Portland Metropatterns

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Distributing the Benefits and Burdens of Growth: 
Metropolitan Equity in the Portland Region

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October 2009
Distributing the Benefits and Burdens of Growth: Metropolitan Equity in the Portland Region

Few metropolitan areas in the nation have the strong general-purpose governance structures that resemble the full-fledged metropolitan systems needed to integrate land use, transportation, housing, and environmental policy on a metropolitan scale. Portland’s Metro and the Twin Cities’ Metropolitan Council come closest. They are well known for the extensive authority they have for planning metropolitan growth and reviewing policies related to metropolitan growth patterns.

In both the Twin Cities and Portland, the presence of metropolitan multi-purpose governments with strong land use, transportation, and growth management powers has helped curb sprawl and racial segregation and has promoted job growth and fiscal equity. However, this does not mean that Portland can afford to be complacent. Recent trends in each of these policies areas provide reason for concern and in order to maintain its high standing in these areas, the region must live up to its reputation for innovation on regional initiatives.

This piece reviews the performance of the Portland area in four dimensions crucial to long-term regional equity—sprawl, segregation, job growth and fiscal equity. Comparisons are first made to the 25 largest U.S. metropolitan areas, with particular attention given to how Portland and the Twin Cities measure up. Then more recent trends in Portland are examined to highlight the areas most in need of immediate attention.

Sprawl, Segregation, Growth and Fiscal Equity in Portland, the Twin Cities, and the 25 Largest U.S. Metropolitan Areas

The harms of political fragmentation are many and related. Fragmented political systems encourage inefficient competition among local jurisdictions, a process that often leads to socially and economically undesirable policies. Cities steal malls and office parks from each other, fight tax incentive wars for auto malls, and zone out the poor for fiscal advantage in a process rife with haphazard planning and NIMBY biases. This disjointed status quo scatters new jobs like grapeshot across the metropolitan landscape, pushing metropolitan housing markets even farther afield into farmland, forest, and sensitive natural places. As a result, transit, a cleaner environment, and basic opportunity for lower income Americans become harder, not easier, to accomplish.

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2 MPOs that have been given state-mandated powers, such as Seattle, San Diego, Los Angeles, and Denver, may be evolving into multi-purpose governments, but the Twin Cities and Portland regional governments remain more powerful. See Orfield, Myron and Thomas Luce, “Governing American Metropolitan Areas: Spatial Policy and Regional Governance,” in Catherine L. Ross (ed.), Megaregions: Dissolving Spatial Boundaries, (Washington, D.C.: Island Press, 2009).
Effective metropolitan governance can help metros deal better with the harmful effects of political fragmentation. Evidence from the two metropolitan areas with the strongest metropolitan governance systems in the nation—the Twin Cities and Portland—shows that effective metropolitan institutions can produce demonstrably better metropolitan outcomes for sprawl, racial segregation, job growth, and fiscal equity. Portland in particular compares well with other large metropolitan areas in absolute terms—its sprawl, segregation and fiscal inequality measures are among the lowest and its growth rate is among the highest of the 25 largest metropolitan areas. However, more recent trends in the Portland in each of these dimensions are troubling and suggest that the region still has work to do to maintain its standing among the nation’s large metropolitan areas.

**Land-Use Planning and Sprawl**

Local government fragmentation intensifies the inter-local competition for economic activity and the tax base that goes with it. Local governments commonly try to maximize their tax bases by zoning most of their land for high-end, big residential lots, or commercial development, creating low-density settlement patterns and job sprawl. Fragmentation also enables leap-frog development by decreasing the area over which individual planning organizations hold power.

