A New Vision of Public Enforcement

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Article

A New Vision of Public Enforcement

Michael Waterstone†

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To begin, consider the situation of a black man in Mississippi in 1964 who wanted to vote in a federal election. He would

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be within his “legal” rights to do so. Since 1870, the United States Constitution, the highest law of the land, had provided that “[t]he right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be denied or abridged . . . by any State on account of race.”¹

Two federal statutes protected this right.² But the reality is that the state and private individuals would vigorously attempt to stop him from voting, even to the point of subjecting him and his family to violence. People that attempted to help him vote could be beaten and even murdered.³

The point of this simple but sad hypothetical is that civil rights laws do not magically create change. Even the most far-reaching and thoughtfully drafted statutes need to be enforced to have any real impact. In the above example, it was not until the passage and enforcement of the Voting Rights Act of 1965⁴ that overt forms of racial exclusion in voting became, for the most part, confined to the history books.

Our collective antidiscrimination experiences have taught us that there can be a significant gap between law and reality. The spectrum and depth of federal civil rights statutes, including the Voting Rights Act of 1965,⁵ Titles II and VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,⁶ the Fair Housing Act,⁷ and, most recently, the Americans with Disabilities Act,⁸ are impressive and a source of national pride. But these statutes have not created a more inclusive society on their own. Behind every individual gain stands the efforts of social forces dedicated to their enforcement.

The process of enforcement therefore needs to be studied and analyzed as part of the larger debate over the form and di-

¹. U.S. Const. amend. XV, § 1.
³. State-sanctioned practices to deny African Americans the right to vote included poll taxes, literacy requirements, and, in Mississippi, a discriminato-
   rily applied constitutional requirement that voters be able to read any section
   of the Mississippi Constitution and give a reasonable interpretation thereof.
   See ROY BROOKS ET AL., CIVIL RIGHTS LITIGATION 559 (2005); see also
   DERRICK BELL, RACE, RACISM, AND AMERICAN LAW 482–86 (2004). The
   violence of this era is well chronicled. Id. at 491.
⁵. Id.
⁶. 42 U.S.C. § 2000a–3a (2000) (nondiscrimination in places of public ac-
   commodation); id. § 2000e–2000e-17 (nondiscrimination in employment).
rection of civil rights laws. Of late, this discussion has increas-
ingly turned toward the judicially and legislatively imposed
limitations on private enforcement. To be sure, there is an im-
portant story to be told about how the ability of private lawyers
to bring civil rights cases in the public interest (functioning as a
“private attorney general”) has been systematically under-
mind. But what is being increasingly left out of the public and
academic discussion is the role of the federal government as an
enforcer of civil rights laws (what I will call “public enforce-
ment”). Despite being almost entirely a function of presidential
prerogative, public enforcement of civil rights laws is not often
discussed in presidential races. And existing academic accounts
tend to treat public enforcement as chronically ineffective and
incapable of improvement. In the current political environ-
ment, it may seem naive or overly ambitious to talk about a
more systemic and effective role for public enforcement author-
ities. But administrations do not last forever, and when the
pendulum swings back in a more pro–civil rights direction, it is
important to have models of more proactive public enforcement
behavior. Moreover, as will be discussed herein, history sug-
gests that a casual dismissal of the effectiveness of public en-
forcement is not entirely warranted.

My goal is to enlarge the civil rights dialogue by renewing
emphasis on the importance and form of public enforcement.
The current decline of the private attorney general’s ability to
fairly and consistently enforce our civil rights laws strengthens
the argument for a renewed emphasis on the various enforce-
ment apparatuses of the federal government. When the United
States takes a strong stand to protect the civil rights of its citi-
zens, it sends a symbolic message and expresses the will of the
people in a way that cannot and should not be completely out-
sourced.

Focusing on the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), this Article first makes the case that a stronger government
role is needed, then explores what that role can and should look
like. Within the context of the ADA, I will argue that the execu-
tive branch’s role should vary depending on the context. In the
areas of failure-to-hire claims and those involving physical ac-
cessibility, public enforcement officials should focus on bringing

large systemic cases that advocate specific and concrete changes. Regarding reasonable accommodations in the workplace and a public entity’s responsibilities not to discriminate in public programs and services, I will suggest that the executive branch can more effectively foster flexible solutions in a context-specific manner.

Federal disability laws have suffered from a lack of structural litigation, or a sustained pattern of cases against large power structures invoking the power of the courts to oversee detailed injunctive relief. Drawing examples from public enforcement of predecessor civil rights statutes, I will argue that these types of cases are an important, yet missing, feature of a successful antidiscrimination strategy. There are many theoretical and practical reasons why public enforcement authorities are uniquely suited to bring these cases and set the agenda for disability civil rights enforcement in a way that private attorney generals cannot currently do. Specifically, I identify two types of structural cases—claims involving failure to hire and physical accessibility—that public enforcement officials can and should be bringing on a systematic basis.

But, in a world where any enforcement official—public or private—cannot possibly bring every case, supplementary enforcement tools also need to be considered. Recent “new governance” scholarship in fields such as labor and environmental law posits that regulators should diversify the ways they interact with regulated entities. This work focuses on collaborative, multiparty, multilevel, adaptive, problem-solving methods of public policy implementation that to varying extents supplant or supplement traditional regulation. Importing this theoretical concept into ADA enforcement yields some important insights. Specifically, I will suggest that to better realize the ADA’s goals regarding reasonable accommodations in the workplace and public entities’ responsibilities not to discriminate on the basis of disability, public enforcement officials should consider nontraditional enforcement options. Ultimately, the goal should be to engage stakeholders in defining these concepts in a context-specific and mutually acceptable way, rather than requiring courts to interpret and express statutory rights.

This Article proceeds in three Parts. Part I starts by situating discussions of enforcement within the larger universe of scholarship critiquing the effectiveness of civil rights law. Part I then turns to a discussion of the rise and fall of the role of the private attorney general in the civil rights arena, a trajectory that opens the door for a renewed discussion of the role and effectiveness of public enforcement. Part II explains the need for, and importance of, structural public law litigation in the disabilities context, and argues that public enforcement officials are theoretically and practically equipped to take the lead. Failure-to-hire and physical access cases provide concrete examples where systemic litigation by public officials is needed. Part III moves beyond litigation, offering a novel application of new governance theory to ADA enforcement, and concludes with suggestions on how to maximize the benefits of these alternative types of enforcement activities.

I. THE ROLE OF ENFORCEMENT

There is a strong consensus in the literature (at least among progressive commentators) that many federal civil rights statutes—including Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the Fair Housing Act, and the Americans with Disabilities Act—have not created as much social change as was originally hoped. Traditionally, academics have focused on either

13. Although the universe of civil rights laws is technically broader than antidiscrimination law, there is a large overlap. Because the primary focus of this Article is on the ADA, which fits both descriptions, I will use the terms somewhat interchangeably.

14. Regarding Title VII, see, for example, Kathryn Abrams, Cross-Dressing in the Master’s Clothes, 109 YALE L.J. 745, 758 (2000) (suggesting that employment discrimination law cannot “actually alter the dominant norms of most workplaces or the kinds of roles that men and women play within them”); Samuel R. Bagenstos, The Structural Turn and the Limits of Antidiscrimination Law, 94 CAL. L. REV. 1, 20–26 (2006) [hereinafter Bagenstos, Structural Turn] (arguing that Title VII has proven ill-suited to redistributing power and remediying unintentional discrimination); Christine A. Littleton, Reconstructing Sexual Equality, 75 CAL. L. REV. 1279, 1325–26 (1987) (asserting that Title VII “does not allow for challenges to male bias in the structure of business, occupations, or jobs”); and Michael Selmi, The Price of Discrimination: The Nature of Class Action Employment Discrimination Litigation and Its Effects, 81 TEX. L. REV. 1249, 1331–32 (2003) (arguing that class action employment litigation has proven ineffective in creating meaningful change). Regarding the Fair Housing Act, see, for example, Robert G. Schwemm, Private Enforcement and the Fair Housing Act, 6 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 375, 383 (1988) (“Ultimately, in light of the limited changes in the nation’s housing patterns over the past 20 years, one has to ask whether the Fair Housing Act can ever generate a systematic and effective attack on housing discrimination in
critiquing court decisions of existing laws or suggesting how new legislation should be created or current laws modified. For example, within disability law, commentators have consistently criticized the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the ADA’s definition of disability.\textsuperscript{15} There has also been discussion of amending the ADA or other disability law statutes to more effectively create change in the lives of people with disabilities.\textsuperscript{16} Criticiz-


\textsuperscript{15} See Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 488–89 (1999) (holding that the plaintiffs were not “disabled” within the meaning of the ADA because eyeglasses improved their vision to 20/20); see also Albertson’s, Inc. v. Kirklingburg, 527 U.S. 555, 565–66 (1999) (holding that plaintiff may not be protected under the ADA, despite having vision in only one eye, because his brain has developed subconscious adjustments to compensate for reduced depth perception); Murphy v. United Parcel Service, Inc., 527 U.S. 516, 518–19 (1999) (holding that the plaintiff was not protected under the ADA because, when medicated, his high blood pressure did not prevent him from functioning normally). For criticism of these decisions, see, for example, Robert L. Burgdorf, Jr., “Substantially Limited” Protection from Disability Discrimination: The Special Treatment Model and Misconstructions of the Definition of Disability, 42 VILL. L. REV. 409, 438–512 (1997) (discussing courts’ misconstructions of the ADA’s definition of disability); Aviam Soifer, \textit{The Disability Term: Dignity, Default, and Negative Capability}, 47 UCLA L. REV. 1279, 1299–1307 (2000) (discussing courts’ restrictive interpretations of the “regarded as” definition); and Bonnie Poitras Tucker, \textit{The Supreme Court’s Definition of Disability Under the ADA: A Return to the Dark Ages}, 52 ALA. L. REV. 321, 325–26 (2000) (detailing legislative history that supports determining disability without considering mitigating measures and the Court’s contrary decisions). Commentators have also noted the restrictive way that courts have interpreted the ADA’s reasonable accommodation provisions. See Michelle A. Travis, \textit{Recapturing the Transformative Potential of Employment Discrimination Law}, 62 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 3, 92 (2005) (arguing that, with a different interpretation of “workplace essentialism,” the ADA could have greater impact); see also Michael Ashley Stein & Michael E. Waterstone, \textit{Disability, Disparate Impact, and Class Actions}, 56 DUKE L.J. 861, 874–79 (2007) (arguing for increased group-based challenges to workplace exclusions).

\textsuperscript{16} For example, in the disability law context, academics and policymakers have discussed a need for some version of an ADA restoration bill. The
ing a conservative judiciary as undermining civil rights laws, or suggesting legislative fixes, is of course not unique to disability law.17

The thrust of the above criticisms is to modify existing statutes or interpretations of these statutes. The predicate argument for substantive change in the law, however, reflects a belief that the law as written is the same as the law in action. This view increasingly has been challenged.18 Neither the individual rights guaranteed in civil rights statutes nor the larger antidiscrimination ideals behind them are self enforcing. Statutes can confer only rights; to be meaningful, these rights
must be defended from intrusion or violation, often in court. The scholarship identifying and critiquing this process increasingly has focused on the role and limitations of private enforcement, with public enforcement being little more than an afterthought or an option that is dismissed out of hand. Because the role of private enforcement is an important part of why I believe a more robust discussion of public enforcement is needed, in this Section I will briefly summarize the rise and fall of the civil rights private attorney general. I argue that the continuation of this discussion—which has not yet taken place—should focus on public enforcement.

A. PRIVATE ENFORCEMENT

1. Background and Rise of Private Enforcement

The concepts of private enforcement and the private attorney general can mean several different things. Most broadly, any plaintiff whose private lawsuit vindicates the public interest by deterring unlawful behavior can be viewed as one variant of a “private attorney general.” Over time, however, an
increasingly developed body of case law and literature has refined the concept. Within the civil rights arena, a private attorney general is a private citizen whose lawsuit, while perhaps benefiting her, also works to the advantage of the public by eliminating discriminatory behavior. Traditionally, federal civil rights statutes have offered the possibility of attorneys fees and damage awards (presumably shared with the plaintiff’s lawyer under a contingency fee arrangement) to entice private lawyers to take these cases.

Initially a “progressive” legal reform, the private attorney general incentives in the enforcement of civil rights had support from both sides of the political aisle. Conservatives championed the role of the private attorney general because it privatized enforcement, thus shrinking the role of the federal government; and liberals supported private actors enforcing civil rights because it freed up civil rights enforcement from any conservative political agenda or administration.

Importantly, during the 1960s and 1970s, there was a pattern of vigorous private civil rights enforcement by public interest organizations. These lawyers—who in and of them-
selves were considered private attorneys general—were generally financed by a blend of foundation and public money (the latter being primarily through the Legal Services Corporation (LSC)). The procedural vehicle of choice for these lawyers was the civil rights class action. There was a sort of symbiosis between the public-interest-minded private attorney general and the judicial and political systems.

2. Backlash Against Private Enforcement

To the extent that this was a golden or even classic era, it did not last very long. The private attorney general as enforcer of civil rights soon faced a multilevel assault by the courts and Congress. In *Buckhannon Board & Care Home, Inc. v. West Virginia Department of Health and Human Resources*, the Court dramatically changed the ways that plaintiffs could recover attorneys' fees in civil rights cases. Rather than qualify-
ing as “prevailing parties” by showing that their lawsuit was a catalyst for voluntary change by the defendant (the previously accepted “catalyst theory”), the Court held that plaintiffs must achieve a “material alteration of the legal relationship of the parties,” such as a favorable judgment on the merits or a consent decree. This judicially imposed limitation has undermined the ability of the private attorney general to bring cases for injunctive relief. In other cases the Court has curtailed Congress’s ability to authorize private damage suits against states and restricted private rights of action to enforce the disparate impact regulations promulgated under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.

Perhaps unintentionally, statutory developments have also been unkind to the private attorney general. In 1991, Congress amended Title VII to allow plaintiffs claiming intentional discrimination to seek compensatory and punitive damages and to request jury trials. These changes were intended to bolster the private enforcement scheme. Ironically, however, by complicating the class certification inquiry, they have stymied the ability of the private parties and their lawyers to bring civil rights class actions.

