

1945

# Have We Won in Europe

Gideon Seymour

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## Recommended Citation

Seymour, Gideon, "Have We Won in Europe" (1945). *Minnesota Law Review*. 1386.  
<https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/mlr/1386>

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## BENCH AND BAR

**Have We Won In Europe?\***

BY GIDEON SEYMOUR\*\*

Mr. Otis and members of the Minnesota Bar: What I am going to say this afternoon is designed more to raise questions in your minds and to stimulate your own thinking than to answer any questions. As your President has said, it was my privilege to be in Germany and the adjacent countries during the last two weeks of the war in Europe. We saw Nazism in its death throes, and yet none of us who were in the group had any sense of being present at the final act of a drama. Rather we felt that we were seeing a curtain rise on a new period in world affairs, which, ever since then, I have been trying desperately to see into and to understand and to help to interpret. The more we study what is going on, the more we are bound, I think, to conclude that we are being too timid in our interpretation of events—that history is moving in these days much more rapidly than our understanding of it. My fear is that it is going to take the American people two to five years or longer to understand things that are happening now which ought immediately to be taken into consideration in our formulation of domestic and foreign policies.

I am going to advance three main propositions this afternoon and try to prove them. The first is that the eastern boundary of Europe has been moved 1,800 miles west by the events of the last few years, and that Europe is now and will be increasingly, economically and politically, a peninsula of the continent of Asia, just as it has always been geographically a peninsula of Asia.

The second proposition is that Russia, like the United States, is turning to the Pacific, turning its back on Europe. For Russia that is turning

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\* An address delivered at a meeting of the Board of Governors of the Minnesota State Bar Association in St. Paul, Minnesota, on June 28, 1945. Due to delay in the issuance of the May number of the Minnesota Law Review, it was possible to print this address in that number.

\*\* Mr. Seymour is the executive editor of the Minneapolis Star Journal and Tribune and has been with that publication since the first part of 1940. He was with the Associated Press for fourteen years as a reporter and as city editor in Chicago and New York, and as a foreign correspondent in Europe, South America, Africa and Australia. With sixteen other newspaper and magazine editors and publishers, Mr. Seymour was invited by the War Department, at the suggestion of General Eisenhower, to visit Europe from April 23 to May 8 of this year for the purpose of seeing conditions in the German concentration camps and to get some first hand impressions of the entire military effort of the United States in Europe during the last two weeks of the war. Mr. Seymour visited, among other cities, Paris, London, Brussels, Antwerp, and the principal cities in western Germany. In addition he saw and examined the concentration camps at Buchenwald and Dachau.

to the east; for us it is a turning to the west. It means that the coming arena of history is going to be the Pacific and China and India, just as the arena of history for the past 500 years has been the Atlantic Ocean and the seaboards of Europe and the Americas.

And my third premise is that peace and stability and prosperity in the United States and in the world, in our time and in our children's time, depend upon the attainment of a durable and healthy understanding between the United States and Russia, and that if any such understanding is to be achieved inside of a framework in which Americans can continue to keep for ourselves the kind of life we want and continue to hold our ideals and to work towards our objectives, the burden of achieving that understanding falls chiefly upon the United States, because Russia can afford better than we can to wait and let the events of history play into her hands.

I want to go back and take those up one by one in some detail. The original plan of the major powers of the United Nations was that when Germany was defeated and Nazism had collapsed, a central military control commission would assume authority in Berlin and lay down over-all policies for the policing of Germany. Britain was to police the Ruhr, the United States was to police Southwestern Germany, France was to police some token territory along her own border, and Russia was to police the rest of Germany. I think probably that is a pretty fair division of Germany for police purposes. The control commission was to lay down over-all policies and the police forces of the four countries were simply to put those policies into effect. Actually it isn't working out that way, and there are fewer and fewer signs that it is going to work out that way.

