public housing was of much higher quality, with more light, space, and amenities than the tenement housing it replaced. Buildings identical to those that are being dynamited are still occupied in many cities. But these factors were not enough to overcome the social consequences of isolation and warehousing of the poorest of the poor—that is, segregation by race and class.

Residential segregation, whether imposed or "voluntary," is thus an important component of what John Yinger calls the "discrimination system," which also includes racial and ethnic disparities in the labor market and public schools, and which interact with racial/ethnic prejudice to reinforce and amplify the decentralization of low-income housing should be slowed to allow resources in housing to be distributed).

55. See JOE R. FEAGIN & ROBERT PARKER, BUILDING AMERICAN CITIES: THE URBAN REAL ESTATE GAME 144-48, 254 (2d ed. 1990) (detailing the failure of government programs to improve inner-city housing that, due to a series of disinvestment-investment cycles, results in deteriorated housing for minorities and luxury housing for whites); SQUIRES, supra note 31, at 112-15 (describing the short-lived revitalization efforts in Boston and Chicago).


58. Id. at 60.

59. See id. at 42-65 (discussing how efforts to improve public housing failed because of continued discrimination against minority groups).
negative effects of each component. 60 Similarly, Melvin Oliver and Thomas Shapiro note that blacks accumulate less actual wealth compared to whites with comparable incomes, in part because their houses do not appreciate in value as much as houses owned by whites. 61 Neighborhoods are thus more than just places to live; they also can be very important in determining a person's possibilities for employment and wealth accumulation, as well as one's friends, personal safety, and the schools that children attend. Neighborhoods are an integral part of the systems that structure peoples' lives. Segregation, which is ultimately grounded in racial and ethnic discrimination, can only exacerbate that discrimination. As Yinger notes:

[Prejudice against minorities thrives when minorities and whites tend not to live together and when minorities achieve less success than whites, on average in school and work. Moreover, prejudices feed back into the system ... and are a key cause of discrimination by landlords, real estate agents, lenders, and others.] 62

Comparing all-white to all-black neighborhoods to justify why segregation might be good thus ignores the social context in which segregated neighborhoods were created and persist. The comparison would only be valid in a society with equitable power distribution across the races and no racism—hardly a description of contemporary United States society. This is not to say that all-black neighborhoods are intrinsically bad, but rather to point out that all-black neighborhoods, because of the social context of the white power structure in which they are embedded, face a harder time in gaining equitable resource allocation than all-white ones. 63 Those who assert that all-black neighborhoods are justifiable can make logical and even compelling points. However, the separatist position—like the argument that segregation is due to individual choice—ignores the practical and historical facts of racism, power, and economic domination.

60. See Massey & Denton, supra note 3, at 47, 68, 222; Taeuber & Taeuber, supra note 7, at 28-68; Farley, Neighborhood Preferences, supra note 7, at 179-83; Farley & Frey, supra note 5, at 23; Harrison & Bennett, supra note 5, at 161-62; Sorenson et al., supra note 7, at 125.


62. Yinger, supra note 52, at 168.

63. Cf. Shaw, supra note 37, at 905 ("There is nothing inherently wrong with an all-black institution. There is something inherently wrong with all-black institutions that are created and maintained by a predominately white power structure and that do not have the resources because the resources are withdrawn as white folks flee." (emphasis in original)).
In the end, all of the myths and other explanations I have discussed fail to account for historical and contemporary patterns of segregation. The high levels of racial segregation in the contemporary United States have not always been with us; segregation is not the result of some "natural" process of urban growth; segregation was not solved by the Fair Housing Act\(^{64}\) nor by other civil rights laws; and segregation cannot be explained away by black-white income differences or by a resort to ban indefensible notions of personal choice. Residential segregation is the direct and continuing result of racism. This racism is both private and public, and has become institutionalized in government and business as well as in individuals' conduct. That this institutionalization is complete is manifest in the fact that segregation is now being hailed as a better option by some of its own victims.\(^{65}\) While it is easy to understand blacks who feel a need for refuge from daily racism, separation means that whites get what they want, and it condemns blacks to further economic hardship and deprivation. No matter how much African-Americans increase their income or personal power, the social structure of segregation means that they do not realistically have the same residential opportunities as whites.