34. Id. at 604.
35. See Albiston & Nielsen, supra note 19, at 1088–92 (discussing Buckhannon’s negative effects on private organizations that bring civil rights cases).
36. See Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 374 (2001) (holding that a private litigant could not bring a damage claim under Title I of the ADA against Alabama).
37. See Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 293 (2001) (holding that Title VI was not intended “to create a freestanding private right of action . . . . [T]herefore . . . no such right of action exists.”). On the judiciary’s assault on the private attorney general, see Karlan, supra note 19, at 186 (“[T]he Court has launched a wholesale assault on one of the primary mechanisms Congress has used for enforcing civil rights: the private attorney general.”).
39. See id.
40. See Allison v. Citgo Petroleum Corp., 151 F.3d 402, 407–10 (5th Cir. 1998) (finding that, although the case could have proceeded as a class action before passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, that statute “ultimately render[s] this case unsuitable for class certification under Rule 23”). But see Hart, supra note 17, at 835–45 (arguing that real reasons courts will not certify employment class actions after the Civil Rights Act of 1991 have to do with perceptions that class actions are unfair, force defendants into blackmail settlements, and are no longer necessary). For a discussion of why these restrictions do not similarly impact government lawyers, see infra notes 146–52 and accompanying text.
The political capital and popularity of the civil rights plaintiffs’ bar has also faded. The first step was the dismantling of the (LSC). Organizations that had been effective private attorneys general in civil rights cases had their funds cut.\textsuperscript{41} Then, in 1996, Congress enacted a series of restrictions on the LSC, including prohibiting organizations that receive funding from the Corporation from bringing class actions.\textsuperscript{42} This was devastating to the LSC’s ability to prosecute large cases on the public’s behalf.\textsuperscript{43}

The civil rights private attorney general came to be viewed less as a social advocate and more akin to his mass tort or securities counterpart.\textsuperscript{44} The recent passage of the Class Action

\textsuperscript{41} In 1982, the Reagan administration attempted to eliminate the LSC altogether. Blank & Zacks, supra note 29, at 6; see also William P. Quigley, The Demise of Law Reform and the Triumph of Legal Aid: Congress and the Legal Services Corporation from the 1960’s to the 1990’s, 17 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 241, 255–56 (1998) (noting that the Reagan budget scheduled the LSC for termination). Although this did not happen, the LSC’s budget was continuously and dramatically reduced. See American Bar Association, Legal Services Corporation, http://www.abanet.org/poladv/priorities/lsc.html (last visited Nov. 5, 2007) (reporting that Congress reduced the LSC budget from $400 million to $278 million in 1996); see also Katja Cerovsek & Kathleen Kerr, Opening the Doors to Justice: Overcoming the Problem of Inadequate Representation for the Indigent, 17 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 697, 698 (2004) (“In 2002, the federal government allocated only $329 million dollars in 2002 to the Legal Services Corporation (LSC), a decrease from the $400 million allocated in 1995. The LSC allocation is $21 million below the 1981 level and far below the $600 million that would be the inflationary equivalent of the 1981 levels.” (citations omitted) (quoting Simran Bindra & Pedram Ben-Cohen, Public Civil Defenders: A Right to Counsel for Indigent Civil Defendants, 10 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL’Y 1, 4 (2003))).


\textsuperscript{43} See BRENNAN CENTER FOR JUSTICE, RESTRICTING LEGAL SERVICES: HOW CONGRESS LEFT THE POOR WITH ONLY HALF A LAWYER 9 (2000), available at http://www.brennancenter.org/dynamic/subpages/atj2.pdf (“To understand just how the restrictions [in the 1996 law] are hurting poor clients, it is useful to look at a tool that LSC-funded lawyers used to be able to use on their behalf: the class-action suit.”); see also Blank & Zacks, supra note 29, at 3 (“It is probable that since 1996, legal services lawyers have been prevented from filing a significant number of potential class action lawsuits.”); David C. Leven, Justice for the Forgotten and Despised, 16 TOURO L. REV. 1, 12–14 (1999). These restrictions meant that LSC-funded entities focused more on smaller, individual cases; those involving unemployment benefits, for example. See Christine Jolls, The Role and the Functioning of Public-Interest Legal Organizations in the Enforcement of Employment Laws, in EMERGING LABOR MARKET INSTITUTIONS FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 141, 167–68 (Richard B. Freeman et al. eds., 2005).

\textsuperscript{44} See Garth et al., supra note 19, at 360–65 (arguing that the private
Fairness Act (CAFA)\textsuperscript{45} demonstrates the decreased political power of the plaintiffs’ civil rights bar. Amongst other things, CAFA moves certain class action cases from state to federal court\textsuperscript{46} on the stated rationale that the civil litigation system had been abused by plaintiffs’ class action lawyers.\textsuperscript{47} Various civil rights groups argued that CAFA was unnecessary in civil rights cases because there was no history of civil rights class action abuses in state court.\textsuperscript{48} Despite vehement pursuit, the civil rights community was unable to get a carve-out for civil rights class actions.\textsuperscript{49}

Commentators also soured on the private attorney general. In a series of articles in the 1980s, Professor John Coffee started questioning the extent to which we could “sensibly rely on private litigation as a method of law enforcement.”\textsuperscript{50} In criti-
cizing the private attorney general as a legal institution that had not lived up to its early promise to promote the public interest, Coffee noted that private lawyers may have different incentives than their clients, which leads to either poor representation (where plaintiffs’ lawyers sell out their clients) or excessive litigation (because the parties to the litigation do not bear its costs).\(^5\) Although Professor Coffee’s work focused on securities litigation, his basic criticisms have recently been extended to the civil rights private attorney general. Professor Michael Selmi conducted a recent study of high-profile employment class action cases with large settlements, all of which were brought by the private bar.\(^5\) Professor Selmi found, quite discouragingly, that these cases have little or no effect on stock price, create little or no meaningful substantive change within corporations, and produce only modest financial benefits for class members, despite the fact that the remedial focus of these cases was monetary relief.\(^5\) He concludes that one of the few things these cases actually accomplished was enriching the lawyers that were involved.\(^5\)

3. The ADA and the Private Attorney General

Enacted at a time when Congress still professed a belief in the private attorney general but courts and the public had turned against it, the ADA has become a prime example of the concept’s limited utility. Like the Fair Housing Act and Title VII, the ADA is heavily dependent on private enforcement. Each title of the ADA allows for a private right of action.\(^5\) Under Title I (discrimination in employment), an aggrieved plaintiff can file a lawsuit after receiving a right-to-sue letter from the EEOC.\(^5\) An individual may then sue for compensatory and

218 (1983).

\(^5\) Id. at 220. See generally John C. Coffee, Jr., Understanding the Plaintiff’s Attorney: The Implications of Economic Theory for Private Enforcement of Law Through Class and Derivative Actions, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 669, 676–90 (1986) (noting the different incentives for plaintiff attorneys and the effects on social benefits).

\(^5\) See Selmi, supra note 14, at 1252–68.

\(^5\) See, e.g., id. at 1250, 1321.

\(^5\) Id. at 1275, 1285, 1292; Deborah R. Hensler & Thomas D. Rowe, Jr., Beyond “It Just Ain’t Worth It”: Alternative Strategies for Damage Class Action Reform, 64 LAW & COMTEMP. PROBS. 137, 137–38 (2001) (noting the negative effects of private class action litigation).


\(^5\) Id.
punitive damages and request a jury trial. Under Title II (discrimination by public entities), an individual may file a lawsuit. Compensatory, but not punitive, damages are allowed. Under Title III (discrimination in privately owned places of public accommodation), an individual may bring a private lawsuit but they are limited to injunctive relief.

The private attorney general project under the ADA has not gone well. Where damages are available within Title I, poor victims of discrimination have difficulty finding lawyers. Within Title II, courts have taken a narrow view of when private litigants can obtain compensatory damages, and the Supreme Court has drastically limited the availability of damages through its expansion of sovereign immunity. Finally, Title III never contained any claims for damages, and, as might be expected, it has the lowest number of cases of any part of the statute.


58. Id. § 12133 (“The remedies, procedures, and rights set forth in section 794a of Title 29 shall be the remedies, procedures, and rights that this title provides to any person alleging discrimination on the basis of disability in violation of [Title II].”).


60. 42 U.S.C. § 12188(a) (2000) (“The remedies and procedures set forth in section 2000a-3(a) of this title are the remedies and procedures this title provides to any person who is being subjected to discrimination on the basis of disability in violation of this subchapter.”). The cited section only includes prospective injunctive relief. Id. § 2000a-3(a).

61. See, e.g., Bagenstos, supra note 19 (critiquing private enforcement of Title III); see also Michael Waterstone, The Untold Story of the Rest of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 58 VAND. L. REV. 1807, 1853–74 (2005) (arguing that Titles II and III of the ADA are underenforced).


63. See e.g., Duvall v. County of Kitsap, 260 F.3d 1124, 1138–39 (9th Cir. 2001) (limiting compensatory damages under Title II to cases of “deliberate indifference”).

64. See Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 374 (2001) (holding that the ADA improperly infringes upon state sovereignty); see also Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 534–34 (2004) (holding that state sovereign immunity was validly abrogated in claims involving access to courts under Title II); Michael E. Waterstone, Lane, Fundamental Rights, and Voting, 56 ALA. L. REV. 793, 794–801 (2005) (discussing the role of the ADA in the Court’s sovereign immunity decisions).

65. As of 2001, there were 720 Title I cases that made it to the courts of appeals, and as of 2004, there were 197 Title II cases that made it to the
Despite these limitations, the popular image of private enforcement under the ADA has been fairly negative. The harsh portrayal of the ADA in the print and other media has been well documented.66 Besides generalized hostility to the ADA, a negative view of the lawyers bringing these cases and their clients is a theme running through media accounts of ADA cases.67

B. PUBLIC ENFORCEMENT

This Article takes the current limitations of and hostile climate surrounding the private attorney general as a given.68 Are we condemned to civil rights laws only offering a “hollow hope”?69 Or are there other enforcement strategies that might be studied and ultimately pursued? Focusing primarily on the ADA, this Article discusses litigation by public officials and new governance forms of enforcement. Both of the following Sections will present a more forceful role for public enforcement officials.

1. Why Discuss Public Enforcement?

The decline of the private attorney general seemingly creates an opportunity to refocus on the other available means of enforcement—that by government officials. But by and large, a discussion of why this is so, what it might look like, and how it might work, has not yet taken place. Public civil rights enforcement has never been much of an issue in presidential courts of appeals, and 82 Title III cases. See Waterstone, supra note 61, at 1853.


67. See id. at 227–31 (“One explanation for many people’s distaste for the enforcement of the ADA via serial litigation is that the plaintiffs and their attorneys stand to financially gain from each of the suits they file.”).

68. It is not that these developments are unimportant—very much to the contrary. The ideas to revive the private attorney general are relatively straightforward and usually involve legislatively overruling Buckhannon and increasing damage awards in civil rights cases. See Kyle A. Loring, Note, The Catalyst Theory Meets the Supreme Court—Common Sense Takes a Vacation, 43 B.C. L. REV. 973, 974 (2002) (proposing that Congress overturn Buckhannon); see also Selmi, supra note 14, at 1328–29 (suggesting a modification of fee incentives for private lawyers in civil rights class actions). If the legislative pendulum swings, however, and Congress enacts reform to make private litigation more effective, the importance of public enforcement could lessen.

69. ROSENBERG, supra note 18, at 336–43.
campaigns,\textsuperscript{70} despite the fact that the means and methods of public enforcement of civil rights is largely a presidential prerogative.\textsuperscript{71} Existing academic commentary has proposed narrow areas of targeted enforcement\textsuperscript{72} or focused only on the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC).\textsuperscript{73} An undercurrent running through the larger body of work on private en-

\textsuperscript{70} The “major newspapers” database in LexisNexis for coverage of the candidates’ positions on public enforcement of civil rights laws in the 2000 and 2004 presidential elections includes United States newspapers with circulation rates in the top fifty, and English-language newspapers published outside the United States that have circulation rates in their own countries’ top five percent or are listed as national newspapers in Benn’s World Media Dictionary. In a search timeframe set at one year before each election the following results were yielded: in the 2004 presidential election, the only campaign-related coverage of public civil rights enforcement related to the Bush administration’s decision to transfer enforcement of partial-birth abortion legislation to the Civil Rights division of the Department of Justice (DOJ). See Dana Milbank, \textit{Bush Signs Ban on Late-Term Abortions into Effect; Civil Rights Agency to Enforce Law; Lawsuits Filed}, WASH. POST, Nov. 6, 2003, at A23; see also Julian Borger, \textit{Fury at Bush’s Civil Rights Policing of Abortion Ban}, GUARDIAN, Nov. 8, 2003, at 15. For information on the Justice Department’s preparations to enforce voting rights in the election, see Tom Brune, \textit{A Record Deployment: Feds Plan to Monitor Voting Rights Tuesday}, NEWSDAY, Oct. 29, 2004, at A4. In the 2000 presidential election, there were only five campaign-related articles mentioning public enforcement of civil rights laws, three of which reported on a speech then-candidate Bush made to the NAACP in July of 2000. See Jena Heath, \textit{Bush Voices to Enforce Rights: He Pledges to Work to End Prosperity Gap}, ATLANTA J. & CONST., July 11, 2000, at A3 (stating that Bush pledged to make civil rights enforcement a “cornerstone” of his administration if he won the presidency).


forccement seems to be that government enforcers do not have enough resources to make a difference, or that the political nature of civil rights means that public enforcement cannot be trusted.

Most public enforcement officials are essentially administrative agencies. At the most general level, there are criticisms that vesting administrative agencies with broad powers inevitably leads to administrative capture, whereby the private interests of regulated groups tend to drive policy decisions to the point where agencies are no longer acting in the “public interest.” Slightly less pessimistically, public choice theorists focus on understanding administrative decision making as being the product of the relationship between interest groups and government officials trying to protect their own interests. More specifically, Professor Selmi has opined that the government is inherently poorly suited to enforce civil rights given the behavioral incentives of its attorneys, including a desire for trial experience, lack of financial interest in the case, and desire to avoid controversial cases.

To be sure, these views have power, and were essentially the rationale for the creation of the private attorney general in


75. See Leroy D. Clark, The Future Civil Rights Agenda: Speculation on Litigation, Legislation, and Organization, 38 CATH. U. L. REV. 795, 818 (1989) (noting the federal government’s “abdication of aggressive enforcement role”); see also Bagenstos, supra note 19, at 35 (“Government enforcers have limited resources in the best of times, and recent years have made painfully apparent just how much the vigor of government enforcement can vary with the political winds.”); Selmi, Public vs. Private, supra note 73, at 1439 (“The political nature of civil rights and the nature of the attorneys entrusted with enforcing civil rights laws mean that the government inevitably acts cautiously—choosing to pursue only those cases that are near certain winners or that are politically uncontroversial.”).


77. See Jody Freeman, The Private Role in Public Governance, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 543, 561 (2000) (characterizing administrative decision making as involving “interest group pressure brought to bear on bureaucrats seeking rewards such as job security, enhanced authority, or the favor of powerful legislators upon whom the agency depends”).
the first place. But for several reasons, none should be conversation stoppers regarding public enforcement. First, the recent broad and systemic undermining of the private attorney general discussed above demands an exploration of different enforcement alternatives. Second, it is clearly true that decisions about governmental enforcement priorities and resources are subject to the political process. Rather than an end point, however, this creates an opportunity to influence change in this arena. Although traditionally below the public's political radar, our public officials (and by extension, the polity) are constantly making decisions about how to fund, organize, or even eliminate public enforcement entities. It is therefore important to stimulate a discussion on why public enforcement is needed and how it can be effective. At the very least, this effort can provide guidance when the political pendulum swings in a pro–civil rights direction. Finally, the view that political volatility renders public enforcement inherently suspect may be overstated. Although the evidence is somewhat mixed, some commentators have found similar enforcement patterns in both Republican and Democratic administrations.

Moreover, this Article is not so much arguing for an expansion of the role of the public enforcement vis-à-vis the private attorney general (although, for the reasons I have discussed above, in the real world the private attorney general's role has diminished). Instead, I am advocating that public enforcement agencies perform the role that they are already tasked with more effectively. I take as a given—and support—the idea that

78. See, e.g., Selmi, EEOC, supra note 73, at 57–59 (proposing to eliminate the EEOC).
79. The author thanks Sam Bagenstos for helping to develop this point.
80. See TRANSACTION RECORDS ACCESS CLEARINGHOUSE, CIVIL RIGHTS ENFORCEMENT BY BUSH ADMINISTRATION LAGS, http://trac.syr.edu/tracreports/civright/106/ (last visited Nov. 5, 2007) (“Key data from the Justice Department and the federal courts show that the government’s enforcement of civil rights cases—an extremely rare event under all recent presidents—sharply declined during the Bush years.”). Of late, there have also been accounts of politicization of the Justice Department, and the Civil Rights Division in particular. See, e.g., Neil A. Lewis, Justice Dept. Reshapes Its Civil Rights Mission, N.Y. TIMES, June 14, 2007, at A1.
81. See Selmi, Public vs. Private, supra note 73, at 1430–31 (concluding that there were no significant differences in EEOC employment discrimination enforcement between Republican and Democratic administrations); Jeffrey H. Orleans, An End to the Odyssey: Equal Athletic Opportunities for Women, 3 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 131, 138 (1996) (noting that neither the George H.W. Bush nor Clinton administrations were “aggressive” in enforcing Title IX).
the ADA and other antidiscrimination statutes allow for both public and private enforcement. This diffusion of enforcement power avoids some capture problems, to the extent they exist. To be sure, my proposals for more effective and robust public enforcement might take the enforcers in a more aggressive direction than their “natural” incentives might otherwise take them. Civil rights enforcement is political, and strong executive leadership—something that the ADA had at its passage—is needed to shake public enforcement agencies from their path dependent behaviors. This is especially needed with the ADA. Deemed the “first true civil rights legislation of the 21st century,” the Warren Court, as well as the Kennedy and Johnson administrations, never had the opportunity to interpret this statute.