The armies of Russia, at the time we landed in Europe the last week in April, were just coming up to the Elbe River, where the Allied armies had stopped. Russia immediately built along the Elbe a stone wall of secrecy and inviolability, behind which she has operated ever since, completely in the dark as far as we are concerned. Our military men—and I believe there have been only four, including General Eisenhower and perhaps a few staff members, who have been permitted to look beyond that line and into Berlin—flew in and were escorted by the Russians to the place where their business was to be done and were escorted back and flown out, and had no liberty whatever to see what the Russians were doing in that portion of Germany which they occupied. American correspondents have been permitted in the Russian-held section of Germany only after they were accredited through Moscow, and then only under the same very limited opportunity to see what was going on. The Russian zone of policing actually is going to extend, as we now know, a good way west of the Elbe. It is going to come roughly to within a point about 150 miles east of the Rhine.

What Russia is doing is erecting a series of buffers in Europe. She has built one political line of defense through Poland, Czecho-Slovakia, the Balkans and Finland, where she intends to have wholly friendly governments. She is building a second line of defense in the parts of Germany and Austria which she possesses and will police.

The topic on the lips of every military and newspaper man, all the two weeks that I was in Germany, was what Russia was going to do. There is no reason, I think, to believe that there will be any opportunity for Allied

military men or for news correspondents from western Europe and the United States to move freely in the part of Germany which Russia is going to police. I think there is no reason to believe that there is going to be free commercial intercourse or free access by our business interests to that part of Germany. At the time I was there, and for some time before, the Allied military government people were talking about what to do with Germany after the war. They were saying "We must set up in Germany, after the collapse of Nazism, local governments. We must allow those local governments to delegate powers to provincial governments where that is necessary, but the provincial governments must delegate no power to a central government in Germany, because the way to keep Germany powerless is to keep the country decentralized and defederalized." That kind of talk is completely unrealistic in that it presumes there is going to be an over-all policy in Germany. Germany is, to all intents and purposes, partitioned for at least some years to come, and it begins to be perfectly obvious that within the very considerable section of Germany which the Russians are going to police, they are going to employ their own policies and they aren't going to be governed by the suggestions of any central military control commission in Berlin. That central commission is to be no more than a figurehead, at least as far as the Russian-policed section of Germany is concerned.

Now we here in the United States are still debating what to do with Germany and what is the extent of the German people's guilt. The fact is that there isn't any Germany left. The collapse of Nazism smashed the fabric even of community institutions in Germany, as well as of national institutions. This is what I mean: When Hitler came into power he immediately set out to disband church organizations and groups corresponding to civic luncheon clubs and the Boy Scouts and the Girl Scouts—he did away with all such groups and put their members into Nazi party and German national organizations. Everything, every kind of community life in Germany, every kind of group life, was Nazified. Now that Nazism has been crushed and those institutions have been destroyed, the Germans just haven't any fabric or group life left, nationally or even in the community. Politically, too, the Germans are completely at a loss. Every German—and we talked to hundreds of them in the Ruhr and Thuringia and all along the Rhine Valley and in Bavaria—every German who came up to talk to us or whom we stopped to talk to on the street would volunteer immediately the statement, "I am not a Nazi" or "I wasn't a Nazi." I talked to several hundred of them, and frequently said, "All right, if you aren't a Nazi, then what are you? Are you a Social Democrat, or a Centrist, or a Communist?" They shrugged their shoulders and didn't know. Everybody in Germany had been either a Nazi or an anti-Nazi for a dozen years or more. Those who were anti-Nazis escaped from the country, if they were able to, or were thrown into concentration camps or were done away with, or they went along with the party and pretended to be Nazis. And when Nazism had fallen they had nothing to tie to politically.