If we give them credence, these three "myths" and the two more sophisticated explanations of segregation (income differentials and voluntary segregation) have strong implications for our understanding of the relationship between school and residential segregation, as well as our commitment to remedy them. Most directly, these myths serve to remove racial segregation from the

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\(^{65}\) See generally Andrew Weise, Neighborhood Diversity: Social Change, Ambiguity, and Fair Housing Since 1968, 17 J. URB. AFF. 107 (1995) (providing a summary and examples of the tension within the fair housing movement between pro-integration and non-discrimination (free-choice) camps). The forces of the Great Migration, redlining, block busting, and real estate discrimination combined to limit white demand for housing in a neighborhood once blacks entered it. As a result, pro-integration programs reach out affirmatively to whites as well as blacks, something that can appear as an insult to blacks who clearly face the bulk of the discrimination in the housing market. Id. at 118. Furthermore, there is the issue of comfort. "Being black in America is hard enough without having to live in a setting where one feels constantly on display." Id. at 125. Thus, "[t]hat many have chosen to build segregated communities now that alternatives exist is surely a symbol of growing freedom among the black middle class. It is also a reflection of frustration with the slow pace of change for all African-Americans since the mid-1960s." Id. at 126. For an explicit argument against separatism, see generally KOFI BUENOR HADJOR, ANOTHER AMERICA: THE POLITICS OF RACE AND BLAME (1996).
responsibility or the control of whites. If segregation has always been here and if it is a natural outgrowth of city development as we know it in the United States, then there is little we can do about it. School desegregation, if it is to happen, must take place within the boundaries of residential segregation patterns. By treating the two issues as separate we make it impossible to solve either while still feeling that we are making an effort. It is in this context that advocates for desegregation have attempted to link housing and schools in the courts. Thus it is vitally important to consider the links between school and neighborhood segregation.

III. THEORETICAL LINKS BETWEEN RESIDENTIAL AND SCHOOL SEGREGATION

Treating residential segregation and school segregation as separate problems has enabled courts to rule that neighborhood segregation is outside the realm of what schools can address or be responsible for. This is understandable, given that the NAACP and other advocates initially fought school segregation in the context of state-sponsored separate facilities. But while overt state sponsorship of segregation has been struck down, segregation attributable to neighborhoods and districts has proven much harder to combat. Neighborhood segregation has become the contemporary way of keeping schools segregated. By treating school and neighborhood segregation as separate, we ignore that the original bases for neighborhood segregation were state-sponsored and state-approved, though not as overtly as

66. For example, if segregation has always been with us, is a natural part of city growth, and at any rate is illegal, then why do whites need to even think about it, much less take responsibility for it or seek to change it? If one pushes the illegality rationale a bit further, then it has been eliminated by laws, so there is no need for whites to try to do anything about it.


68. See Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 740-41 (1974) (rejecting the "assumption that the Detroit schools could not be truly desegregated . . . unless the racial composition of the student body of each school substantially reflected the racial composition of the population of the metropolitan area as a whole"); see also Sussman, supra note 67, at 876-79 (discussing United States v. Yonkers Board of Education, which held the city of Yonkers liable for racial segregation, and stating that politicians in Yonkers realized and intended that school segregation would result from segregation in public housing).

69. See MASSEY & DENTON, supra note 3, at 17-59; SQUIRES, supra note 31, at 48-52; Robert L Green, Desegregation, in METROPOLITAN DESEGREGATION 1, 1 (Robert L. Green ed., 1985).
in the case of schools.

Let us begin by thinking about school and residential segregation from the point of view of an individual neighborhood. At the neighborhood level, the degree of residential integration is simply a function of the relative number of members of different racial/ethnic groups residing there.\textsuperscript{70} Segregation in a neighborhood school, however, is more than a function of the races/ethnicities of the attending students because it is influenced by the relative ages of a community's racial/ethnic groups and the rate of private school attendance, as well as the racial/ethnic makeup of the neighborhood.

