Authorship, Audiences, and Anonymous Speech

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AUTHORSHIP, AUDIENCES, AND ANONYMOUS SPEECH

Lyrissa Barnett Lidsky*
Thomas F. Cotter†

Thence comes it that my name receives a brand,
And almost thence my nature is subdu’d
To what it works in, like the dyer’s hand.

—William Shakespeare, Sonnet 1111

INTRODUCTION

What’s in a name? Audiences often rely on author identity to reduce the search costs involved in sorting and interpreting the constant barrage of messages they receive. Yet the First Amendment, as

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1 WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, Sonnets (London 1609), in THE RIVERSIDE SHAKESPEARE 1863 (2d ed. 1997).

2 For recent discussions of authorial attribution and its relation to trademark law, see Catherine L. Fisk, Credit Where It’s Due: The Law & Norms of Attribution, 95 GEO. L.J. 49 (2006); Jane C. Ginsburg, The Author’s Name as a Trademark: A Perverse Perspective on the Moral Right of “Paternity”? 23 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 379 (2005); Laura A. Heymann, The Birth of the Authornym: Authorship, Pseudonymity, and Trademark Law, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1377 (2005); Greg Lastowka, The Trademark Function of Authorship, 85 B.U. L. REV. 1171 (2005); see also infra Part IIA (discussing the effects authorial attribution can have on the credibility of speech). In face-to-face
interpreted by the United States Supreme Court, confers upon authors a right to speak anonymously or pseudonymously, even when doing so interferes with audiences' attempts to decode their messages. In *McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Commission*, the Supreme Court emphasized the contributions anonymous speakers have made to public discourse and held that the State cannot punish citizens for pseudonymous publication of handbills concerning a ballot initiative. But this right to speak anonymously is not absolute. In *McConnell v. FEC*, the Court emphasized the dangers of anonymous speech and qualified the right to speak anonymously, though none too explicitly, by upholding a statutory provision requiring persons who purchase television advertisements advocating for or against a candidate for federal office to disclose their identities.

These decisions, and the handful of others addressing anonymous speech, provide insufficient guidance to lower courts dealing with the growing problem of malfeasance by anonymous speakers online, and with the growing threat frivolous lawsuits pose to legitimate anonymous speech. Although speech emanating from uniden-

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3 Throughout this Article, we generally use the term "anonymous" to refer to both anonymous and pseudonymous speech—that is, to speech by an author whose identity is unknown, whether or not that identity is ultimately traceable. See L. Detweiler, *Identity, Privacy, and Anonymity on the Internet* § 3.1 (1993), http://www.rewi.hu-berlin.de/jura/proj/dsi/Netze/privint.html ("anonymity is the absence of identity").


5 Id. at 341-42.


7 Id. at 128.

8 See infra note 13.

9 A *USA Today* article reports that in the last two years, "more than 50 lawsuits stemming from postings on blogs and website message boards have been filed across the nation." Laura Parker, *Courts Are Asked to Crack Down on Bloggers, Websites*, USA TODAY, Oct. 3, 2006, at A1.

10 The growth is largely attributable to the Internet, which has made anonymous speech much more common. See generally Lyrissa Barnett Lidsky, *Silencing John Doe: Defamation & Discourse in Cyberspace*, 49 DUKE L.J. 855, 860 (2000) (noting that the Internet "empowers ordinary individuals with limited financial resources to 'publish' their views on matters of public concern"). A new category of lawsuits against anony-
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11 Anonymity can also shield speakers from liability for a variety of torts, including defamation, invasion of privacy, fraud, copyright infringement, and trade secret misappropriation. A relatively “strong” right to speak anonymously therefore may induce more “core” First Amendment speech while enabling more tortfeasors to avoid detection; on the other hand, a weak or non-existent right to speak anonymously would tend to chill core speech but also render more tortfeasors amenable to legal process.

This Article aims to assist lawmakers and courts to find the proper balance between the right to speak without disclosing one’s true identity and the rights of those injured by anonymous speech. To this end, we present both a positive and a normative analysis of anonymous speech. In the positive analysis, we examine the private costs and benefits that speakers encounter when deciding whether to publish with or without attribution; among these costs and benefits are the potentially differing responses of audiences to attributed and nonattributed speech. For example, speakers may feel less vulnerable to retaliation when they speak anonymously, and thus may be more apt both to speak truthfully and to engage in tortious or harmful speech. At the same time, audiences are likely to discount the value of nonattributed speech, thus mitigating some (but not all) of anonymous speech’s potential harm. In theory, audiences could be either

mous online speakers has garnered the label “cyberSLAPP” from those who see the suits as frivolous; people who tend to view them favorably refer to the speech at issue as “cybersmears.” Compare Shaun B. Spencer, CyberSLAPP Suits and John Doe Subpoenas: Balancing Anonymity and Accountability in Cyberspace, 19 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 493, 498 (2001) (“[D]espite some valid claims, many legal experts and privacy advocates claim that companies are abusing the legal process simply to ‘out’ their online critics.”), with Thomas G. Ciarlone, Jr. & Eric W. Wiechmann, Cybersmear May Be Coming to a Web Site Near You: A Primer for Corporate Victims, 70 DEF. COUNS. J. 51, 52 (2003) (“Companies that try to curb the dissemination of misinformation are improperly cast as corporate bullies. Quite the contrary. These companies are honoring their obligation to shareholders to attend to matters that jeopardize reputation, brand name, and thus profitability.”).

11 We concede at the outset that the “marketplace” metaphor has its limitations. As Jeffrey Stake notes, however, in spite of criticism the metaphor “will likely persist as a normative framework for analyzing First Amendment issues until we find a better model.” Jeffrey Evans Stake, Are We Buyers or Hosts? A Memetic Approach to the First Amendment, 52 ALA. L. REV. 1213, 1214 (2001). And we do think that the metaphor, hackneyed and incomplete as it may be, captures some key (albeit contestable) assumptions underlying current First Amendment law. See generally infra Part III.B (discussing assumptions underlying First Amendment doctrine).

12 As we will show, when speech is completely anonymous, rational audiences can be expected to take the lack of an attributed source into consideration in assessing
better or worse off under a regime that grants strong protection to anonymous speech, as opposed to one that grants only weak protection, depending upon which effect—the production of more socially valuable speech, or the production of more harmful, though discounted, speech—predominates. Put another way, speakers’ pursuit of the optimal balance of private costs and benefits in a regime that protects anonymity may produce outcomes that diverge from the optimal balance of social costs and benefits, as viewed from the standpoint of the audience. The extent of the divergence is unclear, however, and thus the implications of the positive analysis standing alone are indeterminate.

Our normative analysis nevertheless suggests a way of resolving this indeterminacy. Traditional First Amendment theory suggests two presumptions that can assist in weighing the relevant costs and benefits of anonymous speech. The first is that the audience for “core” First Amendment speech is both educated and critical—and thus able to defend itself, in large part, from the effects of harmful anonymous speech. This presumption is not empirically based, to be sure, but it is consonant with versions of democratic theory that assume that citizens are rational and capable of self-government. The second is that more speech is, in general, better than less, and therefore that measures designed to reduce the quantity or diversity of speech are inherently suspect. To the extent the anonymity option makes otherwise reluctant speakers more willing to speak, therefore, it is presumptively a social good, despite some risk that it will induce some harmful speech as well. Taking these assumptions as touchstones, we advocate (in the context of claims involving torts such as defamation) a constitutional privilege for anonymous speech, which privilege may be overcome only when the party seeking disclosure of the speaker’s identity

the speech’s quality and truth value. On the other hand, when the speaker uses a pseudonym, audiences may not discount the value of the speech very much, perhaps because they are not aware that the author’s name is a pseudonym. But even when audiences are made aware of this fact, they may (rationally) choose not to discount pseudonymous speech as much as anonymous speech, on the assumption that the pseudonymous author’s identity is known to what Saul Levmore refers to as a “responsible intermediary.” See Saul Levmore, The Anonymity Tool, 144 U. Pa. L. Rev. 2191, 2202 (1996). Audiences might also discount pseudonymous speech less because pseudonyms sometimes serve a trademark-like function of signaling a degree of quality control. See Heymann, supra note 2, at 1419; Lastowka, supra note 2, at 1194.

13 The Supreme Court has been willing to indulge more paternalistic assumptions about the audience in the context of commercial speech. Consumer protection is an accepted rationale for regulating commercial speech. See, e.g., Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 554 (2001) (noting that commercial speech may be regulated to ensure that it is not false and misleading).
presents sufficient evidence from which the trier of fact may conclude that the speaker has committed the tort at issue, and that disclosure of that person’s identity is essential to the alleged victim’s case. Laws requiring disclosure in the context of political speech, on the other hand, should be (if anything) even more difficult to justify; in the context of commercial speech, however, the assumption of a rational, critical audience may give way to more paternalistic assumptions and thus make it relatively easy for the state to compel disclosure.

Part I inspects the unstable foundation upon which the Supreme Court has grounded the right to speak anonymously in cases such as McIntyre and McConnell. Part II presents the positive analysis of the private and public costs and benefits of anonymous speech referred to above. Among other things, this Part makes use of concepts from the law of intellectual property (particularly trademarks and copyright) to illuminate some recurring problems surrounding the publication of anonymous speech. Part III makes the case that our two presumptions, of rational audiences and more-is-better, are firmly grounded in conventional First Amendment jurisprudence. Part IV employs the positive and normative analyses of anonymous speech to provide guidance to legislatures attempting to curb anonymous speech (particularly anonymous speech online) and to courts adjudicating cases that present conflicts between the right to speak anonymously and other important interests.

I. THE MANY FACES OF ANONYMITY

The Supreme Court has held that the First Amendment protects anonymous speech, but the scope of that protection is murky. The two main decisions, McIntyre and McConnell, rely on conflicting assumptions about how audiences respond to anonymous or pseudonymous speech and, ultimately, conflicting assumptions about its value. The Court’s jurisprudence has thus generated conflicting approaches to balancing such speech against other important rights.

A. McIntyre and the Contributions of Anonymous Speech

The leading Supreme Court case on anonymous speech is McIntyre.14 Margaret McIntyre wrote handbills opposing a school tax refer-
endum and then handed them out to people attending public meetings to discuss the tax. She omitted her name from some of the handbills, instead signing them: "CONCERNED PARENTS AND TAX PAYERS [sic]."15 Responding to a complaint from a school official, the Ohio Elections Commission fined McIntyre $100 for violating an Ohio law forbidding distribution of any publication promoting a ballot issue unless it contained the "name and residence" of the person "who issues, makes, or is responsible therefor[.]"16 McIntyre appealed, and the Ohio Supreme Court held that the Ohio law did not violate the First Amendment, since the minor burden on speakers posed by the law was more than offset by the state interest in helping voters assess the "validity" of campaign literature and "identify[ing] those who engage in fraud, libel or false advertising."17 The Supreme Court struck down the Ohio law on a 7-2 vote, with Justice Scalia and Chief Justice Rehnquist dissenting. The Court held that "an author's decision to remain anonymous, like other decisions concerning omissions or additions to the content of a publication, is an aspect of the freedom of speech protected by the First Amendment."18

The Court rested its decision on two grounds. The first ground was instrumental: Protecting anonymity is necessary to induce some authors to contribute valuable information to the marketplace of ideas. The Court lauded the contributions anonymous and pseudonymous authors have made to the "progress of mankind,"19 citing political examples such as the *Federalist Papers* and literary examples such as

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15 *McIntyre*, 514 U.S. at 337.
16 Id. at 338 & n.3.
17 Id. at 340.
18 Id. at 342; see Lee Tien, *Who's Afraid of Anonymous Speech?* McIntyre and the Internet, 75 OR. L. REV. 117, 120 (1996) (arguing that the Court treated "anonymity as the speaker's rightful choice" in *McIntyre*).
19 *McIntyre*, 514 U.S. at 341. In his concurrence, Justice Thomas cited historical examples to show that the Framers believed in protecting anonymous speech. *Id.* at 370 (Thomas, J., concurring). He concluded: "[W]hether certain types of expression have 'value' today has little significance; what is important is whether the Framers in 1791 believed anonymous speech sufficiently valuable to deserve the protection of the Bill of Rights." *Id.*
Mark Twain and George Eliot. The Court’s opinion focused on benign reasons motivating speakers to remain anonymous: fear of retaliation or reprisal, the desire to avoid social ostracism, the wish to protect privacy, or the fear that the audience’s biases will distort the meaning of the work. The Court grandiloquently concluded that “[a]nonymity is a shield from the tyranny of the majority” without which public discourse would certainly suffer.

The Court’s second ground for protecting anonymous speech was authorial autonomy. An author’s decision to remain anonymous is an exercise of autonomy over choice of content, and “an author generally is free to decide whether or not to disclose his or her true identity.” The Court labeled identification requirements “intrusive” because they require authors to reveal “the content of [their] thoughts on a controversial issue.” In essence, the Court treated the decision to remain anonymous as an editorial judgment like any other, which makes choosing to omit one’s name no different than choosing to omit an opposing viewpoint or to include serial commas.

Once the Court equated the author’s name with all other editorial content, the outcome of McIntyre was clear. If an author’s name is “content,” it logically follows that the statute in McIntyre was a content-based regulation. The statute required particular content (i.e., the author’s name) to be included in an author’s work. Moreover, the statute’s application was triggered only by publications that dealt with particular subjects (ballot issues or candidates). Ultimately, however, Ohio’s content-based disclosure requirement was unconstitutional only because it regulated speech at “the core of the protection afforded by the First Amendment.” Handbills that seek to influence “issue-based elections” are “political speech” entitled to every bit as much First Amendment protection as speech advocating the election

20 Id. at 341 n.4 (majority opinion).
21 Id. at 341-42. The Court further noted that the right may be particularly important for “persecuted groups” who criticize oppressive practices. Id. at 342.
22 Id. at 342 n.5.
23 Id. at 357. Indeed, the Court concluded that protection of anonymity is therefore consistent with the “purpose behind the Bill of Rights, and of the First Amendment in particular: to protect unpopular individuals from retaliation—and their ideas from suppression—at the hand of an intolerant society.” Id.
24 Id. at 341.
25 Id. at 355.
26 Id. at 338 n.3 (citing OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3599.09(A) (West 1988) (amended and recodified at § 3517.20 in 1995)).
28 McIntyre, 514 U.S. at 345-46.
of a candidate.\footnote{Id. at 347.} Indeed, the Court asserted that “[n]o form of speech is entitled to greater constitutional protection than Mrs. McIntyre’s.”\footnote{Id.}

A content-based regulation of core political speech almost never survives strict scrutiny, and the regulation in McIntyre was no exception. The Court rejected Ohio’s assertions that the regulation was necessary to “provid[e] the electorate with relevant information” and to prevent fraud and libel.\footnote{Id. at 348.} The Court saw no reason to think that McIntyre’s handbill was misleading, essentially glossing over the implication that others supported the arguments made in the handbill.\footnote{Id. at 337.} Moreover, the Court did not think that McIntyre’s name was likely to be useful to the electorate in evaluating her message, noting that the name of the author of a “handbill written by a private citizen who is not known to the recipient” is likely to “add little, if anything, to the reader’s ability to evaluate the document’s message.”\footnote{Id. at 348–49.} The mere possibility that an author’s name might, in some cases, “buttress or undermine the argument in a document” was insufficient.\footnote{Id. at 348.} The Court also rejected as insufficient Ohio’s second asserted interest—the “ancillary benefit” of deterring and detecting fraud and libel.\footnote{Id. at 350–51.} Although the Court believed that this interest “carries special weight during election campaigns,” it found that the interest could be protected effectively through direct prohibitions on fraud and libel.\footnote{Id. at 349–50.}

Despite the Court’s praise of anonymous speech throughout McIntyre, the opinion acknowledges that First Amendment protection is not absolute.\footnote{See id. at 358 (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (suggesting that the State may “in other, larger circumstances require the speaker to disclose its interest by disclosing its identity”).} The Court envisions a balancing process to ensure that speakers remain accountable for fraud, libel, or other unlawful acts. Indeed, dictum in McIntyre suggests several types of identification requirements that might survive constitutional scrutiny.\footnote{Id. at 351.} These include requirements applicable “only to the activities of candidates

\footnote{Id. at 351. Justice Scalia notes, correctly, that the Court’s indication that a “more limited identification requirement” might be upheld is inconsistent with its application of “exact scrutiny” in McIntyre. Id. at 380–81 (Scalia, J., dissenting).}
and their organized supporters," requirements applicable only to "elections of public officers," and requirements applicable only to "leaflets distributed on the eve of an election." Although the Court never fully explains this dictum, one possible explanation is that the right to speak anonymously is qualified precisely because anonymity sometimes deprives the audience of information that has significant communicative value. The Court's decision acknowledges that an author's identity, as content, contributes to the communicative impact of her work. As the Court notes, in the realm of political rhetoric a speaker's identity "is an important component of many attempts to persuade." The Court also concedes that author identity helps "critics in evaluating the quality and significance of the writing." But this concession suggests that an author's name may be even more important than other types of "content," and stripping an author's identity from a work may deprive the audience of an important clue to unlocking its meaning.

Why are the interests in protecting speaker autonomy and increasing contributions to the marketplace of ideas enough to justify, in the name of the First Amendment, depriving speakers of information that might be needed to correctly interpret a work? Author identity, the Court asserts, is not "indispensable" to the interpretation of a work. The Court reaches this conclusion based on its theory regarding audience response to anonymous speech. Toward the end of the McIntyre opinion, the Court posits that the "inherent worth of the speech in terms of its capacity for informing the public does not depend upon the identity of its source." However, this conclusion rests on the assumption that the audience will use other clues of qual-

39 Id. at 351 (majority opinion).
40 Id.
41 Id. at 352.
42 Robert C. Post, The Constitutional Concept of Public Discourse: Outrageous Opinion, Democratic Deliberation, and Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 103 Harv. L. Rev. 601, 640 (1990) ("In most circumstances we attend as carefully to the social status of a speaker, and to the social context of her words, as we do to the bare content of her communication.").
43 McIntyre, 514 U.S. at 343 (quoting City of Ladue v. Gilleo, 512 U.S. 43, 56 (1994)).
44 Id. at 342 n.5; see also id. at 348 n.11 (noting that a source's identity is "helpful in evaluating ideas" (quoting New York v. Duryea, 351 N.Y.S.2d 978, 996 (Sup. Ct. 1974))).
45 Id. at 342 n.5.
46 Id. at 353 (quoting First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 777 (1978)).
ity and significance to play the role that might in some cases be played by author identity.