2. The Case for Public Enforcement

The broad theoretical case for a renewed emphasis on public enforcement is surprisingly easy to make. As any high school civics student should know, the President is responsible for executing the laws of the United States. The various enforcement apparatuses of the executive branch are similarly

82. A primary criticism of the Help America Vote Act has been its lack of a private remedy. See Michael Waterstone, Constitutional and Statutory Voting Rights for People with Disabilities, 14 STAN. L. & POLY REV. 353, 392 (2003).

83. See Seidenfeld, supra note 76, at 459 (1999) (noting that broad agency discretion could mean that special interest groups would dominate). There is no literature I know of suggesting the two enforcement agencies I will be discussing below, the Department of Justice and the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, have been “captured” in any relevant sense by any entity under their jurisdiction.

84. Professor Selmi likely shares this view. See Selmi, Public v. Private, supra note 73, at 1444 (discussing the “politically infused” nature of civil rights litigation).


86. See infra Part II.A (defining the “path dependent behaviors”).


88. On the civil rights enforcement efforts of the Kennedy and Johnson administrations, see infra note 100.

89. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3, cl. 4 (“[H]e shall take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed.”).
tasked. When the government enforces any set of laws, it acts as a representative of its people. Therefore, when the government enforces the antidiscrimination ideals contained in civil rights statutes, it expresses the will of the people to live in a more just society. This expressive function of the law cannot be completely outsourced to private actors and is lost when civil rights lawsuits become profit-driven enterprises. More globally, when the private market fails to provide a particular public good, the government has an obligation to do so for the betterment of its people.

As Gerald Rosenberg recognized over a decade ago, the executive branch’s support is a necessary condition for meaningful change in the civil rights arena. Experience suggests that Rosenberg is right. Before Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 was passed, African Americans were customarily denied access to public places in the Jim Crow South. The Civil Rights Act played a major role in ending these pernicious practices. Similarly, during that same era, literacy tests and other forms of subtle and overt discrimination regularly denied African Americans the right to vote. The Voting Rights Act has been judged a historical success in eliminating overt racial dis-

92. See Green, supra note 44, at 722–23 (discussing the desirability of the EEOC’s role in protecting the public interest through Title VII systemic cases).
93. In this case, one form of the “public good” would be meritorious cases that would enforce the civil rights laws. As will be discussed below in more detail, the private market is not adequately serving this public good. See Julie Davies, Federal Civil Rights Practice in the 1990’s: The Dichotomy Between Reality and Theory, 48 HASTINGS L.J. 197, 238, 242 (1997) (observing that the market for civil rights class actions is “dramatically underserved” and meritorious claims are not being brought).
95. ROSENBERG, supra note 18, at 36.
96. See BROOKS ET AL., supra note 3, at 267 (“Prior to the Civil Rights Act of 1964, racial segregation was an accepted way of American life.”).
The successes of these statutes have been in large part attributed to aggressive enforcement by public enforcement authorities. The successes of these statutes have been in large part attributed to aggressive enforcement by public enforcement authorities. I now turn to the issue of what exactly public enforcement authorities can and should be doing differently. While I am specifically focused on the ADA, the arguments herein should offer valuable insights for the larger universe of antidiscrimination and civil rights law.

II. STRUCTURAL LITIGATION

The traditional civil litigation model is bilateral and seeks adjudication of specific grievances. This type of case is relatively self-contained and primarily asks for retrospective remedies. What has been alternatively termed public law, structural, or systemic litigation, in contrast, is different. Although there is no uniform definition for this type of litigation, I will use it to describe cases that are filed against large corporations or government entities or other large power structures, and seek structural remedies, meaning that they invoke the power of the courts to oversee institutional reform. They


100. See U.S. COMM’N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, FEDERAL CIVIL RIGHTS ENFORCEMENT EFFORT 10 (1971) (“Within a few months after enactment, the Department . . . brought several enforcement actions that tested the constitutionality of the public accommodations law.”); see also RICHARD CORTNER, CIVIL RIGHTS AND PUBLIC ACCOMMODATIONS: THE HEART OF ATLANTA MOTEL AND MCCLUNG CASES 27 (2001) (“If the enforcement of the Civil Rights Act was to occur in the courts, rather in the streets as President Johnson feared, the primary burden would fall on the Civil Rights Division of the Department of Justice, headed by Assistant Attorney General Burke Marshall.”). Cortner proceeds throughout this book to note the key contributions made by the Civil Rights Division and the efforts of Marshall in particular. See generally id.


102. Commentators use these terms interchangeably. See JOHN C. JEFFRIES ET AL., CIVIL RIGHTS ACTIONS: ENFORCING THE CONSTITUTION 745 (2000) (“Suits of this type have come to be known as ‘structural reform,’ or ‘institutional’ or ‘public law’ litigation.”). I will do the same.

103. See id. (“Other cases, however, involve broader attacks on the way government does business. Such suits are typically brought as class actions for injunctive relief. Often they seek systemic reform of government operations or procedures, relief that far exceeds any preventative or compensatory objective that would make whole any particular plaintiff before the court.”); see also Maimon Schwarzchild, Public Law by Private Bargain: Title VII Consent De-
are usually brought as class actions. Although certain commentators have questioned the procedural and remedial fairness of these institutional cases, there is a strong counterargument if not consensus about the propriety and effectiveness of structural reform litigation.

In any event, the effectiveness of structural litigation in reforming institutions cannot be disputed. Structural litigation campaigns have desegregated schools, reformed prisons, attacked deplorable health care conditions in institutions, challenged police abuse, and targeted discrimination in large

crees and the Fairness of Negotiated Institutional Reform, 1984 DUKE L. J. 887, 888–90 (discussing how large-scale Title VII lawsuits against private companies are public law litigation, whereby courts take responsibility for extensive institutional reforms while acting independently of the adversarial process).

104. See JEFFRIES ET AL., supra note 102, at 745.


106. See Chayes, supra note 101, at 1316 (arguing that involving courts and judges in public law litigation is legitimate and inevitable if justice is to be done in an increasingly regulated society); see also Owen M. Fiss, Foreword: The Forms of Justice, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1, 1–4 (1979) (arguing that structural litigation serves as a means for the judicial branch to articulate constitutional values, which is necessary to create change in large-scale public organizations).


108. See, e.g., Lee v. Washington, 390 U.S. 333 (1968) (per curiam) (affirming the lower court's holding that racial segregation of prisons violated the Equal Protection Clause); see also Greenberg, supra note 30, at 577 ("Since the federal class action rule was revised in 1966, prisoners' rights litigation has utilized the mechanism of class action to bring broad relief to inmates and detainees throughout the country.").


110. The Department of Justice has negotiated consent decrees with various police departments, requiring, among other things, revision of use-of-force policies. See, e.g., Consent Decree at 23–27, United States v. City of Los Angeles, 288 F.3d 391 (9th Cir. 2002) (No. 00-11769 GAF (RCX)), available at http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov (follow "search site" hyperlink; search "00-11769"; follow the hyperlink for the first result); see also ROBERT C. DAVIS ET AL., VERA INST. OF JUSTICE, TURNING NECESSITY INTO VIRTUE: PITTSBURGH'S EXPERIENCE WITH A FEDERAL CONSENT DECREES 7–8 (2002), http://www.vera.org/publication_pdf/180_326.pdf.
private employers. Historically, these cases have been brought by both public and private enforcement authorities.

Despite their effectiveness, systemic and class litigation in civil rights cases have declined in recent years. Reports kept by the Administrative Office of the United States Courts show a decline in civil rights class action filings. From July 1983 through June 1984, civil rights class actions constituted a sizeable amount of the class action suits filed in federal court. From October 2003 through September 2004, this number was down to 11.2%. The total number of civil rights class actions went down, from 369 from July 1983 through June 1984 to 241 in 2004 (despite the passage of the ADA in 1991). As discussed above, these numbers can be partially explained by the reduced ability of the private attorney general to bring and prosecute these kinds of systemic, broad cases. Public enforcement officials have not picked up the slack. From July 1978 through June 1979, the United States filed 8 civil rights class actions; from July 1983 through June 1984, it filed 1, and from October 2003 through September 2004, it filed 5.

111. See, e.g., United States v. Bethlehem Steel, 446 F.2d 652 (2d Cir. 1971) (ordering an employer to desegregate job assignments); EEOC v. Int’l Union of Elevator Constructors Local 5, 398 F. Supp. 1237, 1264–65 (E.D. Pa. 1975) (ordering an employer to develop training programs for minority employees); see also Schwarzchild, supra note 103, at 890 (“Title VII litigation is an excellent example of ‘public law’ or ‘structural’ litigation.”).

112. For an example of cases brought by public authorities, see supra notes 110–11 and accompanying text. For a classic and fascinating narrative of a litigation campaign waged by the NAACP, see generally GREENBERG, supra note 27.


114. See 2004 DIR. ADMIN. OFF. U.S. CTS. ANN. REP. tbl.X-5 [hereinafter 2004 ANN. REP.], available at http://www.uscourts.gov/judbus2004/appendices/x5.pdf. The trends are similar within the subcategory of employment discrimination law. While 1174 employment class actions were filed in federal court from July 1976 through June 1976, the number was only 73 in 2002. Hart, supra note 17, at 820.

115. See supra notes 113 & 114.

116. John J. Donohue III & Peter Siegelman, The Changing Nature of Employment Discrimination Litigation, 43 STAN. L. REV. 983, 1019–21 (1991) (attributing virtual disappearance of class action employment litigation to changes in legal rules, particularly the Court’s decisions in East Texas Freight System and Falcon); Garth et al., supra note 19, at 371 (noting that the economic incentive of attorney fees does not serve a sufficient incentive for lawyers to bring civil rights class action cases); see supra Part I.B.2.

These general trends are exacerbated in the ADA context. There has been a notable lack of systemic and class action litigation under the ADA, particularly with regard to the law’s employment provisions. Very recently, there have been several large class action lawsuits brought by private lawyers alleging discrimination on the basis of sex, but none relating to disability.

There are several executive branch agencies charged with public enforcement of the ADA. I will focus my discussion on the EEOC and Department of Justice (DOJ), which have the most robust statutory role for public enforcement. Generally speaking, these agencies have not made structural litigation a high priority. The EEOC has acknowledged as much, noting its failure to bring and develop broad, systemic cases (while recognizing that they could serve the public interest better by doing a better job). Commentators have confirmed that the EEOC has generally shied away from bringing large systematic cases, both in the ADA and larger civil rights contexts. The DOJ’s

118. See Pamela S. Karlan & George Rutherglen, Disabilities, Discrimination, and Reasonable Accommodation, 46 Duke L.J. 1, 19 (1996) (“Few of the cases brought under the ADA are class actions . . . .”); Stein & Waterstone, supra note 15, at 890–94 (arguing that there is a lack of class action litigation under the ADA).

119. See, e.g., Dukes v. Wal-Mart, Inc., 474 F.3d 1214, 1233 (9th Cir. 2007) (certifying a large class of female workers bringing Title VII claims).

120. While Wal-Mart, like other large defendants, has been sued for disability discrimination by private lawyers, these cases have typically not been brought as class actions. See Wal-Mart Watch, Issues: Discrimination, http://walmartwatch.com/issues/discrimination (last visited Nov. 5, 2007) (presenting information on only smaller, individual discrimination suits).

121. These include the EEOC (Title I), the DOJ (Title II), the Department of Transportation (Titles II and III), the Department of Agriculture (Title II), the Department of Education (Title II), the Department of Health and Human Services (Title II), the Department of Housing and Urban Development (Title II), the Department of the Interior (Title II), the Department of Labor (Title II), and the United States Access Board (Titles II and III). Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104 Stat. 327 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).


123. See Leslie E. Silverman et al., EEOC, Executive Summary, Systemic Task Force Report 1 (2006), available at http://www.eeoc.gov/abouteeoc/task_reports/systemic.pdf (“[W]e found that EEOC does not consistently and proactively identify systemic discrimination. Instead, the agency typically focuses on individual allegations raised in charges.”).

124. See Selmi, EEOC, supra note 73, at 16 (“Consistent with the EEOC’s history and current litigation trends, a relatively small percentage of the cases were filed as class allegations—forty-seven of the cases which constituted
enforcement efforts have also come under criticism for being “overly cautious, reactive, and lacking any coherent and unify-
ing national strategy.”

Aside from improving compliance, large-scale litigation ef-
forts can also serve an important law development function.
For example, in the early years of Title VII, the Civil Rights
Division of the DOJ concentrated on establishing that Title VII
prohibited not only purposeful discrimination but also practices
with a discriminatory impact. The DOJ was a plaintiff in
cases that made it to the court of appeals level, and estab-
ished early precedent that neutral practices with a disparate
impact violated Title VII. This line of cases was a key part of
the road to the Supreme Court’s decision in Griggs v. Duke
Power Co., which “held that facially neutral ‘practices, proce-
dures, or tests’ that are discriminatory in effect cannot be used
to preserve the ‘status quo’ of employment discrimination.”

In contrast, despite the fact that the EEOC promulgated regu-
lations explicitly stating that disparate impact is covered under

13.5% of the claims.”); see also Moss et al., supra note 73, at 18 (discussing
Professor Selmi’s data and conclusions). In the ADA failure to hire context dis-
cussed infra, only four briefs reflecting EEOC participation as a plaintiff dem-
strated representation of more than an individual applicant. See EEOC,
Commission Appellate and Amicus Briefs (Sept. 6, 2007), http://www.eeoc.gov/
litigation/appbriefs.html (providing a search mechanism for EEOC positions
that “discuss significant legal issues which could affect the manner in which
employment laws are interpreted”).

125. Nat’l Council on Disability, Promises to Keep: A Decade of
(examining the enforcement of the ADA between 1990 and 1999 by using sta-
tistical and other federal agency data). Regarding Title II of the ADA, the re-
port also argues that the DOJ has not taken sufficiently strong positions in
important litigation. Id. at 4–6; see also infra notes 137, 231–35 and accompa-
nying text (noting the limited use of the DOJ’s power to bring ADA cases in
the public interest).

126. David L. Rose, Twenty-Five Years Later: Where Do We Stand on Equal
Employment Opportunity Law Enforcement?, 42 Vand. L. Rev. 1121, 1139
(1989).

127. See Local 189 United Papermakers and Paperworkers v. United
States, 416 F.2d 980 (5th Cir. 1969); United States v. Sheet Metal Workers
Int’l Ass’n, Local No. 36, 416 F.2d 123 (8th Cir. 1969); United States v. Hayes
Int’l Corp., 415 F.2d 1038 (5th Cir. 1969); Local 53, Int’l Ass’n of Heat & Frost
Insulators v. Vogler, 407 F.2d 1047 (5th Cir. 1969). But see Int’l Bhd. of Team-
sters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 353–54 (1977) (“[A]n otherwise neutral,
legitimate seniority system does not become unlawful under Title VII simply
because it may perpetuate pre-Act discrimination”).


