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Charles B. Elliott

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THE PROPOSED LEAGUE OF NATIONS

THE Shining Sword which was flashed in the face of the world is broken and the glittering armor of the war lord lies by the wayside as Autocracy flees from the vengeance of an outraged people. Appalled and dazed by the catastrophe which so nearly wrecked the results of ages of patient endeavor, statesmen, publicists, jurists, and the people are determined so to reorganize the world that never again may one state or class of men bring about a great war. The course of history is broken; our conceptions of justice and the proper ambitions of states are being readjusted; and men now feel not only the necessity, but realize the practicability of organizing a world community on lines which will substitute some form of adjustment for war and some sort of supernational force for many great national armies. The alternative seems to be the ultimate destruction of civilization.

There is nothing new in the proposal to create either a world state, a federation of the world, or a league of nations pledged to maintain a certain system of international polity. Many schemes having this in view have been formulated but they have generally embodied the dreams of poets, idealists and closet statesmen.

The Great Design of Henry of Navarre, the projects of Emeric Crucé, Saint Pierre, Penn, Kant and many others fell on the ears of a world occupied with its selfish ends and dominated by theories which it is hoped are now discredited. Although these plans have generally been presented at the end of a great war, the conditions were never such as to impress those in power with the fact that it was necessary to choose between some form of world organization which would preserve peace, and the probable destruction of all free societies. Neither the selfish statesmen of the day nor the revolutionary leaders desired that the conditions then existing be fixed and maintained by force. The statesmen desired a free hand, and the agitators a reorganization. There could be no final peace in the world while dissatisfied nationalities were under the feet of their conquerors. Those only faced the realities who, like the Italian Mazzini, contended that there could be no real peace until the world had passed

through a great conflict in which the forces of justice would triumph. There had to be a leveling before there could be a permanent building.

History repeats itself. The recurring centuries bring back similar conditions and problems, and men try to solve them in the same way. There is little new in the realm of government. Three hundred years ago a war weary Europe was dominated by the House of Austria, of evil memory. Elizabeth ruled over England and Henry of Navarre sat on the throne of France. In the famous *Mémoires* of the Duke of Sully we find the details of a plan which he attributes to Henry IV, under which Austria was to have been confined within narrow limits and the rest of Europe reorganized into states, inhabited by people bound together by ties of nationality, custom, and religion, and their international relations determined and the peace of the world maintained by an assembly in which all were to be represented. It was modeled on the Amphictyonic Council of Greece. An international army to which each state should contribute was to be maintained to enforce the decrees of this council. It is very possible that this Great Design originated and ended temporarily with Henry's minister, but it is vastly interesting to know that three centuries ago men like the Duke of Sully were planning for the use of the major force of the world for the protection of the peace of the world. Henry fell beneath the dagger of Ravallac.

"Had he lived to execute this wonderful project," said the Abbé de Saint Pierre, "he would have been incomparably the greatest man of all the past and of all future. . . . However, that prince has still the honor of making the most conspicuous device and the most useful discovery for the happiness of the human race in the history of the world. The execution of that great enterprise may well be preserved by Providence for the greatest man of posterity."

May we not reasonably hope that the purpose of the Great Design will be effected by the group of statesmen who now represent the great liberal powers of the world?

Of course the word "peace" has many connotations,—ranging from the mere absence of organized war to that condition of non-resistance which Tolstoi advocated, a state of pacifism in which "it is better to be killed by a madman than to resist him by force,"—from the peace of the mystic which passeth under-

standing, to that of the militant citizen who is determined to have peace if he has to fight for it. The peace we refer to means the absence of war in a world governed on the principles of common justice.

My purpose in this article is not to consider particularly the practicability of a League of Nations or the merits of any particular plan of world organization, but to state as briefly as possible the nature of the present world wide movement, the attitude of nations and statesmen toward it and the progress so far made toward the realization of the idea.

Forty years ago Gladstone expressed the hope that he might live to see the idea of right accepted as the governing principle in world policy. Reasonable, practical men of the world believe that the time has arrived when this dream of idealists of the past may be realized. Human nature has not changed, but it has received a tremendous shock. It required the great war to bring the world to a realization of the solid fact that unless the old selfish theories of state conduct are abandoned civilization is headed for a grand wreck. Never before has there been such a condition of open-mindedness and willingness to consider as realities what a selfish world heretofore regarded as the dreams of idealism.