The Court's explanation of the process by which the audience "interprets" author anonymity is oblique. As noted above, the Court suggests that the identity of an author unknown to the audience would add few clues to the meaning of the text. Yet even where an author's identity would be helpful to an audience, the Court believes that the audience is skilled enough to interpret most messages without it. The Court quotes with approval the following statement from *New York v. Duryea*:

"Don't underestimate the common man. People are intelligent enough to evaluate the source of an anonymous writing. . . . They can see it is anonymous. They can evaluate its anonymity along with its message, as long as they are permitted, as they must be, to read that message. And then, once they have done so, it is for them to decide what is 'responsible,' what is valuable, and what is truth."

The quote makes several contestable assumptions about the audience of anonymous speech. Crucially, it presumes the existence of an audience united by common values and habits of interpretation. But the audience for anonymous speech is essentially a construct. The Court did not consult poll data or experts before deciding that Margaret McIntyre's handbill would not mislead or fool the voters who received it. Instead, the Court simply stated that "[t]here is no suggestion that the text of [McIntyre's] message was false, misleading, or libelous," even though the fact that it was signed "Concerned Parents and Taxpayers" might well lead one to assume that numerous citizens had joined in the handbill. What the Court seems to be suggesting is that anyone who read McIntyre's message critically would not be misled—taking into account the facts that the author was unknown, that anyone could adopt the label "Concerned Parents and Taxpayers," and that the text had grammatical errors, an unsophisticated graphic design, and a clear bias on a controversial local political issue.

Thus the *McIntyre* Court appears to be imputing, in the name of the First Amendment, certain qualities to the audience of anonymous speech. Ostensibly this audience is composed of common men, who can exercise common sense to give the proper weight to anonymous speech. The "common man" in the audience presumably will use the tone and style of the text, the context in which it appears, and the persuasiveness of its arguments in deciding "what is 'responsible,'

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47 351 N.Y.S.2d 978.
48 *McIntyre*, 514 U.S. at 348 n.11 (quoting *Duryea*, 351 N.Y.S.2d at 996).
49 *Id.* at 337.
what is valuable, and what is truth.\textsuperscript{50} The Court portrays this as simply an instance of the marketplace of ideas determining the value of ideas\textsuperscript{51} and demands no empirical evidence about how any particular audience member would interpret anonymous speech.

The Court’s theory of audience response to anonymous speech is a critical underpinning of the \textit{McIntyre} decision, but the Court never spells out the full implications of the theory. The Court implicitly acknowledges that audiences cannot always gauge the value of anonymous speech; as a result, both individual audience members and reasoned discourse as a whole may be harmed. Moreover, the Court recognizes that anonymity should not shield abusive speakers from accountability, and that the right to speak anonymously may be outweighed by other important rights. But the Court gives little guidance about how to calibrate the balance.\textsuperscript{52} Instead, the Court merely expresses faith in the audience’s ability to discount anonymous speech, reducing (but not eliminating) any potential harm that might flow from it.

\textbf{B. McConnell and the Dangers of Anonymous Speech}

The Court’s faith in the critical faculties of the audience for anonymous speech appeared to waver in \textit{McConnell}.\textsuperscript{53} \textit{McConnell} addressed the constitutionality of several provisions of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 (BCRA),\textsuperscript{54} and, in the process, clouded the status of the constitutional right to speak anonymously.\textsuperscript{55} The BCRA’s main purpose was to close loopholes in existing campaign finance regulations, especially the “soft money” loophole in the Fed-

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{50} \textit{Id.} at 349 n.11.
  \item \textsuperscript{51} Justice Scalia’s dissent, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist, argued that the Ohio law “forbids the expression of no idea, but merely requires identification of the speaker when the idea is uttered in the electoral context.” \textit{Id.} at 378 (Scalia, J., dissenting). The dissent further argued that in the absence of evidence that the Framers intended the First Amendment to protect anonymous speech, the Court should defer to the “long-accepted practices” of the states in regulating the electoral process. \textit{Id.}
  \item \textsuperscript{52} \textit{See id.} at 381 (“It may take decades to work out the shape of this newly expanded right-to-speak-incognito, even in the elections field.”).
  \item \textsuperscript{53} \textit{540 U.S. 93, 126-28, 193-97 (2003)}.
  \item \textsuperscript{54} \textit{Pub. L. No. 107-155, 116 Stat. 81} (codified primarily in scattered sections of 2 and 47 U.S.C.). The Act is also commonly referred to as the McCain-Feingold Act.
  \item \textsuperscript{55} \textit{See, e.g., Richard M. Cardillo, Note, I Am Publius, and I Approve This Message: The Baffling and Conflicted State of Anonymous Pamphleteering Post-McConnell, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1929, 1941 (2005) (detailing the confusion \textit{McConnell} created in lower courts).}
\end{itemize}
eral Election Campaign Act (FECA). However, the BCRA also imposed various disclosure requirements whose effect was to limit certain types of anonymous political speech during election campaigns. Largely ignoring McIntyre, the Supreme Court upheld most of these disclosure requirements, often relying on paternalistic assumptions about the imagined audience at which this anonymous campaign speech would be targeted.

A bit of background is necessary to understand the BCRA's disclosure requirements. In 1971, the FECA began requiring sponsors of political ads expressly advocating election or defeat of a candidate to disclose their names to the Federal Election Commission (FEC). The FEC construed the disclosure provision to apply only when an election ad contained "'magic words' such as 'Elect John Smith' or 'Vote Against Jane Doe.'" The FECA did not require sponsors of "issue ads" to disclose their identities. Issue ads do not expressly advocate election or defeat of a candidate. Not only were issue ads exempt from the disclosure requirements of the FECA; they were also exempt from provisions that capped the source and amount of funds that could be spent on express advocacy. This meant that anyone who wanted to sponsor an ad advocating for or against a candidate could avoid the FECA's disclosure and spending limitations as long as the sponsor was clever enough to avoid using the "magic words." As a result, issue ads meant to influence elections proliferated.

One of the chief goals of the BCRA was to curb perceived abuses that flowed from the FECA's deferential treatment of issue ads. To achieve this goal, the BCRA broadened the FECA's disclosure require-

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56 McConnell, 540 U.S. at 123. The FECA limits the amount of contributions made to influence federal election campaigns ("hard money" contributions); these limits, however, do not apply to contributions of "nonfederal money"—also known as "soft money"—to political parties for activities intended to influence state or local elections. Id. (citing 2 U.S.C. § 431(8)(A)(i) (2000)).
59 McConnell, 540 U.S. at 126 (citing Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 80 (1976)).
60 Id.
61 Id.
62 Id. at 121–22. Express advocacy must be financed with "hard money," that is, "funds that are subject to the Act's disclosure requirements and source and amount limitations." Id. at 122. Prior to the BCRA, "issue ads" could be financed with "soft money," that is, funds not subject to the FECA's limitations. Id. at 122–26.
63 Id. at 126.
64 Id. at 127–28.
65 Id. at 194.
ments to apply to a new category of ads known as "electioneering communications." Electioneering communications are "broadcast, cable, or satellite communication[s]" that refer to a candidate for federal office in the sixty days prior to the general election or the thirty days prior to the primary. The BCRA subjected this new category of electioneering communications to "significant disclosure requirements." Justices Stevens and O'Connor upheld the electioneering provisions in a decision joined by Justices Breyer, Ginsburg, and Souter. The McConnell majority revealed a relatively hostile attitude toward anonymous political speech. To begin with, the McConnell majority agreed that the proliferation of issue ads during election campaigns was a problem and implied that this was at least in part because the ads were often anonymous. For example, the Court noted that sponsors of "so-called issue ads . . . often used misleading names to conceal their identity." As this sentence suggests, the Court questioned both the motives of those who sponsor issue ads and the contribution they make to public debate. The objectionable ads were not "true issue ad[s]" because their sponsors sought to support or defeat a candidate, albeit without using the "magic words" denoting express advocacy; presumably a true issue ad would address a public controversy without connecting it in any way to particular candidates. Even though the deception would have been readily obvious to potential voters, the Court denigrated the motives of the sponsors because they were attempting to disguise their objective: to support or defeat a particular candidate.

Furthermore, the Court denigrated the motives of the sponsors precisely because they often chose to remain anonymous. The Court criticized them as attempting to "hide themselves from the scrutiny of the voting public," and accepted the argument that this would impair the public's ability "to make informed choices in the political market-

66 2 U.S.C.A. § 434(f)(3)(A)(i) (West Supp. IV 2004). They also must be targeted to an audience of at least 50,000 viewers or listeners within the relevant electorate. This definition of electioneering communications, which appears in section 201 of the BCRA, amends section 304 of the FECA.
67 McConnell, 540 U.S. at 190. The BCRA also limits the funding of electioneering communications by corporations and unions. Id.
68 Id. at 114–224 (Justices Stevens and O'Connor delivered the opinion of the Court with respect to BCRA Titles I and II, in which Justices Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer joined).
69 Id. at 126–29.
70 Id. at 128 (emphasis added).
71 Id. at 193.
72 Id. at 126.
place.”

What is it about these kinds of anonymous ads that would impair the public’s ability to make informed political choices? The Court endorsed the notion that the ads were “dubious and misleading” because the pseudonyms under which they were aired suggested a broad base of support for their views. As an example, the Court cited “‘Republicans for Clean Air,’ which ran ads in the 2000 Republican Presidential primary, [and] was actually an organization consisting of just two individuals.” One might quibble that this is little different than Margaret McIntyre calling herself “Concerned Parents and Taxpayers,” which the Court deemed not to be misleading. Certainly the nature of the chosen pseudonym is not much different here than it was in McIntyre.

Why should the voting public be smart enough to see through Margaret McIntyre’s attempt to give her message more weight but not smart enough to see through the same tactic when used by “Republicans for Clean Air”? Moreover, whatever happened to the argument that the choice to remain anonymous is just like any other editorial choice an author might make? The McConnell Court gave no deference to this editorial choice when it noted that many “mysterious groups” ran issue ads under “misleading names” to increase the ads’ effectiveness. No longer was this a choice of content like any other, but was instead just a dirty campaign trick.

The Court’s hostile assumptions about both the motives behind and the importance of anonymous political ads led it to conclude that the BCRA’s various disclosure requirements were constitutional. The Court’s scrutiny of BCRA section 201 illustrates some of these assumptions. Section 201 amended the FECA to require anyone who dis-

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73 Id. at 197.
74 Id. (citing the district court’s per curiam opinion with approval).
75 Id. at 128.
76 See supra Part I.A.
77 McConnell, 540 U.S. at 128 n.23. Admittedly, the Court was also concerned that these issue ads were being used by candidates and political parties to circumvent FECA limitations. Id. at 129.
79 These same assumptions are mirrored in the Court’s treatment of section 504 of the BCRA. Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 § 504, 47 U.S.C. § 315(e)(1) (Supp. IV 2004). Section 504 directly affects the right to speak anonymously. Id. Section 504 amends the Communications Act of 1934 to require broadcasters to keep public records of all requests to purchase broadcast time “made by or on behalf of a legally qualified candidate for public office.” Id. More sweepingly, the disclosure provision also applies to purchasers of broadcast time to “communicate[] a message relating to any political matter of national importance.” Id. (emphasis added). In essence, section 504 contains three disclosure requirements: (1) the candidate request
burses, or makes a contract to disburse, $10,000 dollars or more per
calendar year on electioneering communications to file a statement
with the FEC. This statement must identify, among other things, all
those who contributed $1000 or more to the disbursement. Although
the Court recognized that this disclosure requirement might, as
applied, interfere with the First Amendment right of association, it
gave no apparent weight to the potential for interference with anony-
mous political speech. Indeed, the Court concluded that section
201’s disclosure requirements “d[o] not prevent anyone from speak-
ing.” The Court found the requirement was amply supported by
three “important state interests,” namely, “providing the electorate
with information, deterring actual corruption and avoiding any
appearance thereof, and gathering the data necessary to enforce
more substantive electioneering restrictions.”

The Court’s reliance on the “informational rationale” is troubl-
ing. An author’s name will almost always provide relevant informa-

requirement, which affects requests “made by or on behalf of” candidates for public
office; (2) the election message requirement, which affects requests to broadcast
information referring to a “legally qualified candidate” or to any election to Federal
office; and (3) the issue request requirement, which affects requests that refer to any
“national legislative issue of public importance,” or any “political matter of national
importance.” Id. The Court concluded that the section 504 provision was facially
constitutional under “any potentially applicable First Amendment standard, including
that of heightened scrutiny.” See McConnell, 540 U.S. at 245. The Court’s opinion
focused primarily on the burden the regulation placed on broadcasters, rather than
the burden it placed on would-be anonymous speakers. See id. at 359 (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting) (citing examples from the majority opinion to argue that “[t]he Court
approaches § 504 almost exclusively from the perspective of the broadcast licensees”).
The Court reasoned that section 504’s burdens are similar to those already imposed
on broadcasters by Federal Communications Commission regulations. Id. at 245
(majority opinion). Essentially ignoring the rights of the would-be anonymous speak-
ers, the Court refused to apply exacting scrutiny to the disclosure requirement. Id. at
curiam) (allowing an “as-applied” challenge to the disclosure provisions by a self-pro-
claimed “grassroots lobbying organization” to go forward).

81 McConnell, 540 U.S. at 197-98.
82 Id. at 201 (alterations in original) (quoting McConnell v. FEC, 251 F. Supp. 2d
176, 241 (D.D.C. 2003)).
83 Id. at 196.
84 Raleigh Levine notes the Court’s growing reliance on the informational ration-
ale in the electoral context: “[T]he Court remains committed to the long-ingrained
national conception that the electorate should consist of informed, intelligent voters,
and . . . the Court has become increasingly concerned that voters may not exercise
their right to vote in the manner that the Court prefers.” Raleigh Hannah Levine,
The (Un)Informed Electorate: Insights into the Supreme Court’s Electoral Speech Cases, 54 CASE
tion to the audience, and if that interest alone is sufficient to overcome the right to speak anonymously, the right has little meaning. Moreover, as Justice Thomas noted in his dissent, the McIntyre Court explicitly rejected the notion that the "simple interest in providing voters with additional relevant information...justif[ied] a state requirement that a writer make statements or disclosures she would otherwise omit." Certainly the interest in providing information to the audience would not justify requiring authors to make other types of content additions. A political ad might be more informative if it were broadcast in black and white and its message was read somberly by an announcer, but a statute attempting to require this would certainly be struck down as an interference with political speech. Nor, one suspects, would the government be constitutionally justified if it were to require all books to include an index, even if this would make them more informative.

The McConnell Court did not rely solely on the informational rationale in upholding section 201's disclosure requirements, however, and for that reason it is possible to make a credible argument distinguishing McConnell from McIntyre. In McConnell, the Justices in the majority gave great weight to the argument that the disclosure requirements were necessary to deter corruption and prevent circumvention of other campaign finance regulations. The campaign regulation in McIntyre affected anonymous speech in support of a ballot referendum, i.e., advertising on behalf of an issue. By contrast, the regulations in McConnell affected advertising by supporters of a candidate, creating a danger that the candidate, if elected, would "repay" his supporters with favorable legislation. Thus, the anticorruption rationale and anticircumvention rationales are arguably stronger in

W. RES. L. REV. 225, 243 (2003). Levine notes that historically the interest in insuring informed voters helped justify literacy tests. Id. at 239–40.


86 McConnell, 540 U.S. at 276 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (quoting McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n, 514 U.S. 334, 348 (1995)); see also Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 218 (1966) (striking down a law used to "punish a newspaper editor" for "publishing an editorial on election day" and rejecting the argument that the statute was a reasonable means of protecting the public "from confus[ive] [sic] last-minute charges and countercharges"); Tien, supra note 18, at 155 (stating that the identity of Margaret McIntyre would have provided very little information to her audience and thus "[t]here [wa]s no victim in McIntyre. Thus, the Court could wax poetic about the virtues of anonymous speech because the only victim would be discourse itself.").

87 McConnell, 540 U.S. at 143–44 (majority opinion).
McConnell than McIntyre. Even so, the Ohio law at issue in McIntyre was not justified solely by an interest in providing voters more information; Ohio had also invoked its interest in preventing fraud and libel, but the Court rejected this as inadequate to justify infringing the right to speak anonymously.\(^8\)

The McConnell Court not only gave more weight to the state interest in preventing corruption than the McIntyre Court; it also tacitly assumed that advertising on behalf of a candidate makes less of a contribution to public debate than advertising purely to advance an issue. As Justice Kennedy pointed out, however, the distinction the Court attempted to draw is rather arbitrary.\(^9\) Often the reason one supports a candidate is precisely because of his views on policy issues. Nonetheless, the potential for corruption is indeed greater, and it must be remembered that the disclosure requirements were part of a much larger program of campaign finance reform designed to decrease the influence of “big money” on the political system.\(^9\) Even so, the McIntyre Court explicitly rejected the argument McConnell seems to adopt, namely, that the Ohio law regulated merely the electoral process rather than pure speech.\(^9\)

Two additional features distinguish McConnell from McIntyre. First, McConnell dealt with broadcasting rather than print media. In the broadcast context, the First Amendment right of “viewers and listeners” to receive information sometimes trumps broadcasters’ First Amendment right to exercise editorial discretion.\(^9\) Broadcasters are subject to extensive government regulation to ensure that they pre-

\(^8\) McIntyre, 514 U.S. at 348–52.
\(^9\) McConnell, 540 U.S. at 291 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
\(^9\) Id. at 115 (majority opinion). In Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 66–67 (1976), the Court stated that “disclosure provides the electorate with information ‘as to where political campaign money comes from and how it is spent by the candidate’ in order to aid the voters in evaluating those who seek federal office” (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 92-564, at 4 (1971)).
\(^9\) McIntyre, 514 U.S. at 345.
\(^9\) Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969). The Supreme Court has even upheld a limited right of access to the broadcast medium on behalf of candidates for federal office; this limited right of access “makes a significant contribution to freedom of expression by enhancing the ability of candidates to present, and the public to receive, information necessary for the effective operation of the democratic process.” CBS, Inc. v. FCC, 453 U.S. 367, 396 (1981) (upholding the FCC’s interpretation of the Communications Act, 47 U.S.C. § 312(a) (7) (Supp. IV 2004), which requires broadcast licensees to give federal candidates “reasonable access” to the airwaves). This right of access would be clearly unconstitutional if applied to the print media. See Miami Herald Pub. Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 256 (1974).
sent conflicting views on issues of public importance. More to the point, federal law has long required broadcasters to provide the public with adequate information about candidates for federal office and to keep records of candidate requests for broadcast time. The BCRA, according to the Court, merely expanded these existing obligations. Moreover, the McConnell majority explicitly contemplated that the audience for "documents" might be different than the audience for broadcasts and refused to address the constitutionality of regulation of broadcast anonymous speech.