As Figure 1 clearly shows, metropolitan areas with higher levels of political fragmentation tend to sprawl more. The sprawl measure used in the chart is a ratio of growth in urbanized land between 1970 and 2000 in each metropolitan area to its population growth during the period. The comparison demonstrates that from 1970 to 2000 both Portland and the Twin Cities sprawled much less than would be expected, given their fragmentation rates. The sprawl ratios of the Twin Cities and Portland were 15 percent and 30 percent lower than expected given each region’s existing level of political fragmentation. In fact, the Twin Cities had the lowest sprawl rate among the highly fragmented metros, while Portland had the second lowest rate among the metropolitan areas with low fragmentation rates.
Two recent policies approved by regional voters have negatively affected Portland’s ability to continue its positive record on sprawl. Measure 37, approved in 2004, meant that, when a land-use regulation reduced the value of a property, the owners of the property could either be compensated for the amount of the loss or have the regulation waived. The potential impact of the measure was reduced when it was amended in 2007 by Measure 49. However, the potential long-run negative impacts are still substantial. Portland Metro’s Urban Growth Boundary (UGB) currently contains roughly 250,000 acres and Measure 37 claims outside the UGB but within the five counties in the Oregon portion of the Portland metropolitan area exceeded 125,000 acres. Although the effects of this have not fully played themselves out, it is clear that the numbers imply significant potential for greater sprawl rates in the region. Thus, although the rate of population growth actually exceeded the rate of urban land growth in the 1980s and 1990s (Figure 1), this pattern has probably not continued in the current decade and is still in jeopardy in the near future.

**Segregation**

The Twin Cities and Portland also experience much lower levels of racial segregation than one would expect given their levels of political fragmentation. Higher levels of political fragmentation in metropolitan areas are associated with greater racial segregation, measured by the dissimilarity index for white and black residents (Figure 2). (The dissimilarity index measures the percent of black residents in a region who would have to change residences in order to achieve complete integration with white students.) Figure 2 demonstrates that metropolitan land use planning in the Twin Cities and Portland clearly mitigates the degree of racial segregation resulting from local exclusionary zoning practices facilitated by political fragmentation. In fact, the dissimilarity indices for Portland and the Twin Cities were 23 percent and 16 percent lower, respectively, than expected given each region’s existing level of political fragmentation. Again, Portland performed second best among metros with low fragmentation rates while the Twin Cities had the lowest level of racial segregation among highly-fragmented metros.

![Figure 2: Fragmentation and Segregation in the 25 Largest Metropolitan Areas (Correlation = .44)](image-url)
Although Portland fares well in the comparison with the 25 largest metropolitan areas based on 2000 census data (Figure 2), recent trends in the region’s schools are troubling. In the 10 years from 1998 to 2008, the share of white students in the region’s elementary schools fell by 14 points from 79 percent to 65 percent. For the most part, this reflected an increase in Latino students from eight percent to 20 percent. Of course, by itself this trend is not troubling. What is troubling is that, at the same time, segregation was increasing. For instance, the school segregation index for white/Latino segregation (equivalent to the neighborhood index for white/black segregation shown in Figure 2) grew by more than 20 percent, from 38 to 46 during the decade.

Reflecting this increase in overall segregation, there was a rapid increase in the number of minority segregated schools in the region. In 1998, there were only 10 elementary schools in the Oregon portion of the region with more than 50 percent non-Asian minority students. In just 10 years, this number had increased to 48 schools (Maps 1 and 2). Nor is segregation limited to the central city. Two-thirds of the schools with non-white shares above 50 percent in 2008—32 of 48—are in suburban school districts. For instance, Cornelius (Forest Grove School District), W.L. Henry (Hillsboro), Vose (Beaverton), and Alder (Reynolds) elementary schools each had non-Asian minority shares above 75 percent in 2008.

This all adds up to a situation where a substantial number of schools are experiencing rapid racial transition. More than a quarter (73 out the 249) of the elementary schools in the five county area that were open in both 1998 and 2008 experienced an increase of more than 20 percentage points in the share of non-Asian minority students. Four-fifths of these schools—58 of 73—were in the suburbs. Left unchecked, these trends will very quickly result in a highly segregated system of regional schools.