The agitation which resulted in the present world wide movement began in the United States soon after the commencement of the great war. Peace societies representing various shades and degrees of pacifism had been active for several decades in England and the United States. We had taken a leading part in the Hague Conventions, which it is now the unworthy fashion to depreciate. Carnegie had devoted his millions to an endowment for international peace, which under the lead of Elihu Root and a board of earnest men was working quietly and effectively along educational lines. The very general demand for arbitration had resulted in Bryan's series of rather platonic treaties. But through many of these activities there ran more than a suggestion of the peace-at-any-price doctrine. Many of the men and women who were most conspicuous if not always the most influential at Peace Conventions and Mohawk Conferences, were fond of ringing the changes on Sumner's query, "Can there be in our age any peace that is not honorable, any war that is not dishonorable?" Such ideas found ready acceptance among a people naturally inclined toward peace and unfamiliar with world conditions. They so

hated militarism that they innocently played into the hands of the militarists of Europe and refused to prepare the nation for the dangers confronting it. With their eyes on the stars they could not see the rough way. While playing the good Samaritan they forgot that the road to Jericho was infested with thieves.

In the spring of 1915 a number of citizens distinguished in diplomacy, commerce, finance, industry, art, education and the church, met in Independence Hall, Philadelphia, and launched a movement which it was hoped would lead to a reorganized world in which another great war would not be allowed. The key note of this organization was struck when the word *enforce* was inserted in the title, and the League of Peace, became the League to Enforce Peace, thus, as President Lowell says, "alienating those who were really opposed to the principles advocated by the league, and attracting men who saw that these principles were not mere nebulous abstractions, but something which it might not be impossible for the nations of the world to approve, adopt and put into operation."

It was not to be a pacifist organization. Although conservative in its platform and moderate in its immediate aims, the League advocated the use of force to control the disturbing factors in international relations, somewhat as law and order is maintained within the borders of the individual state. The great success of this League is due to the fact that it recognizes the solid fact that so long as human nature remains what it is, it is improbable that war can be prevented entirely, and advances a workable scheme for reducing the evil to a minimum. It stands for the very simple and elementary proposition that States, like individuals, must be forced, when necessary, to obey the law.

As Mr. Hamilton Holt said, it furnished the common ground on which the pacifists and the preparationists could unite, because it provided for all sanctions, moral, economic, and physical, to maintain law and order.

Former President William H. Taft has been the president of the League to Enforce Peace from the time of its organization and much of its success has been due to his untiring activity and devotion to the cause. With him have labored many earnest men and women representing all parties, creeds, and occupations, differing in opinion as to many things, but agreeing on the vital principle that the time has come when the world must be so reorganized that there can be no more great wars.

The first national meeting, held in Washington, May 26, 1916, was a notable gathering of more than two thousand men and women, representing almost every occupation in life and coming from every state in the Union. Ex-President Taft presided, and President Wilson delivered an address which was heard throughout the world. Naturally such a meeting gave an immense impulse to the work. After America entered the war the League became a powerful agency for consolidating sentiment in favor of throwing every ounce of the strength of the nation into the contest and winning a victory such as would insure a peace worth preserving. In May, 1918, it held a Win-the-War-for-Peace convention in Philadelphia at which more than five thousand delegates pledged it to support the Government in the struggle against autocracy. Since that time the membership of the national organization has been rapidly increasing, State branches have been organized in many of the states, and the work of organization is being actively pushed. The enthusiasm shown by the public is evidenced by the fact that at the convention recently held in Denver for organizing a local branch in Colorado more than fifteen thousand people were in attendance. Similar organizations have been working in the other allied countries.

The war has been won and it now remains to secure the victory with a peace of justice and organize a League of Nations with the will and the machinery to enforce the peace.