Second, the speakers affected by the disclosure requirements in McConnell were primarily corporate entities or unions. While the Supreme Court has generally held that corporations have the same speech rights as individuals, its decisions in the context of election campaigns have treated corporations and other organizations differently than individual speakers. McConnell, on one reading, simply applies the logic of prior "corporate electoral speech" decisions in finding a compelling interest in limiting "the corrosive and distorting effects of immense aggregations of wealth that are accumulated with the help of the corporate form and that have little or no correlation to the public’s support for the corporation’s political ideas." In other words, corporations and unions should not be allowed to exercise "undue influence" on the electoral process, and their speech may be

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93 See McConnell, 540 U.S. at 239 (citing 47 C.F.R. § 73.1910 (2002)).
94 See, e.g., 47 U.S.C. § 315(a) (2000) (requiring broadcasters that give time to one candidate to provide an "equal opportunity" to other candidates for the same office); id. § 315(b) (Supp. III 2003) (providing that broadcasters must allow candidates to purchase ads at their "lowest unit charge"); id. § 315(e) (imposing, even prior to passage of the BCRA, disclosure requirements regarding "candidate requests" to purchase time).
95 According to the Court, these expanded disclosure obligations were not unduly burdensome on broadcasters, McConnell, 540 U.S. at 242, and they had the virtue of helping "the public evaluate broadcasting fairness." Id. at 239.
96 See id. at 245.
99 McConnell, 540 U.S. at 258.
100 Id. at 205 (quoting Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 660 (1990)).
regulated lest it drown out the speech of individual citizens and impair their ability to choose their representatives.

Even if McConnell and McIntyre are technically distinguishable, they have a deep theoretical inconsistency. The McConnell Court’s assumptions about both the value of anonymous speech and the ability of the audience to properly interpret it differed markedly from the assumptions in McIntyre. The McConnell majority seems hostile to anonymous or pseudonymous speech in the election context. The McConnell opinion rests on paternalistic notions about the abilities of voters; as opponents of campaign finance reform have argued, even the assumption that “money influences outcomes paternalistically implies that voters cannot sift through various information to make decisions.”

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C. Why Anonymity Matters Now

This theoretical inconsistency makes the two decisions unstable guides for the new challenges presented by anonymous speech on the Internet. McConnell and McIntyre both involved anonymous speech in the physical world, where the ability to be truly anonymous is limited. By contrast, the architecture of the Internet makes it easy to speak anonymously, or at least pseudonymously. As a result, there

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102 As communications theorist Ian Ang has observed, the social construction of an “audience” is a mechanism of exercising power over that audience. Ian Ang, Desperately Seeking the Audience 7 (1991). Yet the “audience” itself remains “an imaginary entity, an abstraction constructed from the vantage point of [an] institution[].” Id. at 2. Ang observes: “[M]asses are illusory totalities: there are no masses, ‘only ways of seeing people as masses.’” Id. (quoting Raymond Williams, Culture and Society 289 (1961)).

103 This inconsistency is not unique to the anonymous speech issue, and occasionally the Supreme Court will explicitly lay out its paternalistic assumptions about the audience. See, e.g., Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 64 (1973) (stating that the First Amendment does not prevent states from having laws that regulate what issuers of securities “may write or publish about their wares” because “[s]uch laws are to protect the weak, the uninformed, the unsuspecting, and the gullible from the exercise of their own volition”).

104 Catherine Crump, Note, Data Retention: Privacy, Anonymity, and Accountability Online, 56 Stan. L. Rev. 191, 217 (2003) (contending that the “architecture of real space” curbs “this unaccountable form of speech” and that “anonymity is substantially easier to achieve on the Internet”).
are more anonymous speakers than ever before using the freedom anonymity provides for both good and bad purposes. Certainly Internet anonymity has made public discussion more "uninhibited, robust, and wide-open" than ever before, but at the same time it has magnified the number of speakers abusing the right to speak anonymously.

From a legal standpoint, anonymity issues come in a variety of guises. One of the most common types of cases involves a pseudonymous speaker who uses the Internet to criticize a powerful corporation, institution, or public figure. The targets of the criticism retaliate by suing the speaker for defamation, disclosure of trade secrets, or some other allegedly tortious act. Typically, the plaintiff initiates suit against "John Doe," perhaps identifying him by screen name, and then subpoenas John Doe's Internet service provider (ISP) to disclose his true identity. Some plaintiffs pursue "John Doe" suits as their only available remedy against harmful anonymous speech; other plaintiffs bring "John Doe" suits to discover who their critics are so they can retaliate against them and silence other critics. If plaintiffs can obtain the identity of an anonymous speaker with nothing more than an unfounded allegation of defamation, the right to speak anonymously is meaningless. On the other hand, anonymity cannot be a complete shield for tortious speech. Thus, courts are struggling to craft standards to distinguish “cyberSLAPPs” from legitimate tort claims before compelling defendants to disclose their identities.

Another prominent anonymity issue has involved attempts by the Recording Industry Association of America (RIAA) to track down online copyright infringers. After several courts concluded that the RIAA could not use the subpoena provisions of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA) to force ISPs to reveal the identities of ISP subscribers whom the RIAA suspected had engaged in online copyright infringement, the RIAA began resorting to the "John Doe"

106 For further discussion, see generally Lidsky, supra note 10 (discussing attempts to silence anonymous speakers on the Internet).
107 Id. at 889.
108 The term "SLAPP" stands for strategic lawsuits against public participation. See George W. Pring, SLAPPs: Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation, 7 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 3, 3 (1989). A SLAPP is a lawsuit, typically brought as a defamation action, aimed at silencing legitimate speech on matters of public concern. Id.
109 See infra Part IV.B.
110 Specifically, three courts have concluded that the Copyright Act § 512(h), Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2877, 2883 (codified at 17 U.S.C. § 512(h)), does not authorize the clerk of the court to subpoena an ISP that acts merely as a conduit for the
procedure in these types of cases as well. The RIAA reportedly has succeeded in compelling ISPs to reveal the identities of several thousand users. In one of the leading cases, Sony Music Entertainment Inc. v. Does 1–40, Judge Chin concluded that, although file sharing is not 'political expression' entitled to the 'broadest protection' of the First Amendment, it is "entitled to 'some level of First Amendment protection.'" Nevertheless, he found the plaintiff was entitled to discovery of the alleged file sharers' identities, based upon (1) a sufficiently "concrete showing of a prima facie claim of actionable harm," including "supporting evidence listing the copyrighted song transmission of allegedly infringing materials by third parties, but rather only when, inter alia, the ISP can remove or disable access to allegedly infringing material. See In re Charter Commc'n's, Inc., 393 F.3d 771, 776–78 (8th Cir. 2005); Recording Indus. Ass'n of Am. v. Verizon Internet Servs., Inc., 351 F.3d 1229, 1233–36 (D.C. Cir. 2003); In re Subpoena to Univ. of N.C., 367 F. Supp. 2d 945, 950–56 (M.D.N.C. 2005); see also 17 U.S.C. § 512(h)(2)(A) (2000) (incorporating by reference 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(3)(A)). The dissenting judge in Charter Communications and the district court in Verizon concluded that § 512(h) does apply with respect to ISPs that function merely as conduits. See Charter Commc'n's, 393 F.3d at 779–83 (Murphy, J., dissenting); In re Verizon Internet Servs., Inc., 240 F. Supp. 2d 24, 29–39 (D.D.C. 2003), rev'd, 351 F.3d 1229 (D.C. Cir. 2003). Judge Murphy also rejected arguments that § 512(h) unconstitutionally burdens the right of subscribers to remain anonymous, reasoning that subscribers who anonymously transmit copyrighted materials over the Internet are not engaging in protected expression. See Charter Commc'n's, 393 F.3d at 785–86 (Murphy, J., dissenting). Judge Bates concluded that, although "there is some level of First Amendment protection that should be afforded to anonymous expression on the Internet," that "protection is minimal where alleged copyright infringement is the expression at issue," and in any event, the DMCA provides sufficient safeguards insofar as it requires copyright owners to, among other things, plead a prima facie case of infringement. See In re Verizon Internet Servs., Inc., 257 F. Supp. 2d 244, 258–64 (D.D.C. 2003), rev'd on other grounds, 351 F.3d 1229 (D.C. Cir. 2003). In a follow-up article, we hope to discuss the constitutional dimensions of anonymous speech specifically as it relates to the DMCA procedures.


See Morea, supra note 111, at 205–06; Piasentin, supra note 111, at 201–02; Sag, supra note 111, at 135.

Id. at 563 (quoting McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334, 346 (1994)).

Id. at 563 (quoting Verizon, 257 F. Supp. 2d at 260).

Id. at 564.
downloaded or distributed” and the dates and times of the acts alleged;\textsuperscript{117} (2) the “specificity of the discovery request”; (3) the “absence of alternative means” of discovering the users’ identities;\textsuperscript{118} (4) the centrality of the need for this information; and (5) in light of the terms of the users’ ISP service agreement, their lack of a reasonable expectation of privacy with respect to the downloading and distribution of copyrighted works.\textsuperscript{119}

These two categories of online anonymity cases have garnered the lion’s share of scholarly attention, but anonymity issues arise in other contexts as well. Congress and the states are attempting to combat spammers who hide behind anonymity to overwhelm targeted computer servers with millions of e-mails.\textsuperscript{120} The Securities and Exchange Commission is working desperately to combat securities fraud committed by anonymous speakers.\textsuperscript{121} More troublingly, federal and state legislators are passing laws to curb anonymous speech online. A new federal law makes it a crime for a speaker to use the Internet to “annoy” someone unless the speaker reveals his or her true identity.\textsuperscript{122} A New Jersey bill, if passed, will require any “public forum Web site” to collect the names and addresses of everyone who posts to the site.\textsuperscript{123} And there are calls for further regulation. John Siegenthaler, a journalist and former assistant to Attorney General Robert Kennedy, criticized Congress for enabling and protecting “vol-

\textsuperscript{117} Id. at 565.
\textsuperscript{118} Id. at 564.
\textsuperscript{120} For a brief discussion of spam regulation, see Andrea M. Matwyshyn, Material Vulnerabilities: Data Privacy, Corporate Information Security, and Securities Regulation, 3 BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 129, 158–59 (2005).
\textsuperscript{122} The provision comes from section 113 of the Violence Against Women and Department of Justice Reauthorization Act of 2005, 47 U.S.C.A. § 223 (West 2001 & Supp. 2006). The section is entitled “Preventing Cyberstalking,” and it provides that whoever utilizes “any device or software that can be used to originate telecommunications or other types of communications that are transmitted, in whole or in part, by the Internet,” \textit{id.} § 223(h)(1)(C), “without disclosing his identity and with intent to annoy, abuse, threaten, or harass any person . . . who receives the communications . . . shall be fined under title 18 or imprisoned not more than two years, or both.” \textit{id.} § 223(a).
\textsuperscript{123} See Assemb. 1327, 212th Leg., 1st Sess. (N.J. 2006), available at: http://www.njleg.state.nj.us/2006/Bills/A1500/1327_l2.PDF.
unteer vandals with poison-pen intellects" after he was defamed by an anonymous speaker on Wikipedia.124 Siegenthaler criticized Congress both for immunizing Internet service providers from tort liability based on content posted by their users and for failing to force service providers to help uncover the identity of anonymous defamers. Whatever the merits of Siegenthaler’s arguments, it seems clear that legal issues concerning online anonymity will continue to arise, and when they do, courts and legislators can expect only limited guidance from McConnell and McIntyre.

II. A Positive Analysis of Anonymous Speech

Neither McIntyre nor McConnell appears to recognize the true complexity of anonymous speech. Speakers may use the shield of anonymity for a variety of purposes, only some of which may be consistent with the public good; at the same time, audiences may not accord anonymous speech as much value as attributed speech, which in turn may affect speakers’ decisions whether to publish anonymously in the first place. In this Part, we attempt to catalogue the costs and benefits of anonymous speech, both to speaker and audience, as well as the strategic considerations that are likely to impact both speaker and audience behavior. We will then suggest in Parts III and IV a method for normatively weighing these costs and benefits so as to arrive at concrete policy recommendations.

A. The Informational Value of Authorial Identity

We begin our positive analysis by noting a curious fact about anonymous speech: Anonymous speech persists despite the fact that it is, on average, less valuable than nonanonymous speech to speech consumers (audiences) who often use speaker identity as an indication of a work’s likely truthfulness, artistic value, or intellectual merit. Without attribution, audiences must necessarily rely upon other indicia, which can be less reliable than speaker identity. In this regard, attribution serves a function analogous to that of a trademark used in connection with a product or service, whereas anonymous speech is like a generic or nontrademarked product: Consumers must work harder, sometimes considerably harder, before they can draw reliable conclusions about the qualities of the product itself.125

125 See Fisk, supra note 2, at 62–64, 74; Heymann, supra note 2, at 1378; Lastowka, supra note 2, at 1179; see also Mark Rose, Authors and Owners 1–2 (1993) (observ-
To illustrate, suppose that you encounter an anonymous pamphlet attributing some moral failing to the President of the United States. Depending on how well or how poorly the allegations mesh with your background beliefs and assumptions about the President's character, you assign some implicit probability to the veracity of the allegations. You will also look to other indicia to gauge the truth of the allegation, e.g., the professional quality of the pamphlet, whether it contains misspellings and grammatical errors, and the like. Suppose that, on the basis of all this evidence, you conclude that the probability that the allegations are true is 50%. Now suppose that, in addition to the other indicia of truth or falsity, you know the speaker's identity. First assume the speaker is someone whose integrity you know to be impeccable: George, the modern-day equivalent of Parson.
Weems's "I cannot tell a lie" George Washington. Given this new piece of information, you would change your probability-of-truth estimate from 50% to, say, 90%. (Changing it to 100% might be taking things too far; it is possible, after all, that George, though honest, is mistaken.) Alternatively, assume you know the speaker to be Cretan, a pathological liar. Armed with this information, you would alter your probability estimate downward, say to 10%. A third possibility is that knowledge of the speaker's identity would provide you with no useful information at all; the speaker is unknown to you, and his credibility is not important enough for you to investigate further. On these facts, knowledge of the speaker's identity does not change your \textit{ex ante} probability estimate of 50%. Reflection therefore suggests that knowledge of the speaker's identity does not always matter to you; but that in some nontrivial class of cases, \textit{not} knowing the author's identity could mislead you into either over- or underestimating the statement's truth value. We must also consider that the speaker is aware that disclosing his identity might discount the credibility of his message. So once again, consider the three possible speaker-types: one speaker whose identity, if revealed, would cause you to revise your


128 Although none of the works of the ancient Cretan philosopher Epimenides survive, the so-called Epimenides Paradox that is attributed to him consists of the statement "All Cretans are liars." Technically, the Paradox dissolves unless Epimenides is the only member of the set of Cretans. See Raymond M. Smullyan, \textit{What Is the Name of This Book?} 214–15 (1978). A cleaner version of the paradox is the sentence "'I am now lying.'" See id. at 215.

129 Bayes's Theorem can be used to revise an initial probability estimate on the basis of additional observations. See Michael O. Finkelstein & Bruce Levin, \textit{Statistics for Lawyers} 75–77 (2d ed. 2001). To illustrate, suppose that your initial estimate is that statement $S$ has a 50% chance of being true and a 50% chance of being false. Suppose further that there are five possible speakers, Alice, Bill, Claire, Dan, and Edna; that four of the five (Alice through Dan) always speak the truth; and that the remaining possible speaker, Edna, tells the truth 75% of the time. On these assumptions, we can analyze the problem as follows:

\begin{align*}
P(X) &= \text{ex ante probability that } S \text{ is true } = .50 \\
P(X\cdot E) &= \text{probability that } S \text{ is true, given that Edna is the speaker } = \text{to be determined} \\
P(E\cdot X) &= \text{probability that Edna is the speaker, given that } S \text{ is true } = .15 \\
P(\text{NOT-X}) &= \text{ex ante probability that } S \text{ is not true } = .50 \\
P(E\cdot \text{NOT-X}) &= \text{probability that Edna is the speaker, given that } X \text{ is not true } = 1
\end{align*}
probability-of-truth estimate upward; a second whose identity, if revealed, would cause you to reduce that probability; and a third the revelation of whose identity would have no effect. The first speaker clearly has a motive to reveal his identity, because in doing so he enhances the likelihood that his message will be believed. The fact that the actual speaker has chosen not to reveal therefore suggests either that (1) the actual speaker is not, in fact, the first (truthful) speaker; or (2) the speaker has other reasons, such as fear of retaliation, to keep his identity secret (more on this below).130 By contrast, the speaker with the reputation for dishonesty or poor quality work has an obvious motive to keep her identity a secret, because in doing so she may increase the likelihood that people will believe her statement or overrate her work product. (Of course, she, like the well-reputed speaker, may have other reasons to keep her identity a secret.) As for the third possible speaker, whose identity means nothing to you, presumably the revelation of his identity would influence some readers—those who, unlike you, are familiar with him—either to believe or disbelieve his statement, but you have no way of knowing which effect would predominate. In the abstract, therefore, it is diffi-

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Bayes's Theorem states that:

\[
P(X|E) = \frac{P(E|X)P(X)}{P(E|X)P(X) + P(E|NOT-X)P(NOT-X)}
\]

\[
= \frac{(.15)(.5)}{(.15)(.5) + (1)(.5)}
\]

\[
= .130
\]

Thus, knowing that Edna is the speaker decreases one's probability of truth estimate from .5 to .13. Knowing that one of the other possible speakers was the actual speaker would, of course, increase the probability estimate to 1.0. Alternatively, suppose that there is one chance in a million (.000001) that Edna is the speaker, given that S is true, and two chances in a million (.000002) that Edna is the speaker, given that X is not true. Applying Bayes's Theorem reduces the probability of truth estimate from .5 to 1/3.