The German family structure also was effectively smashed by Hitler. Children were turned informers against their parents. It is difficult for us, who take the family so much for granted as the core of our social organization, to understand the extent to which families were broken up and

disrupted by Nazism. General Immel of Wisconsin, whom some of you may know, who was on General Devers' staff, told a story that could be repeated scores of times with minor variations. In the Rhine Valley, after the Germans had been beaten and the Allies were in complete control, our troops found three boys, two of them nine and one ten years old, cutting telephone cables, whittling the rubber away from the wires, twisting them together to short the circuits, then taping them with bicycle tape so nobody could find the break. They were playing hob with American signal corps telephone lines along the Rhine. The boys were asked why they were doing that. They said they were doing it for the Fuehrer and a man had showed them how to do it and had given them the knives and equipment with which they worked. The officer who arrested them said, "What would your father think?" They said, "Well, he probably wouldn't like it." "Suppose your father and the Fuehrer disagreed about what you ought to do, whom would you obey?" And they said, "Why, the Fuehrer, of course." Parental authority was broken down. Parents were afraid of their children, because the children were told their first duty was to serve the state even when it was against the interests of their parents and their own family group. Germany is in that kind of hopeless chaos today, and that is one major reason why there isn't any Germany.

And then, of course, there is the over-all reason that the country has been effectively cut into four pieces. Germany is not likely to become a single nation again, under any form of government, for many, many years to come. The line of division in Germany between the area that the Russians are to police and the area that the other Allies are to police, has become effectively the borderline between Europe and Russia, and the boundary between Asia (Russia) and Europe is no longer the Ural Mountains but that line just east of the Rhine. If you will take a map of Europe and draw a line roughly from Trieste to Stettin you will see how much of Europe has passed definitely into the Russian zone of influence.

I think there was no practical alternative to doing what has been done in Europe, because there isn't anything else in Europe to tie to. France is not conceivably a first rate or even a second rate world power any more and won't be again in our time. Political fragmentation in France is much worse than it was even in 1939, before the beginning of the war. The French people are extremely war weary. Every correspondent I talked to in Paris who had lived in France before the war and worked there and knew the French people, was unanimously agreed that there will be revolt and civil war in France. Some of the correspondents put the date as early as Bastille Day, July 14, for the beginning of civil disorders.

Britain is left very much weaker by this war than we in the United States realize. We have been thinking for 165 years in this country about imperial Britain, and conceding to her in these later years a might which she no longer possesses. Britain, the United Kingdom—48,000,000 people in an area about the size of the state of Minnesota—became a powerful nation and was able to organize and maintain the peace of the world in the century between 1815 and 1914 because she was the industrial center of the world and very largely dominated the extension of industry in the world. Because of that domination she had become the financial center of the

world. She controlled the seas in an age when a powerful navy was the key to peace and ocean shipping was the key to commerce. Britain has ceased to be in that position in the world. I remarked in London on the way home to an English friend of mine that Britain 50 years from now would be in about the position that the Netherlands are today, and he replied, "Yes, G. K. Chesterton said that back in 1929 in an essay" (published in a book called "Generally Speaking"). I got the book subsequently and Chesterton says precisely that. He says the Netherlands are remembered for their painters and Britain, 50 years from now, will be remembered for her poets. We still think of Canada, Australia, New Zealand and South Africa—and some of us may still think of Ireland—as dominions of the British Empire. We fail to realize that they are independent countries, and while tied to the United Kingdom by sentimental ties even stronger than those which tie us to that nation as a mother country, their interests more and more lie with the nations in the world which have the power. In most cases their interests now lie chiefly with the United States. Australia and New Zealand, for example, recognize that their security in the Pacific depends not on Britain, and never will again, but upon the United States. South Africa's economic system is based on the willingness of the United States to pay \$35 an ounce for gold. Canada is so closely linked to us economically and geographically that in any division of opinion on a major issue between the United States and Great Britain, Canada would, without thinking twice, have to go along with the United States. In my judgment Britain faces a problem of rehabilitation and reconstruction not exceeded in its seriousness by that of any nation which has been in this war, including Germany itself.

I am not one of those who believes that Europe is necessarily going communistic in the Russian sense. I was in Paris during the municipal elections there. The night before the election a Frenchman whom I had looked up and wanted to talk to, because he had been a prisoner in the concentration camp at Buchenwald, took me to a comunistic political rally. I talked to four or five of his comrades who were communists, and they were all condemning Stalin as an intractable old reactionary who was far to their right. French communism is already assuming a French national character. France unquestionably will go to the left, but that doesn't mean France will adopt Russian communism or that it will necessarily be in the orbit of Russian communism.