For this reason, empirical studies of the effect of neighborhood segregation on school segregation have frequently used the racial proportions of the resident student population rather than the total population as the relevant variable for studying school desegregation efforts.\textsuperscript{71} But if the aim is to find out how the two types of segregation are linked, then it is best to include all persons on the neighborhood side of the equation. Assuming only two racial/ethnic groups, we can formally summarize this analysis with two equations:

\begin{align*}
\text{Neighborhood segregation} &= \text{a function of (number of group 1, number of group 2)} \\
\text{School segregation} &= \text{a function of (neighborhood segregation, private school use, school age of group 1, school age of group 2)}
\end{align*}

By specifying the dynamic in this way, we can begin to explore the process through which school and neighborhood segregation work together. For example, if both populations are the same age and there is no use of private schools, then school segregation mirrors neighborhood segregation. Private schools, if affordable by parents, provide an outlet for groups to live together while not sharing schools. They can function to make the schools less integrated than the neighborhood if the private schools are not used equally by all racial/ethnic groups. Note that equal use by racial groups is less likely the more the private schools cost, given the higher poverty rates of blacks. Age can function in a similar way: if whites do not mind having black neighbors but do not want their children socializing or attending

\textsuperscript{70} See Nancy A. Denton & Douglas S. Massey, Patterns of Neighborhood Transition in a Multiethnic World: U.S. Metropolitan Areas, 1970-1980, 28 DEMOGRAPHY 41, 44 (1991). Note that this leaves aside for the moment the fact that the location of a particular neighborhood in the metropolitan context may be influenced by the demography of nearby neighborhoods.

\textsuperscript{71} Rivkin, \textit{supra} note 4, at 282
school with them, then whites can live in integrated neighborhoods before or after child-rearing. An analogous result occurs if urban schools are of lower quality than suburban schools, thus leading whites to avoid them and their neighborhoods if they have school-age children.  

Moving to a more dynamic perspective, we can think about how segregation changes over time. From our neighborhood equation, we see that segregation (by definition) changes with the relative numbers of different groups in a neighborhood. The neighborhood segregation literature reveals that there are very few integrated neighborhoods, though the number is increasing.  

By and large, blacks live in heavily black neighborhoods and whites in heavily white ones. If this situation begins to change, and some blacks move into a previously white neighborhood, what kind of neighborhood will it be? Given the income differences between blacks and whites, as well as the persistent discrimination faced by blacks, we might expect blacks to move into older, established neighborhoods with lower housing values. But these neighborhoods may very well be occupied by older whites who no longer have school age children. Thus, the impetus that school integration can receive from neighborhood integration is constrained by the age of the adults in the neighborhood.

Thinking about school and neighborhood segregation as interrelated processes at the neighborhood level offers two

72. Again, this assumes that whites, on average have greater residential mobility than African-Americans. Given the unquestionable income differential and the evidence of continuing discrimination in housing, this is not a difficult assumption.


74. While I do not know of any research that directly studies the housing value in neighborhoods into which blacks move, this statement can be inferred from data showing lower housing values in neighborhoods with greater integration, Turner & Wienk, supra note 36, at 206; and also from data showing greater housing value and newer housing in neighborhoods that are less integrated, Margery Austin Turner & John G. Edwards, Affordable Rental Housing in Metropolitan Neighborhoods, in HOUSING MARKETS AND RESIDENTIAL MOBILITY, supra note 7, at 125, 131-34; and finally from discussions of how the filtering process works for African-Americans, Phillip L. Clay, The (Un)Housed City: Racial Patterns of Segregation, Housing Quality and Affordability, in THE METROPOLIS IN BLACK AND WHITE: PLACE, POWER, AND POLARIZATION 93, 101 (George C. Galster & Edward W. Hill eds., 1992) [hereinafter THE METROPOLIS IN BLACK AND WHITE].
advantages over thinking of them separately. First, it suggests new research topics at the neighborhood level. For example, using only census data, researchers could examine private school attendance and population age structure differences in the context of black and white mobility into neighborhoods. If one has both school and neighborhood data for a particular neighborhood, then one can look at the process of neighborhood change modeled with the dynamic of school change included. Second, thinking about these two issues simultaneously raises the serious theoretical issue of whether residential and school population changes are mutually reinforcing (both schools and neighborhoods integrate, as would be the case in new housing marketed without discrimination) or working in opposition to each other (as might happen if a neighborhood is gentrified by young whites who do not have children in schools). Clearly, more progress will be made on both fronts if the former is true, but I suspect that the latter case is actually more common; that is, the processes of school and neighborhood changes are more often working against each other than in a complementary fashion.