Title I of the ADA, neither the EEOC nor the DOJ have taken steps to develop the case law in this area.

This underwhelming public enforcement at the federal level has paralleled at the state level. Outside of a few selected states, federal protection is as strong as or stronger than what is provided by state law. And while one commentator has urged a move to the state law battlefield to enforce disability rights, there are few examples of state public enforcement officials bringing systemic cases under state or federal law. Because this is an area where federal protection has, at least on paper, been out in front of state law, and because many state courts have looked to the ADA for guidance on interpreting state law, it is important for federal enforcement officials to take the lead in litigating ADA cases.

130. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.15(c) (2007) (providing a potential defense to the charge of disparate impact).
131. On the lack of ADA disparate impact litigation, see Stein & Waterstone, supra note 15, at 889–90.
133. Buhai, supra note 132, at 1066.
B. A MORE STRUCTURAL LITIGATION ROLE FOR PUBLIC ENFORCEMENT AUTHORITIES

There are both legislative and regulatory bases for a stronger structural litigation role for ADA public enforcement authorities. The EEOC and DOJ are both authorized to bring ADA lawsuits that are in the public interest. The EEOC, responsible for enforcing Title I against private employers, has the ability to bring suit as a plaintiff, and its claims are not limited to the complaints made by a charging party.\textsuperscript{136} Similarly, the DOJ is authorized to bring cases involving a “pattern or practice” of discrimination by public employers under Title I,\textsuperscript{137} although it appears it has only done so once.\textsuperscript{138} The DOJ’s enforcement powers under Title II in cases involving public employers are the same as they are in the Title I context.\textsuperscript{139} Under Title III, the DOJ can bring lawsuits if it has reasonable cause to believe that any person or group of persons is engaged in a pattern or practice of discrimination, or in any other case that raises an issue of general public importance.\textsuperscript{140}

Apart from being allowed to play a structural role, public enforcement authorities are uniquely suited to fill the structural enforcement gap. Most of the limitations that apply to private attorneys general do not apply to public enforcement authorities. These strengths of public enforcement authorities vis-

\textsuperscript{136} EEOC v. Caterpillar, Inc., 409 F.3d 831, 833 (7th Cir. 2005) (“[A] suit by the EEOC is not confined to claims typified by those of the charging party.” (quoting Gen. Tel. Co. of the Southwest v. EEOC, 446 U.S. 318, 331 (1980))); see also EEOC v. Waffle House, Inc., 534 U.S. 279, 291 (2002) (“[O]nce a charge is filed . . . the EEOC is in command of the process.”).

\textsuperscript{137} The DOJ’s role under Title I of the ADA (as well as that of the EEOC) is determined by various provisions of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, including the 1991 amendments set forth in the Civil Rights Act of 1991. 42 U.S.C. § 12117 (2000). These provisions provide that the EEOC should refer employment cases involving governments, governmental agencies, or political subdivisions to the Attorney General. Id. § 2000e-5(f). The Attorney General is further authorized to bring civil actions whenever there is “reasonable cause to believe that any person or group of persons is engaged in a pattern or practice of resistance to the full enjoyment of any of the rights secured by” the ADA. Id. § 2000e-6(a).

\textsuperscript{138} See Davoll v. Webb, 194 F.3d 1116, 1124 (10th Cir. 1999) (alleging disability discrimination by the Denver police department).

\textsuperscript{139} See 42 U.S.C. § 12133 (2000) (stating that enforcement of Title II is the same as 29 U.S.C. § 794a, the Rehabilitation Act); 29 U.S.C. § 794a (2000) (providing that enforcement provisions are the same as those found in the Civil Rights Act of 1964).

à-vis the private attorney general help to assess when public officials should devote resources to systemic litigation.

First, by not being tied to attorneys’ fees and a case’s ability to pay for itself, public enforcement authorities can truly bring and prosecute cases in the public interest. Therefore, whereas private attorneys general increasingly can no longer afford to bring large class action civil rights cases, private enforcement authorities can. Systemic litigation is expensive, and few private lawyers can match the government’s resources when it decides to use them in a particular direction.

Freedom from attorneys’ fees and damages as a means of financing litigation also allows public enforcement officials to bring cases for injunctive relief, which has traditionally been the structural remedy of choice. Professor Selmi has recently criticized privately brought employment discrimination class action lawsuits as being too focused on obtaining large settlements, which primarily enriched the plaintiffs’ lawyers. Lawsuits brought by public enforcement authorities that focus on institutional injunctive relief as opposed to damage awards could help revive the public nature of these types of civil rights class actions.

141. Davies, supra note 93, at 238 (“In the civil rights class action context, for example, there is higher demand than supply of attorneys because the attorneys can only afford to litigate cases that are virtually guaranteed to win.”); see also Albiston & Nielsen, supra note 19, at 41–42 (“Buckhannon reduces litigation not by promoting settlement, but by discouraging plaintiffs from bringing meritorious but expensive claims in the first place . . . .”); Davies, supra note 93, at 258 (noting private civil rights class actions have gone down because of financial factors).

142. The extent to which these agencies are funded or defunded is essentially a political decision. See supra notes 78–81.

143. Fiss, supra note 106, at 2 (“The structural suit is one in which a judge, confronting a state bureaucracy over values of constitutional dimension, undertakes to restructure the organization to eliminate a threat to those values posed by the present institutional arrangements. The injunction is the means by which these restructive directives are transmitted.”); see also David Rudenstein, Institutional Injunctions, 4 CARDozo L. REV. 611, 616 (1983) (noting the importance of institutional injunctions and arguing that they are not in conflict with federalism and democratic process values); Margo Schlanger, Civil Rights Injunctions over Time: A Case Study of Jail and Prison Court Orders, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 550, 561–64 (2006) (detailing the transformative effect of injunctions in prisons).

144. See Selmi, supra note 14, at 1280.

145. Within civil rights law generally and disability law in particular, these suits do happen. They are often brought by public interest organizations. For example, in Barden v. City of Sacramento, 292 F.3d 1073, 1075 (9th Cir. 2002), Disability Rights Advocates, a prominent nonprofit law firm dedicated to bringing high profile ADA cases, sued the city of Sacramento for inaccessible
Second, class action structural litigation has been curtailed by the Supreme Court’s decision in General Telephone Co. of the Southwest v. Falcon, which held that named class representatives had to demonstrate a greater unanimity of interest with the proposed class.\textsuperscript{146} This tightened Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 23’s reins for class certification: plaintiffs who suffered discrimination in hiring, for example, cannot represent plaintiffs who were discriminated against in promotion decisions.\textsuperscript{147} This decision, combined with the 1991 amendments to the Civil Rights Act that allowed Title VII plaintiffs increased damages and jury trials, has led courts to view employment cases as less amenable to class treatment.\textsuperscript{148} This restricts private litigants, however, far more than the government, particularly in disability cases.

Under the ADA, both the EEOC and DOJ have far more procedural breathing room to pursue class-type relief than sidewalks. The requested relief was a structural injunction requiring the City to formulate a plan for sidewalk accessibility. \textit{Id}. But these cases are the exception, not the norm. Public interest organizations do not have adequate staff or funds to bring all of these cases, and government officials have not taken the lead in doing so. \textit{See} Bagenstos, \textit{supra} note 61, at 35. The most prominent disability-based public interest organizations are in large cities. Large segments of the country have no similar operations. In Mississippi, for example, the largest disability rights organization has no lawyers. Mississippi Coalition for Citizens with Disabilities, \url{http://www.mscoalition.com/} (follow “Staff and Board” hyperlink) (last visited Nov. 5, 2007). Additionally, Mississippi’s Protection and Advocacy Office has only one staff attorney and does not typically litigate. Mississippi Protection and Advocacy System, \url{http://www.mspas.com/staff.htm} (last visited Nov. 5, 2007).

\textsuperscript{146} \textsuperscript{147} \textsuperscript{148}
vate litigants. In *General Telephone Co.*, the Supreme Court held that the EEOC could seek class-wide relief for sex discrimination under Title VII without certification as a class representative under Rule 23. The same is true under the ADA, which has allowed the EEOC, in the few class-type cases it has brought, to escape thorny class issues of individualized inquiries that courts usually view as necessary to determine disability. Similarly, when the DOJ brings “pattern or practice” suits under Title I of the ADA, the government, when establishing its prima facie case, is not required to show individual discrimination with respect to each person for whom it seeks relief.

Third, the ability of private litigants to sue state governments has been dramatically curtailed by the Court’s recent “new federalism” jurisprudence. The ADA has been at the center of the development of this body of law. In *Board of Trustees of the University of Alabama v. Garrett*, the Court held that, under the principle of state sovereign immunity, individuals may not sue the state for damages under Title I of the ADA. Insofar as the ADA is concerned, the Court has retreated from this principle somewhat in *Tennessee v. Lane* and *Goodman v. Georgia*, where it held that individuals may sue state enti-

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149. 446 U.S. 318, 319, 326, 330 (1980) (“When the EEOC acts, albeit at the behest of and for the benefit of specific individuals, it acts also to vindicate the public interest in preventing employment discrimination. . . . Forcing EEOC civil actions into Rule 23 model would in many cases distort the Rule as it is commonly interpreted . . . . Rule 23(a) imposes the prerequisites of numerosity, commonality, typicality, and adequacy of representation. When considered in the light of these requirements, it is clear that the Rule was not designed to apply to EEOC actions brought in its own name for the enforcement of federal law.”).


151. *Id.* at 938 (holding that the status of the EEOC as a plaintiff obviates the argument for an individualized inquiry attack on class certification). For an alternative view as to how courts should conceive of group identity through the lens of pandisability, see Stein & Waterstone, *supra* note 15, at 905–16.

152. United States v. City and County of Denver, 943 F. Supp. 1304, 1309 (D. Colo. 1996) (“In seeking to protect the public’s interest, it is sufficient that the government show specific evidence of company discrimination regarding some of the employees that it seeks to represent, and that a broad-based policy of employment discrimination existed.”) (quoting Coe v. Yellow Freight Sys., 646 F.2d 444, 449 n.1 (10th Cir. 1981) (citations omitted)).


ties for damages under Title II where they are seeking to vindicate fundamental rights. It is still uncertain how far this exception will extend. Under Garrett, individuals may sue state officials for prospective injunctive relief under Ex parte Young, but the limitation on damage remedies further undercuts the financial ability of private lawyers to bring these kinds of cases. In the ADA context this is significant, because state governments are a major provider of programs, services, and activities to people with disabilities. Again, however, these discouraging restrictions do not apply to the government, which can bring cases for damages regardless of new federalism sovereign immunity rules.

If the government possesses an array of systemic advantages to the private attorney general in bringing structural cases, how should it use this power? Public enforcement officials should focus on bringing cases where the profit motive for plaintiffs and private attorneys is low (either because of the lack of damage remedy or limitations on attorneys’ fees recovery), noncompliance appears to be systemic, case law is undeveloped, and individual plaintiffs will have standing difficulties challenging various forms of discrimination. I now turn to discussing specific ways, in the context of disability litigation, that the government should take an active role in bringing structural litigation.

1. Employment-Hiring Cases

Before the enactment of the ADA, people with disabilities existed only at the fringes of the labor market. The ADA

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156. 209 U.S. 123, 154 (1908) (holding that the Eleventh Amendment does not protect state officials from suit if the suit would enjoin the official from enforcing an unconstitutional statute); see also Armstrong v. Wilson, 124 F.3d 1019, 1025–26 (9th Cir. 1997) (holding that the plaintiffs’ ADA Title II claims for prospective injunctive relief fell within the Ex parte Young exception to state sovereign immunity).

157. According to a 2005 study, 32% (63 out of 197) of Title II cases brought before the courts of appeals involved state actors as defendants. See Waterstone, supra note 61, at 1861–62.

158. See Garrett, 551 U.S. at 374 n.9.

159. According to the federal government’s National Health Information Survey, when disability was defined as an impairment that imposes limitations on any life activity the employment rate for working-age people with disabilities was 49% in 1990. See H. Stephen Kaye, Improved Employment Opportunities for People with Disabilities 9 fig.1 (2003), available at http://sdc.ucsf.edu/pub_listing.php?pub_type=report; see also Walter Y. Oi, Employment and Benefits for People with Diverse Disabilities, in DISABILITY,
hoped to address this disparity and, by working to eliminate employment discrimination, increase the number of people with disabilities in the workplace. Unfortunately, its success in doing so has been limited.160

To be sure, the Supreme Court’s definition of disability has dramatically limited the number of potential employees that can invoke the statute’s protections.161 But there are still groups of people that consistently qualify as meeting the definition of disability.162 Regarding these groups, one reason that the reach of the ADA’s employment law provisions have been limited is the infrequency with which they are used to open employment opportunities at the hiring stage. Even before the ADA was passed, researchers began to chart the changing nature of employment discrimination litigation, noting that antidiscrimination laws protecting women and minorities were used predominantly to protect the existing positions of incumbent workers.163 This trend is even stronger under the ADA, where failure-to-hire cases are dramatically outnumbered by discharge or accommodation for existing employee cases.164

It is in one sense understandable that there are not more hiring cases. Legal prohibitions against hiring discrimination

WORK AND CASH BENEFITS 103, 121 (Jerry L. Mashaw et al. eds., 1996) (showing that the percentage of people with disabilities with jobs in 1986 was 33%).


161. See Amy L. Allbright, Special Feature: 2003 Employment Decisions Under the ADA Title I—Survey Update, 28 MENTAL & PHYSICAL DISABILITY L. REP. 319, 320 (2004) (“A clear majority of the employer wins in this survey were due to employee’s failure to show that they had a protected disability.”).

162. Individuals who are blind or wheelchair users make up 4% of EEOC charges. See ADA Charge Data by Impairments/Basis—Merit Factor Resolutions, http://www.eeoc.gov/stats/ada-merit.html (last visited Nov. 5, 2007).

163. See Donohue & Siegelman, supra note 116, at 1015–17.

164. See Steven L. Willborn, The Nonevolution of Enforcement Under the ADA: Discharge Cases and the Hiring Problem, in EMPLOYMENT, DISABILITY, AND THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT: ISSUES IN LAW, PUBLIC POLICY, AND RESEARCH 103, 103–04 (Peter David Blanck ed., 2000) (“[O]ver the short life of the ADA, the ratio of discharge to hiring cases has been about 10 to 1, a ratio that is substantially higher than for Title VII cases . . . .”). This was also the case for employment cases under section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. See Karlan & Rutherglen, supra note 118, at 33–34.
are inherently difficult to enforce. It is hard for applicants to
detect discrimination and to prove they are capable of perform-
ing the job for which they applied. Potential plaintiffs have
less incentive to pursue a lawsuit than existing employees, and
are less likely to find a lawyer even if they are so in-
clined. Disability is seen as individualized and incapable of
aggregation, meaning that how an employer views one class of
persons with disabilities may not lead them to fail to hire
another type, which has exacerbated this trend. Yet this
leaves a void of enforcement, because this is exactly where em-
ployers have the greatest incentives to discriminate.

This void is troubling, and needs to be filled in order to
realize the ADA's goal of increasing the number of people with
disabilities in the workforce. What would a structural ap-
proach to litigating hiring discrimination look like? Broadly
speaking, there are two scenarios. In the first, a formal policy
keeps some category of people with disabilities out of the work-
force. Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc. was such a case. Plaintiffs,
twin sisters with myopia, claimed that defendant's policy
requiring uncorrected vision acuity of 20/100 or better discri-

165. See Christine Jolls, Accommodation Mandates, 53 STAN. L. REV. 223,
275 (2000) (“[I]t is generally quite difficult for disadvantaged workers to estab-
lish that they were unlawfully refused employment by an employer.”).