Britain—although Churchill will probably win the pending election, with a smaller majority than he has had in Commons; that means maybe another year of power for him—Britain unquestionably will go socialistic within the next year or two, but that does not mean at all that Britain will be communist in the sense that it will come into the Soviet Russian sphere of influence.

But whether European countries go left or not, even if they should go completely left and into the Russian orbit, it doesn't mean a great deal. For the continent of Europe, which was for centuries the seat of world power, is now the seat of no world power. It is a peninsula of Asia. The centers of world power have moved and are moving to North America and to Asia.

Now for the second premise: that Russia isn't primarily interested in Europe. It is her back yard, not her front yard. She is interested in making herself secure in Europe against attack. But her interest in adding Spain or France or the Low Countries or Scandinavia to the Russian sphere of influence is trivial beside her mounting interest in the eastern world. As has often been remarked, Russia is essentially an Oriental country. Its mind is more Oriental than Occidental. The Russians are free from racial prejudice, and from any concept of their task in the world as the white man's burden, they are superiorly equipped to meet and deal with and understand the hundreds of millions of Asiatics. The population of Russia is growing more rapidly today than the population of any other country in the world except India. Russia's future contacts, its future markets, its future interests lie increasingly landward to the east in China and India.

General Marshall and Admiral King have repeatedly asked the press and public of the United States not to speculate on whether Russia is coming into the war against Japan.

I think Russia will do so, and so do all the informed people I know. But to all intents and purposes Russia *is* in the war against Japan. Surely nobody thinks that the United States and Britain can dictate what is to be the government of Korea or what is to be done with Manchuria if our proposals in that respect are flatly disagreed to and opposed by the Russians. The reason for the request of General Marshall and Admiral King that we avoid speculation about whether or not Russia will come into the war with Japan is simply this: if Russia can come into that war in its own time, it can strike a telling blow against Japan. But if Japan becomes convinced Russia is coming in Japan is likely to try to get in the first blow as she did at Pearl Harbor. And if she were to do that, she undoubtedly could take Vladivostok and some of the area around it and it would cost the Russians time and men to regain what they had lost before they could make their offensive participation in that war fully effective. That certainly wouldn't be to our interest. But there is a further and more important reason: if Russia believed that the American press and public, by its speculation, had caused Japan to decide that Russia was coming in and therefore that Japan must strike first, the Russians would blame us for having prompted the Japanese attack. That would make our relations with Russia more difficult, not simply in Europe, but in Asia where Russia and the United States are going to have even more difficult problems to work out than in Europe.

Russia apparently has promised to come into the Pacific war, probably before the end of the summer. Whether she will keep that promise, if she has made it, remains to be seen. If she keeps it, of course it will be because she thinks it is for her best interest, and not because of any sense of gratitude or obligation to the United States. We see the United States looking increasingly to the west. We are concerned as never before with the internal government and policies of China. We are taking for granted that we will permanently occupy island bases in the Pacific up to and including Okinawa, and perhaps beyond. The population and industry on our own Pacific coast has been permanently increased since Pearl Harbor. All of these are straws in an unmistakable wind. Perhaps we underestimate

the significance and extent of our own turning to the west, because we always have looked to the west. But we have only to recognize what we are doing today to see that the same opportunities which beckon us towards the Pacific beckon to Russia, too, and more strongly because Russia is a part of Asia geographically and politically and even ethnologically. So I suggest to you that a broken Europe, three-fifths of which has now come into the Russian orbit, is now a peninsula of Asia and has become the world's back yard and that Russia's real interest over the next centuries lies to the east.

Now for my third and major suggestion, which is that the ability of the United States and Russia to reach a working understanding is the only hope of ourselves and of the world for peace in this century, and that the chief burden of achieving such an understanding falls upon us if one is to be reached which is to be at all satisfactory to us.