One of the most serious issues associated with racial transition and racial segregation is poverty. Non-white segregated schools and schools which are in racial transition are overwhelmingly high-poverty schools. (Map 3 compared to Maps 1 and 2.) Nearly 90 percent of schools with non-Asian minority shares greater than 50 percent also had poverty rates above 50 percent. For instance, all of the suburban schools listed above (Cornelius, W.L. Henry, Vose, and Alder) had free and reduced-price lunch rates above 75 percent. Similarly, more than three-fourths of schools in rapid racial transition also had poverty rates above 50 percent.3

These trends are important because a substantial body of research shows that high-poverty segregated schools undermine opportunities for their students in many ways. The research shows that students in these schools have lower test scores, higher drop-out rates, lower college attendance rates, lower earnings later in life, and greater risk of being poor later in life.4 A large body of research also shows that integrated schools boost academic achievement, expand expectations, improve overall opportunities for students of color, and, perhaps most importantly,

3 There were 48 schools with non-Asian minority shares above 50 in 2008. Of these, free and reduced-price lunch eligibility rates were not available for four schools, 39 schools had free and reduced-price rates above 50 percent and five had rates below 50 percent. Of the 73 schools showing non-Asian minority share increases greater than 20 percent, 58 had free and reduced-price lunch rates above 50 percent.
PORTLAND REGION:
Percentage of Non-Asian Minority Elementary Students by School, 2008

Legend
Regional Value: 30.9%
- 3.0 to 13.2% (55)
- 13.3 to 18.9% (58)
- 19.0 to 30.0% (64)
- 30.9 to 37.4% (39)
- 37.5 to 49.0% (35)
- 50.0 to 87.5% (48)
- No data (3)

Note: Schools with "No data" had fewer than 25 students in 2008.

Data Source: Oregon Department of Education, National Center for Education Statistics.
PORTLAND REGION:
Percentage of Elementary Students Eligible for Free or Reduced Price Lunch by School, 2006

Legend
Regional Value: 42.6%
- 0.0 to 17.3% (55)
- 17.4 to 29.1% (58)
- 29.2 to 42.5% (64)
- 42.6 to 53.0% (39)
- 53.1 to 73.4% (35)
- 73.4 to 94.2% (46)
- No data (1)

Note: Schools with "No data" had fewer than 22 students in 2006.

Data Source: National Center for Education Statistics
reduce the achievement gap between white students and students of color. Integrated schools also generate valuable social benefits for students of all races. In particular attending integrated schools enhances the cultural competence of white students, preparing them for a more diverse workplace and society.\textsuperscript{5}

\textit{Employment Growth}

The intra-regional competition for economic activity fostered by local government fragmentation often reshuffles jobs from place to place within metropolitan areas, wasting public resources that could better be spent improving region-wide competitiveness. The competition rarely produces any significant new regional economic growth. As a result, in addition to being associated with more sprawl and segregation, political fragmentation is also associated with slower job growth in metropolitan areas (Figure 3).

Once again, the Twin Cities and Portland enjoy higher job growth rates than metropolitan areas with similar levels of political fragmentation. In the Twin Cities, employment grew at nearly double the rate expected given its level of political fragmentation—29 percent compared to 16 percent between 1990 and 2000. In Portland, jobs grew at a rate that was two thirds higher than the predicted rate given its level of fragmentation—39 percent versus 24 percent.

Although the Portland metro enjoyed significantly greater than average job growth rates during the entire period from 1990 to 2006, the region’s growth advantage deteriorated steadily during that time. Between 1990 and 1995, the area outgrew the nation as a whole by 9 percentage points—16 percent compared to 7 percent. The gap declined to 3 percentage points between 1996 and 2000—15 percent to 12 percent—and to 1 percentage point from 2000 to 2006—4 percent to 3 percent.\textsuperscript{6}

\begin{figure}
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{fragmentationEmployment.png}
\caption{Fragmentation and Employment Growth in the 25 Largest Metropolitan Areas (Correlation = -.50)}
\end{figure}

\textsuperscript{5} Ibid., p.4.
\textsuperscript{6} The calculations are based on Bureau of Labor Statistics data for total non-agricultural employment.
Fiscal Inequality