In addition to the theoretical commonalities between school and residential segregation at the neighborhood level, it is also helpful to think of the broader metropolitan context. The stagnation of progress in both residential and school segregation in the large metropolitan areas of the North is complicated by the same structural factor: metropolitan fragmentation. Metropolitan fragmentation refers to the fact that in the North and in older industrial metropolitan areas, governmental and school district boundaries tend to be numerous and closely linked to the center city-suburban division. This is in direct contrast to the situation in the South and in newer, smaller urban areas, where metropolitan areas have been able to repeatedly annex land (allowing the tax bases of the central cities to keep up with population spread), and where school districts are often county-wide rather than subdivided within municipalities or counties.

This political fragmentation limits the effectiveness of even favorable judicial judgments regarding either school or housing to the boundaries within which the suit took place. It is exactly

75. GREGORY R. WEIHER, THE FRACTURED METROPOLIS: POLITICAL FRAGMENTATION AND METROPOLITAN SEGREGATION 190-95 (1991); James, supra note 27, at 975; Rivkin, supra note 4, at 285.
this political fragmentation that the plaintiffs in *Milliken v. Bradley* attacked, to no avail. Commentators have long noted that *Milliken* not only made school desegregation more difficult, but that the Court’s decision had profound effects on residential desegregation as well. Once *Milliken* made school district boundaries inviolable, suburbs could more easily remain all-white enclaves. Political boundaries serve to inhibit the location of low-income housing and discourage city-suburban mobility even in the few suburban areas that have actually formed public housing authorities. In northeastern metropolitan areas, for example, there can be hundreds of public housing authorities. Keeping track of these various boundaries and making separate applications to all of them for assisted housing is hard work for even the most motivated inner-city mover who wants to use the portability of Section 8 certificates. Suburban residential stratification has been well-documented in a series of articles by two of my colleagues, John Logan and Richard Alba. Their research shows that even suburban

77. The Court in *Milliken* refused to allow school desegregation to take place across school district boundaries, though it did specify the conditions under which such a remedy would be allowed by the courts. *Id.* at 744-45.
79. Gregory Weiher has documented the many ways this proliferation of boundaries enhances segregation. *Weiher, supra* note 75, at 45, 87-115.
81. Section 8 certificates (or vouchers) are an individual family-based form of housing assistance given to poor families who then search for housing in the private market. 24 C.F.R. § 982.1 (1995). They are administered and distributed by PHAs (Public Housing Authorities), many of which have long waiting lists. HUD allocates them to metropolitan areas based on need, but in determining the sub-metropolitan area allocation to PHAs, older assisted housing in the city also counts. Therefore, cities may get less than their share of Section 8 certificates even though their higher poverty proportions raised the total number given to the metropolitan area as a whole. In recent years there has been considerable discussion about the relative lengths of waiting lists in cities and suburbs, the PHA requirement that one must live within the PHA boundaries in order to apply, and the difficulties with “portability” (using a Section 8 certificate from one PHA in another PHA), something that is technically allowed but in practice is sometimes difficult. See generally Tegeler et al., *supra* note 80 (providing a full discussion of these issues).
blacks get less in terms of "spatial goods" than whites with comparable socioeconomic characteristics. Governmental fragmentation thus affects ability of both schools and neighborhoods to desegregate and courts can provide only limited relief as long as their remedies only apply to specific suburbs.

These two phenomena thus reinforce each other: the processes by which neighborhoods and schools actually change feeds into and from the proliferation of municipal boundaries. This interaction negatively impacts all African-Americans through its segregative effects. But no people are as strongly affected as the members of the group known colloquially as "the urban underclass." In our recent book, American Apartheid: Segregation and the Making of the Underclass, Douglas Massey and I argue that segregation is the "linchpin" of the "underclass." Discussions of the underclass too often focus on the behaviors of the residents, many of which society disapproves: dropping out of school, children having children, lack of labor force attachment, drug use. While these issues are too complicated for an essay this short, the negative effects of segregation on poor African-Americans are abundantly clear.