Note also that a reader who knows that a work is anonymous rationally will take the lack of an attributed source into consideration in evaluating the work's probable truth or quality. If the work provides some clues as to the speaker's reasons for publishing anonymously, the reader may be able to assess whether the speaker is more likely to fall into the "George" or the "Cretan" category. See infra Part II.B for discussion of the reasons, good and bad, for publishing anonymously. But the reader may be uncertain how to interpret the clues, or may err in interpreting those clues. Alternatively, if the reader is unable to discern or presume whether "good" or "bad" reasons for publishing anonymously predominate, the rational inference is to accord anonymity no weight at all. Either way, there is a risk that the reader will over- or underestimate the work's truth or quality, absent source attribution.

130 See infra notes 160–78 and accompanying text.
cult to tell whether you should accord the statement less weight than
you otherwise might, simply by virtue of its being anonymous; one
rational strategy might be to consider, on the basis of textual or other
evidence, precisely why the speaker at issue may have chosen anonym-
ity. In the following subpart, we will consider in greater depth what
these reasons for remaining anonymous might be; first, however, we
respond to some possible objections to our approach thus far.

The first objection to our equation of anonymous speech with
nontrademarked products is that, as Laura Heymann points out,
trademark law permits the underlying producer of a good to remain
anonymous: As long as a mark conveys the message that the product
emanates from a unique source, it is irrelevant that consumers know
the identity of that source. Relatively few beer drinkers may care,
for example, that a firm known as The Boston Beer Company, Inc.
produces the beer bearing the trademark “Samuel Adams”; the trade-
mark is all they need to know to obtain a beer of predictable quality.
Similarly, readers of detective novels may not be very interested in
learning that the original name of the author who wrote under the
pen name “Ed McBain” was Salvatore Lombino; his pseudonym,
like a trademark, conveys useful information even while his true iden-
tity remains unknown to most readers. A trademark might therefore
be more analogous to an author’s pseudonym than to his true iden-
tity. His true identity would in turn be more like a company’s “trade
name,” that is, the name under which the source company does busi-
ness, which need not be identical with its trademark. This objec-
tion is not fatal to our analysis, however. Presumably, knowledge of an
author’s true identity (or of a producer’s trade name) in addition to
the author’s pseudonym (or a product’s trademark) provides addi-
tional value to some consumers, even if most are indifferent. Literary
critics might be interested in learning more about the man behind
the McBain pseudonym, after all, even if fans are not; similarly, busi-
ness analysts, regulators, and home brewers might be more interested

131 See supra note 129.
132 See Heymann, supra note 2, at 1381, 1414.
133 See Marilyn Stasio, Evan Hunter, Writer Who as Ed McBain Created Police Procedu-
135 Donald W. Foster, Commentary, In the Name of the Author, 33 New Literary Hist. 375, 375 (2002). To be sure, different schools of criticism manifest differing
levels of interest, or disinterest, in the details of the author’s life and circumstances. See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, Law and Literature 218-23 (1998) (distinguishing New
Critics from intentionalists). We contend nevertheless that knowledge of these details is of some use in interpreting a work, even though reasonable minds might accord
them differing weight.
than the average drinker in learning about the company behind Samuel Adams beer.\textsuperscript{136}

A second possible objection to the identity-trademark analogy is that there is likely to be a much greater difference in quality among an author’s various works than among goods marketed under the same trademark. Consumers rightly expect every bottle of Coca-Cola to taste the same; but one might not expect every book by the same author to be precisely the same in terms of aesthetic merit, accuracy, or insight. In response to this argument, we would analogize a new book by an existing, well regarded author to a new product bearing an existing, well regarded trademark or brand. For example, when Coca-Cola or Samuel Adams or any other firm markets a new product under the so-called “family” or “house” mark,\textsuperscript{137} consumers are likely to draw some inferences about the quality of the new product based upon their familiarity with the old. A consumer who has come to trust Coca-Cola as the licensor of quality beverages is rational when she expects a new Coca-Cola sponsored product to meet similar quality standards, despite some possibility that her expectations will be disappointed. Knowing that the product is approved by Coca-Cola enables the consumer to draw a rational \textit{ex ante} inference that she would be unable to draw if the product were generic. Similarly, knowledge of a well regarded author’s identity does not provide a guarantee that a new work will meet the author’s previous quality standards, but it does increase the Bayesian probability that the work will meet those standards.\textsuperscript{138} The benefit to the reader is not absolute, but it is not trivial either.\textsuperscript{139}

\textsuperscript{136} Fortunately, the source of a trademarked product is almost never anonymous in any strong sense. Many companies’ trade names are the same as their trademarks (e.g., Coca-Cola, Microsoft, BMW), in which case the source is not anonymous at all. Moreover, state legislation often requires “registration of assumed or fictitious names under which individuals or commercial entities conduct business” so as “to assist others in identifying the owners of the businesses with whom they deal.” \textsc{Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition § 12 cmt. c.} Federal and state regulations also often require identifying information of the manufacturer to appear on or in connection with the products sold. See, e.g., 16 C.F.R. § 1500.121 (2006) (requiring that hazardous substances be labeled with the manufacturer’s information); 21 C.F.R. § 201.1(a) (2006) (requiring that drug labeling include the manufacturer’s information). Trademark registrations are public records, and thus enable interested persons to discover who owns a registered mark. See 15 U.S.C. § 1062(a) (2000); see also Levmore, \textit{supra} note 12, at 2206 n.21 (noting postal regulation).

\textsuperscript{137} See 1 J. Thomas McCarthy, \textsc{McCarthy on Trademarks and Unfair Competition} § 7:5 (4th ed. 2006) (discussing house marks); 3 McCarthy, \textit{supra}, § 23:61 (discussing families of marks).

\textsuperscript{138} See \textit{supra} note 129.

\textsuperscript{139} See Heymann, \textit{supra} note 2, at 1416 & n.128.
Two other objections go not so much to the fit between authorial identity and trademarks as to the rationality of relying upon either as a proxy for quality. For surely sometimes trademarks do not provide much useful information about product quality, and the same can be said about attributed speech as well. Economists recognize that trademarks are relatively more useful for distinguishing among so-called “experience” goods, that is, goods whose qualities are not easy to evaluate prior to purchase, and relatively less valuable for distinguishing among “search” goods which consumers can evaluate in advance of purchase on the basis of observable characteristics. In our hypothetical above, the taste of a soft drink is clearly an experience good, but other products (say, fresh fruits and vegetables) are largely search goods, whose color, shape, and firmness (though often not taste) can be evaluated in advance. Not surprisingly, trademarks play a less prominent role in the market for fresh produce than in the markets for some other goods, but they are not entirely absent either; different grocery store chains may distinguish themselves on the basis of their produce, and companies such as Harry & David do market themselves as purveyors of quality fruit. In any event, most goods manifest at least some experience characteristics, even if they also exhibit some search qualities as well; clothing, perfume, and automobiles can all be sampled before purchase, but qualities such as durability often remain experience characteristics. Speech shares this dual character. To be sure, some poems, jokes, or works of music (for example) may tend more toward the “search” end of the spectrum, in that one can quickly sample and evaluate them without needing to know anything about their source. But even simple works may be better appreciated if one knows something about the author, the context in which she wrote, her likely influences, and so on; all the more so for more complex works. And it is often not the case that one can adequately sample a work prior to purchase or consumption, in which case knowing something about the author can provide useful information upon


141 Disney also has a trial program in some markets where it is testing a strategy of branding up-market produce using a Disney character sticker. See Jenny Wiggins, Disney Develops a Taste for Fresh Fruit, FIN. TIMES, June 8, 2006, at 1.

142 Forgeries, for example, once exposed as such, typically lose whatever critical acclaim they previously enjoyed, even though the physical attributes of the work remain the same. See William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The Economic Structure of Intellectual Property Law 255-56 (2003) (discussing some possible reasons for this phenomenon); Lastowka, supra note 2, at 1181.
which to decide whether to purchase or consume.\textsuperscript{143} As with other goods and services, attribution may not always provide much informational value, but this is not to say that it never does or that it typically does not.

Similarly, one might contest the usefulness of both trademarks and authorial identity by noting that consumers sometimes overvalue brand-name goods—and, presumably, brand-name authors, too. But it hardly follows that the use of brand names is a net cost to society rather than a net benefit. Granted, consumers occasionally pay more for a product bearing a famous mark than for a lesser-known product that functions equally well; consider, for example, consumers who continue to purchase brand-name drugs even after bioequivalent generics come on the market.\textsuperscript{144} But even this behavior may be rational. Some consumers may believe, for example, that the maker of a brand-name drug will invest more in quality control than the maker of a generic equivalent.\textsuperscript{145} Perhaps it is equally rational to assume that some “brand-name” expressive works will embody small, but potentially important, quality advantages over their lesser-known and superficially fungible competitors. Other times, consumers may prefer brand-name goods because of the consumptive value of the brand name itself. People who wear designer jeans and drive Porsches may do so in order to communicate a message about their tastes, status, and income that they might not be able to communicate as effectively without these products.\textsuperscript{146} Perhaps we also sometimes convey messages about our taste or status based upon our choice of which authors we credit or admire. It would be at least marginally more difficult to convey such messages if anonymous authorship were the norm.

That said, it is nevertheless quite plausible that reliance upon authorial reputation as a proxy for quality or truth or status sometimes

\textsuperscript{143} See LANDES & POSNER, supra note 142, at 117 n.51 (suggesting that books are an “intermediate case” between search and experience goods, insofar as one can examine a book before buying it, but the process is time-consuming and “there are too many books to be able to sample them in this way”); Richard A. Posner, The Future of the Student-Edited Law Review, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1131, 1133–34 (1995) (noting that an author’s reputation functions as a proxy for article quality, in much the same way that trademarks signal product quality).

\textsuperscript{144} See Roger D. Blair & Thomas F. Cotter, Are Settlements of Patent Disputes Illegal Per Se?, 47 ANTITRUST BULL. 491, 500–01 (2002) (noting that the price of brand-name drugs sometimes goes up when generics enter the market, due to the brand loyalty and price insensitivity of some portion of consumers).

\textsuperscript{145} See LANDES & POSNER, supra note 142, at 195.

\textsuperscript{146} See id. at 208–09; Alex Kozinski, Trademarks Unplugged, 68 N.Y.U. L. REV. 960, 969–70 (1993).
results in our according certain works more credence or esteem than they deserve—or in paying insufficient attention to lesser-known authors’ works. But the fact that attribution may enable biased decisionmaking does not mean that it always does so, or that audiences can never foresee and take precautions against their biases. For example, some scholarly journals require anonymous submissions; many institutions, including law schools and bar examiners, typically require students taking examinations to use a code number so that graders will not be able to discern the identities of students being graded; and auditions for symphony orchestras typically are conducted so that judges cannot discover the identity of performers until the audition is completed. Perhaps more such measures would be desirable to combat bias or otherwise force audiences to consider a work or performance on the basis of its inherent characteristics, but again, this hardly suggests that the social costs of attribution routinely outweigh the social benefits.

Finally, most of what we have said about anonymous speech applies to pseudonymous speech as well, though with a few additional twists. A problem unique to pseudonymous speech is that audiences may be unaware that a pen name is merely a pseudonym that masks the author’s true identity, and thus may not discount the value of the speech appropriately. Even so, there are two countervailing effects that arguably tend to make pseudonymous speech more reliable on average than completely anonymous speech. One is that pseudonymous speech is often published through the intermediation of a publisher who is likely to know the speaker’s identity. The publisher is, in a sense, vouching for the speaker’s credibility. Of course, the same may also be true of some anonymous speech; it may be anonymous to the public but not the publisher. The other effect is that pseudonyms actually can function something like trademarks, as both Hey-
mann and Lastowka demonstrate. To the extent the speaker has reputational capital invested in his pseudonym, that investment creates an incentive for the speaker to continue to produce work of predictable quality. The author's incentive to maximize the value of his authorial trademark may counteract much of the potential for abuse that is inherent in pseudonymous speech.

B. The Private Benefits of Anonymity

If attribution generally is something that speech consumers find valuable, it is reasonable to ask why authors who seek public acclaim for their ideas and expression would ever choose to publish anonymously. We have alluded to some possible reasons above, but in this subpart provide a more comprehensive list of the reasons that authors may derive private value from withholding their identities. First, the author may derive some internal, noninstrumental satisfaction from speaking without attribution; we refer to this as the "Intrinsic Rationale" for anonymity. Second, the author may be concerned about the private costs that she, or others whose welfare matters to her, may incur if she speaks truthfully—if she presents her artistic vision without flinching—but without the shield of anonymity. We refer to this as the "Wrongful Retaliation" rationale. Third, the author may be concerned about the private costs that could flow from speaking falsely without the shield of anonymity; we refer to this as the "Justifiable Retaliation" rationale. Fourth, the author may wish to conceal her identity in order to derive some collateral benefit that would be more costly to obtain were her identity revealed. We refer to this as the "Collateral Benefits" rationale. Fifth, the author may be someone who is perceived to be untruthful or the purveyor of low-quality work, but who is in fact telling the truth or producing high-quality work and wants her message to be taken seriously. We refer to this as the "Boy Who Cried Wolf" rationale.

1. The Intrinsic Rationale

Anonymous speech is sometimes said to promote individual autonomy and self-fulfillment by enabling individuals to explore...
new ideas, new means of expression, and even new identities. Thus, one reason for some authors to publish anonymously is that they derive internal satisfaction from not having their true identity revealed. An author may even believe that by publishing anonymously she is making a political or artistic statement. This rationale may underlie the Supreme Court’s characterization of Margaret McIntyre’s decision to publish anonymously as an integral part of her freedom to choose the content of her speech. As such, the interest is akin to one of the "moral rights" that many nations accord to authors on the theory that the author’s infusion of her unique personality into her artistic creations entitles her, as a matter of natural law, to a substantial degree of autonomy with respect to how those creations are presented to the public. In these countries, the author is viewed as having an inalienable right to attribution, which right embraces a subsidiary right to be properly attributed as the author of that which she

154 Jerry Kang, Cyber-Race, 113 HARV. L. REV. 1130, 1131 (2000) (noting that the Internet, with its custom of anonymous and pseudonymous speech, "alters the architecture of both identity presentation . . . and social interaction").

155 Tien, supra note 18, at 120 ("[A]nonymity is more than concealing authorial identity; speech is discursive interaction, and anonymity is useful for constituting individual and group identity in interaction.").

156 For example, a British graffiti artist "Banksy," who has remained pseudonymous "'so I can do my work without being impeded by arrest,'" has gained international recognition. Paul Vallely, Banksy: The Joker, INDEPENDENT, Sept. 23, 2006, at 48, available at http://news.independent.co.uk/people/profiles/article1705576.ece; see also Anne Ferry, Anonymity: The Literary History of a Word, 33 NEW LITERARY HIST. 193, 197 (2002) (noting that in the nineteenth century, "[t]he desire of poets to escape over-personal interpretations of their poems" spurred them to publish anonymously); Foster, supra note 135, at 391 (citing the example of Yehiel Feiner, who wrote about the Holocaust under a pseudonym that translates as "Prisoner," because he "[r]efuse[d] the right to valorize his individual experience" and "spoke as the invisible man, for one and all" who were killed at Auschwitz); Heymann, supra note 2, at 1401–06 (discussing the use of authoronyms for political or social reasons); Lastowka, supra note 2, at 1222–27 (discussing the use of ghost writers as an example of the value of authorial "licensing"). Yet another possibility is that the author believes that anonymity is the more virtuous choice. Religious or ethical traditions may bestow greater esteem upon anonymous contributions to charities, for example. See Levmore, supra note 12, at 2196 n.5. A less exalted motivation for anonymous contributions is that the donor may be less likely to be solicited for other worthy causes. Id.; see also Fisk, supra note 2, at 87–88 (noting that some employers prefer that employees’ authorship of software remain anonymous, so as to reduce the risk of other potential employers luring those employees away).


has created, a right not to be attributed as the author of that which she has not created, and a right to publish anonymously or under a pseudonym.\footnote{159} Although the United States has never fully embraced the concept of moral rights as it is understood in some (mostly European) countries,\footnote{160} our anonymous speech cases appear to recognize something similar to a moral right to speak anonymously—though, as noted above, they leave unresolved the question of how much weight to accord this interest when it comes into conflict with other social interests.

2. Wrongful Retaliation

A second reason for speaking anonymously is that the author is concerned about the potentially negative personal consequences of

\footnote{159} See id. at 12. Of course, the author may have both intrinsic and instrumental reasons for wishing to publish anonymously or under an assumed name. Note also that these rights are not absolute, even in countries with robust moral rights traditions. See Michael B. Gunlicks, A Balance of Interests: The Concordance of Copyright Law and Moral Rights in the Worldwide Economy, 11 FORDHAM INT’L. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 601, 624-25 (2001) (citing ADOLF DIETZ, DAS DROIT MORAL DES URHEBERS IM NEUEN FRANZÖSISCHEN UND DEUTSCHEN URHEBERRECHT 121 (1968)) (noting that German law, unlike French law, requires adherence to an express contractual duty for an author to remain anonymous, with exceptions allowed if the author must prove his authorship or if the work enjoys unforeseeable success).