Intra-regional competition takes place on an uneven playing field where local governments with widely different fiscal capacities compete with each other. In most cases, high-capacity municipalities are the winners of intra-regional competition at the expense of low-capacity municipalities. Fragmentation deepens fiscal inequities in metropolitan areas by intensifying this dysfunctional competition among local governments, creating wider gaps between haves and have-nots. As Figure 4 demonstrates, in the largest 25 metropolitan areas more political fragmentation is associated with greater fiscal inequality (measured by the Gini coefficient for local tax base).\(^7\)

Regional policies such as tax base sharing can be used to distribute economic activity and affordable housing more efficiently across metropolitan areas and to reduce fiscal inequities. The Twin Cities uses a regional tax-base sharing program is the best example of this. The Twin Cities Fiscal Disparities Act of 1971 instituted a tax base sharing program that creates a regional pool with a portion of the region’s commercial-industrial tax base which is then redistributed to local areas. Each taxing jurisdiction contributes 40 percent of the growth of its commercial and industrial tax capacity since 1971 to the regional pool. This tax base is then shared among all local governments using a formula based on total local property tax base—larger proportions of the pool go to municipalities with lower-than-average market value per capita. The program not only reduces fiscal inequality by approximately 20 percent but it greatly reduces the incentives for local areas to participate in costly and inefficient competition for tax base.

The Twin Cities and Portland again stand out among the largest 25 metropolitan metros with their low levels of fiscal inequality. The Gini coefficient of the Twin Cities metropolitan area is 35 percent below the level predicted by its level of political fragmentation—an actual Gini coefficient of 0.17 compared to a predicted one of 0.26. Similarly, fiscal inequality in Portland was 50 percent lower than the level predicted by its level of fragmentation—an actual coefficient of 0.11 versus a predicted coefficient of 0.22.

Compared to most metros, the range of tax base per capita in the Portland area is relatively narrow and the region’s largest places, including Portland, tend to be near the regional average. However, even in this dimension, recent years have seen some erosion of the metro’s good standing. The Gini coefficient for property tax base (market value of property) per capita increased (implying greater inequality) by just over 10 percent in just 5 years between 2003 and 2008. Continuation of this pattern could very quickly erode the region’s good standing in this policy area.

\(^7\) The Gini coefficient measures the difference between the actual distribution of tax base and a perfectly equal distribution. It varies between 0 and 1, taking on a value of 0 if the distribution is perfectly equal (all jurisdictions have the same tax base per household) and 1 if the distribution if perfectly unequal (one jurisdiction with only one household has the entire tax base).
Policy Actions to Consider to Increase Regional Equity

The Portland Metropolitan area is fortunate to have a regional institution like Portland Metro already in place. As the foregoing analysis shows, there are clear benefits resulting from regional institutions like Portland Metro and the Twin Cities Metropolitan Council. Both regions compare well to their peers when it comes to dealing with sprawl, segregation, growth, and fiscal equity. However, recent trends in the Portland area in each of the policy dimensions are troubling. The region would be well-served to deal with these issues now, before its situation deteriorates to the point where remedies become prohibitively costly.

Transportation and Land-Use Planning: Portland is already well-known for its regional transportation and land-use planning. Two aspects are particularly prominent—Metro’s coordination of transportation and land-use planning and its use of the regional UGB. Each of these areas provides potentially powerful tools to promote regional equity.

Transportation and land-use are closely linked. Regional transportation decisions can dramatically affect the value and use of local land. Transportation funding decisions thus provide a powerful lever to influence local policy-making. For instance, one way to overcome local fiscal incentives against affordable housing is to link valuable transportation investments to local programs that expand housing choices. Another way to do this is to require that transit-oriented development—developments linked directly with regional transportation decisions—provide broad housing choices that reduce economic segregation. Both of these strategies create win-win situations—both regional and local interests are served.
Another well-known aspect of regional planning in the Portland area—the one for which it is best-known—is the UGB. The location of the UGB can affect land values in much the same way as transportation decisions, by affecting the economic viability, and value, of individual land parcels. As noted above, Measures 37 and 49 have undermined the power of this instrument to some extent and, perhaps more importantly, they have damaged the state consensus on land use planning. However, the UGB is still a powerful policy tool that can be used both to control sprawl and to complement actions in other policy areas. For instance, boundary expansions can be targeted to communities which actively encourage economically integrated communities through local zoning decisions or incentives for affordable housing. Similarly, participation in inter-district or multi-city programs designed to reduce segregation in schools and neighborhoods could be required of areas requesting UGB expansions.