It is equally clear that poor public housing residents do well if they move to better areas, but because African-Americans at all income levels are restricted in their choice of residence, the whole group pays the price of segregation. In addition, Joe

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83. By "spatial goods" I mean better tax bases, better schools, lower crime rates, better quality housing, better city services, greater housing appreciation, etc. All of these are related to both income of residents and the percentage of residents who are white.

84. Logan & Alba, Locational Returns, supra note 82, at 259-63.

85. WEIHER, supra note 75, at 190-95.

86. Farley & Frey, supra note 5, at 39.

87. MASSEY & DENTON, supra note 3.

88. Id. at 147. Some have suggested that the term "underclass" is pejorative, but it has been widely used in the literature to denote spatially concentrated, high-poverty areas where dropping out of school, teen pregnancy, drug use, and unemployment are very high. I use it in this sense.

89. Id. at 148-85.


Feagin and Melvin Sikes note the costs of segregation to whites:

This social isolation will become even more of a serious handicap for
whites as the United States moves into the twenty-first century during
which whites will eventually become a minority in the United States
population. Even today, living in all-white enclaves does not prepare
white Americans for dealing with a world that is composed mostly of
people of color.\textsuperscript{22}

At the simplest level, metropolitan segregation and the
percentage of African-Americans in central city school districts
are strongly and positively related. Thus, as metropolitan
segregation goes up, the average percentage of blacks in the
center city school district rises. The uneven distribution of
persons in the metropolitan area is thus a crucial determinant
of the challenges that center city districts face in desegregating
schools. Modeling this relationship more precisely is beyond the
scope of this Essay, especially given the increasing complexity
pointed out by other researchers.\textsuperscript{23} There are dramatic regional
differences in segregation in part because of differences in how
well school districts have desegregated, but also because of the
different political boundaries that define those districts
County-wide boundaries in the South are quite selective in this
regard.\textsuperscript{24} It is also noteworthy that the correlation between
black-white segregation and the proportion of African-Americans
in center city school districts is strongest in the Midwest and the
South, regions where there is less ethnic diversity than in the
Northeast and West.

In summary then, residential and school segregation are
interrelated both theoretically and empirically in contemporary
U.S. society. While a correlation does not necessarily imply
mutual causation, it does suggest that efforts to combat either
type of segregation would be well-advised to pay attention to the
effects of the other. While I leave a full model of the complexity

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\textsuperscript{22} Feagin \& Sikes, supra note 50, at 271.

\textsuperscript{23} See, e.g., Reynolds Farley et al., School Desegregation and White Flight:
An Investigation of Competing Models and Their Discrepant Findings, 53 SOC.
EDUC. 123, 124, 136 (1980); Christine H. Rossell, The Carrot or the Stick for
School Desegregation Policy?, 25 URB. AFF. Q. 474, 481 (1990); Franklin D.
Wilson, The Impact of School Desegregation Programs on White Public School
Enrollment, 1968-1976, 58 SOC. EDUC. 137, 138, 142, 145 (1985); Franklin D.
Wilson, Patterns of White Avoidance, 441 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. \& SOC. SCI.
132, 139 (1979).

\textsuperscript{24} Orfield, supra note 4, at 239; Gary Orfield, Segregated Housing,
Educational Inequality, and the Possibility of Urban Integration 16 (1988)
(paper prepared for the Urban Institute Symposium on Residential Mobility and
Minority Incomes) (on file with the author).
of these interrelationships to further research, it is beneficial to explore some policy options, the subject to which I now turn.

IV. COMBATTING RESIDENTIAL SEGREGATION AND SCHOOL SEGREGATION TOGETHER

The literature on residential and school segregation share a focus on the situation of African-Americans, which reflects both the Brown decision and the civil rights movement of the 1960s generally. However, population data reveal that metropolitan areas in the United States are increasingly becoming multi-ethnic, and projections reveal that by the year 2050 the United States as a whole will only barely be a white majority. Therefore, efforts to desegregate either schools or neighborhoods will occur in a more multi-ethnic framework than was true in the past. What are the implications of this multi-ethnicity? In a recent study, Bridget Anderson and I examined the patterns of neighborhood transition in five metropolitan areas between 1970 and 1990: Philadelphia, Miami, Chicago, Houston, and Los Angeles. We chose these five cities to reflect different regions and different combinations of racial/ethnic groups, in order to provide five mini-laboratories for detailed examination of the process of neighborhood change. Neighborhoods occupied by a single group were relatively uncommon throughout the years studied, with two dramatic exceptions: white-only neighborhoods were substantial in Philadelphia (55% in 1970, declining to 34% in 1990); and in Chicago white-only and black-only neighborhoods were 31% and 11% of the total in 1970, but declined to 6% and 19% by 1990. The most common type of two group neighborhoods contained whites and Hispanics only: 63% of Miami's neighborhoods in 1970 were of this type, as were 42% of Los Angeles's, 33% of Houston's, and 29% of Chicago's.