166. See Richard V. Burkhauser & David C. Stapleton, A Review of the
Evidence and Its Implications for Policy Change, in DECLINE IN EMPLOYMENT,
supra note 160, at 396.

167. Id. (noting how disappointed applicants decline to pursue litigation for
reasons such as a “less[er] chance of success, a desire to focus their energy on
searching for other jobs, fear of creating a negative reputation for themselves,
[and] lack of support from fellow employees or employee organizations”); see
also Willborn, supra note 164, at 115 n.2.

168. See Donohue & Siegelman, supra note 116, at 1003–09 (noting that employees with more means have an easier time securing representation than
those with lesser means).

169. See Bagenstos, supra note 160, at 538. For an alternative approach
suggesting courts should take a broader view of disability discrimination, see
Stein & Waterstone, supra note 15, at 916–22.

170. Employers have at least two disincentives to hiring people with dis-
abilities: first, it increases firing costs because of potential lawsuits, and
second, employers need to provide accommodations at their own expense for
disabled employees. See Daron Acemoglu & Joshua D. Angrist, Consequences
of Employment Protection? The Case of the Americans with Disabilities Act,
109 J. POL. ECON. 915, 924 (2001); Jolls, supra note 165, at 273–76.

171. See Bagenstos, supra note 160, at 555–56 (arguing that one hope for
increasing the effectiveness of Title I of the ADA is strengthening enforcement
of the antidiscrimination and accommodation requirements at the hiring
stage).

minated against them. Assuming plaintiffs meet the definition of disability, cases like this turn on whether the requirement is job related and consistent with business necessity, whether the requirement protects the health or safety of that worker or other workers from a direct threat, or whether a reasonable accommodation that will enable the applicant to meet the standard is possible. These types of cases are an analogue to an earlier wave of Title VII litigation: what has been described as easier-to-identify “blanket prohibitions from good jobs.” Whether pursued under a disparate treatment or disparate impact theory, commentators generally view Title VII as removing the most egregious examples of these types of restrictions. It is less obvious that this has been the case in ADA litigation.

The second type of failure-to-hire case is more complicated. Here, there may be no formal (or at least apparent) policy that excludes people with disabilities. Hiring decisions can be made on the basis of even subconscious biases or discomfort with bringing a previously excluded and stigmatized group into the workforce. In both the Title VII and ADA contexts, this discrimination has proven harder to tackle, although, at least in

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173. Id.
174. In *Sutton*, the Court held that the plaintiffs did not meet the definition of disability. *Id.* at 488–89.
176. *Id.* § 12113(b); see also *Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Echazabal*, 536 U.S. 73, 86–87 (2002) (holding that an employer can refuse to hire an individual with a disability whom the employer reasonably believes is a threat to himself).
179. *Id.*; see also Tristin K. Green, *Discrimination in Workplace Dynamics: Toward a Structural Account of Disparate Treatment Theory*, 38 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 91, 137 (2003) (“[D]isparate impact theory has proven an invaluable tool for reducing employer reliance on job requirements that are unrelated to job performance but that stand in the way of minority progress. Without such a tool, employers would have been free to adopt facially neutral job requirements that maintained the exclusion of blacks and minorities from vast areas of employment.”).
180. See Stein & Waterstone, *supra* note 15, at 861–62 (arguing that even a basic application of disparate impact litigation involving neutral formal policies has been lacking under the ADA).
182. See Bagenstos, *Structural Turn, supra* note 14, at 3–4 (averring that disparate treatment and impact models of discrimination are ill-suited to redi-
regards to the ADA, I have previously argued that this is not inevitable.\textsuperscript{183}

Public enforcement authorities are the institutional actors that are best suited to bring both categories of these failure-to-hire cases. Both types present greater challenges for private attorneys general to challenge because they are resource-intensive, have lower probability of high damage awards, and plaintiffs themselves are less likely to want to pursue them. These disincentives, however, apply far less to public enforcement authorities. Both the DOJ and EEOC can pursue cases on their own behalf in the public interest without finding a plaintiff who is ready and able to participate in long, difficult litigation,\textsuperscript{184} and have information-gathering mechanisms in place to identify problematic patterns and trends in the employer community.\textsuperscript{185} Government lawyers are also not beholden to the same financial incentives as the private bar. For these reasons, they are in a better position to negotiate detailed injunctive relief creating forward-looking change in employment-hiring practices.\textsuperscript{186} The goal is to use court oversight via injunctions to create and enforce changes in the way employers perceive and react to putative employees with disabilities.


\textsuperscript{184} See, e.g., EEOC v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 216 F. Supp. 2d 935, 937–38 (D. Minn. 2002) (holding that when the EEOC brings a case in its own name pursuant to statutory authority, it may bypass the requirement of class certification under Rule 23, thereby obviating the need for individual inquiry).

\textsuperscript{185} Before filing an ADA (or Title VII) employment case, an individual needs to file a charge with the EEOC. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1) (2000). The EEOC then classifies and investigates the case. See Moss et al., supra note 73, at 4 (detailing EEOC investigation procedures for ADA claims). Employers with over one hundred employees are also required to file an “EEO-1” form each year with the EEOC. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-8(c); 29 C.F.R. § 1602.7–1602.14 (2007). These reports contain information on enforcement, self-assessment by employers, and research.

\textsuperscript{186} See Michael J. Yelnosky, Filling an Enforcement Void: Using Testers to Uncover and Remedy Discrimination in Hiring for Lower-Skilled, Entry-Level Jobs, 26 U. Mich. J.L. Reform 403, 469 (1993) (“[T]he EEOC is more likely than a private party to obtain injunctive relief.”).
Regarding the first category of cases involving formal barriers, there are some limited examples of public enforcement authorities bringing these kinds of cases. In *EEOC v. Northwest Airlines, Inc.*, the EEOC argued that Northwest Airlines’s blanket policy barring anti-seizure medicated epileptics and insulin-dependent diabetics from holding cleaner or equipment service employee positions violated the ADA.\(^{187}\) Although a private litigant may have had trouble establishing class status, the EEOC did not.\(^{188}\) Similarly, in *EEOC v. United Parcel Services, Inc.*, the EEOC challenged a policy excluding monocular drivers without regard to their actual safety records and driving abilities.\(^{189}\) And in *EEOC v. SPS Temporaries, Inc.*,\(^{190}\) the Commission challenged a temporary employment agency’s hiring practices regarding applicants with disabilities. But these cases are the exception, not the rule, in the limited pool of government litigation dealing with employer hiring.\(^{191}\)

Public enforcement authorities have no visible strategy for or history of bringing failure-to-hire cases that involve less formal policies. Although difficult, these cases need to be part of an effective employment enforcement scheme, as subtle bias, stigma, and views of people with disabilities as inauthentic workers run deep.\(^{192}\) Case development in this area necessitates a robust view of disparate impact law\(^{193}\) and pushes the boundaries of tethering an employment decision to a “specific


\(^{188}\) Id. at 938.

\(^{189}\) 149 F. Supp. 2d 1115, 1121–22 (N.D. Cal. 2000).


\(^{191}\) There are more cases that have been brought on behalf of existing employees. For example, see *United States v. City and County of Denver*, 943 F. Supp. 1304 (D. Colo. 1996), where the DOJ brought a pattern and practice suit against the city and county regarding nonaccommodation of Denver police officers. See also Press Release, EEOC, Denny’s Sued by EEOC for Disability Bias Against Class of Workers Nationwide (Sept. 28, 2006) (covering an EEOC nation-wide suit brought on behalf of Denny’s workers for nonaccommodation and termination).


employment practice,”\textsuperscript{194} a theory for which there is limited success under Title VII.\textsuperscript{195} The troublesome statutory provision governing the proof structure of Title VII disparate impact, however, does not technically apply to the ADA.\textsuperscript{196} Moreover, unlike Title VII, the EEOC is uniquely positioned to provide leadership under the ADA because it is responsible for promulgating regulations under Title I.\textsuperscript{197} The regulations that the EEOC has promulgated support the ADA’s inclusion of disparate impact regime,\textsuperscript{198} yet the EEOC has not pushed this position in failure-to-hire cases.\textsuperscript{199}

One way to develop failure-to-hire cases involving informal policies would involve testing. Testing has been a valuable tool in other areas of antidiscrimination law in helping to ferret out difficult-to-detect discrimination.\textsuperscript{200} Primarily used by public interest groups, testing has been used under the Fair Housing Act and Title VII.\textsuperscript{201} In the employment context, testers are

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{195} Most commentators and courts, however, seem settled that intangible factors have trouble translating into a particular employment practice. See Tristin K. Green, \textit{Work Culture and Discrimination}, 93 CAL. L. REV. 623, 657 (2005) (“[C]ourts have held that an employer’s ‘passive reliance’ on relational means of exclusion is not subject to disparate impact attack.” (quoting EEOC v. Chi. Miniature Lamp Works, 947 F.2d 292, 298 (7th Cir. 1991)). There are examples of cases that are more receptive to these claims. In DeClue v. Central Illinois Light Co., 223 F.3d 434, 435 (7th Cir. 2000), the plaintiff challenged an employer’s failure to provide restroom facilities. Although the court failed to find that this constituted sexual harassment, it did suggest that “insofar as absence of restroom facilities deters women . . . but not men from seeking or holding a particular type of job . . . the absence may violate Title VII” under an impact theory. Id. at 436.
  \item \textsuperscript{196} See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)–(B) (regulating discrimination on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin).
  \item \textsuperscript{197} Id. § 12116.
  \item \textsuperscript{198} Unlike the statute, which uses language consistent with disparate impact but does not mention the term, the EEOC regulations expressly reference disparate impact. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.15(c) (2007).
  \item \textsuperscript{199} This is in contrast to the DOJ’s aggressive disparate impact law development in the early years of Title VII. See Rose, supra note 126, at 1155–57.
  \item \textsuperscript{200} See Selmi, \textit{Public vs. Private}, supra note 73, at 1426 (“[T]esting has proved to be an effective means of documenting discrimination.”); Yelnosky, supra note 186, at 413 (“Testing can help to root out discriminatory practices where the disincentives to bring a private suit result in underenforcement.”).
  \item \textsuperscript{201} See Stephen E. Haydon, Comment, \textit{A Measure of Our Progress: Testing for Race Discrimination in Public Accommodations}, 44 UCLA L. REV. 1207, 1216–17 (1997) (detailing the successes of testing under the Fair Housing Act); see also Yelnosky, supra note 186, at 413 (“The use of testers can uncover
persons who apply for employment with the sole purpose of detecting whether discriminatory hiring practices exist, but who do not intend to accept an offer of employment. The testers are matched to appear equally qualified for the job with respect to important hiring factors, including employment history and references. 202

Public enforcement authorities have used and supported testing in limited fashion. Under the Fair Housing Act, the government has developed a testing program that measures levels of housing discrimination and properly allocates enforcement efforts, 203 although the bulk of the government’s testing efforts involve various programs to provide financing to local private fair housing groups. 204 Under Title VII, the EEOC has recognized the value of testing, 205 and its current position is that it will accept charges from testers. 206 The EEOC has not formulated its own testing program or engaged in systematic efforts to promote testing programs of private groups, and there is a split of agreement as to whether it is statutorily entitled to do so. 207 Although the issue has not yet come up, the EEOC should have greater authority to create a testing program under the ADA because of the agency’s rule-making authority under the statute. 208

employment discrimination that otherwise is unproveable because of its subtle form.


203. MARGERY AUSTIN TURNER ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF HOUS. & URBAN DEV., HOUSING DISCRIMINATION STUDY 14 tbl.3.3 (1991) (showing that testing data collected by HUD from fair housing organizations discloses that black testers were falsely told that units were not available 17% of the time, and received less favorable treatment than white testers 39% of the time).

204. Selmi, Public vs. Private, supra note 73, at 1426.

205. See Press Release, EEOC, supra note 202 (“Testing, which was recognized as a viable technique to uncover workplace bias more than 25 years ago, has been utilized in various quarters including public accommodations, housing, and employment.”).


207. See Yelsnosky, supra note 186, at 459–63 (arguing that while testing is desirable, the EEOC presently lacks statutory authority to conduct testing); see also Leroy D. Clark, Employment Discrimination Testing: Theories of Standing and a Reply to Professor Yelsnosky, 28 U. Mich. J.L. Reform 1, 37–46 (1994) (arguing that employment testing is presently within the power of the EEOC).

A testing program in disability cases would be a valuable tool in the public enforcement arsenal, both as an effective innovation in its own right and as a supplement to cases that private lawyers are limited in their ability to bring. Although certain to be controversial, public testing avoids one of the most contested issues within testing law: whether private testers have individual standing to sue for various forms of relief. For disability cases, testing would involve two applicants, one with an obvious physical disability and one without, but similarly situated in terms of job qualifications. This would raise two sets of issues, both of which would be valuable to assess potential litigation. First, are applicants receiving accommodations in the job application process? Second, and more importantly (or at least harder to detect), are bias and stigma limiting opportunities for qualified applicants with disabilities?

Most knowledgeable observers believe they are. The 2004 National Organization on Disability/Harris Survey of Americans with Disabilities found that, as in previous years, the most prevalent form of discrimination against people with disabilities in employment is not being offered a job for which one is qualified. The second most common is being refused a job interview on the basis of a disability. The State Bar of California’s Committee on Legal Professionals with Disabilities reported that nearly half of the respondents it surveyed believed that they were denied employment opportunities because of their disabilities. More anecdotally, in May 2006, the American Bar Association Commission on Mental and Physical Disability convened the first National Conference on the Employ-

209. See Yelnsoky, supra note 186, at 429–55 (noting the obstacles private individuals and groups face in testing on their own).


213. Together, these two variants of discrimination account for 51% of job-related discrimination against people with disabilities. Id. at 39.

214. ABA Comm’n on Mental & Physical Disability, The National Conference on the Employment of Lawyers with Disabilities: A Report from the American Bar Association for the Legal Profession 10–11 (2006), available at http://www.abanet.org/disability/docs/conf_report_final.pdf. Many respondents also believed that they were denied jobs even though they graduated in the top ten to twenty percent of their law school classes at higher ranked schools than those that received job offers. Id. at 11.
ment of Lawyers with Disabilities. This meeting and subsequent report documented the existence of negative stereotypes about lawyers with disabilities in the legal profession. Many accounts were presented about qualified lawyers with disabilities who were clearly precluded from legal opportunities when interviewers realized they had disabilities. A testing program is invaluable to detect and craft a litigation response to these types of violations.

2. Physical Access Cases for Privately Owned Places of Public Accommodation

The ADA is unique amongst antidiscrimination statutes in that it seeks to restructure the actual physical environment of places of public accommodation. Although previous antidiscrimination laws like Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 required nondiscrimination in access to public places, the changes required to the physical environment were limited. With disabilities, however, discrimination appears to have been built into the environment. Steps can be just as effective in keeping someone with a wheelchair out of a building as a discriminatory policy is for a racial minority. To create access in privately owned places of public accommodation, Title III of the ADA requires that newly constructed or renovated facilities must be fully accessible, and that structures that were built before the ADA’s enactment must be made accessible where doing so is “readily achievable.” The requirements are similar for public buildings under Title II.

215. See id. In the interests of full disclosure, I am a Commissioner of the ABA Commission on Mental and Physical Disability Law.