The most serious obstacle in the way of an effective peace has been removed by the fall of the House of Hohenzollern, the destruction of the Prussian military monarchy and the discrediting of the philosophy of force upon which the political system of the Central Powers rested. The keenest critics of a proposed League of Nations such as Frederick Harrison and Mr. J. B. Firth seem to have had very little hope of a military victory over the Central Powers and no confidence whatever in the desirability of a League of Nations in which a victorious or even a partially defeated Germany would participate. "There can be no security," wrote Mr. Firth in the *Fortnightly Review*, "unless German militarism is completely destroyed, together with the whole German System, of which it is the spirit and the life." The position was correct and unassailable. There is no question but that the German people, almost without exception, accepted the theory that Force is a manifestation of the Divine Will expressed through the mystical entity known as the State; and that success

in the use of force is the justification for its use. Necessarily, then, according to this doctrine, *failure is condemnation*. The Germans are nothing if not logical. Germany has failed, and Chancellor Prince Maximilian now announces that "The victory for which many had hoped has not been granted to us. But the German people has won this still greater victory over itself and its belief in the right of might." It is certainly something gained if the German people have learned that might is not necessarily right. The old Germany could never have been a member of a league of free nations. It was very willing to join a league after a German victory and "to suppress disturbers of the peace." As Chancellor Von Hertling placidly announced, Germany was ready to place herself *at the head* of a league after she had arranged all the national boundaries according to her idea of what was best for Germany. As the mobilized German professors put it, the league, "must, of course, be under the leadership of the most efficient people."

All this has passed away. The world has now to deal with a broken and, we trust, a chastened Germany, and it will grant such terms and impose such conditions as are necessary to establish and maintain a just peace. However, there should be no illusions as to the difficulties to be overcome. The hope of success is in the awakened conscience of the world, and the changed attitude of practical men toward proposals heretofore regarded as mere dreams. It may be that this is a result of fright and therefore temporary. Let us hope, however, that the fires have burned out some of the selfishness of men and that a heretofore dormant sense of justice has been awakened. There is encouragement in the fact that practical men no longer deny the possibility of world organization for world protection.

In the United States the overwhelming sentiment is in favor of a League of Nations, along the lines laid down in the platform of the League to Enforce Peace. If we may judge by the attitude of the press, there is hardly a discordant note. The general principle is almost universally accepted. Public men and politicians of all shades of opinion approve the idea. Mr. Taft is the father of the movement in this country, and his views are well known.

Elihu Root says, "I heartily agree with the purpose and general principle of the League to Enforce Peace. It seems clear to me that if we are ever to get away from the necessity for great

armaments and special alliances, with continually recurring wars, growing more and more destructive, it must be by a more systematic treatment of international disputes brought about by common agreement among civilized nations. It seems to me that any such system must include the better formulation of international law, the establishment of an international court to apply the law, *and a general agreement to enforce submission to the jurisdiction of the court.* I also think the Court of Conciliation for dealing with questions which are not justiciable is very desirable.”

It has been approved by such organizations as the Chambers of Commerce of the United States and the American Federation of Labor, and by publicists, jurists and writers such as Charles E. Hughes, A. Lawrence Lowell, Alton B. Parker, Henry Cabot Lodge, John Bates Clark, Nicholas Murray Butler, Franklin H. Gidding, Stephen S. Wise, Anna Howard Shaw, John Spargo, Lyman Abbott and many others of equal eminence. Col. Roosevelt, who deprecated the agitation for a League of Nations until a victory over Germany had been won, now says:

“But if without in the smallest degree sacrificing our belief in a sound and intense national aim we all join with the people of England, France, and Italy and with the people in smaller states, who in practise show themselves able to steer equally clear of bolshevism and of kaiserism, we may be able to make a real and much needed advance in the international organization. The United States cannot again completely withdraw into its shell. We need not mix in all European quarrels nor assume all spheres of interests everywhere to be ours, but we ought to join with the other civilized nations of the world in some scheme that in a time of great stress would offer a likelihood of obtaining just settlements that will avert war.

“Therefore, in my judgment, the United States at the peace conference ought to be able to co-operate effectively with the British and French and Italian governments to support a practical and effective plan which won't attempt the impossible, but which will represent a real step forward.

“Probably the first essential would be to limit the league at the outset to the Allies, to the people with whom we have been operating and with whom we are certain we can co-operate in the future. Neither Turkey nor Austria need now be considered as regards such a league, and we should clearly understand that bolshevist Russia is and that bolshevist Germany would be as undesirable in such a league as the Germany and Russia of the Hohenzollerns and Romanovs. Bolshevism is just as much an

international menace as kaiserism. Until Germany and Russia have proved by a course of conduct extending over years that they are capable of entering such a league in good faith, so that we can count upon their fulfilling their duties in it, it would be merely foolish to take them in.