It is also important to recognize that existing, federally funded, affordable housing programs can result either in greater opportunity for low- and moderate-income children in high opportunity areas or in increasingly concentrated poverty. The way that the region manages these housing programs—the Low-income Housing Tax Credit (LIHTC) and HUD Section 8 programs, in particular—can have substantial effects on both neighborhood and school segregation. Proactive policies that target high-opportunity parts of the region—areas accessible to job opportunities and good schools—while avoiding areas with existing poverty concentrations are needed because some federal rules in these programs have the effect of concentrating affordable housing in high-poverty areas.

An overarching regional strategy is required for these kinds of efforts to be effective. The Portland area has such a plan, described in Metro’s Housing Needs Analysis. The analysis divides the region into 22 sub-areas and analyzes housing needs through 2030 for eight household types (grouped by income, size, and age and number of children). Although ambitious, the analysis is not as proactive as it could be. Several sub-areas which already have disproportionate shares of the region’s affordable housing are projected to see their shares actually increase during the planning period. The North Portland sub-area, for instance, had 51 percent of its housing affordable to households in the two lowest-income categories and this percentage is projected to increase to 53 to 58 percent by 2030. Other sub-areas with already-existing concentrations of affordable housing are also projected to see increases, including East Portland, Forest Grove-Cornelius, and Milwaukie. At the same time, some sub-areas with very little existing affordable, like West Linn, are projected to see declines. The overall increase in concentrations of affordable housing does not appear to be substantial in the plan. However, any increase at all will exacerbate the already increasing rates of segregation in the region.

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10 Available at http://www.oregonmetro.gov/index.cfm/go/by.web/id=31389#download.
**Segregation**: Segregation in schools and neighborhoods are closely related. Segregated neighborhoods, of course, generate segregated neighborhood schools, but there is also feedback from school characteristics to neighborhoods. Potential residents, especially families with children, evaluate local schools when deciding where to live. This means that racial or social transition in schools—and the record shows that schools can change character very rapidly—can accelerate neighborhood transition. By the same token, stably integrated schools can stabilize neighborhoods. Integrated neighborhoods are much more stable in metropolitan areas with large-scale school integration programs.

This means that, to be successful, housing and school policy must be coordinated. Attempts to integrate schools while ignoring housing segregation or to integrate housing while ignoring school segregation are doomed to failure. The dynamics of racial change in neighborhoods shows this very clearly. Resegregation of once-integrated neighborhoods shows a common pattern: as a neighborhood’s non-white population share increases, it becomes more and more likely to segregate. The higher the share of non-white residents in a neighborhood, the greater is the likelihood that the neighborhood will eventually become segregated.

Figure 5 illustrates the relationship for neighborhoods in the 25 largest metropolitan areas that were black/white integrated in 1980. The figure includes three lines each corresponding to neighborhood transition status. The solid red line shows the percentage of white-black neighborhoods that remained integrated from 1980 and 2000. The blue line shows the percentage of white-black neighborhoods that became non-white segregated by 2000. Finally, the dotted line shows the white-black neighborhoods that became predominantly white by 2000.

On the horizontal axis, the figure shows the black population shares in 1980, ranging from 10 percent to 50 percent, percentages representing the lower and upper limits for a neighborhood to be classified as white/black integrated in the system used for the analysis. The solid red line crosses 50 percent at 30 percent black. This means that a white-black integrated neighborhood that was 30 percent or more black in 1980 was more likely to make the transition to one of the segregated categories than it was to remain integrated during the next 20 years. (The results are similar for other types of integrated neighborhoods.)