Over time, however, two-group neighborhoods declined in importance. Three- and four-group multi-ethnic neighborhoods became the norm: white-Hispanic-Asian, white-black-Hispanic,
or white-black-Hispanic-Asian. The presence of Asians in the city determines how often the four-group type of neighborhood can emerge. Thus, nearly half of Los Angeles's neighborhoods contained all four groups by 1990, whereas in Philadelphia (with a much smaller Asian population) only 11% did. We found similar results in the New York metropolitan area over the same time period.99 Further analysis revealed that these multiethnic neighborhoods are not confined to center cities only,100 were generally formed by the entry of minorities,101 and that their white population did not decline precipitously on average.102

While more detailed study of the stability of these new multi-ethnic neighborhoods remains to be done their existence in substantial numbers offers a new possibility to proponents of both school and neighborhood integration. Historically, integrated neighborhoods often have turned out to be "on road to re-segregation:" public policy has enhanced re-segregation by condoning real estate steering and financial discrimination.103 This process was further enhanced by municipal fragmentation, thereby facilitating the availability of all-white enclaves. To the extent that these all-white enclaves are diminishing in number and to the extent that multi-ethnic neighborhoods can be preserved, this new kind of neighborhood change could support integrated schools as well as building integrated neighborhoods.

To capitalize on the growth of multi-ethnic neighborhoods requires that we begin to tie together social policy designed to desegregate schools and neighborhoods. First, it is necessary to establish formal institutional ties between organizations fighting school segregation and those fighting neighborhood segregation, with a specific focus on these neighborhoods. Such cooperation is easy to suggest, of course, while the organizations involved in combatting both types of segregation are frequently underfunded, understated, and overworked. Organizations that focus on specific neighborhoods, however, could promote creative policies, such as eliminating from busing requirements schools that are already serving integrated neighborhoods.104

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99. Richard D. Alba et al., supra note 73, at 625, 641-44.
100. Id. at 640.
101. Id. at 643.
102. Id. at 638-39.
103. MASSEY & DENTON, supra note 3, at 200-05.
104. See Rossell, supra note 93, at 480-83 (giving many examples of combinations of magnet and voluntary school desegregation plans, especially those that allow within-district variations across schools to improve black-white
would re-establish the importance of neighborhood schools at the same time as promoting residential integration.

Focusing on multiethnic neighborhoods in linking school and neighborhood desegregation efforts also provides the opportunity to actively promote specific examples of successful schools and neighborhoods. Too often we focus only on conflict or on failures, thus increasing the sense of despair that frequently pervades discussion of these issues.\textsuperscript{105} While there is evidence of the positive effects of metropolitan-wide school desegregation in reducing housing segregation patterns,\textsuperscript{106} changing demographics are not accepted by the courts as a cause of school segregation and that must be attacked. There are many arguments for the continued importance of integration\textsuperscript{107} even while there is concern for the difficulties inherent in doing so.\textsuperscript{108} The importance of having experience with members of other race and ethnic groups from an early age is vital to the increasingly multi-ethnic society that the United States is becoming,\textsuperscript{109} and as we increasingly interact closely in a world where most of the people are not white.

In addition to focusing on multiethnic neighborhoods to revise and strengthen both school and neighborhood desegregation policies, other cross-linkages exist as well. First, we could link the building of new schools or the remodeling of old schools to the building of racially and economically integrated housing.

\footnotesize{exposure, even though a few schools remain segregated).

\textsuperscript{105} J.S. Fuerst & Roy Petty, Quiet Success: Where Managed School Integration Works, 10 AM. PROSPECT 65, 65, 72 (1992).