\footnote{160} The U.S. has incorporated some aspects of moral rights protection into its copyright and unfair competition laws over the past generation, however. See Cotter, supra note 158, at 15-27. In 1990, for example, Congress amended the Copyright Act to include a new Visual Artists Rights Act (VARA). See Pub. L. No. 101-650, §§ 601-610, 104 Stat. 5089, 5128-33 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 17 U.S.C.). VARA confers upon the authors of qualifying “works of visual art,” see 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2000) (definition of “work of visual art”), a right of attribution, see id. §§ 106A(a)(1)-(2), but it does not explicitly endow authors with a right to publish anonymously or pseudonymously. See 2 WILLIAM F. PATRY, COPYRIGHT LAW AND PRACTICE 1037 n.88 (1994). Nevertheless, U.S. copyright law has permitted the registration of anonymous and pseudonymous works for close to 100 years, see Act of Mar. 4, 1909, Pub. L. No. 60-349, ch. 320, § 23, 35 Stat. 1075, 1082 (repealed 1976) (stating that the copyright term ran for twenty-eight years from the date of publication, whether the work bore the author’s true name or was published anonymously or pseudonymously), though prior to 1909 the copyright status of anonymous works was precarious. See STENOGRAPHIC REPORT OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE FIRST SESSION OF THE CONFERENCE ON COPYRIGHT (May 31–June 2, 1905), reprinted in 1 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE 1909 COPYRIGHT ACT pt. C, at i, 40 (E. Fulton Brylawski & Abe Goldman eds., 1976) (containing the statement of Register of Copyrights Thorvald Solberg that, as of 1905, an author who wished to obtain federal copyright protection and to remain anonymous had to arrange for another to file the registration as copyright proprietor); 1 PATRY, supra, at 20 (stating that some early state copyright laws declined to extend protection to anonymous or pseudonymous works).
speaking truthfully and with attribution. This interest may be implicated in a number of recurring situations. One common example is the whistleblower who reports on corporate or government wrongdoing despite some risk of incurring retaliation.\footnote{For discussion of the piecemeal nature of whistleblower protection laws, see Daniel P. Westman & Nancy M. Modesitt, Whistleblowing 67-75 (2d ed. 2004).} Similarly, police informants may prefer to remain anonymous to avoid harms to themselves, their families, or to other informants whose identities might be compromised. Employees who publish writings that displease their employers risk being fired,\footnote{Government employees have First Amendment rights when speaking “as citizens on matters of public concern,” but not when speaking “pursuant to their official duties.” See Garcetti v. Ceballos, 126 S. Ct. 1951, 1959-60 (2006). The First Amendment protects both the autonomy interest of the employee when speaking as a citizen, and the public interest in receiving information. See id. at 1959. (“[W]idespread costs may arise when dialogue is repressed.”); City of San Diego v. Roe, 543 U.S. 77, 82 (2004) (per curiam) (stating that the public has an “interest in receiving informed opinion” (emphasis added)).} and people who speak out against corporate policies risk becoming SLAPP targets.\footnote{See Pring, supra note 108, at 6-9 (summarizing a U.S. study on the existence, causes, and effects of SLAPPs). While many state legislatures have enacted “anti-SLAPP” legislation in the past fifteen years, Lauren McBrayer, The DirecTV Cases: Applying Anti-SLAPP Laws to Copyright Protection Cease-and-Desist Letters, 20 Berkeley Tech. L.J. 603, 609-11 (2005), companies are now merely shifting their strategies, and in some cases are using anti-SLAPP legislation itself as a sword. See id. at 607.} The nuisance of having to defend oneself from such a suit, even if the suit proves unsuccessful on the merits, creates an incentive for would-be critics to voice their opinions anonymously.\footnote{Alternatively, the speaker may fear retaliation that is lawful but questionable for policy reasons. To cite one example, W. Mark Felt might have been subject to prosecution had his role as “Deep Throat” been revealed at the time of the Watergate scandal. See 18 U.S.C. § 641 (2000) (criminalizing the theft, conveyance or disposal of public records or things of value). If Felt had exposed such information today, he could also be prosecuted under the Privacy Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552a (2000), or found in contempt of court under the federal grand jury secrecy rule, Fed. R. Crim. P. 6(e). See Timothy Noah, Were Felt’s Leaks Illegal?, Slate, June 1, 2005, http://www.slate.com/id/2120069/index.html. Ironically, President Nixon also took advantage of anonymity by planting pseudonymous newspaper articles praising his administration. See Foster, supra note 135, at 581; Heymann, supra note 2, at 1408 n.106.} And even when the potential consequences are of a lesser magnitude, some speakers may simply feel they can be more candid if allowed to express their opinions anonymously. In many academic disciplines, for example, peer reviews of scholarship are anonymous for precisely this reason. A reviewer forced to disclose her identity may feel inhibited from speaking critically about a person or institution with whom or with which
she will share future professional contacts. Other times, speakers may simply wish not to be harassed with follow-up questions or solicitations.

Alternatively, authors may wish to avoid the shame, humiliation, or social ostracism that might result from disclosure of their identities. To vindicate this interest, courts in some rare instances permit litigants—the putative authors, or at least authorizers, of the papers filed on their behalf—to proceed without revealing their identities, as in Roe v. Wade. More generally, absent anonymity, an author may feel constrained by her class, her gender, or her professional status,

165 Such records are often confidential, but they are potentially discoverable in litigation. See Univ. of Pa. v. EEOC, 493 U.S. 182, 192 (1990).
166 See Levmore, supra note 12, at 2193.
167 410 U.S. 113, 120 n.4 (1973) (noting without comment that the petitioner’s name was a pseudonym). Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 10(a) requires every pleading to include the caption of the case, including the parties’ names, and Rule 17(a) requires that every action be prosecuted in the name of the real party in interest. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(a), 17(a). In cases implicating “significant privacy interests,” however—principally challenges to laws regulating such matters as sexual behavior, birth control, and abortion—courts sometimes permit parties to litigate under pseudonyms, though even in this context often on the condition that the party’s real name be disclosed to the court and to the defense. W.N.J. v. Yocom, 257 F.3d 1171, 1172 (10th Cir. 2001) (citing Nat’l Commodity & Barter Ass’n v. Gibbs, 886 F.2d 1240, 1245 (10th Cir. 1989)); see also Roe v. Aware Woman Ctr. for Choice, Inc., 253 F.3d 678, 684–87 (11th Cir. 2001) (recognizing the right of a plaintiff in an abortion case to proceed anonymously, provided that her name be disclosed to defendants for discovery purposes).

168 See Ferry, supra note 156, at 195 (noting that in the seventeenth century “it was considered altogether improper for gentlemen and persons of rank to appear in print as poets, so that [those] who wanted to display their wit as a way of advancing themselves in courtly circles were driven to publish verse unsigned but under fancy disguises that could be seen through”); Foster, supra note 135, at 379 (observing that in early modern England, “[p]ersons of rank . . . were more heavily invested in their personal name than in their literary product”).

169 “The motivations for publishing anonymously . . . have included an aristocratic or a gendered reticence, religious self-effacement, anxiety over public exposure, fear of prosecution, hope of an unprejudiced reception, and the desire to deceive.” Robert J. Griffin, Anonymity and Authorship, 30 New Literary Hist. 877, 885 (1999). Another example that might fall within this category is that of a speaker who publishes anonymously or under a pseudonym to avoid the audience’s perceived irrational bias. As Levmore and Heymann both note, for example, women authors often resorted to male-sounding pseudonyms (e.g., George Sand) so that their works would
or by the ideas or opinions of her employer. An author of erotic stories, for example, may prefer to keep her identity as a high school physics teacher secret—perhaps because of potential retaliation from her employer, but also because of the potential for embarrassment and breakdown of classroom discipline that may otherwise result. Nor is the need for anonymity necessarily limited to narrow personal interests; one might be motivated to protect the group or nation to which one belongs instead. For example, when George Kennan published his famous *Foreign Affairs* article (under the pseudonym “X”) in 1947, heralding what came to be known as the U.S. containment policy against the Soviet Union, he requested anonymity due to his employment at the time with the U.S. State Department.

In all of the preceding examples, anonymity not only reduces the speaker’s private costs of speaking but also may be seen to advance two important social goals as well. First, anonymity encourages contributions to the marketplace of ideas by eliminating barriers both to speaking (such as age, social status, or ethnicity) and to listening (such as fear of social censure or geographical isolation). Protecting anonymity helps those with inside information sound the alarm against threats to public welfare, and it helps citizens to check abuses by powerful institutions, corporations, and actors. Second, anony-

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170 See also Heymann, *supra* note 2, at 1404–05 (providing an example of one professor who admittedly wrote mystery novels under an authoronym for fear of being rejected for tenure).


172 It does this in part by encouraging speakers to contribute to public discourse without fear. Kang observes that “individuals are less fearful in cyberspace” because their “physical body is never at risk.” See *Kang, supra* note 154, at 1161. Anonymous speech also encourages audiences to listen without allowing the identity of the speaker to prejudice their interpretation of his message. See *Lidsky, supra* note 10, at 896 (arguing that the widespread use of anonymity and pseudonymity on the Internet “disguises status indicators such as race, class, gender, ethnicity, and age, which allow elite speakers to dominate real-world discourse”); *Post, supra* note 42, at 640 (“In most circumstances we attend as carefully to the social status of a speaker, and to the social context of her words, as we do to the bare content of her communication.”). Lee Bollinger offers another argument that, if true, applies equally well to anonymous speech; he contends that one of the functions of the First Amendment is to make us more tolerant of others by bringing us into contact with diverse ideas and viewpoints. *Lee C. Bollinger, The Tolerant Society* 50 (1986).

mous speech promotes democratic self-governance, which Alexander Meiklejohn and others have argued is the ultimate aim of the First Amendment. The inclusion of voices in public debate that might not otherwise be heard, particularly the voices of those with less power and influence, makes public discourse and ultimately our system of government more democratic. By increasing the likelihood that unconventional perspectives will be brought to bear on important social problems, anonymity may help generate creative solutions. And even if it does not, citizens who participate in public discourse are more likely to seek out information about important policy issues and thus to become more capable of exercising democratic self-governance.

3. Justifiable Retaliation

A darker side of anonymity is revealed, however, when we consider various other reasons why authors may wish to speak without attribution. One prominent reason is that the speaker wants to conceal his identity because he fears the negative consequences of having spoken falsely. The disgruntled employee may wish to spread lies about his employer with impunity; the anonymous reviewer may wish to settle a personal score; a confidential informant or spy may wish to sow the seeds of discontent or control public opinion. More generally, the pathological liar (Epimenides’s Cretan in our earlier example) is likely to be better off speaking anonymously than with attribution; unaware of the liar’s true identity, people may accord his anonymous speech more credit than, on balance, it is due. Thus Schopenhauer may have been exaggerating when he called anony-


175 See supra note 128 and accompanying text.

176 In addition, it may be more difficult to track down and punish a truly anonymous speaker. Whether a rule forbidding anonymity would give rise to substantial social benefits for this reason alone, all other things being equal, is nevertheless difficult to say. People who wished to speak falsely might simply flout a rule requiring them to disclose their true identities. Compare McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334, 352–53 (1995) (questioning the difficulty of enforcing bans on disseminating false documents against anonymous authors as opposed to wrongdoers using
mous speech "the refuge for all literary and journalistic rascality," but he cogently stated the case for author attribution as a curb to abuse:

[When a man publicly proclaims through the far-sounding trum-
pet of the newspaper, he should be answerable for it, at any rate
with his honor, if he has any; and if he has none, let his name neu-
tralize the effect of his words. And since even the most insignificant
person is known in his own circle, the result of such a measure
would be to put an end to two-thirds of the newspaper lies, and to
restrain the audacity of many a poisonous tongue.]

Nearly two hundred years after Schopenhauer, the Internet has
come to exacerbate this dark side of anonymity due to its "disinhibit-
ing effect" on many speakers. Studies show that even when an
Internet user is not anonymous and knows the recipient of his e-mail
message, the speaker is more likely to be disinhibited when engaged
in "computer mediated communication" than in other types of com-
munications. The technology separates the speaker from the
immediate consequences of her speech, perhaps (false) lulling her
to believe that there will be no consequences. Since the Internet mag-
nifies the number of anonymous speakers, it also magnifies the likely-
hood of false and abusive speech.

4. Collateral Benefits

A fourth possibility, related to the preceding one, is that the
speaker wishes to conceal his identity in order to enhance the
probability of obtaining some collateral benefit to which he is not
entitled, or which could otherwise be obtained only at higher cost.

false names), with id. at 382 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that a signing require-
ment would significantly deter authors from lying).

178 See Adam N. Joinson, Disinhibition and the Internet, in Psychology and the
Internet 75, 79–81 (Jayne Gachenback ed., 2d ed. 2007); Danah Boyd, Faceted Id/
etedIdentity.pdf ("[I]n anonymous situations, people’s lack of fear of retribution or
sense of other people undermines the effectiveness of social regulation."); M.E.
manuscript), available at http://www2.norwich.edu/mkabay/overviews/anonpseudo.
pdf (arguing that anonymity lowers peoples "normal inhibitions" because "the dei-
viduation of anonymous people lowers their self-reflective propensities").

179 To be sure, the First Amendment does not protect fraud: for example, using
fake identification to obtain liquor or cigarettes, to register to vote, or to obtain a
driver’s license or passport. Cf. Hibel v. Sixth Judicial Dist. Court, 542 U.S. 177,
187–88 (2004) (upholding requirement that persons detained on "reasonable suspi-
cion" of criminal activity identify themselves to police). Clearly, the state may require
To cite one example, one can imagine a book reviewer who wishes to conceal his identity because people would be more likely to conclude that the review is biased if the author's identity were known. History is indeed replete with examples of writers who published favorable reviews of their own work or other accomplishments, either anonymously or under pseudonyms. Alternatively, a speaker may wish to conceal his identity as the funding source for political advertisements in order to deflect suspicion, post-election, that the prevailing candidate is repaying the funder from the public fisc. Or consider the copyright infringement cases discussed in Part I.C. When I transmit copyrighted materials to another person, I may well be expressing something true and valuable (e.g., "I like this music," or "I think you will enjoy this song"). But the main reasons I choose to transmit anonymously may be to shield myself and the recipient from copyright liability, assuming the transmission is without consent of the copyright owner, and to induce future exchanges.

Arguably all of the phenomena described above could simply be listed as further examples under the heading "Justifiable Retaliation." We separate them out only to make the point that, in these instances, the speaker may well be telling the truth: He may believe that his work is admirable, or that his political party deserves to win, or that the file-shared music is worth listening to. (Depending on the circumstances, he may not face retaliation either, other than in the soft sense of suspicion or disbelief; though in the copyright and breach-of-confidentiality cases the penalties could be much more serious.) The public nevertheless also has some interest in knowing the identity of the

disclosure of identity in order to obtain a wide range of government benefits, without incurring liability for compelling speech. Our examples above, however, touch upon the publication of expressive speech to obtain collateral benefits such as public acclaim or political favors.


181 STEVEN D. LEVITT & STEPHEN J. DUBNER, FREAKONOMICS 121–22 (rev. ed. 2006) (discussing an author's favorable statements about himself under the pseudonym "Mary Rosh"). One might publish an anonymous review of another's work for similar reasons, that is, to minimize the suspicion of bias (either for or against the author). An author's publication of anonymous reviews also might be compared to publishing a study without revealing that it is being funded by a person or entity that stands to benefit from a particular conclusion.

182 Another example might be that of a doctor, lawyer, or other fiduciary who anonymously discloses truthful, but confidential, information about a patient or client. Whether the motivation was to attain some collateral benefit or to settle a score, the author's interest in anonymity is clearly at odds with the perceived social benefits of enforcing legal duties of confidentiality.
source, so as to judge for itself the credibility of the review, or the potential for political corruption or other rent-seeking behavior; or, assuming that the application of copyright liability to file-sharing is on balance socially desirable, to discourage the unauthorized transmission of copyrighted works.

5. The Boy Who Cried Wolf

A fifth possibility is that the speaker prefers anonymity because she perceives that the public will accord her speech less value—to the public's own detriment, as well as to the speaker's—if it realizes her identity. Everyone but the wolf, after all, would have been better off had the boy in Aesop's fable been credited on the one occasion on which he spoke the truth about the lupine menace. As noted above, when the public perceives the probability of a given speaker speaking the truth as being below the average for speakers generally, the speaker is likely better off speaking anonymously than he would be if he revealed his true identity. In this instance, however, withholding the speaker's identity also may protect the public against (rationally) underestimating the truth-value of the statement.

III. Toward a Normative Standard

The analysis presented above suggests, among other things, that attribution often provides valuable information for speech consumers, and accordingly that audiences will tend to discount speech from an undisclosed source. Some authors nevertheless prefer to publish anonymously, either because of the intrinsic satisfaction anonymity gives them, or because they believe that anonymity shields them from adverse consequences that they would suffer if their identities were known. Yet our positive analysis standing alone leads to few if any clear normative conclusions concerning the appropriate legal response to anonymous speech. In crafting a normative analysis, therefore, we draw upon traditional First Amendment principles to provide some weight to the various interests that our normative analysis has identified as relevant. We argue below that existing First Amendment law generally assumes that more speech is better than less, even if a necessary byproduct of more speech is the production of more harmful speech, and that audiences for core First Amendment speech are largely rational and capable of self-governance. Whether
or not these assumptions are demonstrably true,\textsuperscript{183} they are deeply enmeshed in our constitutional system, and rules that comport with them are more likely to withstand constitutional scrutiny. Taking these assumptions as our starting point, we can begin to devise standards for the regulation of anonymous speech, based upon the premise that the potential chilling effects of compulsory disclosure are real and must be given substantial weight, and that audience self-help is, in general, an adequate if imperfect substitute for compulsory disclosure. We develop this analysis and apply it to some current matters of controversy in the following Part.

\textbf{A. Assessing the Social Costs and Benefits of Anonymous Speech}

One way of further analyzing the social costs and benefits described in Part II is to consider the consequences of a hypothetical rule that required speakers to disclose their identities under all circumstances. An obvious consequence of a rule forbidding anonymity would be that some authors who crave anonymity for intrinsic reasons might prefer not to publish at all. On the other hand, authors who speak anonymously only to avoid wrongful retaliation could be induced to speak with attribution if retaliation could be deterred in other ways. Indeed, for this class of speakers, a system that simultaneously compelled disclosure of authorial identity and effectively prevented retaliation would be preferable to one that merely protected anonymity, because (1) speech consumers would stand to benefit from knowing the speaker’s identity, and (2) the speaker would stand a better chance of being taken seriously, all other things being equal. Reality suggests, however, that retaliation (let alone mere social ostracism) can never be prevented with 100\% effectiveness, and thus that a rule forbidding anonymity almost certainly would discourage some apprehensive speakers from coming forward. Stronger penalties against retaliation nevertheless could ameliorate some of the negative consequences of a nonanonymity rule (though such penalties could give rise to other negative consequences such as an increase in the cost of false positives, i.e., erroneous determinations that wrongful retaliation has occurred). In addition, a rule forbidding anonymity might cause the public to accord too little weight to truthful warnings emanating from speakers such as the Boy Who Cried Wolf—though potential wolf-criers who recognize this problem in advance would have a marginally greater incentive not to develop a reputation as

wolf-criers in the first place. A rule requiring them to disclose their identities therefore could conceivably have a net positive effect on the dissemination of truthful information, at least in the long run.\footnote{184}

On the other side of the ledger, a rule that required speakers to disclose their identities would deter some members of the third class of anonymous speakers—those who fear justifiable retaliation—from coming forward. But this result might appear to be a positive social good, to the extent this class of speakers gives rise to greater social losses than private benefits.\footnote{185} Moreover, a rule protecting this class against retaliation would make no sense, even if it were feasible, precisely because such a rule would immunize the class from liability for defamation, product disparagement, and other conduct that the legal system (rightly, in our view) condemns. A disclosure rule also would require speakers in the fourth class, those seeking collateral benefits, to reveal their identities—and this too would appear to be a social good, if, for example, it would enable speech consumers to draw appropriate inferences about the credibility of the speech at issue.\footnote{186}

What the preceding analysis suggests, unfortunately, is that any attempt to tally up the social costs and benefits of anonymous speech is destined to be indeterminate; or, to put it another way, that our positive analysis standing alone leads to few if any clear normative conclusions. On the one hand, it is conceivable (though, we think, unlikely) that a rule forbidding anonymity altogether would maximize social welfare, even when the potential chilling effect with respect to speakers falling into categories one and two—those who crave anonymity for intrinsic reasons, and those who fear wrongful retaliation—is taken into account. Surely some of these speakers would continue to speak out, even at some risk or discomfort to themselves; those risks could be reduced somewhat by increasing the penalties for retaliation, and whatever social losses that would nevertheless ensue would have

\footnote{184} An analogy can be drawn to the firm that wants consumers to recognize its trademark as symbolizing a consistent level of quality. \textit{See supra} note 125.