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11 Similar analyses of racial change in other types of neighborhoods show similar patterns. For instance, neighborhoods that were white-Hispanic integrated in 1980 were more likely to resegregate by 2000 than to remain integrated if their Hispanic share exceeded 24 percent. See Orfield, Myron and Thomas Luce *Region: Planning the Future of the Twin Cities*. (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, forthcoming in 2010), chapter 3.
In contrast, creating the same chart for the 15 metropolitan areas that had large-scale regional integration programs (region-wide or county-wide in the primary county) in schools during this period shows how region-wide school integration policies can stabilize housing patterns. In these metropolitan areas, shown in Figure 6, neighborhoods that were white-black integrated in 1980 were more likely to remain integrated during the next 20 years than to resegregate regardless of the initial racial mix. In other words, even neighborhoods that were very close to 50 percent black—the upper limit to be designated integrated in 1980—were more likely to remain integrated than to make the transition to segregated. Apparently, white households are less likely to flee racially mixed environments if they are confident that their children will continue to attend integrated schools even if the racial mix of the neighborhood changes.

12 The included metropolitan areas were Charlotte NC, Daytona Beach FL, Greensboro NC, Indianapolis IN, Lakeland FL, Las Vegas NV, Louisville KY, Nashville TN, Orlando FL, Pensacola FL, Wilmington DE, Raleigh-Durham NC, Sarasota FL, Tampa-St. Petersburg FL and West Palm Beach FL.
A variety of approaches to increase integration in schools and neighborhoods are available. A potentially effective strategy in neighborhoods is inclusionary zoning. Inclusionary zoning requires developers to build or fund a certain percentage of new homes for low-income families as a condition of receiving an approval for new development. Montgomery County, Maryland has used this technique to integrate thousands of low-income housing into new developments. Local governments should adopt voluntary inclusionary zoning requirements to be used when developers seek additional rights or variances. Inclusionary housing could also be linked to the rezoning that follows the addition of land inside the urban growth boundary.

A variety of strategies are available to promote school integration. Financial incentives can be used to encourage pro-integrative strategies within schools districts, including, for instance, pro-integrative school boundary decisions or magnet schools. Since between-district segregation is often more pronounced than intra-district patterns, inter-district strategies are also important. Choice programs targeted for low-income students or for students making pro-integrative choices are one option. Another is multi-district collaborative efforts to encourage pro-integrative inter-district transfers or to operate inter-district magnets. Viable program designs exist for these kinds of efforts.\(^\text{13}\) What is required is the will to pursue them.

**Fiscal Equity:** Portland currently relies on indirect methods—its regional transportation and planning powers—to control inter-local competition for tax base and reduce regional fiscal inequalities. A more direct means like tax-base sharing can be both more efficient and less costly. A tax-base sharing strategy can also be customized to directly support regional planning efforts. For instance, the Twin Cities model for contributions to the pool—40 percent of the growth in commercial-industrial tax base—is designed to directly reduce incentives for inefficient inter-local competition for tax base. Adding part of the market value of high-value housing to the pool—assessed value in excess of $300,000 for instance—would support regional affordable housing efforts by reducing the disincentive to accept new developments with moderate-value homes. Similarly, contributions to or distributions from the pool could be designed to encourage new development inside the UGB, rather than outside.

**Tracking Progress:** Finally, it is important to be able to evaluate whether the outlined policy initiatives are meeting their goals or not. Evaluation must be timely—on an annual basis in most cases—because it is inevitably more difficult and expensive to deal with existing problems than to avoid them in the first place. A set of accountability measures should therefore be designed to evaluate the effectiveness of Metro’s (and other agencies’) policy-making in these areas.

**Recommended accountability metrics**

- A measure of the increase in urbanized land compared to population growth inside and outside the Urban Growth Boundary to track the effectiveness and sustainability of land use policies and to evaluate the long-term impacts of Measures 37 and 49;
- Measures of segregation in regional schools and (when possible) neighborhoods, including traditional measures like dissimilarity and exposure indexes and annual school level classifications to track racial and income transition in schools;
- Job growth compared to other metros and the extent to which jobs are clustered to promote multi-modal transportation options and transit-oriented development;
- Fiscal inequality in a region measured by the Gini coefficient for local tax-bases; and
- The percentage of affordable housing in moderate- to high-opportunity communities to track the fairness of affordable housing distribution in a region.\(^\text{14}\)

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