"The league, therefore, would have to be based on the combination among the Allies of the present war—together with any peoples like the Czech-Slovaks, who have shown that they are fully entitled to enter into such a league if they desire to do so. Each nation should absolutely reserve to itself its right to establish its own tariff and general economic policy and absolutely ought to control such vital questions as immigration and citizenship and the form of government it prefers. Then it probably would be best for certain spheres of interest to be reserved to each nation or a group of nations."

President Wilson was prompt to express his approval of the program of the League to Enforce Peace. Speaking with reference to the war at the meeting of the League on May 27, 1916, he said:

"With its causes and its objects we are not concerned. The obscure fountains from which its stupendous flood has burst forth we are not interested to search for or explore. . . . And the lesson which the shock of being taken by surprise in a matter so deeply vital to all the nations of the world has made poignantly clear is that the peace of the world must henceforth depend upon a new and more wholesome diplomacy. Only when the great nations of the world have reached some sort of an agreement as to what they hold to be fundamental to their common interest, and as to some feasible method of acting in concert when any nation or group of nations seeks to disturb those fundamental things, can we feel that civilization is at last in a way of justifying its existence and claiming to be finally established. . . . Repeated utterances of the leading statesmen of most of the great nations now engaged in war have made it plain that their thought has come to this, that the principle of public right must henceforth take precedence over the individual interests of particular nations and that the nations of the world must in some way band themselves together to see that right prevails as against any sort of selfish aggression. . . . I am sure that I speak the mind and wish of the people of America when I say that the United States is willing to become a partner in any feasible association of nations formed in order to realize these objects and make them secure against violation."

On September 2, of the same year, in accepting a renomination Mr. Wilson said:

"The nations of the world must unite in joint guarantees that whatever is done to disturb the whole world's life must first

be tested in the court of the whole world's opinion before it is attempted."

On January 22, 1917, in his address to the Senate on Essential Terms of Peace in Europe, the President, who then favored "a peace without victory," stated the conditions upon which this government "would feel justified in asking our people to approve its formal and solemn adherence to a League of Peace."

There must, he said, be "a peace that is worth guaranteeing and preserving," and "It will be absolutely necessary that a force be created as a guarantor of the permanency of the settlement so much greater than the force of any nation now engaged or any alliance hitherto formed or projected that no nation, no probable combination of nations could face or withstand it. If the peace presently to be made is to endure, it must be a peace *made secure by the organized major force of mankind*. . . . And in holding out the expectation that the people and government of the United States will join the other civilized nations of the world in guaranteeing the permanence of peace upon such terms as I have named I speak with the greater boldness and confidence because it is clear to every man who can think that there is in this promise no breach in either our traditions or our policy as a nation, but a fulfillment, rather, of all that we have professed or striven for. I am proposing, as it were, that all nations should with one accord adopt the doctrine of President Monroe as the doctrine of the world. . . . There is no entangling alliance in a concert of power. When all unite to act in the same sense and with the same purpose all act in the common interest."

America finally became involved in the war and on January 8, 1918, the President formulated his "program of the world's peace," in which appeared the following:

"14. *A general association of nations must be formed under specific covenants for the purpose of affording mutual guarantees of political independence and territorial integrity to great and small states alike.*"

In his speech at New York on September 27, President Wilson further elaborated his views. Both the Democratic and Republican party platforms approved the principle of a League of Nations.

Recent events make it unnecessary to refer in detail to the expressions of British statesmen. Those who hesitated have been driven to support the general principle by the growing force of public opinion. The great leaders such as Lloyd George, Lord Bryce, Balfour, Lord Grey, Lord Curzon, Lord Robert Cecil and

Mr. Asquith are definitely committed in favor of a League of Nations. All political parties and factions are united. Lord Grey has published an able pamphlet on the subject. Lord Curzon has supported it in a powerful speech in the House of Lords. On November 13, Lloyd George, in speaking of the coming conference to fix the terms of peace, said, "It is the duty of Liberalism to use its influence to ensure that it shall be a reign of peace. . . . In my judgment a league of nations is absolutely essential to permanent peace. We shall go to the peace conference to guarantee that a League of Nations is a reality."

According to the pessimistic Mr. J. B. Firth (who appears to have been serving in the capacity of Devil's Advocate), in England, "the League of Nations has become a popular catchword. If there is to be a general election late in November or December, all the political parties will have to subscribe to it and every candidate will pledge himself to support any practical scheme that may be put forward." And he adds, with some irritation, the British Government "will continue to explore the possibilities of the idea in the hope of evolving a workable scheme and they and the United States will not be satisfied until they have persuaded their allies to join with them in setting up some new instrument of international machinery for the prevention of war, which they will call the League of Nations."