The United States and Russia will increasingly be the two great world powers. All the newspaper men coming back from San Francisco point out that decisions taken out there were taken by the whole assembly if everybody agreed on it; but if there was disagreement, the decision was made by the Big Five—the United States, Russia, Britain, China and France; and if there was disagreement in the Big Five, the decision was made by the Big Three; and if there was disagreement among the Big Three, the United States and Russia decided; and if the United States and Russia could not agree, there wasn't any agreement. If the United States and Russia can agree upon and evolve a framework of collective security, then no other nation or nations in the world can start a major war in our time. I do not think it even matters, if we and Russia can agree and work together, whether we have any long range policy for controlling Germany, because Russia and the United States, as long as they agree, could improvise from month to month and almost from week to week a policy towards Germany which would make it impossible for Germany ever to rise again as an aggressor. But if the United States and Russia can't agree, then we are virtually passing to Germany the balance of power. We are inviting her to play Russia off against the United States and the United States off against Russia, as Hitler so successfully played Russia against the west in the 1930's, thus enabling Germany to raise itself by its bootstraps and reconstitute itself and make another bid for world domination.

But I want to look even closer home for the inevitable consequences of inability of the United States and Russia to work together. I am not particularly afraid of war between this country and Russia in our time, or perhaps in our children's time. Certainly at present and in the foreseeable future such a war would be impossible for either nation to win in military terms. That isn't, I think, the thing we need to fear. What we do need to fear is an assumption on our part and on the part of the Russian people or government that war between Russia and the United States is a future likelihood, which has to be reckoned with as a possibility or a probability in our formulation of national policy. The danger is that we will live under the shadow of the fear of such a war, and that we will decide that we have to gear our economy and our society to be ready for such a war. If we do that, if we proceed from here on the assumption that we may have to fight

Russia five or ten or fifteen or twenty or twenty-five years from now, then we might just as well stop talking about reconversion; we might just as well make up our minds that the conscription of our young men and the regimentation and rationing of these last four years and the payment of the kind of taxes we have been paying are just a practice swing for the kind of lives we are going to have to lead from now on. And in that event we may as well say goodbye to the kind of free society that we have thought we were fighting to preserve. Because to prepare ourselves for such a conflict means that we must be totalitarianized and militarized in this country in such a way that we shan't again know what free government is. The issue will never come before us in the form of any clearcut referendum on whether or not we want harmony with Russia. The fabric of our future will be woven thread by thread and determined by the steps we take on individual and largely secondary issues, so that finally we will have to cut our suit out of the cloth that we have woven.

Russia is even more suspicious of the United States than the United States is of Russia, if that be possible. The American Army Graves Registration Service, when the Germans had been driven out of Rumania by the Russians, sent a party of Americans in uniform into Rumania to identify and mark and photograph the graves of several American flyers who had been killed in the air raids on the Ploesti oil fields. The Russians, as soon as they encountered this group of Americans, arrested them and said, "We have uncovered a big American spy plot," because the Russians just couldn't comprehend that the United States Army was attempting to identify the graves of individual American dead. The Russians just don't bury men that way who have died in war. They bury them in mass graves, usually without identification, and it was incomprehensible to them that the United States really was sending in a party of military men to try to identify and mark individual American graves.

Here is another story: The Russians didn't want any American planes piloted by Americans to land on Russian airports. They took delivery of all our lend-lease planes, you know, outside of Russia. They did finally agree, reluctantly, that any American planes which were so badly injured bombing Berlin or eastern German targets that they couldn't possibly get back to their own bases, might land, in such great emergency, at bases on the Russian front. One day in the closing days of the war an American Flying Fortress, which had been bombing Berlin, was hit by anti-aircraft fire. The pilot thought he would have to come down at a Russian base. So the plane was brought down. The Russian officer who came out to greet them said, "What is your purpose in landing here? Your plane isn't conceivably damaged badly enough so that there is any need for this. You could have very easily got back to your base." The American pilot looked over his plane and said, "Well, I guess it isn't as badly hurt as I thought. I thought we were so badly injured there was some doubt as to whether we could get back, so I landed here." The Russian said, "Well, this is all very irregular, but since your plane has landed here you may as well go back a couple of hundred miles, to a main base behind the lines, where your plane can be repaired and refueled so you can go back to your western European base." And the Fortress and crew took off for the rear base. They dis-