218. Id. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(iv).

219. The regulations interpreting Title II of the ADA provide that regarding existing facilities, “each service, program, or activity [conducted by a public entity] . . . when viewed in its entirety, [must be] readily accessible to and usable by individuals with disabilities.” 28 C.F.R. § 35.150(a) (2007). This does not mean that each existing facility must be physically accessible to and usable by individuals with disabilities. See id. § 35.105(a)(1). The section of the regulations dealing with new or modified facilities provides that “[e]ach facility or part of a facility constructed by, on behalf of, or for the use of a public entity shall be designed and constructed in such manner that the facility or part of the facility is readily accessible to and usable by individuals with disabilities . . . .” See id. § 35.151(a).
Although there are no long-term systemic studies to date, media reports, testimony from advocates across the country, and other accounts have shown that widespread inaccessibility of physical structures in private and public facilities remains a rampant problem, even in cases where barrier removal would not be difficult. Especially regarding privately owned places of public accommodation, this represents a failure of the ADA’s remedial scheme and reliance on private enforcement. Individual litigants can only receive injunctive relief under Title III, and their lawyers’ only hope of receiving payment for these cases comes from recovering attorneys’ fees, an enterprise that has become more uncertain after the Supreme Court’s decision in *Buckhannon*.

A recent essay by Professor Samuel Bagenstos discusses the paradoxical situation created by a broad statute with limited remedies. Professor Bagenstos notes the media and political attack on serial litigation, which he characterizes as an inevitable (though undesirable) consequence of importing the private attorney general profit motive into civil rights litigation.

There is an enforcement void here that the government is best suited to fill. ADA access cases against privately owned places of accommodations are inherently unattractive for the private bar to bring. In addition to the lack of damage remedy and difficulty obtaining attorneys fees, standing is difficult to obtain.

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220. See Bagenstos, supra note 19, at 3; see also ADA Notification Act: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 106th Cong. 49 (2000) (statement of Rick A. Shotz, ADA Consulting Assocs.) (“[P]robably less than one building in 10 that is a public accommodation is compliant with the ADA.”). For an example of ADA compliance problems, see Dan Weikel, *Getting There Is None of the Fun*, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 13, 2006, at B1 (discussing a lack of sidewalk and public right-of-way access in Riverside, California).

221. 532 U.S. 598 (2001); see Albiston & Nielson, supra note 19, at 1089. Regarding public buildings, the scenario under Title II is not much better. Plaintiffs can only receive damages for cases involving “deliberate indifference.” Duvall v. County of Kitsap, 260 F.3d 1124, 1138 (9th Cir. 2001). A private plaintiff’s ability to sue for damages is also curtailed by the Court’s decisions in *Garrett* and *Lane*. See Waterstone, supra note 64, at 795, 833–34.

222. See Bagenstos, supra note 19, at 3.

establish. A plaintiff must meet the continuing violation doctrine, meaning that she must show that there is a risk of the harm happening to her again. A plaintiff's standing is also tied to his or her disability, meaning that a wheelchair user suing a stadium can only obtain an injunction with respect to the parts of the stadium in which he encountered difficulty and cannot seek relief for individuals with vision impairments.

Again, the government can avoid most of these structural limitations. Under Title III of the ADA, the government’s enforcement powers are substantially broader than private litigants. The attorney general can initiate complaints and commence a civil action if it believes that any person or group of persons is engaged in a pattern or practice of discrimination, or any person or group of persons has been discriminated against and such discrimination raises an issue of general public importance. By suing in the public interest, the government’s standing is not tied to any particular plaintiff or his or her disability. Unlike private individuals, the government can seek compensatory damages, and can seek civil penalties (up to $100,000 for multiple violations) in cases it deems important to “vindicate the public interest.”

Primarily, however, government enforcement can and should get its power from its unique ability to pursue structural injunctive relief. The attorney general can bring cases solely focused on invoking the courts’ injunctive powers to enforce and monitor physical accessibility standards. Unlike private individuals, the government does not have to be overly concerned about financing cases through attorneys’ fees and damage


227. See Mary Crossley, Becoming Visible: The ADA’s Impact on Health Care for Persons with Disabilities, 52 ALA. L. REV. 51, 63 (2000) (asserting that actions brought by the DOJ or a United States Attorney are important because they “take the focus away from the harm threatened to a particular individual with a disability and can provide an effective mechanism for compelling a health care provider to conform its practices more broadly to the ADA’s auxiliary aids requirements”).


229. Id. § 12188(b)(2)(C).
awards. They can also bring broad cases challenging all facets of inaccessibility in public places, rather than being tied to inefficient piecemeal litigation on behalf of individual or discrete classes of plaintiffs.230

Yet across administrations, the attorney general’s office has not pursued this agenda.231 Examining the Title III case law for cases that the DOJ brought under their “general public importance” and “pattern or practice” authority that involve new construction232 shows that the DOJ’s cases have almost all involved movie theater or sports stadium lines-of-access.233 While sparse in scope and number,234 these cases do show the potential of this type of litigation strategy. In United States v. AMC Entertainment, Inc., the DOJ secured a court order that required compliance with ADA access codes in AMC stadium-style theaters across the country.235 The court kept jurisdiction of the action for five years to enforce the injunction.236 What is needed is more structural cases like this that create an in-depth look at inaccessible conditions for broad categories of people with disabilities.

These guidelines for when public enforcement officials should devote resources to bringing structural litigation to supplement private enforcement—cases where the profit motive for plaintiffs and private attorneys is low (because of a lack of

230. In a Title VII case in the pre-Falcon era, one court commented on this principle. See McLendon v. M. David Lowe Pers. Servs., Inc., No. 75-H-1185, 1977 WL 15, at *3 (S.D. Tex. Apr. 29, 1977) (“[T]his Court must reject the thesis that a named plaintiff must have been the victim of . . . discrimination . . . manifested by an employer. To hold otherwise would be to burden the Courts with a multiplicity of suits . . . . This would be plainly an inefficient method of implementing . . . Title VII.”).
231. See Bagenstos, supra note 19, at 35; see also Milani, supra note 74, at 112–13.
233. The fact that these cases have been consistently brought since the earlier years after the ADA’s passage demonstrates the Department’s path dependent behavior. See, e.g., United States v. Cinemark U.S.A., 348 F.3d 569, 572 (6th Cir. 2003) (holding that the regulation requiring wheelchair accessibility for public assembly areas meant that theater owners must provide similar viewing angles for all patrons); United States v. Ellerbe Becket, Inc., 976 F. Supp. 1262, 1268–69 (D. Minn. 1997) (holding an architectural firm in violation of the DOJ regulation involving sight lines for sports facilities).
234. For a reading, analysis, and codification of every Title III ADA case at the court of appeals level from 1990–2004, see generally Waterstone, supra note 61 (examining all eighty-two appellate cases brought under Title III).
236. Id.
damage remedy, limitations on attorneys’ fees recovery), non-compliance appears to be systemic, there is an absence of case development, and individual plaintiffs will have standing difficulties challenging various forms of discrimination—certainly also apply to other areas of disability law.237 In the broader universe of civil rights laws, there is also the potential for a structural approach by public enforcement officials to create meaningful change.238

237. One area of disability law involves the provisions of the Fair Housing Amendments Act that require all new multifamily housing be designed and constructed with six specified accessibility features. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(3)(C) (2000). Professor Robert Schwemm notes widespread noncompliance with this statutory provision, and discusses the lack of cases despite their potential for success. Robert G. Schwemm, Barriers to Accessible Housing: Enforcement Issues in 'Design and Construction' Cases Under the Fair Housing Act, 40 U. RICH. L. REV. 753, 768–74 (2006). The advantages the DOJ receives from bringing these cases are significant. For example, in cases brought by the Department, the courts have taken a relaxed view of the “continuing violation” doctrine. Id. at 845. Another area where this type of vigorous enforcement is at least as important is under the provisions of the Help America Vote Act (HAVA) requiring that voting systems shall "be accessible for individuals with disabilities, including nonvisual accessibility for the blind and visually impaired, in a manner that provides the same opportunity for access and participation (including privacy and independence) as for other voters." 42 U.S.C. § 15481(a)(3)(A) (Supp. III 2005). Here, public enforcement is crucial, because the only grievance option available to private citizens is an administrative proceeding. Id. U.S.C. § 15512. The DOJ has taken the position that individuals do not have a private right of action to enforce this part of HAVA. See Federal Defendants’ Opposition to Plaintiff’s Motion for Preliminary Injunction at 3, Taylor v. Onorato, 428 F. Supp. 2d 384 (W.D. Pa. 2006) (No. 06-481) (arguing that HAVA confers no private right of action); see also Taylor v. Onorato, 428 F. Supp. 2d 384, 345 (W.D. Pa. 2006) (holding that private plaintiffs have no private right of action under HAVA access provisions). The DOJ does have the ability under HAVA to bring “a civil action against any State or jurisdiction in an appropriate United States District Court for such declaratory and injunctive relief . . . as may be necessary.” 42 U.S.C. § 15511 (Supp. III 2005). So far, however, despite early evidence of noncompliance, the Department has brought only two cases relating to the disability provisions of HAVA. See United States v. Maine, No. 06-86-B-W, 2007 WL 1059565 (D. Me. Apr. 4, 2007); Complaint, United States v. N.Y. State Bd. of Elections, No. 06-CV-0263 (GLS) (N.D.N.Y. Mar. 1, 2006), available at www.usdoj.gov/crt/voting/hava/ny_hava.htm.

238. Some of the nondisability provisions of the HAVA, for example, fit this description, though the ability of a private plaintiff to bring a lawsuit challenging her ability to cast a provisional ballot is unclear, as the statute itself provides no private right of action. See 42 U.S.C. § 15482 (Supp. III 2005) (provisional ballot provision); cf. Sandusky County Democratic Party v. Blackwell, 339 F. Supp. 2d 975, 975 (N.D. Ohio 2004) (holding that an individual has standing to sue under this provision pursuant to § 1983). Standing is traditionally difficult to establish in voting cases, and HAVA’s provisional ballot provisions have been criticized for being unclear. See Rick L. Hasen, If It Is
III. NEW GOVERNANCE

Litigation, or the threat of litigation, is a means to an end—narrowing the gap between what laws formally state should happen and what actually does happen. As set forth above, public enforcement officials should engage in a structural litigation campaign to help increase ADA compliance. But the reality is that enforcement agents—whether public or private—will never be able to bring every even potentially meritorious case. To a certain extent, an enforcement gap will probably always exist. For those that tend to take a litigation-centric view of civil rights in general and enforcement in particular, there is a relatively new but expanding body of scholarship that may ultimately challenge the assumption that litigation is the enforcement apparatus of choice. Loosely referred to in the literature as “new governance,” this scholarship moves away

Broke, Fix It. Now, RECORDER (S.F.), Nov. 4, 2004, available at http://www.law.com/jsp/law/LawArticleFriendly.jsp?id=1099217144168; Daniel Tokaji, The 2008 Election: Could It Be a Repeat of 2000?, FINDLAW WRIT, Nov. 30, 2004, http://writ.news.findlaw.com/commentary/20041130_tokaji.html. Similarly, victims of housing discrimination often may not realize they have been treated unfairly, or even if so, may not want to sue, paralleling the problem of victims of employment discrimination who have not been hired. Schwemm, supra note 14, at 380. Development of disparate impact law has also been slow and uneven. See James A. Kusher, An Unfinished Agenda: The Federal Fair Housing Enforcement Effort, 6 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 348, 356 (1988); see also BROOKS ET AL., supra note 3, at 311 (noting that the Supreme Court has not yet decided disparate impact case under the Fair Housing Act). A commitment to public systemic litigation in these areas will help these statutes achieve their respective goals of a fairer voting system and eliminate discrimination in the housing market.

239. I include myself in this category. See Waterstone, supra note 61, at 1826–32 (looking at respective rates of litigation across the Titles of the ADA).

240. This coincides with an alternative strain of scholarship that urges a move outside of the traditional legal process altogether to vindicate civil rights. For example, Professors Kevin Johnson and Bill Hing have recently written about a new immigrants’ civil rights struggle. See Bill Ong Hing & Kevin R. Johnson, The Immigrant Rights Marches of 2006 and the Prospects for a New Civil Rights Movement, 42 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. (forthcoming 2007), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=951268. They suggest that with an uncertain Congress and a judiciary unlikely to support social change, immigrant groups should focus their current efforts on building broad political coalitions with other groups. Id. (manuscript at 42–43, 47, 67–79). Professor Orly Lobel also recently wrote on perceived limited successes of various civil rights movements and the subsequent shift away from traditional legal reform toward community organizing and grassroots campaigning. Orly Lobel, The Paradox of Extra-Legal Activism: Critical Legal Consciousness and Transformative Politics, 120 HARV. L. REV. 937, 971–87 (2007). This is a view that Lobel ultimately rejects. Id.
from traditional modes of enforcement and regulation. Instead, it focuses on collaborative, multiparty, multilevel, adaptive, problem-solving methods of public policy implementation that to varying extents supplement or supplant traditional regulation.

After briefly explaining the basics of new governance for the uninitiated, this Part discusses a potential fit between disability policy as set forth in the ADA and enforcement options that seek to shift the locus of control from courts to networks of interested parties. Although with new governance the line between public and private actors becomes more blurry and less important, I will focus primarily on the role public enforcement officials have to play in the constellation of new governance activities. In many ways, public officials have lagged behind private actors in the development of creative enforcement mechanisms, despite many institutional advantages. Although the choice to focus on public enforcement is somewhat limiting, I believe that it is defensible. As set forth above, pub-


242. See Lobel, supra note 241, at 373 (describing the Renew Deal governance as engaging many actors while giving citizens active roles).

243. Innovation certainly occurs on the private side, even operating loosely within the framework of traditional litigation. The law firm of Goldstein, Demchak, Baller, Borgen & Dardarian, and solo practitioner Lainey Feingold, have developed a method known as structured negotiations. They describe this method as an alternative to litigation that emphasizes “collaboration, relationship-building, solution, and disability community empowerment.” See E-mail from Lainey Feingold to ADRC Listserve (Jan. 3, 2007) (on file with author). Structured negotiations aided in successfully negotiating legal agreements on issues including Talking ATMs, accessible websites, tactile point of sale devices, and alternative format systems with various national companies. See The International Center for Disability Resources on the Internet, News on Talking ATMs and Other News Dealing with Banks, Retail Locations, and Financial Institutions, http://www.icdri.org/AssistiveTechnology/ATMs/news_on_talking_atms.htm (last visited Nov. 5, 2007) (listing companies such as Walmart, Bank of America, RadioShack, Safeway, Citibank, and Wells Fargo); see also Tim Hay, Negotiating Wins for the Disabled, DAILY JOURNAL (L.A.), June 21, 2007, at 3 (describing efforts of lawyers Lainey Feingold and Linda Dardarian to get corporations and local governments to improve accommodations for the blind).
lic enforcement authorities have both the constitutional mandate and statutory obligation to vindicate civil rights. They should seek to do so in the most effective way possible, whether this involves litigation or other, less conventional methods. Below, I will demonstrate that as a practical matter, public enforcement authorities are well suited as a matter of presence and resources to play a strong role in new governance-type enforcement options.

Although this is a first step in applying new governance theory to civil rights law (and not an exhaustive treatment on the subject), I make some initial observations about its worth in the disability arena. In particular, I highlight two areas covered by the ADA where public enforcement authorities could actually take steps to decentralize ADA norm elaboration but potentially improve compliance.244

A. FORM AND STRENGTH OF NEW GOVERNANCE

In the fields of labor law and environmental law, amongst others, commentators have challenged the traditional modes of enforcement and regulation, advocating a diversification of the ways that enforcement officials interact with regulated entities.245 Sometimes (though not uniformly) referred to as new governance,246 this body of work challenges the predominance

244. “Norm” is used here the same way Professor Susan Sturm uses it; that is, moving from a general legal statement to a more specific one in which the law is translated into concrete change. Sturm, supra note 181, at 522 (“The structural approach to second generation problems calls for a dynamic and reciprocal relationship between judicially elaborated general legal norms and workplace-generated problem-solving approaches, which in turn elaborate and transform the understanding of the general norm.”).