\textsuperscript{106} Joe T. Darden, Neighborhood Racial Composition and School Desegregation in New Castle County, Delaware, in METROPOLITAN DESEGREGATION, supra note 69, at 123, 124; Diana Pearce, Beyond Busing: New Evidence on the Impact of Metropolitan School Desegregation and Housing Segregation, in METROPOLITAN DESEGREGATION, supra note 69, at 97, 102-03.


\textsuperscript{109} Harrison & Bennett, supra note 5, at 141, 147-53.
A new school is a boon to developers trying to sell houses, and Florida has had success in allowing developers to build one, but only if they meet certain housing requirements.110 Second, we could link the building of housing to particular schools, for example by offering incentives to builders to improve neighborhoods with reasonably good schools in danger of decline due to demographic changes. There are, of course, obstacles to such linkages and state and federal housing and education departments remain both institutionally separated and shackled by obsolete policies and constraining case law. Identifying the linkages between housing and school segregation and the possibilities for cooperation and reform, however, are a necessary step in breaking down these institutional and political barriers to change.

CONCLUSION

We are at a time when racism seems to be becoming more open111 and when major leaders are quite discouraged about future progress.112 Yet the dream lives on that by being together as equals, particularly from a young age, before stereotypes and racial distrust have hardened, we can learn to appreciate and understand each other.113 Research continues

110. See Orfield, supra note 4, at 252 ("Developers were told that they could have a neighborhood school, which would greatly help in the marketing of their housing, only if they developed a plan to market it to an integrated market and thus create a naturally integrated community.").
112. Kenneth Clark states:
   Reluctantly, I am forced to face the likely possibility that the United States will never rid itself of racism and reach true integration. I look back and shudder at how naive we all were in our belief in the steady progress racial minorities would make through programs of litigation and education, and while I very much hope for the emergence of a revived civil rights movement with innovative programs and dedicated leaders, I am forced to recognize that my life has, in fact, been a series of glorious defeats.
   Kenneth B. Clark, Racial Progress and Retreat: A Personal Memoir, in RACE IN AMERICA: THE STRUGGLE FOR EQUALITY 3, 18 (Herbert Hill & James E. Jones eds., 1993); see also DERRICK BELL, FACES AT THE BOTTOM OF THE WELL: THE PERMANENCE OF RACISM 21 (1982); Shaw, supra note 37, at 909 ("I tend to be susceptible to anger. I have to fight bitterness, because bitterness is corrosive and destructive. I may not be as optimistic as some . . . about where we are on race in this country.").
113. Metz, supra note 107, at 64.
to show benefits to race relations from interracial contact, particularly for whites, and that a better neighborhood environment improves outcomes for blacks. While the policy recommendations I suggest are hardly enough, and face both legal and practical difficulties, they do represent a different approach from the past.

The need for a different approach from the past is well exemplified in a recent book by Jennifer Hochschild entitled *Facing Up to the American Dream*. Hochschild demonstrates, using both meticulous analysis of survey data by race and class, and precise arguments, both the continuing power of and the internal inconsistencies in the American Dream. She argues that since the American Dream focuses on individuals rather than structures, the seeds for the discontent currently seen among the "estranged poor" are part and parcel of the dream itself. Yet the dream remains salient among many poor of both races. Hochschild thus concludes that the alternatives to the dream—white denial and black separatism—would be unfortunate for the fabric of the nation.

As Joe Feagin and Hernan Vera note at the end of their volume *White Racism*: "Whites support the cause of equality and justice for blacks only when it is in their interest to do so. The difficult and necessary task, in our view is to bring whites to a recognition that the destruction of racism is in their interest." Since people of all races care deeply about both their neighborhoods and the education of their children, perhaps the strategy of combatting both school and neighborhood segregation simultaneously in a multi-ethnic neighborhood context will be in everyone's interest. The limited success seen in the two spheres of residential segregation and housing segregation separately makes approaching them together even more challenging. But

116. See Rosenbaum et al., supra note 90, at 1529, 1533-39 (noting statistical improvement in educational achievement and job prospects, among others).
118. Id. at 252-53.
119. Id. at 157-83, 314.
120. Id. at 259-60.
121. FEAGIN & VERA, supra note 111, at 191.
as long as these two systems of segregation mutually reinforce each other, it may prove easier—and indeed necessary—to combat them together. And combat them we must.