covered that they had a stowaway, a Pole who had lived for some years in the United States and spoke pretty good English. He said he was a Polish patriot whom the Russians were seeking as a political prisoner, and that if the Russians got their hands on him he would be sent to Siberia or shot. He said, "I know this is a foolish thing I did. I hid in this plane in desperation, hoping you would save me." Of course, the Americans are suckers for that kind of hard luck story, and there was probably a good deal of truth in it. These lads are 26 or 27 years old, or younger, and it is their business to fly and fight, not to know a great deal about political situations. But they said to him that there wasn't anything they could do. When they landed at the rear Russian base the Russians would go over the plane to repair it, and he was bound to be discovered and there was nothing for him to do but give himself up. Then a member of the crew had an idea. He said there was an extra sergeant's jumper in the plane and the stowaway could be put into that extra suit of coveralls and his name could be added to the crew and maybe they could get him out alive. But when they landed at the rear base, the officer said, "What is this, seven members of the crew. The manifest telegraphed from the front said there were only six." It had never occurred to the lads that the manifest would be telegraphed to the rear base. A little questioning soon developed what had happened and the Pole was detected and taken away, and the American members of the crew were held by the Russians for a number of weeks, because the Russians were certain—and probably still are—that they had uncovered a major spy plot.

The Russians see in anything which brings them into contact with the Americans a possible plot of Americans to spy on them and to attempt to obtain Russian secrets. Their suspicion, as I say, is just as great as our own suspicion of the Russians.

We spent two hours and a half talking to General Eisenhower and questioned him pretty closely about relations with the Russians. Eisenhower said, "I personally have always gotten along splendidly with Stalin. Every request I have made of him he has granted." But the very answer was equivalent to saying that there was no military contact between the Russians and the Americans except at the very top level, between Eisenhower and Stalin themselves. I quoted Eisenhower's remark to another American general who laughed wryly and said, "Sure, but there are a lot of things we would like to know about the Russians that are too trivial for Eisenhower to ask Stalin."

Amon Carter, Texas publisher in our party, had a son taken prisoner by the Germans, who was in a camp in Russian territory. He hadn't had any word of his boy and was very eager to know whether he was alive and well. As soon as we got over there he started to work through military channels to try to find out something. He didn't get anywhere. Finally the request came clear up to Eisenhower and Eisenhower asked Stalin if he could find out whether a boy named Carter was in the prison camp in Luckewald. Stalin was fine about it. He not only looked up the boy, but put him and half a dozen of his comrades on a plane and flew them back, so that the boy was united with his father. The point of the story is that the only way to accomplish that was for Eisenhower to ask Stalin.