It has been asserted that Clemenceau and other French statesmen have not been enthusiastic over such a league. Certainly there has been less agitation of the matter in Paris than in England and the United States. But France, like the other Allies, has accepted the Wilson bases of peace and, on November 15, the chairman of the French official commission, appointed some time ago to work out a plan, announced his approval of the project. "The universal war," says M. Bourgois, "has demonstrated to all nations the necessity for an international constitution. This would assure to each nation the sanctity of its rights. Diplomatic and judicial measures could place a discordant state in intolerable solitude, and not only the state, but its citizens would suffer. President Wilson has admitted the legitimacy of economic penalties and hinted that they might possibly be used against the Central Powers.

"If this weapon should fail, there would remain international military intervention. But economic measures which would de-

prive a country of raw materials and interrupt land and sea transport would be sufficient to crush resistance."

It is therefore certain that the representatives of the victorious Allies are fully committed to the idea of a League of Nations and that the peace conference must make a serious attempt to formulate a practical working scheme.

The difficulties are many and serious and the highest qualities of statesmanship will be required. Nothing will be easier than to repeat the platitudes of political morality and lay down perfectly valid general principles. So far, very naturally under the circumstances, we have had little in the way of details from those in authority. Evidently President Wilson is in substantial accord with the original program formulated by the League to Enforce Peace, which is as follows:

"We believe it to be desirable for the United States to join a league of nations binding the signatories to the following:

"First: All justiciable questions arising between the signatory powers, not settled by negotiation, shall, subject to the limitations of treaties, be submitted to a judicial tribunal for hearing and judgment, both upon the merits and upon any issue as to the jurisdiction of the question.

"Second: All other questions arising between the signatories, and not settled by negotiation, shall be submitted to a council of conciliation for hearing, consideration, and recommendation.

"Third: The signatory powers shall jointly use forthwith, both their economic and military forces against any one of their number that goes to war, or commits acts of hostility, against another of the signatories before any question arising shall be submitted as provided in the foregoing.

"Fourth: Conferences between the signatory powers shall be held from time to time to formulate and codify rules of international law, which, unless some signatory shall signify its dissent within a stated period, shall thereafter govern in the decisions of the judicial tribunal mentioned in article one."

Later the following interpretation of Article Three was authorized by the Executive Committee:

"The signatory powers shall jointly use forthwith, their economic forces against any of their members that refuses to submit any question which arises to an international judicial tribunal or council of conciliation before issuing an ultimatum or threatening war. They shall follow this by the joint use of their military forces against that nation if it actually proceeds to make war or invade another's territory."

As Mr. Taft says, it must be observed that this platform is constructed on broad lines and its machinery must be worked out in international conferences. It may be open to attack, but its feasibility is not successfully shown by exceptional hypotheses under which it would fail of its purpose. The most practical plan of government may thus be shown to be futile. If the platform will work in most cases, the value of the result justifies its adoption. The distinction between justiciable and non-justiciable controversies is recognized.

The life giving element in this plan, and that which distinguishes it from the various Hague Conventions and the Bryan arbitration treaties, is the provision for using force against a state that resorts to war *without first submitting its claim to arbitration or conciliation*. Experience has shown pretty conclusively that when the serious ambitions and interests of powerful states are involved moral sanctions are not sufficient to ensure the observance of international obligations. The history of the past four years has demonstrated that no state may ignore and defy the moral judgment of the world. But it also shows that unless there is some exterior, restraining, physical force, swollen empires, intoxicated with their own power, are liable to try the experiment. Force must be controlled by superior force, and the mere fact of the known existence of the superior force is generally sufficient to maintain peace. It is the big club which Roosevelt advises all soft spoken communities to carry. But Bryan says that if you speak softly you will never need a club, and thus we have the two schools. Even the gentle (but exceedingly practical) Quaker, William Penn, who in 1693 published an *Essay towards the Present and Future Peace of Europe*, in which he urged the establishment of a European parliament, provided that "if any of the Sovereignties that constitute these imperial states, *shall refuse to submit their claim or pretensions to them, or to abide and perform the judgments thereof, and seek their remedy at arms*, or delay their compliance beyond the time prefixed in their resolutions, *all the other sovereignties, united as one strength, shall compel the submission and performance of the sentence*, with damages to the suffering party, and charges to the sovereignties that obligated their submission."

