Publication
Hamline Law Review
Volume
22
Page
703
Year
1999
Abstract
As recently as twenty years ago, the ability and desire of corporate shareholders to mount a challenge over corporate governance 4 seemed unlikely. After all, shareholders were considered to be passive, impotent, and unconcerned with anything but the value of their investment. Although shareholders of decades past were admittedly passive and powerless, today's shareholder activism is fueled largely by the institutional investor. In short, a shareholder revolution has occurred, highlighted by the ascendancy of the institutional investor. Accompanying the institutional investors' growth and concentration of share ownership is their desire and ability to participate meaningfully in governance issues. "An extraordinary ferment of activity in the field of corporate governance" has resulted.
Recommended Citation
John H. Matheson, Corporate Governance at the Millennium: The Decline of the Poison Pill Antitakeover Defense, 22 Hamline L. Rev. 703 (1999), available at https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/faculty_articles/108.