\footnote{185} \textit{But see} N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279 n.19 (1964) ("Even a false statement may be deemed to make a valuable contribution to public debate, since it brings about 'the clearer perception and livelier impression of truth, produced by its collision with error.'" (quoting \textit{John Stuart Mill}, \textit{On Liberty} 15 (1947))).

\footnote{186} This is not to say that all cases arguably falling into this or other categories would be easy cases. Speakers may have mixed motives for retaining anonymity—or it may be difficult to discern what the speaker's motive is at all. Political speech in particular may be difficult to disentangle. On the one hand, speakers may rightly fear retaliation for speaking their minds in a public forum. On the other, knowing who has funded a political advertisement provides some insight into who is likely to be showered with benefits flowing from the public fisc, if the candidate whose position aligns with the advertisement comes to power.
to be balanced against the gains flowing from a reduction in the quantity of harmful speech. For surely more harmful speech and other rent-seeking behavior would either be deterred or more easily detected if anonymity were forbidden; perhaps, then, the benefits of a nonanonymity rule would outweigh the costs, as measured by some felicific calculus. On the other hand, a regime that forbade anonymity altogether might seem creepy, if not outright totalitarian. And it may well be the case—in fact, we suspect that it probably is the case—that a reasonable social welfare calculus cuts in favor of some sort of proanonymity norm, if we assume that (1) substantial numbers of speakers falling into categories one and two would be deterred from coming forward under a mandatory disclosure rule, and (2) audiences can protect themselves from many of the potential harms of anonymous speech by resort to the self-help option, i.e., by not giving anonymous speech as much credit as attributed speech. Exactly how strong the proanonymity norm must be, however, assuming that some version of a proanonymity norm is welfare-enhancing at all, is hardly

187 Indeed, whistleblowers, informants, and other would-be truth-tellers often do have to reveal their identities eventually, for example, if they are called to testify in court. Due process is surely sufficiently weighty to overcome the speaker’s interest in anonymity—which simply shows that the strong version of the right to speak anonymously, which some might read into McIntyre, cannot be the last word. Moreover, as suggested in the text above, government sometimes does try to protect nonanonymous whistleblowers from retaliation—for example, through anti-SLAPP legislation, see, e.g., Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 25.16 (West Supp. 2007); witness protection programs, see Witness Security Reform Act of 1984, 18 U.S.C. §§ 3521-3528 (2000); and rules protecting the identity of confidential tipsters under some circumstances, see, e.g., Scher v. United States, 305 U.S. 251, 254 (1938) (stating that, in a criminal case, disclosure of an informer’s identity is forbidden “unless essential to the defense”). Where such protections are in place, the social interest in permitting anonymity is reduced as well. To the extent audiences may benefit from artistically-motivated anonymity, however, see supra notes 156, 172, that benefit would be lost under a nonanonymity regime.

188 Concededly, not all audience members will respond reasonably to speech by an unknown author, as the prevalence of spam e-mails suggests. After all, if no one responded to the often-pseudonymous offers of sexual enhancement or stock market tips, the spam would stop coming.

189 Here, the rationale in favor of anonymity is similar to that which underlies copyright and some other forms of intellectual property protection: that, while copyright may give rise to a variety of social costs, on balance it creates a surplus of social benefits by encouraging the production and publication of works of authorship that otherwise would not be produced or published. The rationale is also similar to that underlying various evidentiary privileges, such as the attorney-client privilege.
the sort of thing that can be determined with scientific precision. Strictly speaking, the analysis remains indeterminate.\textsuperscript{190}

We nevertheless contend that the analysis is useful in several respects. First, it shows that implicit tradeoffs \textit{will} occur, whether we desire them or not, and whatever the rule society adopts happens to be. A rule that provides strong protection to anonymous speech will result in more harmful speech, whereas a rule that provides weak protection threatens to chill a good deal of core speech. We may not know which effect predominates, but it is useful to recognize that some socially desirable consequences will be forgone, no matter which rule prevails. The analysis also encourages us to consider other ways (such as increased reliance upon self-help or the adoption of measures to prevent retaliation) of reducing the anticipated but inevitable negative consequences that are likely to flow from whatever rule is adopted. Second, the analysis suggests that, to the extent that social welfare considerations play at least some role in the debate, the premises implicit in existing law can be used to craft presumptions about whether the benefits or harms of anonymous speech are likely to predominate under various possible standards. We elaborate upon this point in the following subpart.

\textbf{B. First Amendment Presumptions}

Traditional First Amendment theory helps to fill the gaps left by the positive analysis by providing two important premises: first, that audiences are capable of rationally assessing the truth, quality, and other characteristics of core speech, and second, that more speech is generally preferable to less. Both premises are open to debate.\textsuperscript{191} But both have a long and distinguished pedigree and are unlikely to be displaced from the pantheon of general First Amendment principles.

\textsuperscript{190} Indeed, the problems with a purely utilitarian analysis of anonymous speech go beyond mere indeterminacy. Whether the costs and benefits of anonymous speech are even commensurable with respect to one another is debatable: As we suggested above, for example, if the autonomy interests in support of a right to speak anonymously are worthy of respect, how exactly does one determine the optimal tradeoff in return for a reduction in harmful speech? More importantly, and as others before us have noted, the social welfare approach appears inconsistent with a good deal of existing First Amendment jurisprudence (even if, as we would argue, it captures some aspects of that jurisprudence). Much speech may be of little value, or even positively harmful, but few accounts of the First Amendment make these observations paramount, or even relevant under all circumstances. \textit{See, e.g.}, Jed Rubenfeld, \textit{The Freedom of Imagination: Copyright's Constitutionality}, 112 \textit{Yale L.J.} 1, 20-24 (2002).

\textsuperscript{191} \textit{See} Mark Fenster, \textit{The Opacity of Transparency}, 91 \textit{Iowa L. Rev.} 885, 928 (2006) (citing empirical studies "demonstrat[ing] citizens' lack of political knowledge," but observing that public choice theory explains why "the public's ignorance is rational").
anytime soon. Thus, anonymity norms that take these principles as starting points will fit comfortably within the existing First Amendment framework, and reliance on these principles will avoid the impasse that otherwise arises due to the unquantifiable nature of the costs and benefits of anonymous speech.

1. Audiences Are Rational

A critical factor in weighing the value of the right to speak anonymously against other important rights and interests is how audiences respond to anonymous speech. Traditional First Amendment jurisprudence does not address the issue directly, despite the fact that its dominant metaphor, the "marketplace of ideas," entails an implicit theory of audience response. Oliver Wendell Holmes, who together with Louis Brandeis articulated the philosophical foundation of modern First Amendment theory, introduced the marketplace of ideas metaphor into First Amendment jurisprudence. Holmes asserted in *Abrams v. United States* that "the best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the market." Holmes's assertion is a tenet of modern First Amendment jurisprudence, but it only has credence if the "consumers" in the marketplace of ideas are shrewd evaluators of information circulating in that market. Consumers in a market pick and choose what is valuable, and their aggregate decisions drive purveyors of worthless goods (or information) out of the market. Yet marketplace theory only works if consumers are capable of thinking critically and exercising autonomy to discern what is valuable and what is not. Extending the analogy, if truth (whether Truth with a capital "T" or some more contingent notion of truth) is to emerge from the marketplace of ideas, the consumers of ideas must be capable of exercising their critical faculties to separate the wheat from the chaff, the valuable (by each consumer's own lights) from the valueless.

Holmes recognized that the operation of the marketplace of ideas relies on the rationalism of American citizens. *Abrams* involved the prosecution of five Russian socialist immigrants for distributing

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194 250 U.S. 616.
195 Id. at 630 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
196 See M. Neil Browne et al., *The Shared Assumptions of the Jury System and the Market System*, 50 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 425, 436 (2006) ("The key to market optimality is the presumed existence of the calculating, well-informed, intensely rational consumer in a context where power relationships permit the rationality to function freely.").
pamphlets opposing U.S. involvement in World War I.\textsuperscript{197} Although Holmes had nothing but contempt for the "creed" espoused by the defendants, "these poor and puny anonymities,"\textsuperscript{198} he believed that the government had failed to establish that their speech hindered the U.S. war effort.\textsuperscript{199} Employing what would come to be known as the clear and present danger test,\textsuperscript{200} Holmes concluded that the defendants' speech did not present an imminent threat of "immediate" harm precisely because a rational audience would discount what the defendants had written; "[o]nly the emergency that makes it immediately dangerous to leave the correction of evil counsels to time warrants making any exception to the [First Amendment]."\textsuperscript{201} A rational and skeptical audience, if given time for deliberation, can discuss and ultimately see through "evil counsels," thereby eliminating their dangers without resort to government regulation.\textsuperscript{202}

Justice Brandeis further articulated this rationalist conception of public discourse.\textsuperscript{203} Brandeis firmly believed that the forces of "reason as applied through public discussion" would ameliorate potentially dangerous speech.\textsuperscript{204} According to Brandeis, "[o]nly an emergency can justify repression"\textsuperscript{205} of speech, even speech the State believes to be "false and fraught with evil consequence."\textsuperscript{206} In ordi-

\begin{footnotes}
\item[197] Abrams, 250 U.S. at 616–17 (majority opinion).
\item[198] Id. at 629 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
\item[199] Id. at 628–29.
\item[200] Justice Brandeis further refined the test in Whitney v. California:
\[\text{[N]o danger flowing from speech can be deemed clear and present, unless the incidence of the evil apprehended is so imminent that it may befall before there is opportunity for full discussion. If there be time to expose through discussion the falsehood and fallacies, to avert the evil by processes of education, the remedy to be applied is more speech, not enforced silence.}\]
\item[201] Abrams, 250 U.S. at 630–31 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
\item[203] Whitney, 274 U.S. at 372–79 (Brandeis, J., concurring).
\item[204] Id. at 375–76.
\item[205] Id. at 377.
\item[206] Id. at 374.
\end{footnotes}
nary circumstances, the State must rely on its citizens to "expose through discussion the falsehood and fallacies [of dangerous speech], to avert the evil by the processes of education."207 Brandeis, like Holmes, preferred the correction of evil speech via public discussion rather than state coercion, viewing state coercion not only as unnecessary, but also as a threat to citizen autonomy, democratic participation, and the search for truth.208

This faith in rationalism permeates First Amendment jurisprudence.209 To list just a few examples, the Supreme Court adapted the test for punishing speech that incites violence directly from Holmes's clear and present danger test, and the incitement test assumes that audiences can avoid the dangers of inciting speech by employing their common sense.210 The Supreme Court made this point abundantly clear in the incitement case Dennis v. United States211: "[T]he basis of the First Amendment is the hypothesis that speech can rebut speech, propaganda will answer propaganda, free debate of ideas will result in the wisest governmental policies."212 This same assumption is the basis of the Court's prohibition of fighting words, which include only those expressions that spur the listener to violence before he has time for rational thought.213

Defamation law also strongly reflects the Supreme Court's faith in rationalism. In New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,214 the landmark case

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207 Id. at 377.
208 See Lidsky, supra note 202, at 1023–24.
209 This Article makes no claim about original intent, but Thomas Jefferson's First Inaugural Address displays a rationalist bent: "If there be any among us who would wish to dissolve this Union or change its republican form, let them stand undisturbed as monuments of the safety with which error of opinion may be tolerated where reason is left free to combat it." Thomas Jefferson, First Inaugural Address (Mar. 4, 1801), in INAUGURAL ADDRESSES OF THE PRESIDENTS OF THE UNITED STATES, S. Doc. No. 101–10, at 13, 15; see also Letter from James Madison to W.T. Barry (Aug. 4, 1822), in THE COMPLETE MADISON 337, 337 (Saul K. Padover ed., 1953) ("[A] people who mean to be their own Governors, must arm themselves with the power which knowledge gives."); Sharon K. Sandeen, In for a Calf Is Not Always in for a Cow: An Analysis of the Constitutional Right of Anonymity as Applied to Anonymous E-Commerce, 29 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 527, 581 n.224 (2002) (noting that Founding-era leaders such as Benjamin Franklin believed that freedom of expression was properly limited by the rights of other individuals).
210 Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447–49 (1969). The incitement test has been adapted to the tort context as well. For thoughtful discussion, see David A. Anderson, Incitement and Tort Law, 37 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 957 (2002).
211 341 U.S. 494 (1951).
212 Id. at 503.
"constitutionalizing" defamation law, the Court explicitly quoted Justice Brandeis's concurring opinion in Whitney v. California for the proposition:

"'Those who won our independence believed... that public discussion is a political duty; and that this should be a fundamental principle of the American government.... Believing in the power of reason as applied through public discussion, they eschewed silence coerced by law—the argument of force in its worst form.'"215

Yet the Sullivan Court did not paint an idealized portrait of public discussion. The Court recognized that "debate on public issues" will "include vehement, caustic, and sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks on government and public officials," as well as "half-truths," "misinformation," "exaggeration," "vilification," and "false statement[s]."216 The Court nonetheless held that the State may only punish defamatory falsehoods about public officials when the speaker knows or recklessly disregards the falsity of his words. Thus, the State may punish lies about public officials, but not merely negligent falsehoods. The Sullivan Court based its holding in part on the inevitability of "erroneous statement... in free debate" and the chilling effect that would result were such statements to form the basis for large tort verdicts.217 However, Sullivan also rests on the premise that public officials will not suffer unduly as a result of the inevitable false statement. For this premise to be realized, however, the public must be capable of sorting through the "half-truths" and "misinformation" to glean the foundations of "enlightened opinion." As the Court wrote, a paramount First Amendment value is ensuring that public discourse is "uninhibited, robust, and wide-open,"218 but this kind of discourse can only benefit citizens who are capable of exercising their critical faculties to ferret out valuable information.

This same reliance on the audience to apply its critical faculties lies at the heart of the public figure/private figure distinction in defamation.219 This distinction rests largely on the fact that public figures, as speakers, have more access than other speakers to the marketplace of ideas, and can protect themselves from the harm of defamation by

215 Id. at 270 (quoting Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 367, 375-76 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring)) (emphasis added).
216 Id. at 270-73.
217 Id. at 271-72.
218 Id. at 270.
219 See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 344 (1974) (noting that public figures have access to the media to rebut defamatory falsehoods, and using this to justify, in part, forcing them to prove actual malice before recovering for defamation).
employing "self-help—using available opportunities to contradict the lie or correct the error." Public figures, in other words, have more ability than other speakers to win over the public in the "competition of . . . ideas." If the audience is allowed to hear both sides, it can rationally determine the truth of the matter for itself. Thus, public figures must show a high standard of fault in order to recover for defamation. Private figures, unable to use self-help as effectively to remedy defamation, receive more legal solicitude and are able to recover damages under much less stringent standards. The constitutional lesson to be drawn seems to be that the First Amendment prefers self-help remedies to state coercion. Put another way, the constitutional preference is for requiring victims of potentially harmful speech to mitigate that harm by engaging the critical faculties of the audience; the audience can then discern the truth from the competing claims, at least in the realm of speech that lies at the core of the First Amendment.

2. More Is Better

The presumption that audiences will respond rationally to speech is integrally related to a second fundamental presumption in First Amendment jurisprudence, namely, that truth is best gathered "'out of a multitude of tongues.'" This proposition, too, is debatable. Speech from a multitude of tongues may be diverse, but it also may be unintelligible; and some observers question whether true diversity can be accomplished without paternalistic governmental intervention. Whatever the merits of these arguments, the laissez-faire approach to the marketplace of ideas remains the dominant paradigm for regulat-

220 Id.
221 Id. at 340.
222 Id.
224 See Cass R. Sunstein, Democracy and the Problem of Free Speech xvii–xx, 18–19 (1993). Diversity is thwarted when powerful media corporations "set the parameters of public debate." Franklin et al., supra note 193, at 11. Moreover, "[m]any citizens are barred from meaningful participation in the marketplace of ideas by poverty or inadequate education, and class, race, or gender may impair the ability of some speakers to make their voices heard." Id.
ing the print media, including the Internet.\textsuperscript{225} The laissez-faire approach reflects both the strength of our national commitment to democratic self-governance as well as our distrust of governmental intervention.\textsuperscript{226} Respect for the autonomy of citizens demands that they be allowed to consider all available information in deciding what course to follow. And they must be free to make these choices without governmental intervention, for such intervention "would necessarily circumscribe the potential for collective self-determination."\textsuperscript{227} Even if a benign moderator might improve the quality of public discourse, American constitutional theory normally bars the state from playing that role (and rightly so). If history proves anything, it proves that distrust of governmental intervention in the marketplace of ideas is warranted, for governmental attempts to "prescribe what shall be orthodox"\textsuperscript{228} have resulted frequently in suppression of truth and enshrinement of error.\textsuperscript{229}

In recognition of this fact, First Amendment jurisprudence has committed to "uninhibited, robust, and wide-open" public discourse, even at the expense of tolerating some degree of false and abusive speech. Early on, James Madison recognized that "[s]ome degree of abuse is inseparable from the proper use of every thing; and in no instance is this more true than in that of the press."\textsuperscript{230} Explicitly

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{225} Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 885 (1997) (applying this approach to regulation of Internet speech). Broadcasting is subject to far more government controls due to spectrum scarcity. See generally Mehmet Konar-Steenberg, \textit{The Needle and the Damage Done: The Pervasive Presence of Obsolete Mass Media Audience Models in First Amendment Doctrine}, 8 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 45, 46 (2005) (decrying paternalistic regulation of broadcast media as inconsistent with empirical research on audience behavior); Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr. & A. Richard M. Blaiklock, \textit{Enhancing the Spectrum: Media Power, Democracy, and the Marketplace of Ideas}, 2000 U. ILL. L. REV. 813, 873 ("[I]f the ownership of local media outlets is centralized among a few owners, the dangers of self-serving and, perhaps, antidemocratic, behavior loom much larger.").
\item \textsuperscript{226} As Alexander Meiklejohn eloquently wrote, "[w]hen men govern themselves, it is they—and no one else—who must pass judgment upon unwisdom and unfairness and danger. And that means that unwise ideas must have a hearing as well as wise ones . . . ." \textit{Meiklejohn, supra} note 174, at 26.
\item \textsuperscript{227} Robert Post, \textit{Meiklejohn’s Mistake: Individual Autonomy and the Reform of Public Discourse}, 64 U. COLO. L. REV. 1109, 1118 (1993); \textit{see also} Kenneth L. Karst, \textit{Equality as a Central Principle in the First Amendment}, 43 U. CHI. L. REV. 20, 40 (1975) (observing that the "state lacks ‘moderators’ who can be trusted to know when ‘everything worth saying’ has been said").
\item \textsuperscript{228} W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943).
\item \textsuperscript{229} For eloquent expression of this idea, see \textit{Frederick Schauer}, \textit{Free Speech} 81–86 (1982).
\item \textsuperscript{230} N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 271 (1964) (quoting \textit{The Debates in the Several State Conventions on the Adoption of the Federal Constitution} 571 (Jonathan Elliot ed., 2d ed., Philadelphia, J.B. Lippincott & Co. 1876)).
\end{itemize}
adopting Madison's philosophy, the Supreme Court in *New York Times*
refused to punish even negligent "erroneous statement[s]";\textsuperscript{231} the
Court realized that errors are "inevitable in free debate" in order to
ensure that "freedoms of expression . . . have the 'breathing space'
that they 'need . . . to survive.'\textsuperscript{232} This landmark decision, like many
others, opts for underregulation of potentially harmful speech lest
protected speech be chilled. In other words, more speech is better
than less speech, and a more diverse public discourse must sometimes
be bought at the expense of a less civilized one.