It will be noted that this original program did not provide for the use of force to compel the enforcement of the judgment of the tribunal or the recommendation of the Council of Conciliation.

According to Mr. Bryan, "this, of course, lessens the objection in proportion as it lessens the probability of a resort to force." Others regarded the plan as incomplete because it did not provide for the execution of the decrees of the court and recommendations of the Council.

Since the signing of the armistice and the certainty of victory the League to Enforce Peace has somewhat amplified its program and restated its principles as follows:

It is necessary to create:

"1—For the decision of justiciable questions, an impartial tribunal whose jurisdiction shall not depend upon the assent of the parties to the controversy, provision to be made for enforcing its decisions.

"2. For the questions that are not justiciable in their character, a council of conciliation, as mediator, which shall hear, consider and make recommendations, and failing acquiescence by the parties concerned, the league shall determine what action, if any, shall be taken.

"3. An administrative organization for the conduct of affairs of common interest, the protection and care of backward regions and internationalized places, and such matters as have been jointly administered before and during the war. We hold that this object must be attained by methods and through machinery that will insure both stability and progress, preventing on the one hand, any crystallization of the status quo that will defeat the forces of healthy growth and change, and providing, on the other hand, a way by which progress can be secured and necessary change effected without recourse to war.

"4. A representative congress to formulate and codify rules of international law, to inspect the work of the administrative bodies, and to consider any matter affecting the tranquillity of the world or the progress or betterment of human relations. Its deliberations should be made public.

"5. An executive body able to speak with authority in the name of the nations represented and to act in case the peace of the world is endangered.

"The representatives of the different nations in the organs of the league should be in proportion to the responsibilities and obligations they assume. The rules of international law should not be defeated for lack of unanimity.

"A resort to force by any nation should be prevented by a solemn agreement that any aggression will be met immediately by such an overwhelming economic and military force that it will not be attempted.

"No member of the league should make any other offensive or defensive treaty or alliance and all treaties of whatever nature made by any member of the league should at once be made public.

"Such a league must be formed at the time of the definite peace, or the opportunity may be lost forever."

That the proposed league must be provided with adequate means to enforce its will upon a guilty state is implied, when not expressly stated, in all President Wilson's utterances. As to the extent to which it shall go, the interpretation of the phrase economic force, and the nature and source of the necessary military power, he has expressed no opinion. All such matters must be left for the peace conference to determine. If the members of that body can not work out a practicable plan of world organization it will simply mean that they are no more capable of managing world affairs than were their predecessors. Seventy years ago Tennyson dipt into the future and saw "The nations' airy navies grappling in the central blue." Science made this vision a reality. Had but a small part of the skill, energy, and intense application which made the airy navies, submarines and other destructive agencies possible been devoted to organizing the world for peace, the poet's prophecy of a time when "the common sense of most shall hold a fretful realm in awe" would also have been realized and the battle flags would long since have been furled in "the Parliament of man, the Federation of the World." The scientists were successful in providing for destruction; the statesmen bungled the work of construction and conservation.

No one imagines that the creation of an effective League of Nations is not difficult. It is easy to say, with Sir Gilbert Murray, "Laugh at impossibilities, and cry, 'It shall be done.'" But faith and confidence are not enough. The objections raised by those of little faith are many and some of them are serious. The representatives of great states which have long been in competition in the race for political and trade supremacy will find it extremely difficult to waive the advantages given them by their power. All past alliances have been based on self interest and therefore came to an end when conditions changed. The past is strewn with the wrecks of such alliances, most of which pledged perpetual friendship. The Concert of Europe often played but jangling music. Delays and bickerings have usually accompanied the attempts of independent military bodies to act as a unit, but

the possibility of combined military action under a single head has been demonstrated when there is a real necessity therefor. It will, of course, be difficult to induce the great states to consent to restraints on their future actions. It is said that after Great Britain disentangled herself from the Holy Alliance, Canning exclaimed, "No more Areopagus. Now, England will be free to look after her own interests in her own way." It is very probable, however, that the "splendid isolation" idea has lost some of its attractiveness for British statesmen and the practice by any state of seeking "her own interest in her own way," regardless of the rights of others, is exactly what the world does not intend longer to tolerate. The war was fought to put an end to just that sort of thing.