246. See Karkkainen, supra note 12, at 472 (using the term “New Governance”); Lobel, supra note 241, at 344 (using term “governance” while addressing the new governance model).
of “traditional” regulation, whereby certain enumerated practices are directly prohibited and a centralized enforcement agency implements and enforces the law, usually through adversarial litigation by that entity or by private actors.\textsuperscript{247} The goal of new governance theory is to get a broad range of stakeholders involved, including regulated entities, private interest groups, government enforcement agencies, and the class of people that the law is intended to benefit. Ideally, these various groups converge on a set of legal norms, and then utilize their collective energy in achieving effective and context-specific solutions.

New governance advocates believe this approach has several strengths. Litigation is adversarial, and any process with less focus on assigning blame is more likely to arrive at a mutually satisfying agreement. This can be particularly effective if the range of stakeholders—the regulated entities, enforcement officials, and the law’s beneficiaries—are all involved in discussing solutions.\textsuperscript{248} New governance’s premium on information sharing allows reforms and compliance schemes that work well for one actor to be passed on to other interested parties.\textsuperscript{249} In this way, a broader audience is reached and impacted than might be possible in litigation, and a continuous cycle of learning is created. Public enforcement officials, as well as private actors, can facilitate this process.\textsuperscript{250} Finally, the norm elaboration and refinement that occurs by multiparty nonadversarial talks can create behavior that pushes the bounds of what the law might otherwise more formally require.\textsuperscript{251}

\textsuperscript{247} In the literature, this is referred to as top down “hierarchy and control” regulation. See, e.g., Lobel, supra note 241, at 344 (stating that the new governance model embodies greater participation and collaboration than the New Deal’s hierarchical system).

\textsuperscript{248} William A. Shutzkin, The Land That Could Be: Environmentalism and Democracy in the Twenty-First Century 14–15 (2000); see also Lobel, supra note 241, at 374 (describing an increase in public and private sector interdependence).

\textsuperscript{249} See David Osborne & Ted Gaebler, Reinventing Government: How the Entrepreneurial Spirit Is Transforming the Public Sector 232–34 (1992) (examining strategic planning that involves studying a company’s current situation and goals, developing a way to achieve those goals, and then measuring the result); see also Lobel, supra note 241, at 380–81 (stating that the new governance model creates incentives to share information to enable the comparison of various success levels of methods in similar situations).

\textsuperscript{250} See Sturm, supra note 181, at 512–14 (information tracking by private entities); see also Lobel, supra note 241, at 422–23 (information gathering by public officials).

\textsuperscript{251} This is the thrust of Professor Sturm’s argument within employment
Professor Orly Lobel’s recent work on workplace safety regulation by the Occupational Safety Health Administration (OSHA) illustrates new governance principles, with an emphasis on the role played by public enforcement officials. OSHA is responsible for promulgating regulations for workplace safety and for monitoring workplace compliance, primarily through inspections. Yet OSHA has traditionally underenforced its regulations; and to the extent that OSHA enforced its regulations through the traditional adversarial model, these efforts were criticized for punishing good faith efforts to move beyond compliance, and for diminishing the willingness of regulated entities to cooperate and learn. This was partly symptomatic of the fact that OSHA’s one-size-fits-all rules did not fit all firms, especially in an era of fast production, small firms, and complex chains of authority. Professor Lobel presents recent OSHA initiatives as showing the potential successes of a new governance approach. These initiatives include incentives that offer a decreased chance of inspection for firms that were below the industry injury rate; OSHA partnerships with certain industries that allowed information sharing and steps to eliminate specific risks; and an increased emphasis on training and outreach programs. The existing, although incomplete, evidence reviewing these programs suggests that they have been successful. The Government Accounting Office concluded that the new cooperative strategies have improved safety and health practices, and allowed OSHA to play a “collaborative, rather than a policing, role with employers.” Similarly, OSHA reports show a decrease in workplace injuries for firms partici-

discrimination law; courts, workplaces, employees, lawyers, and mediating organizations can work together to tackle “second-generation” discrimination in a way that courts have not under the operative legal framework of Title VII. See generally Sturm, supra note 181, at 461–63, 567–68.

252. See Orly Lobel, Interlocking Regulatory and Industrial Relations: The Governance of Workplace Safety, 57 ADMIN. L. REV. 1071, 1073 (2005) (“[Governance encompasses] a range of innovative policy approaches, integrates cooperation into the core of regulatory relations and sensibly combines both choice and sanction . . . through a formalized structured legal framework.”).

253. Id. at 1088–90.

254. Id. at 1093–95.

255. Id. at 1104–08.

pating in these programs, and interviews with participating workplaces describe increased trust and better relationships with OSHA officials.

New governance is not without its downside. There is a risk of co-option or exit, whereby the entities being regulated either opt out of the scheme entirely or are able to so influence the process that reforms become pretextual. Secondly, there is the problem of voice, which involves making sure that the beneficiaries of regulation sufficiently and meaningfully participate in the norms and rules that will impact them. Finally, new governance’s reliance on soft law and actual track records in creating reform have been questioned, although the great weight of new governance scholarship recognizes the value of traditional enforcement and regulation to complement “soft law” approaches. Cognizant of these strengths and weaknesses, I now turn to explaining how new governance concepts have been and could be effectively imported into disability law.

B. Conceptual Fit of the ADA with New Governance

In thinking about new governance and disability law, one is confronted with some initial choices. Some new governance thinking involves social situations that occur at a different point in time or space than the current state of disability law—

258. Lobel, supra note 252, at 1109–10.
259. See Green, supra note 195, at 675 (2005) (describing co-option as a potential drawback of employer self-regulation); see also Lobel, supra note 252, at 1075–76 (asking if the state will return as regulator if public-private partnerships are ineffective).
260. Lobel, supra note 252, at 1076.
261. See Karkkainen, supra note 12, at 476–77 (“By all accounts[,] the actual transition of new governance approaches to public problem solving thus far has been spotty. Innovations occur here and there, discernible within a number of disparate policy domains but dominant in few, and the outcomes of these scattered policy experiments remain ambiguous and contested. Even the most successful experiments have yet to be replicated widely, leaving them vulnerable to skeptics’ charge that their success depends upon factors unique to their own time, place, and fortuitous circumstances.” (citations omitted)); see also Jacqueline Savitz, Compensating Citizens, in Beyond Backyard Environmentalism 65–69 (Joshua Cohen & Joel Rogers eds., 2000) (criticizing the softness of new governance); Bagenstos, Structural Turn, supra note 14, at 27–34.
262. See Karkkainen, supra note 12, at 486 (“Most New Governance scholars acknowledge the necessity for some or many forms of ‘hardness’ in law, and would deviate from that, if at all, only by admitting ‘softness’ in one or a few aspects of the legal regime they envision.”).
for example, without a formal comprehensive statute. In this Article, I do not attempt to speculate as to what a world without the ADA might look like in terms of disability policy and regulation, although that would be an interesting thought exercise.

As a consequence of this choice, my primary focus will be on governance options that, while working within the general structure of the ADA, create opportunities to localize, decentralize, and increase the number of stakeholders who have a say in how regulated entities comply with the law. This does not diminish or eliminate the need for ADA litigation, although ADA cases may lose their role as the primary procedural vehicle for establishing and vindicating positive rights. Rather, I will highlight enforcement options that make the courts less of a vehicle to define rights, and instead provide the enforcement apparatus and backbone to more narrowly tailored and context-specific solutions.

The legal and policy frameworks of the ADA are amenable to such an approach. From a textual perspective, the ADA essentially prohibits behavior by certain regulated entities that “discriminates” on the basis of disability. This prohibition comes in varying degrees of specificity, but there is enough interpretative and regulatory space to generate a fruitful discussion of nonlitigation enforcement alternatives.

263. See Lobel, supra note 242, at 436–38 (describing how new governance principles underlie the legal rules for the internal Internet standard setting).

264. Other scholars use the litigation system to shift the locus of control from courts more directly to stakeholders. Professors Charles Sabel and William Simon, for example, suggest that while structural litigation traditionally focused on “command and control” type consent decrees, the movement is toward “decrees” that emphasize broad “goals and methods of monitoring achievement.” Charles F. Sabel & William H. Simon, Destabilization Rights: How Public Law Litigation Succeeds, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1015, 1025–26 (2004); see also Green, supra note 195, at 678–83 (suggesting, alternatively, doctrinal and administrative options going beyond legal rights to combat work culture discrimination).

265. For example, to the extent that the ADA was merely a laundry list of very specific physical modifications that certain classes of regulated parties had to make, any discussion of how new governance might enforce—as opposed to create—those rules would be somewhat stilted. Either entities comply or face lawsuits by private or public forces seeking to make them perform required statutory changes. Generally speaking, however, the ADA is not this binary. See infra notes 266–72 and accompanying text.
sis of disability.266 Within the statute, however, there is flexibility in executing this role. For example, even within employment law (which is one of the most detailed parts of the statute), an employer must reasonably accommodate a qualified employee with a disability.267 How an employer internally manages that process, however, is largely left up to that employer. To a significant extent, employers and employees must discern for themselves what constitutes a “reasonable accommodation,” or invoke the power of the courts to decide the issue for them.268 Similarly, while public entities must meet the program access standard, meaning that programs, services, and activities must be accessible when viewed in their entirety,269 it is largely up to the public entity to determine how to do so.270

Finally, under Title III of the ADA, all new construction must conform to the United States Access Board’s ADA Accessibility Guidelines.271 But these guidelines contain a provision allowing departure from the technical requirements “where the alternative designs and technologies used will provide substantially equivalent or greater access to and usability of the facility.”272 All of this creates the opportunity for more flexible, context-specific solutions that can be arrived at through collaborative

266. See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (2000) (“No covered entity shall discriminate against a qualified individual with a disability because of the disability of such individual in regard to job application procedures, the hiring, advancement, or discharge of employees, employee compensation, job training, and other terms, conditions, and privileges of employment.”); see also id. § 12132 (“Subject to the provisions of this subchapter, no qualified individual with a disability shall, by reason of such disability, be excluded from participation in or be denied the benefits of the services, programs, or activities of a public entity, or be subjected to discrimination by any such entity.”); id. § 12182 (“No individual shall be discriminated against on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of any place of public accommodation by any person who owns, leases (or leases to), or operates a place of public accommodation.”).

267. Id. § 12112(b)(5)(A).

268. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o)(2) (2007) (suggesting that “reasonable accommodation may include” altering facilities so that they may be used, changing job opportunities, and engaging the employee to determine his or her limitations). Even the employer’s “interactive process” engagement with the employee is a creation of administrative regulation. Id.

269. 28 C.F.R. § 35.150(a) (2007).

270. Id. § 35.105 (requiring every public entity to complete a self-evaluation of their services, programs, and practices, and develop a transition plan to make any necessary modifications).


problem solving, even within the context of traditional litigation.

There are additional reasons that disability law would be supported by a move away from courts and lawsuits. In all of its forms, litigation under antidiscrimination law is primarily a search for blameworthy actors.273 Yet the ADA, perhaps to a unique extent in antidiscrimination law, can be seen as incorporating a vision of distributive justice.274 In all of its titles, the ADA assigns costs to public and private actors who may harbor no animus toward people with disabilities. The cost of accommodating these individuals and creating access where before there was none is statutorily designed to be borne by a broad range of actors, including private employers, owners of private-ly owned places of public accommodation, or individual state and local governments. Forms of regulation that focus less on blame may be better suited to distributive goals than litigation.275

Finally, many of the criticisms of traditional “command and control” top-down regulation apply to ADA enforcement. In other fields, new governance scholars have criticized public regulation as creating both over- and underregulation and enforcement.276 The problem of ADA underenforcement has been discussed above: there is very little real risk of employers or businesses being sued for violating the ADA, and even less of a chance such a lawsuit would be brought by a public enforcement official.277 Yet there is also at least perceived overen-
forcement, evidenced by the business community’s complaints about overly technical and difficult-to-understand architectural requirements. New governance theorists also criticize the traditional regulatory model as bogged down in ossified regulations and unresponsive to fast-moving market realities.

Within disability law, Title I of the ADA has been criticized for having limited success in attacking “second-generation” subconscious discrimination. Similarly, the job security that the ADA is supposed to provide is of limited usefulness “in a world of reduced job security for everyone.”

C. Practical Applications

This Section first highlights several existing public-level programs that stress collaboration, information sharing, and flexibility. The Section then offers some critiques from new governance theory. Finally this Section proposes and discusses two somewhat more ambitious alternatives, both offered with an eye toward increasing the range of actors involved in and effectiveness of norm generation: (1) expanding administrative programs under the DOJ; and (2) applying doctrinal approaches from sexual harassment law to reasonable accommodation claims.

There are already some facets of the disability law and policy system that stress collaboration, cooperative interactions,
and information sharing. The various ADA regulations, for example, were written with input from the disability law and business communities.282 This process ensures that an array of stakeholders have a voice, if not an ultimate say, in regulations that will impact them. Public agencies have also attempted to distill the law’s requirements into various user-friendly guides. The EEOC and DOJ all have helpful information on their websites that provides visitors with nonbinding suggestions for how to comply with the ADA.283 The EEOC has also made an effort to increase its outreach and training activities.284

The ADA also offers at least one concrete incentive for collaboration. The law provides that state and local governments can have their building codes certified by the DOJ as meeting or exceeding minimum accessibility guidelines.285 If they do, such governments receive a rebuttable presumption of compliance in any ADA Title III litigation.286 This increases the opportunity for collaboration and effective ex ante compliance. There have also been some efforts for public enforcement officials to serve as a clearinghouse for information. The EEOC


283. ADA Home Page, http://www.ada.gov/ (last visited Nov. 5, 2007); EEOC, Disability Discrimination, http://www.eeoc.gov/types/ada.html (last visited Nov. 5, 2007). Among other subjects, the EEOC handbooks discuss how attorneys, small businesses, and food service companies may provide reasonable accommodations for individuals with disabilities. See id. The DOJ’s handbooks cover topics ranging from achieving van-accessible parking to providing disability accommodations in polling places. See ADA Home Page, supra.


has stated a commitment to create stakeholder networks,\textsuperscript{287} including advocacy groups and community organizations, although it is unclear how extensive or effective these efforts have been. As part of his New Freedom initiative, President George W. Bush issued an executive order directing federal agencies to work with states to help them assess their compliance with the ADA.\textsuperscript{288} The result was DisabilityInfo.gov, which bills itself as “the federal government’s one-stop Web site for people with disabilities, their families, employers, veterans and service members, and many others.”\textsuperscript{289} Through its Program to Monitor ADA Litigation, the DOJ has recently made more of an effort to serve as a point of centralization for ADA litigation.\textsuperscript{290}

Perhaps the best example of a sustained and effective collaborative approach to ADA enforcement is the DOJ’s Project Civic Access program under Title II.\textsuperscript{291} Under this program, the DOJ identifies state and local governments and conducts compliance reviews. The DOJ has developed technical assistance materials to help communities come into compliance with Title II, and ultimately enters into settlement agreements to ensure such compliance. As of September 2007, the DOJ has entered into 155 settlement agreements with 144 localities in all 50 states.\textsuperscript{292} This program serves as a repository of information gathering, and has allowed the DOJ to build a body of expertise in identifying and offering solutions for common problems with Title II compliance. Also, by negotiating with individual state and local governments, the DOJ can impact more communities than it could by using more expensive and time-consuming litigation. Further, the DOJ can tailor consent decrees that make sense for individual communities. Nevertheless, cities and towns are not lining up to participate; the state and local governments that participate in Project Civic Access are chosen by

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{287} See EEOC, PRIORITY CHARGE HANDLING TASK FORCE app. c (1998), available at http://www.eeoc.gov/aoubeoc/task_reports/pch-lit.html.
\item \textsuperscript{288} Exec. Order No. 13,217, 66 Fed. Reg. 33,155 (June 18, 2001).
\item \textsuperscript{289} Welcome to DisabilityInfo.gov, http://www.disability info.gov/ (last visited Nov. 5, 2007).
\item \textsuperscript{290} See United States Dep’t of Justice, Program to Monitor ADA Litigation, http://www.ada.gov/litmon.htm (last visited Nov. 5, 2007).
\item \textsuperscript{291} See United States Dep’t of Justice, Project Civil Access Fact Sheet, http://www.ada.gov/civicfac.htm (last visited Nov. 5, 2007).
\item \textsuperscript{292} Id.
\end{itemize}
the DOJ, and not the other way around.\textsuperscript{293} Moreover, the consent decrees negotiated under Project Civic Access do not go beyond a bare minimum of statutory compliance.\textsuperscript{294} This is despite the fact that the program defines the ADA’s goals more broadly than antidiscrimination, which seems to open the door for a broader dialogue.\textsuperscript{295}

Ultimately, these developments trend in the direction of new governance without taking large steps. Two more aggressive approaches, both issue areas within the ADA, (1) offer little in the way of precise statutory guidance except for high level guarantees of protection from discriminatory behavior; (2) could benefit from individualized and contextualized solutions that would be more accepted by stakeholders than those that courts have been able to provide; (3) like many other areas of the ADA, are currently underenforced; and (4) are places where public enforcement authorities are uniquely positioned to provide leadership on nontraditional enforcement options.