C. Implications

These First Amendment assumptions are directly relevant to evalu-
ating the contribution anonymous speech makes to public discourse
and to deciding how that contribution is to be weighed against other
important rights. Any regulation of anonymous speech should begin
with the presumption that information consumers are likely to dis-
count unattributed speech and to use indicia other than author iden-
tity to judge its reliability. In other words, regulation of anonymous
speech should start with the assumption that the audience itself will
be able to dissipate much of the harm of anonymous speech.\textsuperscript{233} Another implication is that anonymous speech is, presumptively, valu-
able speech. While First Amendment jurisprudence might prefer
attributed speech to anonymous speech, it clearly prefers anonymous
speech to no speech at all, especially when audiences can exercise
"self-help" to minimize the perils of anonymous speech.\textsuperscript{234} This is not

\textsuperscript{231} *Id.* at 271–72.

\textsuperscript{232} *Id.* (quoting *NAACP v. Button*, 371 U.S. 415, 433 (1963)).

\textsuperscript{233} See *Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC*, 512 U.S. 622, 641 (1994) ("At the heart of
the First Amendment lies the principle that each person should decide for himself or
herself the ideas and beliefs deserving of expression, consideration, and adherence. Our
political system and cultural life rest upon this ideal."). Certainly we can and
sometimes do make different assumptions about the citizenry as information consum-
ers. For example, regulation of the speech of issuers of securities is explicitly pre-
mised on paternalism. As the Supreme Court noted, writing specifically about so-
called "blue sky" laws: "Such laws are to protect the weak, the uninformed, the unsus-
pecting, and the gullible from the exercise of their own volition." *Paris Adult Theatre
I v. Slaton*, 413 U.S. 49, 64 (1973). Yet to make such paternalistic assumptions as a
general matter, especially when applied to core speech, is fundamentally antithetical
to democratic theory.

\textsuperscript{234} This argument is sometimes made in support of giving reporters a privilege to
protect confidential sources of information. The reporter's privilege increases the
overall quantity and quality of speech that the public receives, and it encourages
speakers to come forward when they might otherwise remain silent. However, there is
one key difference between the argument for a reporter's privilege and the argument
to say that all audience members will be intelligent, sophisticated, critical readers; indeed, many audience members will not be capable of the rationalism that is an article of faith in much First Amendment jurisprudence. Even so, both democratic theory and First Amendment jurisprudence are deeply committed to respecting citizens’ autonomy and capacity for self-governance, and this commitment dictates a rationalist account of audience response to core speech rather than a paternalistic one.\(^2\) As Justice Potter Stewart eloquently wrote, “[e]nlightened choice by an informed citizenry is the basic ideal upon which an open society is premised.”\(^3\)

**IV. Coping with Anonymous Speech: A Guide for Legislators and Courts**

The cost-benefit and constitutional analyses presented here have important practical implications for both legislatures and courts. Lawmakers who rely solely on the cost-benefit analysis might rationally decide that anonymous speech is more trouble than it is worth, despite its many benefits. But the First Amendment analysis tips the balance. This Part provides guidance to legislatures about what types of situations might justify statutes compelling disclosure of author identity. We also argue that legislatures and courts should recognize a privilege to speak anonymously in cases involving political or other

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\(^2\) Several theorists have focused on the importance of public discourse as a component of democracy. Robert Post, for example, quotes John Dewey for the proposition that “democracy begins in conversation,” and Post’s own theory focuses on how Supreme Court decisions have made “public discourse” a central facet of our constitutional system. See Robert C. Post, Constitutional Domains 185–87 (1995) (quoting Dialogue on John Dewey 58 (Corliss Lamont ed., 1959)). Similarly, Robert Bennett has proposed a “conversational model” to describe “the actual functioning of democracy in the United States.” Robert W. Bennett, Counter-Conversationalism and the Sense of Difficulty, 95 Nw. U. L. Rev. 845, 871 (2001). Under this model, “an important influence in producing a sense on the part of citizens of involvement in the processes of government—and thence of fidelity to its decisions—is its pervasive tendency to direct conversation about public affairs their way.” Id. Bennett concedes that the discourse that results is not necessarily “enlightened or high-minded,” id. at 872, but his theory demands that citizens be capable of meaningful “engagement” in “ongoing public conversation.” See Robert W. Bennett, Democracy as Meaningful Conversation, 14 Const. Comment. 481, 481 (1997).

\(^3\) See Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 726 (1972) (Stewart, J., dissenting) (arguing that the press promotes citizens’ ability to make enlightened choices).
core speech; a privilege that can only be overcome upon an exacting showing of need by either the State or private litigants.237

A. When Should the State Mandate Disclosure?

Congress recently passed legislation criminalizing threatening, harassing or “annoying” online anonymous speech.238 This patently unconstitutional239 statute is not the first or only legislative attempt to quell online anonymous speech.240 Nor will it be the last. Hence, both legislators and their critics can benefit from the insights that this analysis yields.

The first, and perhaps most obvious, insight is that legislatures should not regulate anonymous speech in the literary, artistic or political realms, absent a compelling need for the regulation beyond simply providing the audience with more information. More specifically,

237 Of course, context can be crucial. Our focus remains centered principally on anonymous speech as it relates to political campaigns and to torts such as defamation and infringement. Other contexts may be quite different. As we noted above, for example, in the context of civil litigation, courts occasionally permit parties to appear anonymously, but there is certainly no presumption in favor of anonymous litigation. See James v. Jacobson, 6 F.3d 233, 238 (4th Cir. 1993) (listing factors that a court should consider before allowing a party to proceed as a “Doe” defendant). In the context of criminal litigation, courts rarely permit the State to withhold a testifying witness’s identity, taking into account the centrality of the witness to the prosecution or defense case and the danger to the witness’s safety. See, e.g., United States v. Varella, 692 F.2d 1352, 1355-56 (11th Cir. 1982); Alvarado v. Superior Court, 5 P.3d 203, 223 (Cal. 2000). In such instances, constitutional guarantees of due process or the right to confront one’s accusers normally give rise to a presumption against anonymity. Similarly, we express no general views in this paper, though we may in future work, on the constitutionality of “antimask” laws that forbid people from disguising their identities in public places. These laws may chill some speech but may conceivably be justified as anti-intimidation measures. Compare Church of the Am. Knights of the Ku Klux Klan v. Kerik, 356 F.3d 197, 206-07 (2d Cir. 2004) (holding an antimask law constitutional), with Am. Knights of the Ku Klux Klan v. City of Goshen, 50 F. Supp. 2d 835, 840-42 (N.D. Ind. 1999) (declaring a similar law unconstitutional).


legislatures should not regulate types of speech in which (a) speakers have high autonomy interests (such as literary or artistic speech), (b) the potential for abuse is relatively low, and (c) a rational audience exists with the ability to protect itself from potential harms. Consideration of these factors will not obviate making hard choices between competing interests in all cases, but it will facilitate analysis of whether compelled disclosure is practically or constitutionally warranted.

As an illustration, reconsider the example of anonymous book reviews. Whatever the merits of Schopenhauer's criticisms of anonymous reviewers, it would be unwise and unconstitutional to criminalize anonymous book reviews. The speaker's autonomy interest in making aesthetic judgments is high, aesthetic judgments are notoriously subjective, and a rational audience is likely to discount anonymous reviews. If, for example, a reader wants to buy a copy of Milan Kundera's *The Unbearable Lightness of Being* from Amazon.com, she will find 212 customer reviews on the book's web page. As far as the reader is concerned, these reviewers are anonymous, even when they include their real names. She has no reason to credit their aesthetic judgments apart from the persuasiveness of their writing. It is unlikely that any single review will influence her purchasing decision, and the potential for damage from any one review (say, one which abuses its anonymity) is mitigated by the presence of numerous other entries. She almost certainly will not read all 212 reviews, but the reviews in the aggregate provide information about the popular opinion of Kundera's book; if she generally hews to popular opinion, the reviews may determine whether she purchases the book.

This is not to say that anonymous reviews are always harmless. Naive readers may give anonymous reviews undue credit, and in this case an anonymous reviewer could successfully abuse the right to speak anonymously by skewering a rival's book that he secretly admires. Even though this behavior is boorish, it would unduly infringe speaker autonomy to criminalize it, especially where a rational audience will discount the review as the subjective opinion of

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241 Quixotically, virulent negative reviews might make the reader more likely to purchase. Consider the case of a highly controversial political author whose reviews garner countless emotional tirades from opponents, making the book more desirable in the eyes of a fan who enjoys the author's controversial qualities.

242 A prankster, masquerading as "Andrew Lloyd Webber," posted near-defamatory book reviews on Amazon.com. John Schwartz, *Who's Composing All Those Fake Online Reviews?*, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 27, 2001, at C4 ("[F]alse Lloyd Webber endorsements went to guidebooks on combating halitosis and premature ejaculation... Many of the reviews were not fit to print in this newspaper and might qualify as libelous if not for the latitude that the law affords to obvious parodies.").
someone whose motives and biases are unknown. Moreover, legal remedies are available to pursue the speaker who crosses the line into making false and defamatory factual assertions. A statute compelling disclosure is simply too blunt an instrument to regulate anonymous “core” speech that poses a low risk of harm when rationally discounted.

A corollary, however, is that the State should have authority to compel speakers to disclose their identities to their audiences when the speakers’ autonomy interests are particularly low and the potential for abuse particularly high. Thus, nothing in our analysis would prevent legislatures from regulating anonymous unsolicited commercial e-mail, or “spam.” Estimates suggest that thirteen million spam are sent each day,\(^{243}\) many of them pseudonymously. The sender of the e-mail is motivated by financial self-interest rather than self-fulfillment, and the potential for fraud is high.\(^{244}\) Even though most rational audience members can protect themselves from fraudulent anonymous spam (if not from annoying anonymous spam), First Amendment jurisprudence specifically allows for a limited degree of paternalistic regulation of commercial (as opposed to core) speech.\(^{245}\)

What, then, should legislators do in the realm of electoral speech? Anonymous speech during election campaigns is largely political speech, and yet the Supreme Court’s electoral speech jurisprudence occasionally allows paternalistic regulation in the name of ensuring an informed citizenry.\(^{246}\) As we saw in Part I, the compelled disclosure provisions in \textit{McConnell} rest in part on the assumption that voters will not be able to perceive partisan bias in election advertisements, at least when the advertisements are run immediately before an election. And yet the Supreme Court in \textit{Mills v. Alabama}\(^ {247}\) struck down a law that made it a crime for a newspaper to publish editorials for or against a ballot measure on election day, even though the purpose of the law was to protect voters from “confusive last-minute


\(^{244}\) Nigerian banking con schemes and e-mail viruses are common examples of spam-based fraud, and both should probably be familiar to anyone who has been using electronic mail for any length of time.


\(^{246}\) See Levine, supra note 84, at 253-56 (discussing this paternalistic strain in electoral speech jurisprudence).

\(^{247}\) 384 U.S. 214 (1966).
challenges and countercharges." Mills refused to allow the state to criminalize election-day editorials as a means of preventing voter confusion; paternalism simply could not justify such an "obvious and flagrant abridgement of the constitutionally guaranteed freedom of the press." Although detailing the problems with the Court’s electoral speech jurisprudence is beyond the scope of this Article, our normative analysis suggests that restrictions on political speech, even in the electoral context (or especially in the electoral context), should not be based on paternalistic assumptions about voters. Thus, the relevant question both for lawmakers and for courts ought to be whether a compelled disclosure law can be justified without reference to paternalism. Reconsider the compelled disclosure provision in McConnell. It was not motivated solely by the desire to protect the audience from being misled by clever partisans. It was also motivated by the desire to prevent corporations and unions from circumventing contribution limits and to prevent politicians from being corrupted. Our analysis does not undermine the legitimacy or weightiness of these concerns, but instead indicates that they should be evaluated standing alone, without the added weight of paternalistic assumptions about voters to bolster them.

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248 Id. at 219. The law made it a crime to solicit votes for or against a ballot proposition on election day, and the editor of the Birmingham Post-Herald was arrested for violating it after his newspaper carried an election-day editorial urging voters to adopt a mayor-council form of government. Id. at 215–16.

249 Id. at 219. In theory the arguments made against paternalistic regulation should apply equally to broadcasting, but the Supreme Court has tolerated regulation to achieve broadcast “fairness” due to the fact that the broadcast spectrum is a scarce resource not available to all citizens. This sort of paternalistic regulation is reflected in a 2005 FCC order directing broadcasters and cable operators to disclose the “nature, source, and sponsorship” of “prepackaged news stores” or face up to a $10,000 fine and/or a year in jail. See Frank Ahrens, Broadcasters Must Reveal Video Clips’ Sources, FCC Says, WASH. POST, Apr. 14, 2005, at A2.


251 Voters certainly do not need to know the identity of the speaker to understand that a purported issue ad that ended with the message “Contact Senators Feingold and Kohl and tell them to oppose the filibuster” of President Bush’s judicial nominees is really a partisan ad aimed at defeating Feingold’s bid for reelection. See Wis. Right to Life, Inc. v. FEC, No. 04-1260, 2004 WL 3622736, at *5 (D.D.C. Aug. 17, 2004), vacated by 546 U.S. 410 (2006).

252 The overall vitality of the regulatory scheme upheld in McConnell, 540 U.S. at 246, is already being called into question by the Supreme Court, albeit indirectly. See Randall v. Sorrell, 126 S. Ct. 2479, 2492–94 (2006); Wis. Right to Life, 546 U.S. at 411–12.

A more difficult illustration is presented by the anonymous speech regulation in Justice for All v. Faulkner, 410 F.3d 760 (5th Cir. 2005). A “literature policy” at the
B. Balancing Anonymous Speech Rights in Torts Cases

In the last ten years, courts have found themselves adjudicating more disputes pitting the rights of anonymous speakers against the rights of those allegedly harmed by their speech. The typical case begins with the aggrieved plaintiff bringing suit against a "John Doe" for anonymously publishing defamation, perpetrating fraud, divulging trade secrets, or violating the plaintiff's copyright—all on the Internet.\(^\text{253}\) The plaintiff files suit, then subpoenas "John Doe's" ISP...

University of Texas required all printed materials distributed on campus, regardless of subject matter, to contain the name of a University-affiliated person or group responsible for distribution. \(\text{Id. at 763.}\) One of the University's justifications for restricting anonymous leafleting was to "preserve the campus for use by students, faculty, and staff" by excluding "non-affiliated" speakers from distributing literature on campus. \(\text{Id. at 764.}\) An anti-abortion student group contended that the literature policy abridged its First Amendment right of anonymous speech, and the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals agreed. \(\text{Id. at 763.}\) The court recognized anonymous speech on university campuses as an important means of expressing "controversial ideas." \(\text{Id. at 765.}\) In other words, the court acknowledged the strong autonomy interests of students in speaking anonymously on campus. However, the case was complicated by the fact that university campuses are not open to the public; the court therefore had to parse public forum jurisprudence before concluding that the area affected by the literature policy was a designated public forum. \(\text{Id. at 766-69.}\) As regulation of speech in a public forum, the literature policy had to pass "strict scrutiny," at least the version applicable to content neutral regulations. It failed. \(\text{Id. at 769-71.}\) Although the court acknowledged that the University's interest in "preserving the campus for student use" was significant, it held that the literature policy was not narrowly tailored to advance that interest. \(\text{Id. at 769.}\) Although the literature policy affected only leaflets and not other forms of anonymous speech, the court still concluded that it placed an inordinate burden on anonymous speech because it "require[d] the speaker to identify himself, not just to certain University officials, but to every person who receives the literature being distributed." \(\text{Id. at 771.}\) The court then suggested that lesser restrictions on anonymous speech, such as requiring a registered student to notify university officials before distributing leaflets, might be narrowly enough tailored to survive strict scrutiny. \(\text{Id.}\) Although the court's decision reached a justifiable conclusion, our positive analysis points out a significant factor that the court's decision overlooked. The regulation was not aimed at protecting the audience from any harm that would flow from the anonymous speech; rather, it was aimed at protecting them from the secondary effects of speech, namely the presence of "unauthorized" anonymous speakers who might displace authorized speakers from the university campus.