But it is said that in order to enter a League of Nations which will be more than a platonic partnership it will be necessary for a state to consent to restrictions upon its independence and to surrender a part of its sovereignty. In a sense this is true, but instead of being an objection it is an argument in favor of a League of Nations. Sovereignty, in this sense, means simply supreme power,—a state subject to no law, no legal restraint, with the "right" to run amuck in the world without moral responsibility therefor. The principal object of a League of Nations is to restrict this sort of sovereignty and place states under the control of a super-national authority.

The contention that the United States could not enter a League of Nations under its present constitution and that such action would imperil the Monroe Doctrine is not entitled to very serious consideration. It might be said that unless the United States is willing to submit its vital international policies to the judgment of the world it may not ask other nations to do so. But the Monroe Doctrine will no more be endangered under a treaty establishing a League of Nations than it is under some twenty-five existing arbitration treaties by which the United States has agreed that all disputes "of every nature whatever" shall be referred for investigation and report to an international commission. Under the plan proposed by the League to Enforce Peace, any controversy which might affect the Monroe Doctrine may very well be submitted to the Council of Conciliation and thereafter, as in all other cases, it would be for the United States to determine its future course. No one proposes to enforce the recommendation by war.

The claim that such a treaty would violate the constitution in that it would take from Congress the power to declare war rests upon a misconception of the situation. No act of the proposed league could take this power from Congress. The treaty would, of course, be approved by the Senate in the ordinary way and at the most would impose upon Congress the duty to declare a war under certain conditions, and "to impose in a contractual way by treaty an obligation on Congress is not to take away its *power* to discharge it or to refuse to discharge it." The power would remain with Congress exactly as at present. As to this there seems to be little, if any, difference of opinion among those who are qualified to express an opinion on such a question. The whole situation is summarized in the following statement of Mr. Taft:

"The United States should enter the League: first because of all nations in the world it wishes to avoid war and to make it as remote as possible; second because its interests have now become so world-wide, and it has become so close a neighbor of all the great powers of Europe and of Asia that a general war must involve the United States. . . .

"The objection that by such a league as this the United States will have to abandon the Monroe Doctrine is entirely unfounded. On the contrary, the League will assist the United States in maintaining that doctrine by invoking the action of the world to hold off its violation by a European nation's making war against an American country until after a hearing or a decision on the merits of the controversy. Nor will it commit the United States to any judgment in respect to the Doctrine, because, under the League it is not the subject matter of a judgment, but only of a recommendation of a compromise which the United States is at liberty to accept or reject. The League offers no authority or opportunity to European nations to subvert American governments or colonize American territory, any more than it offers to the United States corresponding authority or opportunity for similar action in Europe.

"Nor does the League involve the delegation to an international council, in which the United States has but one vote, the power to hurry this country into war. The President and the Senate sign the treaty of the League and bind the United States to its obligations. Congress is the authority which will decide whether the facts exist calling for action by the United States, and then will take such action as the obligation requires."

The people of the liberal world are in grim earnest in this matter and demand that the men who represent them at the

peace conference shall devise some plan of world organization which will protect them and their children from the danger of another great war. They demand something more than a formula of words and phrases expressing a desire for justice and the intention to be controlled in the future by copy-book sentiments. The members of the conference will not all be altruists or internationalists. Regardless of fine words, the most of them will consider themselves as there to care for the interests of their own countries first and for humanity in general afterwards. As these interests begin to clash, the idea of a League of Nations will be in danger of falling into the background. The present objections and difficulties will then loom larger than the future advantages. With the removal of the pressure of war, the conflicting interests, passions, and prejudices of parties and individuals will destroy the unanimity which has so far prevailed and unless the demand for effective action is backed by a strong aggressive public sentiment there is danger that the entire movement may come to nothing. Unfortunately, although perhaps necessarily, the proposals for a League so far as they are official have been put forth in language so general as to leave room for much freedom of construction and many who are really in favor of a league hesitate for fear that it will lead the country—they know not where. There is danger, also, that enthusiastic friends of a League of Nations may demand too much and thus get nothing. It will be advisable, probably, for the nations to supervise certain matters, such for instance as the former German colonies, through the League, because the terms of the peace can be carried out in no other way. But an attempt to create a new world sovereign state with independent powers of legislation and with direct control over all sorts of matters is doomed to failure. The world is not ready for that sort of internationalism.

The program of the League to Enforce Peace is reasonable and practicable.

CHARLES B. ELLIOTT.

MINNEAPOLIS