De Gaulle came from a little town in eastern France. When the

Germans came into that town in the invasion of France they took a creamery and laundry and moved them over into eastern Germany. So when the Russians and Americans had made a junction in Germany, De Gaulle began asking for that creamery and laundry. Nobody could do anything about it until finally it came to Eisenhower's attention. Eisenhower sent a message to Stalin saying that De Gaulle's home town had a laundry and creamery over in Germany and would he try and find them and send them back. The point, again, is that Eisenhower had the only military contact with Stalin. And when the fighting ended, questions that had been military became political, so that military contacts, to all intents and purposes, ceased to exist. And the only political contact between the United States and Russia was the one that had existed between Roosevelt and Stalin. Some Americans have thought this was a situation of Roosevelt's making—that he insisted on handling personally our relations with the Russians. But I think it was at least as much the fault of Russia and of its highly centralized government and of Stalin himself that there was no political contact on the lower levels. When Mr. Roosevelt died, that political contact was broken just at the period of intensification, with the end of the war coming, when there was need for more and more contact. For weeks after the death of President Roosevelt and during the time when the fighting was ending we just hadn't any sure political contact with the Russians. It was during that period that the diplomats were all saying that our relations with Russia were deteriorating very rapidly. Harry Hopkins, I think, has done a notable job of reestablishing the political contact, but there still is not a regular, continuing political contact between the United States and Russia, to enable the threshing out and exchange of opinions on differences between the two countries. For that reason some have suggested that Eisenhower, who had a splendid record of dealing harmoniously with the Russians on a military level, would be abler than any other man we have to deal with the Russians on a civilian and political level. Eisenhower represents what the Russians most admire in the United States—not just military might but the productive and organizational might of the United States which produced our military effectiveness. Possibly Eisenhower is better equipped than any other man in the United States to negotiate and deal with the Russians and to stand for principles and not give any appearance of retreating on principles, while still being able to compromise and negotiate and bargain and make concessions to the Russians.

After our conversation with Eisenhower, General Bedell Smith had a luncheon for us and there were fifteen generals present. I was seated next to Air Marshall Teddar, the British general on Eisenhower's staff whom Eisenhower credits with having made tactical air power so effective an arm of the army ground forces. Teddar, talking off the record about relations between Britain and the United States on the one hand and Russia on the other, said, "Yes, perhaps Russia is going to behave even more badly after this war than the United States did after the last one." Well, that may be an irritating remark to some Americans, and yet it is a very interesting British slant. Britain feels that the United States did behave very badly after the first World War, and that a second World War could have been avoided if we had behaved more wisely than we did.

There may be enough of a parallel there to be worth turning over in our minds. Is Russia's position for a generation after this war in international affairs going to be somewhat comparable to the isolationism of the United States in world affairs for a generation after the first World War?

One of the editors in our group asked an American general, "What about Stalin's broken promises?" and he said, "Well, Stalin has a board of directors the same as Roosevelt had or Truman has." The United States broke some promises after the first World War. President Wilson made some commitments which the United States didn't fulfill. Of course it can be said that Wilson had no right to make commitments affecting the United States until he knew that the Senate and the American people would back them up. But apparently Stalin has made some commitments that the army men and others around him would not back up, and therefore we say, "Russia has broken some promises," in the same way the British a generation ago, and with as much reason, said that the United States had broken some promises.

It took the United States 25 years and the awful curse of a second World War to realize the responsibility that we have to take in world affairs, if we are to have security for ourselves. It seems probable that it is going to take 25 or 50 years to bring Russia around to a belief that it can work in mutual good faith with its western neighbors in world affairs in the kind of organization that has been set up tentatively at San Francisco. But the United States has got to take the initiative in wooing Russian friendship and breaking down the misunderstandings which exist between us, because the Russians, better than we, can afford to play a waiting game. The events of history will tend to play into Russia's hands if we just let things drift in the world, because the longer we go without taking affirmative action, the more powerful, comparatively, Russia will be and the less powerful will be the nations like Britain and France, whom we have traditionally regarded as friends.

I am not suggesting that we sacrifice principles. On the contrary, I am pleading that we retain our principles and promulgate them and live up to them so that they will be understood and respected by Russia and by the great part of the world which is still inchoate, but which is going to have to be reckoned with increasingly in the generations ahead.

It is utter nonsense that opposition elements in the United States congress at this moment should be trying to cut down the appropriation of OWI. Maybe the OWI hasn't been efficiently run and maybe it needs a thorough housecleaning. But the most effective means we have of advertising our system to the world can be through the OWI. And certainly the Republicans have an interest in advertising the American way of life to the world and acquainting the people of the world with what we believe to be its advantages. It seems to me folly on our part to object so intensely, on the one hand, that the Russian system have an unimpeded chance to spread over the whole world, and at the same time to refuse to advertise to the world the things that we believe in and the fruits of our belief.