\(^{253}\) See cases cited \text{infra} note 255; see also Lidsky, \text{supra note 10}, at 858 n.6 (listing numerous libel cases brought against pseudonymous Internet speakers between 1995 and 2000). For commentary on this phenomenon, see Victoria Smith Ekstrand, \textit{Unmasking Jane and John Doe: Online Anonymity and the First Amendment}, 8 COMM. L. & POL'Y 405, 407 (2003); David L. Sobel, \textit{The Process that "John Doe" is Due: Addressing the Legal Challenge to Internet Anonymity}, 5 VA. J.L. & TECH. 3, ¶¶ 1-2 (2000), http://www.vjolt.net/vol5/symposium/v5i1a3-Sobel.html; Shaun B. Spencer, \textit{CyberSLAPP Suits and John Doe Subpoenas}, 19 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 493 (2001); Michael S.
to reveal his true identity. If John Doe is lucky, his ISP notifies him and he is able to file a motion to quash the subpoena. At that point, a court must decide whether and how to balance the plaintiff’s right to proceed in tort with the defendant’s right to speak anonymously. If all it takes is an allegation of defamation to uncover a defendant’s identity, the right to speak anonymously is very fragile indeed, because it is easy for a plaintiff to allege defamation any time he comes in for harsh criticism online. On the other hand, anonymity should not immunize the defendant’s tortious conduct. How, then, is a judge to adjudicate the dispute?

Some courts have simply found the anonymous speaker’s rights unworthy of protection once the plaintiff has alleged the speech is tortious. More commonly, though, courts have struggled to balance the rights of plaintiffs and defendants, adopting a variety of different standards to the task. The most noteworthy recent decision


254 The lawsuits are not frivolous merely because they are brought to silence the defendant. Defamation suits are almost always aimed at “silencing the defendant, and from the standpoint of traditional First Amendment law, there is no harm in silencing knowingly or recklessly false statements of fact, for these statements have no value to public discourse.” See Lidsky, supra note 10, at 860.

255 See, e.g., Court Order at 1-2, Hvide v. John Does 1 Through 8, No. 99-22831 (Fla. Cir. Ct. May 25, 2000) (on file with author, who was acting as counsel for the Does at the hearing in which the judge made this statement) (comparing anonymous speakers to hooded Ku Klux Klan members); Vogel, supra note 253, at 803 & n.39 (citing Court Order, supra, at 1-2; Court Order at 1-2, Biomatrix, Inc. v. Doe I, No. BER-L-670-00 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. Jan. 28, 2000); In re Imperial Sugar Co., No. 2000-33782 (Tex. Dist. Ct. July 21, 2000)) (finding that these cases "contained little if any analysis of the competing interests").

of this second type is *Doe v. Cahill*, which serves as a good point of departure for developing a uniform framework, whether statutory or judicial, to protect the interests of both plaintiffs and defendants. In *Cahill* the plaintiffs filed suit against a "John Doe" defendant for defamation and invasion of privacy. Writing under the pseudonym "Proud Citizen," the defendant criticized plaintiff Cahill's performance as a city councilman on a website devoted to discussion of local politics. Plaintiffs complained that two postings in particular were defamatory. The first praised the local mayor and called Cahill, in contrast, "a divisive impediment to any kind of cooperative movement," asserting that "[a]nyone who has spent any amount of time with Cahill would be keenly aware of such character flaws, not to mention an obvious mental deterioration." The other posting again praised the mayor and stated "Cahill [sic] is as paranoid as everyone in the town thinks he is." Plaintiffs obtained a court order requiring Doe's ISP to disclose his identity. The provider notified Doe, who filed a motion to prevent disclosure, which the judge denied on the ground that plaintiffs had a good faith basis for their tort claims.

On appeal, the Delaware Supreme Court found the good faith standard to be insufficiently protective of anonymous speakers' First Amendment rights. Instead, the Court, faced with "an entire spectrum of 'standards' that could be required," held that plaintiffs must meet a "summary judgment standard" before piercing a defendant's anonymity. Under this standard a plaintiff must: (1) provide notice to the anonymous poster, to the extent possible, that his identity is being sought and allow defendant a reasonable opportunity to respond; (2) establish the prima facie elements of his claim sufficiently to avoid summary judgment. The court believed that no explicit balancing of interests was necessary, since balancing was

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257 884 A.2d 451.
258 Plaintiff councilman and his wife originally filed suit against four John Doe defendants. Only one defendant appealed. See *id.* at 454.
259 The court also referred to it as a blog. *Id.*
260 *Id.*
261 *Id.*
262 The trial judge determined that, in order to obtain disclosure of Doe's identity, the plaintiffs had to establish a "good faith basis" for their claims, that the identity was "directly and materially related to their claim," and "that the information could not be obtained from any other source." *Id.* at 455.
263 *Id.* at 457.
264 *Id.*
265 *Id.* at 460–61.
266 *Id.* at 461.
already entailed in the application of the summary judgment standard. The Delaware Supreme Court was careful to tailor the summary judgment standard to the defamation context, requiring the plaintiff to “introduce evidence creating a genuine issue of material fact” only for those elements “within the plaintiff’s control.” What that meant in Cahill was that the plaintiff, a public figure, had to produce prima facie evidence that the defendant published a false and defamatory statement concerning him to a third party; once plaintiff established these elements, the court would compel disclosure to allow plaintiff to establish the remaining element of his claim, namely that the defendant made the statement with knowledge or reckless disregard of its falsity (that is, with actual malice). The court believed this standard fairly balanced the plaintiff's and defendant’s interests since plaintiff had “easy access to proof” of all of these elements except for actual malice, which hinges on the defendant’s state of mind.

Applying this standard, the court concluded that no reasonable person would interpret the substitution of a “G” for the “C” in “Cahill” as an indication that Mr. Cahill had a same-sex affair. Nor would it conclude that Cahill was mentally ill. The “Gahill” statement was more likely a typo than a homosexual slur, and the paranoia allegation was merely a statement of opinion rather than an assertion of fact. The court based this determination in part on how “reasonable readers” decode anonymous messages on Internet websites or blogs. Such readers take their cues from context and “are unlikely to view messages posted anonymously as assertions of fact,” especially when they appear on websites filled with invective and hyperbole. The Court pointed out that the website’s guidelines stated that it was devoted to “opinions” about local politics. Moreover, at least one reader of Doe’s postings responded that “your tone and choice of words is [that of] a type of person that couldn’t convince me. You sound like the person with all the anger and hate . . . .” Read in

267 Id.
268 Id. at 463.
269 Id. at 463–64. The court stressed that the first element—which requires courts to determine whether a statement contains factual assertions that are capable of a defamatory meaning—is “perhaps the most important” in establishing the legitimacy of a plaintiff’s claim. Id. at 463.
270 Id. at 467.
271 Id.
272 Id. at 465 (quoting Rocker Mgmt., LLC v. John Does 1 Through 20, No. 03-MC-33, 2003 WL 22149380, at *2 (N.D. Cal. May 29, 2003)).
273 Id.
274 Id. at 467.
context, Doe's statements were "incapable of a defamatory meaning." The court therefore held that the plaintiff failed to satisfy the summary judgment standard necessary to obtain Doe's true identity.

The Delaware Supreme Court's approach in Cahill is broadly consistent with the kind of balancing this Article advocates. However, it is the first decision on this issue by a state's high court, and it adds yet another standard to the "spectrum" available to any court or legislature searching for a workable solution. Therefore, it is worthwhile to lay out the steps in a workable solution in the hope that a uniform standard will evolve from the current morass. This uniform standard could be enacted by legislators or adopted by courts. The components of an ideal standard are as follows.

1. Notice to the Anonymous Speaker

The first component is a requirement that anonymous speakers be given notice and an opportunity to be heard. A speaker cannot defend her right to speak anonymously unless she receives notice that her identity is being sought in a civil or criminal action and she is given an opportunity to come forward to assert her rights. Obviously, the notice requirement cannot be applied too stringently when the defendant's identity is unknown. In the Internet context, it is reasonable to require the plaintiff to post notice on the same website, blog, chat room, or other forum where the defendant's allegedly tortious communication was made. Moreover, since plaintiff will ordinarily seek the defendant's identity from an ISP, it is logical to require the ISP to give notice to its subscriber before disclosing the subscriber's identity. The Cable Communications Policy Act places such a burden on operators of cable systems that provide internet service, but these requirements should be extended to cover other claims as well to help guarantee the defendant has a chance to defend his right to speak anonymously before it is too late.

275 Id.
276 Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984 § 2, Pub. L. No. 98–549, 98 Stat. 2779 (codified at 47 U.S.C. § 551(c) (2000)). The Cable Communications Policy Act prohibits the dissemination of subscriber data by operators of cable systems without consent, unless the disclosure is necessary to render service or if it is made to a governmental entity pursuant to court order, in which case the subscriber must be notified of the order and given an opportunity to prohibit or limit the disclosure. Id. This act was subsequently modified by the Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992 § 20, 47 U.S.C. § 551 (2000). See Fitch v. Doe, 869 A.2d 722, 725–27 (Me. 2005) (noting that the trial court erred in ruling a subscriber had consented to disclosure; under 47 U.S.C. § 551(c)(2)(B), the ISP could release such information to a nongovernmental entity in response to court order if it notified the subscriber).
2. Applying a Qualified Privilege to Speak Anonymously

Once the anonymous speaker challenges disclosure of his or her identity, a court must step in to determine whether the speaker enjoyed a privilege to speak anonymously and, if so, whether the plaintiff has presented sufficient evidence to overcome that privilege. As a threshold matter, the court must determine whether the speech at issue is core First Amendment speech, as defined (broadly) by Supreme Court precedent. If the anonymous speech at issue is core speech, the qualified right to speak anonymously acts as a privilege to protect the anonymous speaker's identity from automatic disclosure.

Although the process we advocate here differs little from the process applied in Cahill, it is nonetheless useful to describe the process in terms of privilege law. Privilege concepts are familiar to both First Amendment law and tort law. A variety of First Amendment and

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277 Defining core First Amendment speech creates troublesome issues at the margins, but it is clear, at a minimum, that core speech includes discussions of political, literary, artistic, historical, cultural and social concerns. See generally Harry Kalven, Jr., The New York Times Case: A Note on "The Central Meaning of the First Amendment," 1964 Sup. Ct. Rev. 191, 208 ("The Amendment has a 'central meaning'—a core of protection of speech without which democracy cannot function, without which, in Madison's phrase, 'the censorial power' would be in the Government over the people and not 'in the people over the Government.'").

278 As for the copyright infringement cases involving the file sharing of recorded music, we suggested above that the act of file sharing is partially expressive, even if it is also (perhaps predominantly) conduct to which the expression is incidental. See supra Part II.B.4. We therefore tend to agree with those courts that have required plaintiffs to overcome the presumption of anonymity with, inter alia, specific supporting evidence that the file sharer has downloaded copyrighted material. See supra notes 110-19 and accompanying text.

279 The "reporter's privilege" to shield confidential sources is probably the most familiar. Depending on the jurisdiction, the basis for any applicable "reporter's privilege" may be a statute, a state constitution, common law, or possibly the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. See Franklin et al., supra note 193, at 577 (discussing sources of reporter's privilege). The Supreme Court has never recognized a reporter's privilege based on the First Amendment, but many lower courts have interpreted the Court's unusual and enigmatic decision in Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972), "as creating a federal constitutional privilege." Franklin et al., supra note 193, at 575. In Branzburg, the Supreme Court held that the First Amendment does not shield reporters from having to testify before grand juries about information obtained from confidential sources. Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 682. Branzburg was a 5-4 decision, but Justice Powell, who joined the majority opinion, wrote a separate concurrence emphasizing how "limited" the majority decision was and suggesting that he would extend reporters a testimonial privilege in some circumstances. Id. at 709-10 (Powell, J., concurring). The irony of Branzburg is that Justice Powell's concurrence ultimately lent weight to the dissenting Justices' contention that the First Amendment
Tort privileges attempt to balance competing interests in ways that foster open discussion and debate.\textsuperscript{280} Sullivan, the most famous First Amendment case of the twentieth century, is often described as creating a constitutional privilege to criticize public officials; a plaintiff can overcome the privilege by showing that the defendant's speech was false and made with actual malice. And courts have developed a number of qualified privileges, such as the privilege to fairly and accurately report information in an open public record, to protect public discussion from suffering the chilling effects of defamation liability. One virtue of describing the right to speak anonymously in this familiar way is that it suggests at the outset that the right is not absolute but must be balanced against plaintiffs' interests in order to foster uninhibited public discourse. Moreover, it suggests the relevant mechanism for balancing: Once the privilege applies, it creates something in the nature of a presumption that the defendant's identity is protected and places the burden on the plaintiff to overcome it by establishing, in essence, the legitimacy of her need for disclosure.\textsuperscript{281}

3. Overcoming the Privilege

In order to overcome the privilege to speak anonymously, a plaintiff should be required to provide prima facie evidence to support those elements of plaintiff's claim that are within plaintiff's control. In other words, the plaintiff must provide prima facie evidence of elements that are not dependent on defendant's identity, like the defamatory nature of the communication, publication, and identification. By helping to guarantee the legitimacy of plaintiff's claim, this requirement ameliorates the threat that plaintiffs will bring claims merely to silence or retaliate against those who criticize them. Moreover, it strikes a proper balance between the interests of plaintiffs and defendants. The plaintiff is able to uncover the defendant's identity, but only when she shows the identity is necessary for the plaintiff to create a qualified privilege for reporters who are subpoenaed to appear before grand juries. See \textit{id.} at 736 (Stewart, J., dissenting). Justice Stewart later suggested that considering Powell's concurrence, \textit{Branzburg} could be characterized as rejecting the reporters' claim of privilege by a vote of "four and a half to four and a half." Potter Stewart, \textit{Or of the Press}, 26 \textit{HASTINGS} L.J. 631, 635 (1975).

\textsuperscript{280} See \textit{FRA.LIN} \textit{ET AL.}, supra note 193, at 259–62 (discussing common law privileges that apply in defamation actions).

\textsuperscript{281} Michael Vogel is correct in asserting that existing procedural rules could be used to protect the right to speak anonymously. See Vogel, supra note 253, at 823. But a formal mechanism for protecting the right, such as the privilege we advocate here, focuses attention on the significance of the right and guides the balancing that is to take place, thereby increasing predictability.
pursue her claim. The burden of producing prima facie evidence of the elements of her claim is one that the plaintiff must bear anyway; all that this requirement does is to require this evidence be produced at the outset, prior to disclosure of defendant's identity. Cahill demonstrated how such a burden could be met by defamation plaintiffs.

Although defamation is the most common tort brought against anonymous speakers, there is no practical reason why the same approach could not be taken to other types of tort cases involving expressive speech. For example, a plaintiff alleging misappropriation of a trade secret by an anonymous defendant should be required to produce evidence tending to show that the information disclosed was indeed a trade secret. Establishing this element does not require defendant's identity, and it serves as an indicium of the genuineness of plaintiff's claim. Once established, the plaintiff should be able to obtain defendant's identity to establish misappropriation, which depends on the status and mental state of the defendant. This same approach can and should be applied to other tort claims brought based on anonymous speech.

4. Balancing Harms

One final component should be added to the privilege analysis. If a plaintiff is able to overcome the defendant's privilege to speak anonymously, the defendant should have a final opportunity to convince the judge, in camera, that the magnitude of harm she faces if her identity is revealed outweighs the plaintiff's need for her identity. Only at this point would a court need to consider the speaker's actual motive (e.g., fear of death) and, if necessary, to engage in the difficult task of weighing the competing interests. Although a defendant would rarely be able to establish a threat of sufficient magnitude to

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282 A trade secret can be any information that "derives independent economic value ... from not being generally known to, and not being readily ascertainable by proper means by, other persons who can obtain economic value from its disclosure or use," and is subject to "efforts that are reasonable under the circumstances to maintain its secrecy." UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1(4) (amended 1985), 14 U.L.A. 538 (2005). As with copyright infringement, however, there may be a preliminary question of whether the act of using or disclosing an alleged trade secret is expressive speech or merely conduct. For a recent discussion of the occasional tensions between First Amendment law and trade secret law, see Pamela Samuelson, Principles for Resolving Conflicts Between Trade Secrets and the First Amendment (Univ. Cal. Berkeley Public Law Research Paper No. 925056, 2006), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=925056.

outweigh plaintiff's need for defendant's identity, this last component of the privilege analysis serves as a final piece of insurance that defendant's right to speak anonymously is not too lightly compromised.

CONCLUSION

Judge Learned Hand once famously wrote that "the First Amendment . . . presupposes that right conclusions are more likely to be gathered out of a multitude of tongues, than through any kind of authoritative selection. To many this is, and always will be, folly; but we have staked upon it our all."²⁸⁴ As Judge Hand recognized, democracy rests on our faith in citizens' ability to decide for themselves where truth lies in public discourse. This same faith underlies the Supreme Court's recognition of a First Amendment right to speak anonymously. The Court's anonymous speech decisions manifest a faith, albeit one that wavers at times, in citizens' ability to discount anonymous information and protect themselves from its harms, at least in most cases. This faith is being challenged by the Internet-fueled growth of anonymous speech. Legislators increasingly seek to curb anonymous speech in the name of protecting citizens from harm, and courts increasingly must adjudicate tort claims against anonymous speakers. Both legislatures and courts need guidance in dealing with these issues that the Supreme Court has failed to provide.

This Article provides that guidance. We provide a positive analysis of the motivations, both good and bad, of anonymous speakers. Our positive analysis is supported by recent scholarship on the trademark function of authorship, which we use to show how audiences infer the motivations of authors and thereby decode anonymous speech. Even so, our positive analysis fails to show that anonymous speech, on balance, produces more social good than social harm.

We therefore turn to First Amendment jurisprudence and democratic theory to provide a normative basis for protecting anonymous speech and to provide guidance on how to balance it against other important rights. These sources largely forbid paternalistic regulation of anonymous speech concerning matters at the core of the First Amendment, and they suggest that the first line of defense against the threat posed by anonymous speech is audience "self-help."²⁸⁵

Ultimately, therefore, we caution legislators against passing legislation compelling authors to disclose their identities in the name of providing audiences more information: Compelled disclosure cannot

²⁸⁵ See supra Part III.A.
be justified absent a compelling need for author identity, at least in the realm of core speech. We also advocate that legislatures enact or courts adopt an evidentiary privilege to safeguard the right to speak anonymously from the chilling effect of "cyberSLAPPs." Adoption of the privilege would bring a uniform approach to the vexing problem of balancing the rights of anonymous speakers with the rights of those harmed by their speech.