The first alternative is Title II’s broad mandate that public entities not discriminate on the basis of disability in the programs, services, and activities that they offer.\textsuperscript{296} This rather sparse statutory provision offers a unique opportunity for new governance principles to work. The law sets broad aspirations at a fairly general level, but leaves room for norm elaboration and defining.\textsuperscript{297} Yet the current system of underenforcement

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{293} See id. (“In most of these matters, the compliance reviews were undertaken on the Department’s own initiative under the authority of Title II and, in many cases, section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 because the governments receive financial assistance from the Department and are prohibited by the Act from discriminating on the basis of disability.”).
\item \textsuperscript{294} They may even stop short of that. See id. (“During the investigations, staff of the Disability Rights Section reviewed compliance with most ADA requirements.” (emphasis added)).
\item \textsuperscript{295} See id. (“The key goals of the ADA are to ensure that all people with disabilities have equality of opportunity, economic self-sufficiency, full participation in American life, and independent living.”).
\item \textsuperscript{296} See 42 U.S.C. § 12132 (2000) (“Subject to the provisions of this subchapter, no qualified individual with a disability shall, by reason of such disability, be excluded from participation in or be denied the benefits of the services, programs, or activities of a public entity, or be subjected to discrimination by any such entity.”).
\item \textsuperscript{297} The statute provides that the Attorney General will promulgate regulations to “implement” Title II, see 42 U.S.C. § 12134(a) (2000), which the DOJ has done, see 28 C.F.R. §§ 35.101–35.190 (2007). These regulations, while somewhat more specific than the actual statute, still leave ample room for specific norm generation. See, e.g., id. § 35.130(b)(1) (“[Public entities shall not] deny a qualified individual with a disability the opportunity to participate in or benefit from the aid, benefit, or service.”).
\end{itemize}
leaves too many states and counties free to essentially opt out of any meaningful reform. Some steps are needed to jump start reform and ensure accountability.

One option would be expanding the basic idea that is offered in the DOJ’s Project Civic Access program. The DOJ could require public entities covered by Title II to submit self-evaluations and plans, demonstrating what modifications to accessibility they have already made and what they are planning to make. Rather than focusing on selected cities, the DOJ would essentially require public entities to more formally engage in the process. There is precedent for public enforcement authorities playing this type of screening and information-gathering role. The EEOC, for example, collects disability-related information from employers in its EEO-1 surveys. AND the structure of § 5 of the Voting Rights Act involved states having to “pre-clear” changes to their voting systems with the DOJ.

The challenge would be to find the proper balance between using these reports to create opportunities for similar entities to learn from each other’s decisions and progress, yet also still vesting ultimate coercive power with the DOJ if the plans reveal deficiencies. These plans need to be public, so as to create a centralized source of knowledge from which other public entities may learn. The value of this endeavor would be compromised if the risk of litigation was so great as to discourage hon-

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298. See, e.g., Waterstone, supra note 61, at 1857–59 (describing how states exhibit “significant noncompliance” with Title II of the ADA).

299. This idea would be easy to implement. Since 2003, the DOJ’s Title II regulations have required that public entities must complete self-evaluations of their services, policies, and practices, and develop a transition plan to make any necessary modifications. See 28 C.F.R. § 35.105a. Yet the opportunity for this exercise to stimulate discussion, reform, and learning was largely lost. Though the fact that these plans had to be publicly available for three years after they were written, see id., there was no visible effort by the DOJ to use these plans as a basis for information sharing and dialogue, despite the Department’s statutory mandate to “implement” Title II. See 42 U.S.C. § 12134 (2000).

300. The EEOC has been criticized for not systematically analyzing or sharing that information. See supra note 185; see also Sturm, supra note 181, at 551.

301. See 42 U.S.C. § 1973b (1970). True, this part of the Voting Rights Act has triggered contentious federalism objections. But what I am describing for ADA purposes is far less intrusive on state sovereignty; whereas section 5 of the Voting Rights Act requires states to actively petition the federal government before they make changes (to avoid incurring legal liability), state and local governments merely have to report on what they have done and are planning to do. See id.
est reporting and good faith efforts at innovation. It would also be harmful if, based on empty promises of future reform, derelict public entities were allowed complete amnesty when no progress was being made. In striking this balance, the guideposts should be process as well as outcome oriented. In preparing these plans, are public entities involved in meaningful discussions with different constituencies, including seeking the input of the disability community? Knowing that the ADA does not require absolute and perfect access to every facet of every governmental endeavor, have the parties made appropriate choices about priorities and direction? Do all parties seem satisfied (or equally unsatisfied) with the outcome and plan?

This proposal attempts to shift the locus of control from courts deciding what is or is not “discrimination,” an undertaking for which their capacity in the Title II context has been rightly criticized as inconsistent and insufficiently flexible.³⁰² Instead, the power is ideally put in the hands of stakeholders, allowing them the space to create solutions that are meaningful and acceptable to them. The DOJ—and the courts if necessary—serve as facilitators in this process and enforcers if need be. However, like others who express trepidation at the “softness” in new governance,³⁰³ one would be loathe to abandon the ultimate coercive authority of either the private or public attorney general. Without it, flexible enforcement options start to look more like opt out provisions.³⁰⁴

The second area where new governance theory could have a helpful impact on creating change involves reasonable accommodation claims. Here, the law provides a somewhat more

³⁰² Compare Am. Ass’n of People with Disabilities v. Hood, 310 F. Supp. 2d 1226, 1236 (M.D. Fla. 2004) (holding that Florida Supervisor of Elections violated the regulations promulgated under the ADA by purchasing a voting system that was not readily accessible to people with disabilities without third-party assistance), with Am. Ass’n of People with Disabilities v. Shelley, 324 F. Supp. 2d 1120, 1126 (C.D. Cal. 2004) (“Nothing in the Americans with Disabilities Act or its Regulations reflects an intention on the part of Congress to require secret, independent voting.”).

³⁰³ See supra note 261 and accompanying text.

³⁰⁴ Within campaign finance law, for example, commentators have acknowledged some successes of the Federal Election Commission’s attempts to use new enforcement techniques, including conciliation, while noting that the Commission has maintained the ability to litigate if need be. See Bradley A. Smith & Stephen M. Hoersting, A Toothless Anaconda: Innovation, Impotence, and Overenforcement at the Federal Election Commission, 1 ELECTION L.J. 145, 146–51 (2002); see also Todd Lochner, Overdeterrence, Underdeterrence, and a (Half-Hearted) Call for a Scarlet Letter Approach to Campaign Finance Violations, 2 ELECTION L.J. 23, 25–32 (2003).
definitive backdrop. The ADA explicitly confers a positive right on individuals with disabilities to a reasonable accommodation to allow them to perform their jobs.305 But the ADA is silent on what separates a reasonable accommodation from an unreasonable one.306 The doctrinal result is a rather inconsistent set of cases where judges attempt to delineate an imprecise line,307 despite having a limited set of statutory and policy tools for doing so.308 This uncertainty is further exacerbated by the fact that most ADA cases do not even make it to the point where a judge or jury will make a pronouncement as to a requested accommodation’s reasonableness; rather, most cases are dismissed at the earlier summary judgment phase, often because a plaintiff cannot meet the statute’s definition of disability.309

This state of affairs provides insufficient guidance or norm elaboration for the vast majority of accommodation request situations that never get anywhere near the courthouse.310 This is an unsatisfying outcome, and one that fails to sufficiently tap into the law’s transformative potential. How can the positive,

305. See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(a) (2000) (defining discrimination as the failure to make “reasonable accommodations to the known physical or mental imitations of an otherwise qualified individual with a disability”).

306. See id. Congress specifically considered—and rejected—a more precise formula. See Burgdorf, supra note 85, at 518. Although this has been criticized as a weakness of the statute, see Steven B. Epstein, In Search of a Bright Line: Determining When an Employer’s Financial Hardship Becomes “Undue” Under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 48 VAND. L. REV. 390, 397 (1995), it allows for this type of norm-shifting from courts to a range of stakeholders.

307. Compare Huber v. Wal-Mart Stores, 487 F.3d 480, 484 (8th Cir. 2007) (holding that an employee with a disability must be reassigned to a vacant position as an accommodation only if the employee is the most qualified applicant for that position), with Smith v. Midland Brake, Inc., 180 F.3d 1154, 1167 (10th Cir. 1999) (holding that reassignment under the ADA results in automatically awarding a position to a qualified disabled employee regardless of whether other, better-qualified applicants are available).


309. Amy L. Albright, 2005 Employment Decisions Under the ADA Title I—Survey Update, 30 MENTAL & PHYSICAL DISABILITY L. REP. 492, 492 (showing that in 2005, in 288 out of 401 Title I cases, employers won on motions for summary judgment or to dismiss due to plaintiff employee’s failure to meet the requirements of a prima facie case of discrimination).

though imprecise guarantees in the ADA be more effectively utilized?

Under contemporary notions of class action litigation, reasonable accommodation cases are often viewed as so individualized that litigating them on a systemic basis has not proven effective.311 One answer, then, may lie in borrowing from doctrinal moves urged in sexual harassment law, and increasingly focusing on process in the reasonable accommodation context.312 Liability could be imposed on employers who do not have a fair and legitimate process for assessing the reasonableness of any requested accommodation. There is regulatory and case law support for such an approach. The EEOC’s regulations already come down strongly on the side of making the reasonable accommodation request an “interactive process,”313 and at least one circuit court has held that an employer who does not engage in the interactive process may be precluded from obtaining summary judgment on an ADA failure-to-accommodate claim.314 If a court was called to do so, it could ultimately pass judgment on the reasonableness of a requested accommodation, but placing a doctrinal premium on the process could force employers to more seriously respond to requests for accommodation.

A more administrative-type proposal would involve employers submitting reports to the EEOC detailing their reasonable accommodation practices, including past responses to re-

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311. See Stein & Waterstone, supra note 15, at 879–85 (explaining that under group-based discrimination theories, disability-based employment suits have proceeded on a largely individualized basis).

312. An employer may raise an internal antiharassment policy as a defense to a sexual harassment claim. See Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 765 (1998). Some circuits have expressed this as a presumption that an employer has exercised reasonable care to prevent and correct sexual harassment. See, e.g., Matvia v. Bald Head Island Mgmt., Inc., 259 F.3d 261, 268 (4th Cir. 2001). Finally, demonstration of good faith efforts to comply with Title VII is a defense to punitive damages. Kolstad v. Am. Dental Ass’n, 527 U.S. 526, 545 (1999).

313. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o)(3) (2007) (explaining that the interactive process should “identify the precise limitations resulting from the disability and potential reasonable accommodations that could overcome those limitations”).

quests for accommodation and procedures for handling such requests. The template for this already exists; it would essentially be a more detailed version of the EEO-1 form that large employers are already required to file with the EEOC. 315 Like the Title II discussion above, there will be an issue regarding the level of coerciveness of these reports. Should they be voluntary, with perks (like a rebuttable presumption in the employer’s favor in litigation) offered to employers that demonstrate innovative internal processes for dealing with disability at the hiring and reasonable accommodation stages (ideally arrived at with consultations with specialists like the Job Accommodation Network and/or disability community), 316 or have a demonstrated and constituent record of hiring employees with disabilities? Or should they be mandatory, with penalties or risk of litigation for deficient practices?

In any event, the focus of both the doctrinal and administrative approaches attempts to use the shadow of litigation to influence behavior outside of court in a way that stresses problem solving and bringing various stakeholders to the table. The goal is to move reasonable accommodation cases away from courts, where they tend to become zero-sum gain contests between adversaries, toward networks of employers, employees, and specialists who have the incentives to arrive at mutually agreeable ex ante solutions. In so doing, the hope would be that the conversation could be transformed from litigating highly individualized contentious cases toward efforts to create more disability-friendly workplaces. 317

315. See supra notes 185 & 300 and accompanying text.
316. The Job Accommodation Network is a free consulting service designed to “increase the employability of people with disabilities by: 1) providing individualized worksite accommodations solutions, 2) providing technical assistance regarding the ADA and other disability related legislation, and 3) educating callers about self-employment options.” Job Accommodation Network, http://www.jan.wvu.edu (last visited Nov. 5, 2007).
317. Because the number of actual employees who will even file a claim with the EEOC, let alone bring a lawsuit, is so miniscule, the hope is that this self evaluation will benefit far more employees than could ever be impacted except through the mechanism of class and systemic litigation. See Nielsen & Nelson, supra note 310, at 664–65. For alternative solutions, see Green, supra note 195, at 679 (suggesting that individual claim for harassment could trigger “diagnostic investigation into the possibility that a broader discriminatory work culture” may exist); and Stein & Waterstone, supra note 15 (offering a litigation-based system for transforming individualized claims for accommodation into larger workplace reevaluations).
CONCLUSION

It is my hope that this Article will expand the dialogue on the enforcement of civil rights and antidiscrimination laws. Rights without remedies benefit no one, and laws that are systematically underenforced create a “hollow hope” that can impede other forms of social change. The existing discussion has focused on the limits of the private attorney general to enforce civil rights laws. The importance of private enforcement cannot be disputed, and it is imperative that judicial opinions limiting the ability of the private civil rights bar to sue acting in the public interest are reversed. But until that happens, and even thereafter, public enforcement should not be let off the hook so easily. In the past, public enforcement played a more important role in the enforcement of civil rights; and it is my hope that this can happen in the future.

To that end, I have focused on what a more effective public enforcement scheme should look like. Within the context of the ADA, this will vary across contexts. The first and most important piece is a public commitment to systemic litigation. The criteria for identifying areas where this should occur are where the profit motive for plaintiffs and private attorneys is low, noncompliance appears to be systemic, there is an absence of case development, and individual plaintiffs will have standing difficulties in challenging various forms of discrimination. Within disability law, I have presented two categories of cases—failure-to-hire and physical access cases—that fit this description. Outside of disability law, there are certainly others.

New governance also provides a theoretical foundation for evaluating other types of enforcement activity. Enforcement options that stress creative individualized solutions, collaborative problem solving with a diverse range of stakeholders, and effective information strategies deserve support. There are areas within the ADA that would benefit from more diverse yet localized norm elaboration. Ultimately, however, these more flexible alternatives need to be coupled with a consistent and clear commitment to systemic public litigation. The two parts of this paper should be understood as functioning together to improve public enforcement. In this way, the ADA can take its place amongst other civil rights statutes as having created opportunity and access for a previously excluded group.