I am urging not that we abandon principles, but that, standing on those principles and living up to them, we be willing to negotiate and compromise and make concessions on details, and that we conduct an aggressive

campaign of friendship with Russia, which may win, over a long period of time, the confidence of the Russian people. In order to do that we have got to recognize the difference between principles and details.

I was talking to Commander Stassen on the telephone some days ago in San Francisco, and he said, "Is it true, as we feel out here, that there is a wave of anti-Russian opinion sweeping the United States because of the feeling that too many concessions have been made out here to the Russians?" I said, "I think there is a rising wave of suspicion against Russia, although I don't know how much of it arises from what has been happening in San Francisco." And he said, "We have not surrendered any principles to the Russians. All that we have given them is time." We must not surrender principles; we must be ready to give endlessly on details and to compromise and negotiate and bargain. To work out a harmonious relationship with Russia is going to take, on our part, a great deal of humility and consummate patience and tact, and I am not sure that those are characteristics of the American people. A lot of Americans are going to be saying all of the time, "We have already made too many concessions to the Russians. Why don't we stand up for our rights and not give an inch. Let's stop kowtowing to them." There are people who are going to holler that we are surrendering our principles in every dealing that we attempt with the Russians, because these people want, not agreement, but disagreement.

I think all of us tend to recognize our own sacrifices more readily than we recognize the sacrifices of other people. In almost every audience that I talk to, when I say anything about Russia, somebody comes up to me and says, "Well, the trouble with the Russian people is that they haven't been allowed to know how much the United States has done for them. We have given them planes and tanks and guns." The Russians would reply to that, "Yes, we know how much you have done for us, but do the Americans realize how much Russia has done for them?" Russia gave 10,000,000 Russian lives to defeat Hitler in Europe. And I am one of those who believes that Hitler wouldn't have been defeated in Europe this year or next year, and maybe not at all, if we hadn't had Russia on our side. If our dead had equalled Russia's, in proportion to our population, the United States would today have seven and a half million dead in the fighting in Europe instead of fewer than a hundred thousand. Planes and tanks and guns don't weigh much in the scale against human lives. But a good many Americans would reply, "The Russians didn't give those lives for us. They gave them to save their own skins." And the Russians would say, "That is the kind of realism we would like more of in dealing with the Americans. Of course we gave the lives to save our own skins! Of course the Americans gave the planes and tanks and guns to save *their* skins! And the sooner the United States recognizes that both nations did what they did because each was trying to save its own skin, and not for any sentimental reasons, the sooner we will be on a realistic basis in foreign affairs."

The American people need to understand why the Russians regard the end of fighting in Europe as the end of a chapter and why they have turned to a completely clean page in the relationships between the two nations. They regard events from here on as a beginning over again. The Russians, I think, would give us credit for having been a pretty fair wartime ally, and

the Americans would regard the Russians as having been pretty fair wartime allies. But the Russians say, "That is all over now. The war is past. Now we want to know what kind of a peacetime ally you are going to be." Relations between the United States and Russia will inevitably grow better from now on, if we have patience and tact. They are already growing better. But the road is long. The die is not going to be cast in Europe alone, or by what Russia does or does not do in the Pacific. This is a long term proposition, a matter of 25 or 50 years, and we must keep on working year by year to try to find a basis of compatibility with Russia in a framework of collective security large enough so that within it the Russians can continue to be Russians and the people of the United States can continue to be Americans. To work together is not impossible. The alternative to working together is so catastrophic that even if we couldn't see the slightest ray of hope for avoiding ultimate conflict with the Russians, it would still be five or ten or fifteen or twenty years too soon to say that conflict was inevitable.

If we, as Americans, have the genius and the patience to fashion from the military victory of the United Nations in Europe the beginnings of a system of collective security—if we have the courage and ambition and the belief in our own society to work aggressively to bring Russia to an understanding of our point of view—then we can get to a place 25 or 50 years from now from which we can look back and say we won in Europe. It is too early yet to say that we have. The military men have been able only, as always, to clear the ground on which we can build the kind of structure that we are going to live in. The kind of structure that we build is up to us to make.

Thank you.

